by antiaristo » Thu Feb 02, 2006 9:32 pm
Blair cannot survive this. Recall the "Downing Street Minutes" where Blair was told of how intelligence was being "fixed" around policy? He cannot claim he was misled.<br><br>The focus now will shift to the advice of the attorney general.<br><br>On 7 March Lord Peter Goldsmith wrote his formal opinion, which concurred with the Foreign Office. In my own non Mandarin terms the opinion was clear that invasion could not be justified in law. The paper was long, and windy (no criticism. I would not have enjoyed the task myself.) and as I recall about seventeen pages.<br><br>Seventeen pages of waffle to say "Sorry. No can do."<br><br>On 17 March the Office of the Attorney General issued the "opinion". Invasion was legal, no impediments to action.<br><br>On the afternoon of 17 March Lord Goldsmith went to the Lords and adopted that opinion as his own. He had completely reversed himself in ten days.<br><br>There are very credible reports that the 17 March "opinion", perhaps rwo pages, was written by Morgan and Falconer.<br><br>Here is what I'm pretty sure happened.<br><br>It is known that Goldsmith was summoned to No 10 Downing Street on 13 March, where he met with Baroness Sally Morgan and Lord Charlie Falconer. You will note the numerical imbalance.<br><br>Morgan reported direct to Blair. She was one of three given "special powers to direct civil servants" (The other two were Jonathan Powell and Alastair Campbell). Falconer was then an obscure junior minister somewhere, but three months later he became the Lord Chancellor.<br><br>That "special power" was the royal prerogative, as grounded in the Treason Felony Act. Morgan, possibly both, invoked the Treason Felony Act against Goldsmith. They told him that his opinion was illegal, because it served to put a constraint upon Her Majesty.<br><br>Goldsmith almost certainly conceded, but sticking to the line that he could write no other opinion. From that point he was out of the process until after the Morgan/Falconer "opinion" was issued in his name. When called to the Lords to make a statement, he had no alternative but to adopt the second "opinion" as his own.<br><br>The person who took the UK to war was Queen Elizabeth II. Everybody else was her tool.<br><br>We all have difficulty in accepting that those fine and gracious people could do something so crass and crude as an obvious forgery. But the truth is that they do it all the time. They've done it to me five times. We are mesmerised by the ritual of parliamentary procedure, when the truth is it can be turned into a puppet show whenever she so chooses.<br><br>THAT is why the Treason Felony Act must be nullified.<br><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>7pm <br><br>Bush told Blair we're going to war, memo reveals <br><br>· PM backed invasion despite illegality warnings <br>· Plan to disguise US jets as UN planes <br>· Bush: postwar violence unlikely <br><br>Richard Norton-Taylor<br>Thursday February 2, 2006 <br><br>Tony Blair told President George Bush that he was "solidly" behind US plans to invade Iraq <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>before he sought advice about the invasion's legality</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> and despite the absence of a second UN resolution, according to a new account of the build-up to the war published today.<br><br>A memo of a two-hour meeting between the two leaders at the White House on January 31 2003 - nearly two months before the invasion - reveals that Mr Bush made it clear the US intended to invade whether or not there was a second resolution and even if UN inspectors found no evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme.<br><br>"The diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning", the president told Mr Blair. The prime minister is said to have raised no objection. He is quoted as saying he was "solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam".<br>The disclosures come in a new edition of Lawless World, by Phillipe Sands, a QC and professor of international law at University College, London. Professor Sands last year exposed the doubts shared by Foreign Office lawyers about the legality of the invasion in disclosures which eventually forced the prime minister to publish the full legal advice given to him by the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith.<br><br>The memo seen by Prof Sands reveals:<br><br>· Mr Bush told the Mr Blair that the US was so worried about the failure to find hard evidence against Saddam that it thought of "flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft planes with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colours". Mr Bush added: "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach [of UN resolutions]".<br><br>· Mr Bush even expressed the hope that a defector would be extracted from Iraq and give a "public presentation about Saddam's WMD". He is also said to have referred Mr Blair to a "small possibility" that Saddam would be "assassinated".