by AlicetheCurious » Tue Sep 26, 2006 6:37 pm
<!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>It would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and, indeed, at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries.<br><br>There have been numerous reports from reliable sources of large-scale looting, pillaging and plundering, and of instances of destruction of villages without apparent military necessity. The liability of the Provisional Government of Israel to restore private property to its Arab owners and to indemnify those owners for property wantonly destroyed is clear, irrespective of any indemnities which the Provisional Government may claim from the Arab States.<br><br>Count Folke Bernadotte, UN Mediator on Palestine, 1948<br>(Later assassinated by Zionist terrorists)<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/ab14d4aafc4e1bb985256204004f55fa!OpenDocument">domino.un.org/unispal.nsf...enDocument</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br><br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr>The exodus (of the Palestinian Arab population) was divided into two broadly equal waves: one before and one after the decisive turning-point of the declaration of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 and the intervention of the armies of the neighbouring Arab states on the following day. One can agree that the flight of thousands of well-to-do Palestinians during the first few weeks following the adoption of the UN partition plan - particularly from Haifa and Jaffa - was essentially voluntary <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>(!!!!)</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END-->. The question is what was the truth of the departures that happened subsequently?<br><br>In the opening pages of "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem", Benny Morris offers the outlines of an overall answer: using a map that shows the 369 Arab towns and villages in Israel (within its 1949 borders), he lists, area by area, the reasons for the departure of the local population (9). <br><br>In 45 cases he admits that he does not know. The inhabitants of the other 228 localities left under attack by Jewish troops, and in 41 cases they were expelled by military force. In 90 other localities, the Palestinians were in a state of panic following the fall of a neighbouring town or village, or for fear of an enemy attack, or because of rumours circulated by the Jewish army - particularly after the 9 April 1948 massacre of 250 inhabitants of Deir Yassin, where the news of the killings swept the country like wildfire.<br><br>By contrast, he found only six cases of departures at the instigation of local Arab authorities. "There is no evidence to show that the Arab states and the AHC wanted a mass exodus or issued blanket orders or appeals to the Palestinians to flee their homes (though in certain areas the inhabitants of specific villages were ordered by Arab commanders or the AHC to leave, mainly for strategic reasons)." ("The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem", p. 129).<br><br>On the contrary, anyone who fled was actually threatened with "severe punishment". <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>As for the broadcasts by Arab radio stations allegedly calling on people to flee, a detailed listening to recordings of their programmes of that period shows that the claims were invented for pure propaganda.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>In "1948 and After" Benny Morris examines the first phase of the exodus and produces a detailed analysis of a source that he considers basically reliable: a report prepared by the intelligence services of the Israeli army, dated 30 June 1948 and entitled "The emigration of Palestinian Arabs in the period 1/12/1947-1/6/1948". <br><br>This document sets at 391,000 the number of Palestinians who had already left the territory that was by then in the hands of Israel, and evaluates the various factors that had prompted their decisions to leave. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>"At least 55% of the total of the exodus was caused by our (Haganah/IDF) operations." To this figure, the report’s compilers add the operations of the Irgun and Lehi, which "directly (caused) some 15%... of the emigration". A further 2% was attributed to explicit expulsion orders issued by Israeli troops, and 1% to their psychological warfare. This leads to a figure of 73% for departures caused directly by the Israelis. In addition, the report attributes 22% of the departures to "fears" and "a crisis of confidence" affecting the Palestinian population. As for Arab calls for flight, these were reckoned to be significant in only 5% of cases...</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>In short, as Morris puts it, this report "undermines the traditional official Israeli ’explanation’ of a mass flight ordered or ’invited’ by the Arab leadership". Neither, as he points out, "does [the report] uphold the traditional Arab explanation of the exodus - that the Jews, with premeditation and in a centralised fashion, had systematically waged a campaign aimed at the wholesale expulsion of the native Palestinian population." <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>However, he says that "the circumstances of the second half of the exodus" - which he estimates as having involved between 300,000 and 400,000 people - "are a different story."</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>One example of this second phase was the expulsion of Arabs living in Lydda (present-day Lod) and Ramleh. On 12 July 1948, within the framework of Operation Dani, a skirmish with Jordanian armoured forces served as a pretext for a violent backlash, with 250 killed, some of whom were unarmed prisoners. <br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>This was followed by a forced evacuation characterised by summary executions and looting and involving upwards of 70,000 Palestinian civilians - almost 10% of the total exodus of 1947- 49. Similar scenarios were enacted, as Morris shows, in central Galilee, Upper Galilee and the northern Negev, as well as in the post-war expulsion of the Palestinians of Al Majdal (Ashkelon). Most of these operations (with the exception of the latter) were marked by atrocities - a fact which led Aharon Zisling, the minister of agriculture, to tell the Israeli cabinet on 17 November 1948: "I couldn’t sleep all night. I felt that things that were going on were hurting my soul, the soul of my family and all of us here (...) Now Jews too have behaved like Nazis and my entire being has been shaken (10)."