Moderators: Elvis, DrVolin, Jeff
82_28 wrote:Why the hell can't we just wipe it all clean? Perhaps it is socialism. But liquidate all humans who have a worth of over a million dollars US. Then yes, REDISTRIBUTE that shit back out. If that is what matters -- money -- then redistribute that shit. These scared motherfuckers who could probably pay someone a grand to come and get me, need to see what they have done. These people are technocrats. The worst of the worst of cults.
I can't tell you how many rich men keep me in their kindness, but still would never listen to a suggestion I ever had to say. Because they have the money, they know it all. In fact I have warned rich men to not take various business gambles. Some of these gambles came 5 or 6 years ago. All, every single one that I know of was shot to shit recently. And see I don't know shit. Perhaps if I had money I would know even more about being a fucking craven idiot. Thus, I would know more, wouldn't I? And that's all that counts. There truly is no captain of this ship and if there is, he doesn't give a fuck about the steerage passengers. Surprise Surprise.
US money supply plunges at 1930s pace as Obama eyes fresh stimulus
The M3 money supply in the United States is contracting at an accelerating rate that now matches the average decline seen from 1929 to 1933, despite near zero interest rates and the biggest fiscal blitz in history.
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Published: 9:40PM BST 26 May 2010
Comments 7 | Comment on this article
The stock of money in the US fell from $14.2 trillion to $13.9 trillion in the three months to April, amounting to an annual rate of contraction of 9.6pc Photo: AFP
The M3 figures - which include broad range of bank accounts and are tracked by British and European monetarists for warning signals about the direction of the US economy a year or so in advance - began shrinking last summer. The pace has since quickened.
The stock of money fell from $14.2 trillion to $13.9 trillion in the three months to April, amounting to an annual rate of contraction of 9.6pc. The assets of insitutional money market funds fell at a 37pc rate, the sharpest drop ever.
"It’s frightening," said Professor Tim Congdon from International Monetary Research. "The plunge in M3 has no precedent since the Great Depression. The dominant reason for this is that regulators across the world are pressing banks to raise capital asset ratios and to shrink their risk assets. This is why the US is not recovering properly," he said.
The US authorities have an entirely different explanation for the failure of stimulus measures to gain full traction. They are opting instead for yet further doses of Keynesian spending, despite warnings from the IMF that the gross public debt of the US will reach 97pc of GDP next year and 110pc by 2015.
Larry Summers, President Barack Obama’s top economic adviser, has asked Congress to "grit its teeth" and approve a fresh fiscal boost of $200bn to keep growth on track. "We are nearly 8m jobs short of normal employment. For millions of Americans the economic emergency grinds on," he said.
David Rosenberg from Gluskin Sheff said the White House appears to have reversed course just weeks after Mr Obama vowed to rein in a budget deficit of $1.5 trillion (9.4pc of GDP) this year and set up a commission to target cuts. "You truly cannot make this stuff up. The US governnment is freaked out about the prospect of a double-dip," he said.
The White House request is a tacit admission that the economy is already losing thrust and may stall later this year as stimulus from the original $800bn package starts to fade.
Recent data have been mixed. Durable goods orders jumped 2.9pc in April but house prices have been falling for several months and mortgage applications have dropped to a 13-year low. The ECRI leading index of US economic activity has been sliding continuously since its peak in October, suffering the steepest one-week drop ever recorded in mid-May.
Mr Summers acknowledged in a speech this week that the eurozone crisis had shone a spotlight on the dangers of spiralling public debt. He said deficit spending delays the day of reckoning and leaves the US at the mercy of foreign creditors. Ultimately, "failure begets failure" in fiscal policy as the logic of compound interest does its worst.
However, Mr Summers said it would be "pennywise and pound foolish" to skimp just as the kindling wood of recovery starts to catch fire. He said fiscal policy comes into its own at at time when the economy "faces a liquidity trap" and the Fed is constrained by zero interest rates.
Mr Congdon said the Obama policy risks repeating the strategic errors of Japan, which pushed debt to dangerously high levels with one fiscal boost after another during its Lost Decade, instead of resorting to full-blown "Friedmanite" monetary stimulus.
