(from 1985) How MI5 vets BBC staff

by **pfredricks** » Tue Dec 13, 2005 4:51 pm

This may be old news, but I just came across a reprint of the following article published on the front page of "The Observer", 18 August 1985 (this was before the paper was part of the Guardian group; it was owned by Tiny Rowland's mining company Lonrho): <blockquote>Quote:<hr>THE OBSERVER has obtained concrete evidence for the first time of the way the security service, MI5, secretly controls the hiring and firing of BBC staff. Senior executives in the corporation have revealed to us a series of cases in which the careers of journalists, directors and broadcasters have been affected by MI5 blacklisting. Until now the BBC has always consistently denied any interference, on MI5 instructions. When we went to see Mr Christopher Martin, Director of Personnel, at the corporation's headquarters in Portland Place, last Friday, and presented him with details of our dossier, he refused to respond to the substance of our evidence, saying that the area was 'confidential.' The most disturbing aspect of the vetting system, which can make or mar the careers and lives of both BBC radio and television staff is that often the blacklisting is quite misguided or based on simple errors of fact. On page 9 of today's Observer we detail eight cases where individuals were initially either prevented from getting a job in the BBC or denied promotion. In one case the security service blocked the appointment of an editor of The Listener. Others blacklisted for periods of their careers include two television directors, Stephen Peet (who later went on to make the 'Yesterday's Witness' series for BBC) and John Goldschmidt (who recently made a film about the whistle-blower Stanley Adams); journalist Isabel Hilton, who now works for the Sunday Times; and numerous young film editors, reporters and producers accused of having left-wing sympathies. At the last count, in 1984, the BBC had a staff of almost 30,000. We have discovered that all current affairs appointees, together with many of those involved in the actual making of programmes - including directors and film editors - are vetted. We have also established who runs the system. It operates, unknown to almost all BBC staff, from Room 105 in an out-of-the way corridor on the first floor of Broadcasting House - a part of that labyrinth on which George Orwell modelled his Ministry of Truth in 'Nineteen Eighty-Four.' The legend on the door - 'Special Duties-Management'- gives little away. Behind that door sits Brigadier Ronnie Stonham, 'Sp.A. to D.Pers.' As special assistant to Christopher Martin, his job, with a team of three female assistants, is to liaise with MI5. Brigadier Stonham, a signals officer with an Intelligence background who left the Army in 1982, has signed the Official Secrets Act, like all his BBC colleagues in the appointments department. Last week, after our initial approaches to the BBC, Brigadier Stonham's office said he would be absent all week. At his Clapham, south London, home, his wife said 'He is not here.' Brigadier Stonham gets the names of successful candidates from chairmen of the various interviewing boards, or hiring producers. They call what they are doing 'college' or 'the formalities.' For internal BBC staff applying for promotion, MI5 keeps continuous political surveillance on those it considers 'media subversives' - a category which can include directors, film editors, even actors. Their files are stamped with a symbol which looks like a Christmas tree. That means that a second, secret file is held in Room 105. Some of these merely contain intimate personal details. Most contain purported 'security' information, collected by local Special Branch policemen. If a staff member in this category is shortlisted the second file, a buff folder with a round red sticker and the legend 'secret,' is given to the department head, who has to sign for it. What is happening is concealed from the individuals concerned, who have no idea what is being used against them. The names of outside applicants are submitted to F Branch 'domestic' subversion desks at MI5, which is headed by the diplomat Sir Antony Duff. They are fed into a computer containing the details of 500,000 'subversives'. The vetting operation is run by C Branch, who also obtain access to other big private companies. Cathy Massiter, who was a junior officer at M15 in the mid- 1970s, has described to us how lists of BBC candidates would pass across her desk for approval. Often the word from MI5 that it regards a person as a 'security risk' is enough to blacklist him or her permanently. Ordinary interviewing board members are not encouraged to ask questions, A particularly bizarre aspect of the system is that BBC boards, when interviewing candidates, are expressly forbidden to ask them openly about their political views. We found that senior executives were fearful of speaking out about vetting because of the Official Secrets Act. We also found that victims of blacklisting were generally too frightened to admit it. Now, however, two former director-generals have described the system to us, and executives holding past and current senior BBC posts have described what happened in eight specific cases. Sir Hugh Greene, one former director-general, says: 'In my day we would never have allowed jobs like The Listener to go to MI5.' In every instance when MI5's claims were challenged the allegations dissolved into instances of, at best, over-zealousness, and at worst false information against the applicant, or even political spite. <hr></blockquote> <a href="http://www.cambridgeclarion.org/press_cuttings/mi5.bbc.staff_obs_18aug1985.html">www.cambridgeclarion.org/...g1985.html</a> Then there's the further article mentioned, which looks at specific cases - "The blacklist in Room 105": <a href="http://www.cambridgeclarion.org/press_cuttings/mi5.bbc.page9_obs_18aug1985.html">www.cambridgeclarion.org/...g1985.html</a>

