by Hugh Manatee Wins » Thu Jul 06, 2006 7:45 pm
<!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>To suggest that the film "Paper Clips" was conceived and executed to somehow discourage people from finding out about Project Paperclip is about as absurd as your Nacho Libre keyword hijacking theory.<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>Do you have proof for that assertion? No. None offered, anyway.<br><br>I'm sure you can cite your own favorite items from the source below to make your points against my arguments and I post it just to show that we ALL need to avoid falling into intellectual quicksands <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>but this demand for "proof" from Prof Pan and Dreams End is bizarre to say the least.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.hasslberger.com/about/about/awa/awa_6.htm">www.hasslberger.com/about.../awa_6.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>Twenty-Five Ways To Suppress Truth:<br>The Rules of Disinformation<br><br>by H. Michael Sweeney<br><br> 19. Ignore proof presented, <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>demand impossible proofs.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> This is perhaps a variant of the "play dumb" rule. Regardless of what material may be presented by an opponent in public forums, <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>claim the material irrelevant and demand proof that is impossible for the opponent to come by</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> (it may exist, but not be at his disposal, or it may be something which is known to be safely destroyed or withheld, such as a murder weapon). In order to completely avoid discussing issues may require you to categorically deny and be critical of media or books as valid sources, deny that witnesses are acceptable, or even deny that statements made by government or other authorities have any meaning or relevance. <br>....<br> 4. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Use a straw man. Find or create a seeming element of your opponent's argument which you can easily knock down to make yourself look good and the opponent to look bad. Either make up an issue you may safely imply exists based on your interpretation of the opponent/opponent arguments/situation, or select the weakest aspect of the weakest charges. Amplify their significance and destroy them in a way which appears to debunk all the charges, real and fabricated alike, while actually avoiding discussion of the real issues.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br>....<br><br>6. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Hit and Run. In any public forum, make a brief attack of your opponent or the opponent position </strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END-->and then scamper off before an answer can be fielded, or simply ignore any answer. This works extremely well in Internet and letters-to-the-editor environments where a steady stream of new identities can be called upon without having to explain criticism reasoning -- simply make an accusation or other attack, never discussing issues, and never answering any subsequent response, for that would dignify the opponent's viewpoint. Example: "This stuff is garbage. Where do you conspiracy lunatics come up with this crap? I hope you all get run over by black helicopters." Notice it even has a farewell sound to it, so it won't seem curious if the author is never heard from again.<br>....<br> 18. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Emotionalise, Antagonise, and Goad Opponents. If you can't do anything else, chide and taunt your opponents</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> and draw them into emotional responses which will tend to make them look foolish and overly motivated, and generally render their material somewhat less coherent. Not only will you avoid discussing the issues in the first instance, but even if their emotional response addresses the issue, you can further avoid the issues by then focusing on how "sensitive they are to criticism".<br>....<br> <hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>I'm not saying you are trying to 'suppress' my 'truth.' <br>But I am pointing out your own faulty logic processes, breaches of netiquette, and demands for proof as counter-productive on a board where we discuss the history of secret psychological manipulation using our own educated 'rigorous intuition.'<br><br>Talk about "nonsensical" and "thin speculation." <br>The kinds of things you take as coincidence or inconsequential are surprising. Maybe the idea of hiding needles by throwing out more hay stack is too complex to comprehend. I don't think so.<br><br>You make these scoffing statements with no discussion of the long history of covering up the US-Nazi connection.<br><br>Miramax made the film, not eighth grade students.<br>That's why Project Paperclip is on the top eye-level shelf at my local video rental store.<br><br>You honestly think this is a coincidence that that the US protection of Nazi war criminals as assets was called EXACTLY the same thing? Exactly?<br><br>wow.<br><br>on edit:<br><br>Ok, both Prof Pan and Dreams End keep citing as problematic to the point of impossibility a scenario of 'massively micromanaged' media minions of complicity eagerly taking their marching orders for mind control from an as yet unnamed office with 'Dr. Evil, Incorporated' stencilled on the opaque glass door with strains of "bwahahaha" floating into the smoke-stained rafters.