"Fiscal policy does not work. The US has just tried the biggest fiscal experiment in history and it has failed. What matters is the quantity of money and in extremis that can be increased easily by quantititave easing. If the Fed doesn’t act, a double-dip recession is a virtual certainty," he said.
Mr Congdon said the dominant voices in US policy-making - Nobel laureates Paul Krugman and Joe Stiglitz, as well as Mr Summers and Fed chair Ben Bernanke - are all Keynesians of different stripes who "despise traditional monetary theory and have a religious aversion to any mention of the quantity of money". The great opus by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz - The Monetary History of the United States - has been left to gather dust.
Mr Bernanke no longer pays attention to the M3 data. The bank stopped publishing the data five years ago, deeming it too erratic to be of much use.
This may have been a serious error since double-digit growth of M3 during the US housing bubble gave clear warnings that the boom was out of control. The sudden slowdown in M3 in early to mid-2008 - just as the Fed raised rates - gave a second warning that the economy was about to go into a nosedive.
Mr Bernanke built his academic reputation on the study of the credit mechanism. This model offers a radically different theory for how the financial system works. While so-called "creditism" has become the new orthodoxy in US central banking, it has not yet been tested over time and may yet prove to be a misadventure.
Paul Ashworth at Capital Economics said the decline in M3 is worrying and points to a growing risk of deflation. "Core inflation is already the lowest since 1966, so we don’t have much margin for error here. Deflation becomes a threat if it goes on long enough to become entrenched," he said.
However, Mr Ashworth warned against a mechanical interpretation of money supply figures. "You could argue that M3 has been going down because people have been taking their money out of accounts to buy stocks, property and other assets," he said.
Events may soon tell us whether this is benign or malign. It is certainly remarkable.
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Barack Hoover Obama
By Ken Silverstein
Kevin Baker has an excellent piece in the July issue of the magazine (available to subscribers) about the similarities between our current president and our thirty-first, Herbert Hoover:
The comparison is not meant to be flippant. It has nothing to do with the received image of Hoover, the dour, round-collared, gerbil-cheeked technocrat who looked on with indifference while the country went to pieces. To understand how dire our situation is now it is necessary to remember that when he was elected president in 1928, Herbert Hoover was widely considered the most capable public figure in the country. Hoover—like Obama—was almost certainly someone gifted with more intelligence, a better education, and a greater range of life experience than FDR. And Hoover, through the first three years of the Depression, was also the man who comprehended better than anyone else what was happening and what needed to be done. And yet he failed.
Mind you, Baker is not (like the majority of the GOP) rooting for Obama to fail:
It is impossible not to wish desperately for his success as he tries to grapple with all that confronts him: a worldwide depression, catastrophic climate change, an unjust and inadequate health-care system, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ongoing disgrace of Guant·namo, a floundering education system. Obama’s failure would be unthinkable. And yet the best indications now are that he will fail, because he will be unable—indeed he will refuse—to seize the radical moment at hand.
Every instinct the president has honed, every voice he hears in Washington, every inclination of our political culture urges incrementalism, urges deliberation, if any significant change is to be brought about. The trouble is that we are at one of those rare moments in history when the radical becomes pragmatic, when deliberation and compromise foster disaster. The question is not what can be done but what must be done.
Along comes the New York Times today with a piece by Joe Nocera about Obama’s financial regulatory “reform” plan that’s particularly interesting in tandem with Baker’s piece:
Three quarters of a century ago, President Franklin Roosevelt earned the undying enmity of Wall Street when he used his enormous popularity to push through a series of radical regulatory reforms that completely changed the norms of the financial industry. Wall Street hated the reforms, of course, but Roosevelt didn’t care. Wall Street and the financial industry had engaged in practices they shouldn’t have, and had helped lead the country into the Great Depression. Those practices had to be stopped. To the president, that’s all that mattered.
On Wednesday, President Obama unveiled what he described as “a sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms that followed the Great Depression.” In terms of the sheer number of proposals, outlined in an 88-page document the administration released on Tuesday, that is undoubtedly true. But in terms of the scope and breadth of the Obama plan — and more important, in terms of its overall effect on Wall Street’s modus operandi — it’s not even close to what Roosevelt accomplished during the Great Depression.