by **antiaristo** » Tue Dec 13, 2005 5:35 pm

Thatcher began to ruin the BBC as soon as she entered office. One person that has followed this closely is Tony Gosling. He used to work for "the beeb". Today he runs a superb website called Bilderberg.org Highly recommended <a href="http://www.bilderberg.org/index.htm">www.bilderberg.org/index.htm</a> <blockquote>Quote:<hr>MI5 and the Christmas Tree files - secret political vetting at the BBC 'The Christmas Tree' is also a reference to the tune of 'The Red Flag'. Extract from: Blacklist The Inside Story of Political Vetting by Mark Hollingsworth and Richard Norton-Taylor The Hogarth Press LONDON Published 1988 ISBN 0 7012 0811 2 Chapter 5 MI5 and the BBC: Stamping the ‘Christmas Tree’ Files ‘One thing I can state quite categorically is that there has never been any victimisation of anyone for their political views at the BBC.' Sir Hugh Greene, Director-General of the BBC 1960-69, reported in the Sunday Times, 20 February 1977. ‘On employment, our policy is to appoint the best people we can.’ Sir Ian Trethowan, Director-General of the BBC 1977 – 82, in a letter to Lord Avebury, 13 November 1980. If ever there was an example of ‘security' factors being used as a pretext for political vetting, it is at the BBC. When their security procedures were revealed in 1985, the corporation said that vetting was restricted to a relatively small number of people who had access to ‘sensitive information’<hr></blockquote> much more <a href="http://www.bilderberg.org/mi5bbc.htm">www.bilderberg.org/mi5bbc.htm</a>

by **jenz** » Wed Dec 14, 2005 8:23 am

does anyone know how, if at all, Freedom of Information impinges on files held by security services on a person - ie can they ask to see them?

by **hmm** » Wed Dec 14, 2005 11:34 am

interesting piece in the guardian about freedom of information in the uk.. <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/freedom/Story/0,2763,1387430,00.html">www.guardian.co.uk/freedo...30,00.html</a> <blockquote>Quote:<hr>There were some caveats, though. In the run-up to January 1 there were fears that government departments were indulging in some ruthless housekeeping by shredding awkward documents, which only exacerbated existing concerns that ministers were going to extend the right to non-disclosure from the legitimate aims of protecting national security, law enforcement and international relations to include protecting reputations and hiding cock-ups. "The legislation's most contentious feature is a ministerial veto, allowing cabinet ministers to override the Information Commissioner if he orders a government department to release information on public interest grounds," Frankel continued. "No one is putting any bets on ministers being able to resist its use where politically damaging information is at stake."<hr></blockquote> if you are trying to ask if the freedom of information act allows one to see a up-to-date version of the file the security services keep on oneself i think the answer would be no..

by **slimmouse** » Wed Dec 14, 2005 11:49 am

<blockquote>Quote:<hr>"The legislation's most contentious feature is a ministerial veto, allowing cabinet ministers to override the Information Commissioner if he orders a government department to release information on public interest grounds," <hr></blockquote> So much for the fancily titled publicly reassuring "information minister" So now, we have the above, in the context of this ; <blockquote>Quote:<hr>The government has acknowledged, however, that the public requires a complete picture about the events of 7 July and details about the four men who carried out the attacks. The remit of the inquests into their deaths does not extend that far and the information will not emerge at a criminal trial - because there will not be one as the bombers are dead. Instead, a senior civil servant will compile a narrative, drawing together intelligence and police material<hr></blockquote>. Taken from the "No public inquiry into 7/7 thread. Firstly, note the second paragraph. Whatever happened to Haroon Rashid Aswat ? Wasnt he the mastermind ? Well he aint fucking dead, so thats a blatent lie. But of course, no-one wants the public finding out too much about this guy right ? So, instead we have a civil servant compiling a narrative based on ministerial censored documentation. Censored documentation, including no doubt any CCTV footage - both that which "officially exists", or that which "officially doesnt". No full inquiry into exactly WHO Peter Powers company were conducting their "terror responses" for that day, or how Bob Ciley ( CFR ) happens to be head of London Underground, Or question about the "official" lie that the terrorists caught the 7.40 train ( that didnt exist ) from Luton to London. No questions regarding the eye witness testimony of Bruce Lait ( "The metal was pushed upwards as if the bomb was underneath the train" ), or the "coincidental" equity flooding activities of Greenspan just prior to the event. 1984 anyone ? Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=slimmouse@rigorousintuition>slimmouse</A> at: 12/14/05 9:04 am

(from 1985) How MI5 vets BBC staff

(from 1985) How MI5 vets BBC staff

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