<br><br>· Mr Blair told the US president that a second UN resolution would be an "insurance policy", providing "international cover, including with the Arabs" if anything went wrong with the military campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning oil wells, killing children, or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq.<br><br>· Mr Bush told the prime minister that he "thought it unlikely that there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups". Mr Blair did not demur, according to the book.<br><br>The revelation that Mr Blair had supported the US president's plans to go to war with Iraq even in the absence of a second UN resolution contrasts with the assurances the prime minister gave parliament shortly after. On February 23 2003 - three weeks after his trip to Washington - Mr Blair told the Commons that the government was giving "Saddam one further final chance to disarm voluntarily".<br><br>He added: "Even now, today, we are offering Saddam the prospect of voluntary disarmament through the UN. I detest his regime - I hope most people do - but even now, he could save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully."<br><br>On March 18, before the crucial vote on the war, he told MPs: "The UN should be the focus both of diplomacy and of action ... [and that not to take military action] would do more damage in the long term to the UN than any other single course that we could pursue."<br><br>The meeting between Mr Bush and Mr Blair, attended by six close aides, came at a time of growing concern about the failure of any hard intelligence to back up claims that Saddam was producing weapons of mass destruction in breach of UN disarmament obligations. It took place a few days before the then US secretary Colin Powell made claims - since discredited - in a dramatic presentation at the UN about Iraq's weapons programme.<br><br>Earlier in January 2003, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, expressed his private concerns about the absence of a smoking gun in a private note to Mr Blair that month, according to the book. He said he hoped that the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, would come up with enough evidence to report a breach by Iraq of is its UN obligations.<br><br>The extent of concern in Washington at the time is reflected in the plan to send US planes over Iraq disguised in UN livery - itself a clear breach of international law.<br><br>Prof Sands also says that Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's UN ambassador at the time, told a colleague from another country that he was "clearly uncomfortable" about the failure to get a second resolution.<br><br>Foreign Office lawyers consistently warned that an invasion would be regarded as unlawful. The book reveals that Elizabeth Wilmshurst, the FO's deputy chief legal adviser who resigned over the war, told the Butler inquiry, into the use of intelligence during the run-up to the war, of her belief that Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, shared the FO view.<br><br>Lord Goldsmith told the FO lawyers in early 2003: "The prime minister has told me that I cannot give advice, but you know what my views are", according to private evidence to the Butler inquiry.<br><br>Shortly afterwards, in February 2003, Lord Goldsmith visited Washington where he had talks with William Taft, Mr Powell's legal adviser. Mr Taft is quoted in the book as as saying Lord Goldsmith also met "our attorney general [then John Ashcroft], and people at the Pentagon".<br><br>On March 7 2003 Lord Goldsmith advised the prime minister that the Bush administration believed that a case could be made for an invasion without a second UN resolution. But he warned that Britain, if it went ahead, could be challenged in the international criminal court. Ten days later, he said a second resolution was not necessary.<br><br>Sir Menzies Campbell, Liberal Democrat acting leader, said last night: "The fact that consideration was apparently given to using American military aircraft in UN colours in the hope of provoking Saddam Hussein is a graphic illustration of the rush to war. It would also appear to be the case that the diplomatic efforts in New York after the meeting of January 31 were simply going through the motions, with decision for military action already taken."<br><br>Sir Menzies continued: "The prime minister's offer of February 23 to Saddam Hussein was about as empty as it could get. He has a lot of explaining to do."<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br><br>Added on edit<br><br>The story has been updated this morning. The new URL is<br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,,1700881,00.html">politics.guardian.co.uk/i...81,00.html</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--> <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=antiaristo>antiaristo</A> at: 2/3/06 7:37 am<br></i>