<br><br>For sixty years the CIA has been infiltrating and warping to their desires all the American institutions that affect what we feel, believe, value, and do.<br><br>Journalism, academia, the behavioral sciences, public schooling, publishing, radio, TV, movies, all the arts.<br><br>And the media mega-conglomerates have steadily reduced the number of offices to control while the internet has integrated propaganda that used to be divided between foreign and domestic.<br><br>And the very cultural steering deployed has created more and more 'normalized' self-regulatingly complicit minds even as the number of 'shepards' needed for the flock has gone way down.<br><br>Check out this 1964 document, 'Winning the Cold War: The US Idealogical Offensive.'<br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>NOTE: Read page 1086 and the blurb describing 'Psychological Operations Handbooks' covering many countries. You really think they would leave out the good old USofA?</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/colombia/americanuniversitymay1963.htm">www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/co...ay1963.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>Read this Army War College paper on The Evolution of Strategic Influence-<br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA420183">handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA420183</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>or at this link-<br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.metacrawler.com/info.metac/clickit/search?r_aid=C2DBABF7BBA647DFBCEBFAD0A4CF5580&r_eop=12&r_sacop=33&r_spf=0&r_cop=main-title&r_snpp=33&r_spp=0&qqn=lxF)oBxW&r_coid=239137&rawto=http://fas.org/irp/eprint/gough.pdf">www.metacrawler.com/info..../gough.pdf</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>The 1951 Psychological Strategy Board was the first 'Dr. Evil' office door which hid the intentional psychological manipulation plans for all Americans under the direction of tobacco-king Gordon Gray. The CIA had the PSB archives in their control and then, probably after a purging, split them up between the Truman and Eisenhower presidential libraries.<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/physc.htm">www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/physc.htm</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><br><!--EZCODE IMAGE START--><img src="http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hstpaper/psych.jpg" style="border:0;"/><!--EZCODE IMAGE END--><br>July 18, 1951. Gordon Gray (right), former Secretary of the Army and President of the University of North Carolina, being administered the oath as the first Director of the new Psychological Strategy Board by Frank K. Sanderson (left), Administrative Officer of the White House, while President Harry S. Truman (center) witnesses the event. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: Truman Library Collection.<br>....<br>The Psychological Strategy Board Files comprise documentation of the work of that agency from its founding on April 4, 1951 until the end of the Truman administration. The documents are filed according to the War Department decimal file system.<br><br>The two most important series are Class 000--General, and Class 300--Administration. These series together contain files on Government agencies; private societies and associations; boards, commissions, committees and councils; individual people, including PSB staff members; and PSB programs and procedures.<br><br>A second segment of PSB files, documenting the period January 20 to September 3, 1953, are in the holdings of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.<br>....<br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr> COLLECTION DESCRIPTION<br><br>The Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) was established by Presidential Directive of April 4, 1951 "to authorize and provide for the more effective planning, coordination, and conduct within the framework of approved national policies, of psychological operations."<br><br>The PSB was composed of the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, or their designated representatives. The founding Presidential Directive instructed the PSB to report to the National Security Council "on the Board's activities on the evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned."<br><br>The Psychological Strategy Board succeeded the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which had been established during World War II to coordinate the Government's psychological warfare efforts. During the Truman Presidency, the PSB, in addition to its inherited coordination role, conducted planning for psychological operations undertaken by its constituent agencies. It did not conduct operations of its own.<br><br>According to Edward P. Lilly, the PSB's historian, the Board's basic function was to prevent interagency rivalries from developing among the agencies involved in psychological operations. Seventeen meetings of the PSB's constituent agency representatives were held during the last year and a half of Truman's administration.<br><br>During the Eisenhower presidency, the PSB became purely a coordinating body; all planning was discontinued. The Board was terminated by Executive Order 10483 of September 3, 1953, and its functions were transferred to the Operations Coordinating Board.