Rather, the Obama plan is little more than an attempt to stick some new regulatory fingers into a very leaky financial dike, and not rebuild the entire system. Without question, the latter would be more difficult, more contentious and probably more expensive. But it would also have more lasting value.
President Obama, to be fair, seems to be even more alone than Hoover was in facing the emergency at hand. The most appalling aspect of the present crisis has been the utter fecklessness of the American elite in failing to confront it. From both the private and public sectors, across the entire political spectrum, the lack of both will and new ideas has been stunning. When it came to the opposition, Franklin Roosevelt reaped the creative support of any number of progressive Republicans throughout his twelve years in office, ranging from New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia to Nebraska Senator George Norris to key cabinet members such as Henry A. Wallace, Harold Ickes, Henry Stimson, and Frank Knox. Obama, by contrast, has had to contend with a knee-jerk rejectionist Republican Party.
More frustrating has been the torpor among Obama’s fellow Democrats. One might have assumed that the adrenaline rush of regaining power after decades of conservative hegemony, not to mention relief at surviving the depredations of the Bush years, or losing the vestigial tail of the white Southern branch of the party, would have liberated congressional Democrats to loose a burst of pent-up, imaginative liberal initiatives.
Instead, we have seen a parade of aged satraps from vast, windy places stepping forward to tell us what is off the table. Every week, there is another Max Baucus of Montana, another Kent Conrad of North Dakota, another Ben Nelson of Nebraska, huffing and puffing and harrumphing that we had better forget about single-payer health care, a carbon tax, nationalizing the banks, funding for mass transit, closing tax loopholes for the rich. These are men with tiny constituencies who sat for decades in the Senate without doing or saying anything of note, who acquiesced shamelessly to the worst abuses of the Bush Administration and who come forward now to chide the president for not concentrating enough on reducing the budget deficit, or for "trying to do too much," as if he were as old and as indolent as they are.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid—yet another small gray man from a great big space where the tumbleweeds blow—seems unwilling to make even a symbolic effort at party discipline. Within days of President Obama’s announcing his legislative agenda, the perpetually callow Indiana Senator Evan Bayh came forward to announce the formation of a breakaway caucus of fifteen "moderate" Democrats from the Midwest who sought to help the country make "the changes we need" but "make sure that they’re done in a practical way that will actually work"—a statement that was almost Zen-like in its perfect vacuousness. Even most of the Senate’s more enlightened notables, such as Russ Feingold of Wisconsin or Claire McCaskill of Missouri or Sherrod Brown of Ohio, have had little to contribute beyond some hand-wringing whenever the idea of a carbon tax or any other restrictions on burning coal are proposed.
From Greece to Spain
The Eurozone's Self-Inflicted Crisis
May 26, 2010
By MARK WEISBROT
The current turmoil in financial markets around the world is another illustration of the damage that can be done by a bloated and politically powerful financial sector, combined with finance ministers and central bankers who identify with this sector and have their own right-wing policy agenda.
Welcome to Europe, which has become the epicenter of the new global “financial crisis.”
On Tuesday, the focus of Europe’s troubles shifted somewhat from Greece to Spain.
At first glance it’s not obvious that there should be a crisis in Europe at all. Even if Greece were to default on its debt – and this would most likely be a rescheduling or a restructuring rather than a large-scale cancellation of the bulk of Greece’s debt – this would involve a relatively small amount of money compared to the resources that the EU has available to bail out any affected banks. And Spain’s debt is much smaller, relative to its economy, than that of Greece: it’s about 60 percent of GDP, well below the EU average of 80 percent.
But “the markets” have decided that Spain is next in line for attack, and so the price of Credit Default Swaps – a type of insurance -- on their debt shot up today. If this sentiment grows, Spain’s interest rates will continue to rise, and then their debt burden really could become unsustainable.