</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>The Israeli government of the time pursued a policy of non- compromise, in order to prevent the return of the refugees "at any price" (as Ben Gurion himself put it), despite the fact that the UN General Assembly had been calling for this since 11 December 1948. <br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Their villages were either destroyed or occupied by Jewish immigrants, and their lands were shared out between the surrounding kibbutzim. The law on "abandoned properties" - which was designed to make possible the seizure of any land belonging to persons who were "absent" - "legalised" this project of general confiscation as of December 1948. Almost 400 Arab villages were thus either wiped off the map or Judaised, as were most of the Arab quarters in mixed towns. According to a report drawn up in 1952, Israel had thus succeeded in expropriating 73,000 rooms in abandoned houses, 7,800 shops, workshops and warehouses, 5 million Palestinian pounds in bank accounts, and - most important of all - 300,000 hectares of land (11).</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br>In "1948 and After" (chapter 4), Benny Morris deals at greater length with the role played by Yosef Weitz, who was at the time director of the Jewish National Fund’s Lands Department. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>This man of noted Zionist convictions confided to his diary on 20 December 1940: "It must be clear that there is no room in the country for both people (...) the only solution is a Land of Israel, at least a western Land of Israel without Arabs. There is no room here for compromise. (...) There is no way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries(...) Not one village must be left, not one (bedouin) tribe."<br><br>Seven years later, Weitz found himself in a position to put this radical programme into effect. Already, in January 1948, he was orchestrating the expulsion of Palestinians from various parts of the country. In April he proposed - and obtained - the creation of "a body which would direct the Yishuv’s war with the aim of evicting as many Arabs as possible". This body was unofficial at first, but was formalised at the end of August 1948 into the "Transfer Committee" which supervised the destruction of abandoned Arab villages and/or their repopulation with recent Jewish immigrants, in order to make any return of the refugees impossible.</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> Its role was extended, in July, to take in the creation of Jewish settlements in the border areas.<br><br>...<br><br>...<br><br>Benny Morris contrives to make two seemingly contradictory statements within two pages of each other, namely that "Plan D was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestine’s Arabs" and that "from the beginning of April, there are clear traces of an expulsion policy on both national and local levels". ("The Birth...", pp. 62 and 64)<br><br>...<br><br>As Morris himself admits, <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>"Ben Gurion always refrained from issuing clear or written expulsion orders; he preferred that his generals ’understand’ what he wanted done. He wished to avoid going down in history as the ’great expeller’"</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--> ("The Birth...", pp. 292-3).<br><br>The fact that the founder of the State of Israel took advantage of the impressive extent of his powers and worked towards the maximum enlargement of the territory allocated to the Jewish state by the United Nations, and towards reducing its Arab population to a minimum, is a matter of historical fact. <br><br>Morris devoted an important article (17) to Ben Gurion’s long-term support for the transfer project. As he writes in his preface to "1948 and After...", "Already from 1937 we find Ben Gurion (and most of the other Zionist leaders) supporting a ’transfer’ solution to the ’Arab problem’ (...) Come 1948, and the confusions and deplacement of war, and we see Ben Gurion quickly grasp the opportunity for ’Judaising’ the emergent Jewish State" ("1948 and After..., p. 33).<br><br>Prior to this, he tells us that "the tendency of military commanders to ’nudge’ Palestinians’ flight increased as the war went on. <!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>Jewish atrocities - far more widespread than the old histories have let on (there were massacres of Arabs at Ad Dawayima, Eilaboun, Jish, Safsaf, Majd al Kurum, Hule (in Lebanon), Saliha and Sasa, besides Deir Yassin and Lydda and other places) - also contributed significantly to the exodus" ("1948...", p. 22).</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br><br>Ilan Pappe, a professor at the University of Haifa, devotes two chapters of his book "The Making of the Arab- Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951" to these issues. Eschewing the caution of Morris’s position, he concludes that "Plan D can be regarded in many respects as a master plan for expulsion. The plan was not conceived out of the blue - expulsion was considered as one of many means for retaliation against Arab attacks on Jewish convoys and settlements; nevertheless, it was also regarded as one of the best means of ensuring the domination of the Jews in the areas captured by the Israeli army" ("The Making...", p. 98 ).<br><br>Furthermore, the actual text of Plan D leaves very little doubt as to the intentions of Ben Gurion and his friends. It spoke of "operations against enemy population centres located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force. <br><br><!--EZCODE BOLD START--><strong>These operations can be carried out in the following manner: either by destroying villages (by setting fire to them, by blowing them up, and by planting mines in their debris), and especially of those population centres which are difficult to control continuously; or by mounting combing and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village, conducting a search inside it. In case of resistance, the armed force must be wiped out and the population expelled outside the borders of the state" ("The Making...", p. 92).</strong><!--EZCODE BOLD END--><br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://mondediplo.com/1997/12/palestine">mondediplo.com/1997/12/palestine</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br><br>For a map of the population distribution in Palestine as of 1945, AFTER a large-scale influx of Jewish immigrants from Europe, see:<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/a73996728ba8b94785256d560060cd1a!OpenDocument">domino.un.org/unispal.nsf...enDocument</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br><br>For a map of Jewish settlements set up in what was left of the Palestinian territories, as of 1996, see:<br><br><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/96fd41bb37e40f8685256b98006ec72a!OpenDocument">domino.un.org/unispal.nsf...enDocument</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>Please note that this map is 10 years out of date, and that most of those Jewish settlements have dramatically expanded, both in terms of population and territory, since then.<br><br>If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's stupid to argue that it's not a duck.<br><br>The same goes for ethnic cleansing.<br> <p></p><i></i>