<br><br>The Psychological Strategy Board had three directors during Truman's presidency. Gordon Gray was the first director, serving from June 1951 to May 1952. Raymond H. Allen, the second director, served from May to September 1952. Third was Admiral Alan Kirk, who served the remainder of Truman's term. Charles E. Johnson was the Board's executive officer. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Besides the office of the Director, the staff of the Psychological Strategy Board included the following offices: the Executive; Plans and Policy; Coordination; and Evaluation and Review.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>The files of the Psychological Strategy Board were in the physical custody of the Central Intelligence Agency until they were turned over to the National Archives in about 1980. They were then divided chronologically into Truman and Eisenhower administration periods, and transferred to the appropriate Presidential Libraries.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>The Truman Library's portion was opened for research in 1981. In December 1988, the PSB files were temporarily closed and were subsequently reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency. Several hundred formerly open documents were restricted because of security classified content as a result of this review. The files were reopened for research in October 1989.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>The PSB files, with the exception of a single folder of material filed under Gordon Gray's name, are arranged according to the filing scheme described in the War Department Decimal File System (Washington, D.C., revised edition, 1943). Each classification group, or "class," has been treated in the description of the PSB files as a series.<br><br>Probably the two most important series are Class 000--General, which includes such classifications as 040 Agencies, 080 Societies and Associations, 091 Countries, and 091.4 Peoples; and Class 300--Administration, which includes such classifications as 300.6 Memoranda and Notes, 334 Boards, Commissions, Committees, Councils and Missions, 337 Conferences, Military and Naval and Others, which includes minutes, agendas and related documentation for the PSB's staff and board meetings, 381 National Defense, and 387.4 Armistice, which includes material about the Korean War. About 85% of the volume of the PSB files, apart from the Indexing and Suspense Form Series, is contained in these two classes.<br><br>The Indexing and Suspense Form series is composed entirely of forms of this name, which were used by the Psychological Strategy Board staff to provide cross references to their files. The origins of the forms were often, or perhaps even usually, attached to the fronts of the documents being referenced, and copies were then distributed throughout the files as appropriate. Copies were also put into this Indexing and Suspense Form series, which thus acts as an index to the PSB files. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Not all of the documents cross referenced are present in these files.<br><br>The Truman Library staff does not know where such documents are, nor why, if they were ever part of the PSB files, they were removed from them.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> The Indexing and Suspense forms are arranged by the War Department decimal file system. They are filed disproportionately in two decimal files: 040 Executive Departments of the United States Government, and 201 Personal Records. The documents referenced are described by correspondents, dates and subject content.<br><br>A list of the specific War Department decimal file system classifications used in this collection of Psychological Strategy Board files is appended to this finding aid.<br><br>The Truman Library staff has selectively annotated the folder-title list to try to give some definition to uninformative folder titles. Acronyms and code names have been identified whenever possible. All Library staff additions made to folder titles received from the White House appear in brackets. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>The document designation "NSC 10/5," which appears frequently in the folder titles in this collection, has not been defined or further described; all information regarding this designation was, at the time this finding aid was prepared, security classified.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> <hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>A US State Department-friendly academic named Kenneth Osgood just published a book which attempts to portray Eisenhower as the psy-ops mastermind driving the psychological warfare campaigns used on Americans. This is similar to the CIA's attempt to hang the blame for Vietnam on the dead Kennedy. Eisenhower's famous warning about the military industrial complex is being discredited by Osgood.<br>The revision of history in response to the internet is accelerating.<br><br>http://www.fau.edu/~kosgood/Form_Before_Substance.pdf(“Form before Substance: Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy,”)<br><br>http://wise.fau.edu/%7Ekosgood/<br>http://wise.fau.edu/~kosgood/cv/home(Kenneth A. Osgood, curriculum vitae)<br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (Cornell University, 2004)<br><br>Intensive Russian, Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia (St. Petersburg, Russia), 1995<br><br>Intensive Russian, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1994<br><br>Center for Cold War Studies, University of California at Santa Barbara, Associate Coordinator, 1997-1999. Acted as conference coordinator for three academic conferences; planned numerous symposia, lecture series, and workshops; contributed to the authorship of successful external and internal grants applications; maintained website; directed official correspondence and publicity.