To make it worse, “the markets” can’t seem to decide what they want from these governments in order to love them again. Two weeks ago the Euro was plummeting because the financial markets wanted more blood: they wanted Greece, Spain, Portugal, and the other currently victimized countries of Europe (Italy and Ireland) to commit to more spending cuts and tax increases. Then they got what they wanted, and within a day or two, the Euro started crashing again because “the markets” discovered that these pro-cyclical policies would actually make things worse in the countries that adopted them, and reduce growth in the whole Eurozone.
Unfortunately the European authorities – especially the European Central Bank – are even worse than the markets. They are less ambivalent and more committed to punishing the weaker economies by having them cut spending even if it causes or deepens recession and mass unemployment (over 20 percent in Spain).
It will be recalled that the turmoil in financial markets took a big turn for the worse on May 6 when the European Central Bank announced that it was not going to engage in “quantitative easing” – creating money – in order to help ease the crisis. They reversed their decision, but only partially. And the agreement reached for the so-called “trillion dollar bailout” requires that any country borrowing the funds must agree to more austerity. This means that if a country like Spain does run into trouble due to increased borrowing costs, tapping the “bailout” funds will force them to accelerate a downward economic spiral. And where is the inflation that the ECB is worried about? The Eurozone is projected by the IMF to have 1 percent inflation for this year and 1.5 percent next year.
Imagine how much worse the United States economy would be today if, instead of responding to our recession with fiscal stimulus, near zero interest rates and a doubling of the Fed’s balance sheet – we had opted for budget cuts and tax increases. That is what the European authorities are advocating for the weaker Eurozone economies.
The Greek population refuses to accept these conditions, and understandably so. The upper classes in Greece don’t pay their taxes, and now the majority are being forced to pay the price for their cheating – a price greatly magnified by the irrational, pro-cyclical nature of the adjustment. Unrest is growing in Spain as well, with the largest unions talking about a general strike.
There is a class dimension to all of this, with the EU authorities and the bankers united in wanting to balance the books on the backs of the workers – and adopt “labor market reforms” that will weaken labor and redistribute income upward for generations to come. The EU authorities and financiers believe that real wages must fall quite sharply in these countries in order to make them internationally competitive – but the protestors are responding with a fiscal version of “No justice, no peace.”
They might add: “No justice, no euro.” From the beginning there have been serious economic questions about the viability and the desirability of the common currency – most importantly whether such a currency union was feasible among countries with greatly different productivity levels, no common fiscal policy, and a Central Bank committed only to maintaining very low inflation (without regard to employment).
The populations now suffering under EU-imposed austerity must have a real and credible threat to get out – or they will end up with indefinite sacrifice for the reward of lower living standards.
Mark Weisbrot is an economist and co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. He is co-author, with Dean Baker, of Social Security: the Phony Crisis.
This article was originally published in The Guardian.
Fitch downgraded Spain's credit rating to AA-plus, and said it expects the country's adjustment to a lower debt level will materially reduce its rate of economic growth over the medium-term.
Fitch cited an inflexible labor market and a restructuring of regional and local savings banks as hindrances to the pace of adjustment.
The AAA Equations: No Quants Required
No AAA rating on junk securities = far fewer suckers to buy junk = lower demand = less incentive for Wall Street to produce junk = lower demand from Wall Street for subprime mortgages from predatory lenders = less incentive to make predatory loans to house-buying suckers from the lower classes = fewer defaults when the housing market contracts = less economic misery on the ground in the US today.
No AAA rating on the junk = fewer sales of the junk = less market heat around subprime securities = fewer derivatives and clones = a much smaller financial house of cards = less severe crash when the housing market contracts = less severe misery for investors around the world = less economic misery in the world.
Moody's, S&P and Fitch get rich by helping to generate more economic misery in the world.
Stocks slide, euro falls after Spain downgrade
Stocks slide, euro falls after Spain downgrade
Albert H. Yoon
NEW YORK
Fri May 28, 2010 1:10pm EDT
(Reuters) - World equities slid and the euro fell on Friday after a downgrade of Spain's credit rating sent a new chill through markets already worried about the European debt crisis.
