by starroute » Fri Sep 01, 2006 4:18 pm
hava, with all due respect, I believe the only way to pry US support away from Israel is to convince American Jews that Israel has become morally bankrupt. I know that's harsh, but it's the only way I can see to get the message through.<br><br>I'm reminded, by the way, that we're quickly coming up on the 50th anniversary of the Suez Crisis -- which was the first point at which I started to wonder why so many of the adults around me seemed to think that what Israel was doing was a Good Thing, when even I as a nine-year-old could tell that it wasn't.<br><br>I found a few intriguing -- and disheartening -- pieces of information about the Suez Crisis when I went just now to check the exact date at Wikipedia:<br><!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote><strong><em>Quote:</em></strong><hr><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK START--><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis">en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suez_Crisis</a><!--EZCODE AUTOLINK END--><br><br>In 1952, officers in the Egyptian army overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk who had been a close ally of the British. Abandoning policies co-operative with European powers, the new government asserted an independent and Arab nationalist identity. This led to conflict with the European powers over the Suez Canal. . . .<br><br>Meanwhile, the so-called Gaza Strip - a part of the former British mandate, now occupied by Egypt - became a haven for masses of Palestinian refugees and a hotbed for guerilla activity against the fledgling Jewish state. In response, from 1953–1956 the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a number of strikes. These attacks were assisted by the future prime minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, who interrupted his studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to become the military leader of the first special forces unit of the IDF: the elite Unit 101. This policy of reprisals was a major source of internal dispute between hawks, led by David Ben-Gurion, and doves, led by his successor for a short time, Moshe Sharett. It sometimes led to strong external criticism from the United Nations and even Israel's supporters.<br><br>The Gaza raid on 1955 February 28 marked yet another turning point in relations between the two enemies. In retaliation Egypt began to sponsor official Fedayeen and commando raids on Israel, sometimes through the territory of Jordan, which also officially opposed these raids, while still publicly discouraging Palestinian infiltration. . . .<br><br>On 1956 July 26, Egypt, under the leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which operated the vital trade route to the east, and in which British banks and business held a 44% stake. . . .<br><br>The British Prime Minister of the time, Sir Anthony Eden, tried to persuade the British public of the need for war and so, perhaps in an attempt to recall World War II-era patriotism, he compared Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal with the nationalism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler twenty years earlier. However, it is interesting to note that the very first comparisons between 1930s dictators and Nasser during the crisis was made by the opposition Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell and the left-leaning tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mirror. Eden had been a staunch opponent of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and he claimed that a display of force was needed to prevent Nasser becoming another expansionist military threat. . . .<br><br>In the months that followed Egypt's nationalization of the canal company, with the support of the former managers of the company that operated the canal, Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez, a secret meeting between Israel, France and Britain took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Details on the Protocol of Sèvres only emerged years later, as records of the meeting were suppressed and destroyed. All parties agreed that Israel should invade and that Britain and France would subsequently intervene, instruct the Israeli and Egyptian armies to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles (16 km) from either side of the canal, and then place an Anglo-French intervention force in the Canal Zone around Port Said. It was to be called "Operation Musketeer".<br><br>On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula and made rapid progress towards the Canal Zone. . . . The United Kingdom and France began to bomb Egypt on October 31 to force the reopening of the canal with Operation Musketeer. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships then present in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early 1957. . . .<br><br>Thus, the Eisenhower administration forced a cease-fire on Britain and France, which it had previously told the Allies it would not do. Part of the pressure that the United States used against Britain was financial, as Eisenhower threatened to sell the United States reserves of the British pound and thereby precipitate a collapse of the British currency. After Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France, the U.S. refused to fill the gap, until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. . . .<br><br>The British government and the pound thus both came under pressure. Eden was forced to resign and the invading forces withdrew in March 1957. Before the withdrawal, Lester Pearson, Canada's acting cabinet minister for external affairs, had gone to the United Nations and suggested creating a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez to "keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." The United Nations eagerly accepted this suggestion, and the force was sent, greatly improving conditions in the area. Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Lester Pearson's creation and he is considered the father of the modern concept "peacekeeping". . . .<br><br>The Crisis resulted in the resignation of the British Conservative Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and marked the completion of the shift in the global balance of power from traditional European powers to the United States and the Soviet Union and was a milestone in the decline of the British Empire. . . .<br><br>Eisenhower later admitted, after retiring from office, that the Suez Crisis was perhaps the biggest mistake he made in terms of foreign policy. Not only did he feel that the United States weakened two crucial European Cold War Allies but he created in Nasser a man capable of dominating the Arab world when Nasser was little liked let alone respected amongst other Arab countries.<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END--><br>Have we really been playing out this same insane tape loop for 50 years? You'd think someone might have come up with a few new moves in that time. <p></p><i></i>