<br></strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>U.S. Department of State, Ukraine Desk and Office of New Independent States, Staff Assistant/Intern, Summer 1995. </strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=0302&week=d&msg=mdzjdT/9uwhxmn8l2udraQ&user=&pw=Commentary on "Playing the CIA's Tune? The New Leader and the Cultural Cold War" by Hugh Wilford, Diplomatic History 27:1 (Winter 2003): 15-34, H-Diplo Discussion Network (September 2003).<br><br>Now don't forget the work of Christopher Simpson on the history of the coopting of the behavioral sciences which was so large-scale it makes MK-ULTRA look like a week-end hobby-<br><br>http://www.leftgatekeepers.com/articles/WorldViewWarfareAndWW2ByChistopherSimpson.htm<!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>Worldview Warfare and World War II<br>by Christopher Simpson, 1994 *<br><br> During the second half of the 1930s, the Rockefeller Foundation underwrote much of the most innovative communication research then under way in the United States. There was virtually no federal support for the social sciences at the time, and corporate backing for the field usually remained limited to proprietary marketing studies. The foundation's administrators believed, however, that mass media constituted a uniquely powerful force in modem society, reports Brett Gary, 28 and financed a new project on content analysis for Harold Lasswell at the Library of Congress, Hadley Cantril's Public Opinion Research Project at Princeton University, the establishment of Public Opinion Quarterly at Princeton, Douglas Waples' newspaper and reading studies at the University of Chicago, Paul Lazarsfeld's Office of Radio Research at Columbia University, and other important programs.<br> As war approached, the Rockefeller Foundation clearly favored efforts designed to find a "democratic prophylaxis" that could immunize the United States' large immigrant population from the effects of Soviet and Axis propaganda. In 1939, the foundation organized a series of secret seminars with men it regarded as leading communication scholars to enlist them in an effort to consolidate public opinion in the United States in favor of war against Nazi Germany -- a controversial proposition opposed by many conservatives, religious leaders, and liberals at the time -- and to articulate a reasonably clear-cut set of ideological and methodological preconceptions for the emerging field of communication research. 29<br> Harold Lasswell, who had the ear of foundation administrator John Marshall at these gatherings, over the next two years won support for a theory that seemed to resolve the conflict between the democratic values that are said to guide U.S. society, on the one hand, and the manipulation and deceit that often lay at the heart of projects intended to engineer mass consent, on the other. Briefly, the elite of U.S. society ("those who have money to support research," as Lasswell bluntly put it) should systematically manipulate mass sentiment in order to preserve democracy from threats posed by authoritarian societies such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.<br> One Rockefeller seminar participant, Donald Slesinger (former dean of the social science at the University of Chicago), blasted Lasswell's claims as using a democratic guise to tacitly accept the objectives and methods of a new form of authoritarianism. "We [the Rockefeller seminar] have been willing, without thought, to sacrifice both truth and human individuality in order to bring about given mass responses to war stimuli," Slesinger contended. "We have thought in terms of fighting dictatorships- by-force through the establishment of dictatorship-by-manipulation. 30<br><br> Slesinger's view enjoyed some support from other participants and from Rockefeller Foundation officers such as Joseph Willits, who criticized what he described as authoritarian or even fascist aspects of Lasswell's arguments. Despite this resistance, the social polarization created by the approaching war strongly favored Lasswell, and in the end he enjoyed substantial new funding and an expanded staff courtesy of the foundation. Slesinger, on the other hand, drifted away from the Rockefeller seminars and appears to have rapidly lost influence within the community of academic communication specialists.<br><br> World War II spurred the emergence of psychological warfare as a particularly promising new form of applied communication research. The personal, social, and scientific networks established in U.S. social sciences during World War II, particularly among communication researchers and social psychologists, later played a central role in the evolution (or "social construction") of U.S. sociology after the war. A detailed discussion of U.S. psychological operations during World War 11 is of course outside the scope of this book. There is a large literature on the subject, which is discussed briefly in the Bibliographic Essay at the end of this text. A few points are worth mentioning, however, to introduce some of the personalities and concepts that would later play a prominent role in psychological operations and communication studies after 1945.