The downgrade by Fitch Ratings ignited a new round of selling in equities that were already lower after lackluster U.S. economic data injected a note of caution ahead of long holiday weekends in both the United States and the UK.
Fitch downgraded Spain's credit rating to AA-plus, and said it expects the country's adjustment to a lower debt level will materially reduce its rate of economic growth over the medium-term.
Fitch cited an inflexible labor market and a restructuring of regional and local savings banks as hindrances to the pace of adjustment.
"This should exacerbate the tremendous volatility we've seen in global stocks as the world wrestles with the idea of a debt-based collapse," said Chip Hanlon, president of Delta Global Advisors in Huntington Beach, California.
"Adding to this is the fact that no one wants to be long over a holiday weekend."
The euro fell as low as $1.2284, according to electronic trading platform EBS, near a session of $1.2281.
The euro also dropped versus the yen, and was last down 0.9 percent at 111.59 yen.
The major U.S. stock indexes shed more than 1 percent, and U.S. Treasuries slightly extended gains, hitting session highs after the Fitch downgrade. Benchmark 10-year notes were last up 18/32 in price, yielding 3.30 percent.
Investors had been shunning risk even before the Fitch downgrade on Spain.
A Commerce Department report that U.S. consumer spending failed to rise in April after six straight months of gains, cast a cloud over the outlook for the consumer-driven U.S. economy. Traders were particularly cautious ahead of long holiday weekends in London and New York, and ready to step back and take profits after a strong equities rally on Thursday.
The Dow Jones industrial average .DJI was down 119.94 points, or 1.17 percent, at 10,139.05. The Standard & Poor's 500 Index .SPX was down 15.13 points, or 1.37 percent, at 1,087.93. The Nasdaq Composite Index .IXIC was down 32.14 points, or 1.41 percent, at 2,245.54.
The S&P 500 and the Nasdaq had each fallen more than 1 percent earlier in the day, though had pared losses sharply before the news on Spain sparked a new wave of selling.
Technology bellwether Apple Inc (AAPL.O) managed to buck the downtrend, after Asian and European customers mobbed stores as the iPad tablet computer debuted outside the United States. Apple shares rose 1.5 percent. Bank of America Merrill Lynch raised its price target on Apple by $25 to $325 and kept its "buy" rating.
But still pressuring global shares and the euro was concern of contagion from the Greece debt crisis. Despite the lack of major shocks from Spain, Portugal or Ireland, which all have heavy debt loads, investors were still loathe to add risky assets due to questions of how shakier sovereign credit would affect the economic recovery.
(Connecticut) Attorney General Sues Credit Agencies For Tainted Ratings That Enabled Financial Meltdown
March 10, 2010
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal today sued two of the nation’s largest credit rating agencies -- Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s -- for knowingly assigning tainted credit ratings to risky investments backed by sub-prime loans. Blumenthal said Moody’s and S&P’s alleged misconduct enabled the worst economic downturn in the nation since The Great Depression. The lawsuits, unique and unlike others filed on behalf of specific investors or pension funds, are sovereign enforcement actions brought under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Despite repeated statements emphasizing their independence and objectivity when rating structured finance securities, Moody’s and S&P knowingly failed to live up to their representations. In particular, their ratings on structured finance securities were tainted by their desire to earn lucrative fees. Moody’s and S&P knowingly catered to the demands of investment banks and other large issuers of structured finance securities in order to increase their own revenues. As a result, many structured finance securities that contained a great deal of credit risk undeservedly received Moody’s and S&P’s highest ratings, Blumenthal alleges.
“These credit rating agencies gave the best ratings money could buy -- catering to their powerful investment bank clients, rather than objectively rating risky bonds,” Blumenthal said. “Countless investors and others -- including individuals, banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, hedge funds and pension funds -- were misled into believing that these credit ratings were independent and objective, and lost money on investments they might have avoided if told the truth.
“Moody’s and S&P violated public trust -- resulting in many investors purchasing securities that contained far more risk than anticipated and that have ultimately proven to be nearly worthless.
“The results have been catastrophic -- crippling the entire economy. Today’s lawsuit seeks an order stopping Moody’s and S&P from deceiving consumers, as well as civil penalties and disgorgement of ill-gotten profits.”