<br><br> The phrase "psychological warfare" is reported to have first entered English in 1941 as a translated mutation of the Nazi term Weltanschauungs-krieg (literally, worldview warfare), meaning the purportedly scientific application of propaganda, terror, and state pressure as a means of securing an ideological victory over one's enemies. 31 William "Wild Bill" Donovan, then director of the newly established U.S. intelligence agency Office of Strategic Services (OSS), viewed an understanding of Nazi psychological tactics as a vital source of ideas for "Americanized" versions of many of the same stratagems. Use of the new term quickly became widespread throughout the U.S. intelligence community. For Donovan psychological warfare was destined to become a full arm of the U.S. military, equal in status to the army, navy, and air force. 32<br><br> Donovan was among the first in the United States to articulate a more or less unified theory of psychological warfare. As he saw it, the " engineering of consent" techniques used in peacetime propaganda campaigns could be quite effectively adapted to open warfare. Pro-Allied propaganda was essential to reorganizing the U.S. economy for war and for creating public support at home for intervention in Europe, Donovan believed. Fifth-column movements could be employed abroad as sources of intelligence and as morale-builders for populations under Axis control. He saw "special operations -- meaning sabotage, subversion, commando raids, and guerrilla movements -- as useful for softening up targets prior to conventional military assaults. "Donovan's concept of psychological warfare was all-encompassing," writes Colonel Alfred Paddock, who has specialized in this subject for the U.S. Army War College. "Donovan's visionary dream was to unify these functions in support of conventional (military) unit operations, thereby forging a 'new instrument of war.'" 33<br><br> Donovan, a prominent Wall Street lawyer and personal friend of Franklin Roosevelt, convinced FDR to establish a central, civilian intelligence agency that would gather foreign intelligence, coordinate analysis of information relevant to the war, and conduct propaganda and covert operations both at home and abroad. In July 1941 FDR created the aptly named Office of the Coordinator of Information, placing Donovan in charge. 34<br><br> But that ambitious plan soon foundered on the rocks of Washington's bureaucratic rivalries. By early 1942 the White House split the "white" (official) propaganda functions into a new agency, which eventually became the Office of War Information (OWI), while Donovan reorganized the intelligence, covert action, and "black" (unacknowledgeable) propaganda functions under deeper secrecy as the OSS. Officially, the new OSS was subordinate to the military leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but the relationship between the military and the civilian OSS was never smooth. Donovan frequently used his personal relationship with FDR to sidestep the military's efforts to restrict the OSS's growing influence. 35<br><br> Similar innovations soon spread through other military branches, usually initiated by creative outsiders from the worlds of journalism or commerce who saw "psychological" techniques as a means to sidestep entrenched military bureaucracies and enhance military performance. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, a longtime Wall Street colleague of Donovan, established a small, highly secret Psychologic Branch within the War Department General Staff G-2 (Intelligence) organization. (McCloy is probably better known today for his later work as U.S. high commissioner of Germany, chairman of the Chase Bank, member of the Warren Commission, and related posts). 36 McCloy's Psychologic Branch was reorganized several times, briefly folded in the OSS, shifted back to military control, and renamed at least twice.<br><br> The Joint Chiefs meanwhile established a series of high-level interagency committees intended to coordinate U.S. psychological operations in the field, including those of the relatively small Psychological Warfare Branches attached to the headquarters staffs of U.S. military commanders in each theater of war. If this administrative structure was not confusing enough, the psychological warfare branch attached to Eisenhower's command in Europe soon grew into a Psychological Warfare Division totaling about 460 men and women. 37<br><br> These projects helped define U.S. social science and mass communication studies long after the war had drawn to a close. Virtually all of the scientific community that was to emerge during the 1950s as leaders in the field of mass communication research spent the war years performing applied studies on U.S. and foreign propaganda, Allied troop morale, public opinion (both domestically and internationally), clandestine OSS operations, or the then emerging technique of deriving useful intelligence from analysis of newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and postal censorship intercepts.<br><br> The day-to-day war work of U.S. psychological warfare specialists varied considerably. DeWitt Poole -- a State Department expert in anticommunist propaganda who had founded Public Opinion Quarterly while on sabbatical at Princeton before the war-became the chief of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the OSS. There he led OSS efforts to recruit suitable agents from immigrant communities inside the United States, to monitor civilian morale, and to analyze foreign-language publications for nuggets of intelligence. Sociologists and Anthropologists such as Alexander Leighton and Margaret Mead concentrated on identifying schisms in Japanese culture suitable for exploitation in U.S. radio broadcasts in Asia, while Samuel Stouffer's Research Branch of the U.S. Army specialized in ideological indoctrination of U.S. troops. Hadley Cantril meanwhile adapted survey research techniques to the task of clandestine intelligence collection, including preparations for the U.S. landing in North Africa. 38<br><br> There were six main U.S. centers of psychological warfare and related studies during the conflict. Several of these centers went through name changes and reorganizations in the course of the war, but they can be summarized as follows: (1) Samuel Stouffer's Research Branch of the U.S. Army's Division of Morale; (2) the Office of War Information (OWI) led by Elmer Davis and its surveys division under Elmo Wilson; (3) the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of the U.S. Army, commanded by Brigadier General Robert McClure; (4) the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) led by William Donovan; (5) Rensis Likert's Division of Program Surveys at the Department of Agriculture, which provided field research personnel in the United States for the army, OWI, Treasury Department, and other government agencies; and (6) Harold Lasswell's War Communication Division at the Library of Congress.<br><br> Dozens of prominent social scientists participated in the war through these organizations, in some cases serving in two or more groups in the course of the conflict. The OWI, for example, employed Elmo Roper (of the Roper survey organization), Leonard Doob (Yale), Wilbur Schramm (University of Illinois and Stanford), Alexander Leighton (Cornell), Leo Lowenthal (Institut fur Sozialforschung and University of California), Hans Speier (RAND Corp.), Nathan Leites (RAND), Edward Barrett (Columbia), and Clyde Kluckhohn (Harvard), among others. 39<br><br> (The institutions in parentheses simply indicate the affiliations for which these scholars may be best known.) OWI simultaneously extended contracts for communications research and consulting to Paul Lazarsfeld, Hadley Cantril, Frank Stanton, George Gallup, and to Rensis Likert's team at the Agriculture Department. 40 OWI contracting also provided much of the financial backbone for the then newly founded National Opinion Research Center. 41<br><br> In addition to his OWI work, Nathan Leites also served as Lasswell's senior research assistant at the Library of Congress project, as did Heinz Eulau (Stanford). 42 Other prominent contributors to the Lasswell project included Irving Janis (Yale) and the young Ithiel de Sola Pool (MIT), who, with Leites, had already begun systematic content analysis of communist publications long before the war was over. 43 Lasswell's Library of Congress project is widely remembered today as the foundation of genuinely systematic content analysis in the United States. 44<br><br> At the Army's Psychological Warfare Division, some prominent staffers were William S. Paley (CBS), C. D. Jackson (Time/Life), W. Phillips Davison (RAND and Columbia), Saul Padover (New School for Social Research), John W. Riley (Rutgers), Morris Janowitz (Institut fur Sozialforschung and University of Michigan), Daniel Lerner (MIT and Stanford), Edward Shils (University of Chicago), and New York attorney Murray Gurfein (later co-author with Janowitz), among others. 45 Of these, Davison, Padover, Janowitz, and Gurfein were OSS officers assigned to the Psychological Warfare Division to make use of their expertise in communication and German social psychology. 46 Other prominent OSS officers who later contributed to the social sciences include Howard Becker (University of Wisconsin), Alex Inkeles (Harvard), Walter Langer (University of Wisconsin), Douglas Cater (Aspen Institute), and of course Herbert Marcuse (Institut fur Sozialforschung and New School). 47 0SS wartime contracting outside the government included arrangements for paid social science research by Stanford, the University of California at Berkeley, Columbia, Princeton, Yale's Institute of Human Relations, and the National Opinion Research Center, which was then at the University of Denver. 48 Roughly similar lists of social scientists and scholarly contractors can be discovered at each of the government's centers of wartime communications and public opinion research. 49<br><br> The practical significance of these social linkages has been explored by social psychologist John A. Clausen, who is a veteran of Samuel Stouffer's Research Branch. Clausen made a systematic study during the early 1980s of the postwar careers of his former colleagues who had gone into the fields of public opinion research, sociology, and psychology. 50 Some twenty-five of twenty-seven veterans who could be located responded to his questionnaire; of these, twenty-four reported that their wartime work had had "lasting implications" and "a major influence on [their] subsequent career." Clausen quotes the reply of psychologist Nathan Maccoby (Stanford): "The Research Branch not only established one of the best old-boy (or girl) networks ever, but an alumnus of the Branch had an open door to most relevant jobs and career lines. We were a lucky bunch." Nearly three-fifths of the respondents indicated that the Research Branch experience "had a major influence on the direction or character of their work in the decade after the war," Clausen continues, "and all but three of the remainder indicated a substantial influence.... [F]ully three-fourths reported the Branch experience to have been a very important influence on their careers as a whole." 51<br><br> Respondents stressed two reasons for this enduring impact. First, the wartime experience permitted young scholars to closely work with recognized leaders in the field -- Samuel Stouffer, Leonard Cottrell, Carl Hovland, and others-as well as with civilian consultants such as Paul Lazarsfeld, Louis Guttman, and Robert Merton. In effect, the Army's Research Branch created an extraordinary postgraduate school with obvious scholarly benefits for both "students" and the seasoned " professors."<br><br> Second, the common experience created a network of professional contacts that almost all respondents to the survey found to be very valuable in their subsequent careers. They tapped these contacts later for professional opportunities and for project funding, according to Clausen. "Perhaps most intriguing" in this regard, Clausen writes, was the number of our members who became foundation executives. Charles Dollard became president of Carnegie. Donald Young shifted from the presidency of SSRC [Social Science Research Council] to that of Russell Sage, where he ultimately recruited Leonard Cottrell. Leland DeVinney went from Harvard to the Rockefeller Foundation. William McPeak ... helped set up the Ford Foundation and became its vice president. W. Parker Mauldin became vice president of the Population Council. The late Lyle Spencer [of Science Research Associates] . . . endowed a foundation that currently supports a substantial body of social science research. 52<br><br> There was a somewhat similar sociometric effect among veterans of OWI propaganda projects. OWI's overseas director Edward Barrett points out that old-boy networks rooted in common wartime experiences in psychological warfare extended well beyond the social sciences. " Among OWI alumni," he wrote in 1953, are the publishers of Time, Look, Fortune, and several dailies; editors of such magazines as Holiday, Coronet, Parade, and the Saturday Review, editors of the Denver Post. New Orleans Times-Picayune, and others; the heads of the Viking Press, Harper & Brothers, and Farrar, Straus and Young; two Hollywood Oscar winners; a two-time Pulitzer prizewinner; the board chairman of CBS and a dozen key network executives; President Eisenhower's chief speech writer; the editor of Reader's Digest international editions; at least six partners of large advertising agencies; and a dozen noted social scientists. 53<br><br> Barrett himself went on to become chief of the U.S. government's overt psychological warfare effort from 1950 to 1952 and later dean of the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism and founder of the Columbia Journalism Review. 54<br><br> It is wise to be cautious in evaluating the political significance of these networks, of course. Obviously Herbert Marcuse drew quite different political conclusions from his experience than did, say, Harold Lasswell, and it is well known that even some of the once closely knit staff of the Institut fur Sozialforschung who emigrated to the United States eventually clashed bitterly over political issues during the cold war. 55 Nevertheless, the common experience of wartime psychological warfare work became one step in a process through which various leaders in the social sciences engaged one another in tacit alliances to promote their particular interpretations of society. Their wartime experiences contributed substantially to the construction of a remarkably tight circle of men and women who shared several important conceptions about mass communication research. They regarded mass communication as a tool for social management and as a weapon in social conflict, and they expressed common assumptions concerning the usefulness of quantitative research-particularly experimental and quasi-experimental effects research, opinion surveys, and quantitative content analysisas a means of illuminating what communication "is" and improving its application to social management. They also demonstrated common attitudes toward at least some of the ethical questions intrinsic to performing applied social research on behalf of a government. The Clausen study strongly suggests that at Stouffer's Research Branch, at least, World War II psychological warfare work established social networks that opened doors to crucial postwar contacts inside the government, funding agencies, and professional circles. Barrett's comments concerning the Psychological Warfare Division suggest a similar pattern there. As will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter, the various studies prepared by these scientists during the war -- always at government expense and frequently involving unprecedented access to human research subjects -- also created vast new data bases of social information that would become the raw material from which a number of influential postwar social science careers would be built.<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>Prof Pan and DE, I think that's enough to get you started on the Cold War history of the CIA's mandate to influence the values, beliefs, and behavior of all Americans all the time.<br><br>I've got a helluva lot more "proof" where that came from, too. <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=hughmanateewins>Hugh Manatee Wins</A> at: 7/6/06 8:14 pm<br></i>