Structured finance securities have been the centerpiece of the national financial crisis. They are financial products whose value is derived from a stream of revenue flowing from a pool of underlying assets -- assets most commonly backed by residential mortgages, including subprime mortgages. They can also be backed by other assets such as student loans and credit card balances. Moody’s and S&P dominate the ratings market for structured finance securities -- and are responsible for rating virtually all structured finance securities issued into the global capital markets. Investors and other market participants rely on Moody’s and S&P to fulfill their stated promise of independence and objectivity.
In Moody’s own Best Practices Handbook, the company claims: “We serve investors by providing them with timely credit research and independent, thoughtful, and accurate rating opinions on which they can base their investment decisions.”
Both Moody’s and S&P have secretly defied their public promises and legal duty to provide independent and objective ratings, Blumenthal said.
This was not always the case. At one time, Moody’s and S&P refused payments from -- or even to meet with -- issuers of a security it rated. The companies’ business models have increasingly shifted, however, so that a vast majority of their fees are now paid by issuers.
As one of Moody’s former vice presidents publicly noted, “Starting in 2000 there was a systematic and aggressive strategy to replace a culture that was very conservative, an accuracy and quality oriented culture, a getting the rating right kind of culture, with a culture that was supposed to be business friendly but was consistently less likely to assign a rating that was tougher than our competitors.”
Blumenthal said Moody’s and S&P’s lack of independence and objectivity, violating the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, has manifested itself in several ways, including:
Moody’s and S&P modified rating methodologies to make more money: In short, in direct contrast to their public representations, and unbeknownst to investors and other market participants, Moody’s and S&P’s rating methodologies were directly influenced by a desire to please their clients and enhance their own revenue. Assessing actual credit risk was of secondary importance to revenue goals and winning new business.
Ratings shopping: Issuers unhappy with a credit rating agency’s initial analysis can attempt to influence the process by informing the rating agency of a more desirable rating that one of its competitors is willing to assign. As a result, the rating agency knows that it must meet its competitor’s rating or forgo the revenue altogether. Both Moody’s and S&P knuckled under to this pressure and allowed it to influence the ratings they assigned to structured finance securities.
Despite public representations of vigilant monitoring of conflicts of interest inherent to the Issuer Pays business model, Moody’s marginalized its own compliance departments and even punished employees who raised concerns about its lack of independence and objectivity. In some cases, compliance employees were given poor performance evaluations, less compensation and even demoted for interfering with Moody’s ability to please the large issuers of structured finance securities that paid the majority of Moody’s fees.
Today’s action is distinct from Blumenthal’s ongoing litigation against all three credit rating agencies -- Moody’s, S&P and Fitch -- that was filed in July 2008. The earlier lawsuits allege that the agencies knowingly gave state, municipal and other public entities lower credit ratings as compared to other forms of debt with similar or even worse rates of default. Those cases remain pending.
Blumenthal thanked members of his office who worked on the investigation – Assistant Attorneys General Matthew Budzik, George O’Connell and Laura Martella, and Paralegal Holly MacDonald, under the direction of Assistant Attorney General Michael Cole, Chief of the Attorney General’s Antitrust Department.
Fitch says confident in "AAA" subprime ratings
NEW YORK
Wed Jul 18, 2007 11:31am EDT
July 18 (Reuters) - Subprime mortgage bonds carrying the highest, "AAA," rating have not eroded in quality despite price declines in the securities in recent days, Fitch Ratings said on Wednesday.
Bonds
"We continue to be confident that "AAA" ratings reflect the high credit quality of those bonds," Glenn Costello, co-head of Fitch's residential mortgage group, said on a conference call. The top-rated bonds are designed to withstand a very high percentage of defaults, he said.
Fitch, Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Service last week roiled debt markets by announcing downgrades or potential cuts to bonds and collateralized debt obligations backed by subprime loans. Using new rating criteria that boosts default expectations, Fitch said it may take rating actions on at least $7.1 billion in low-investment grade debt, and about $803 million in CDOs.
A benchmark index of "AAA" rated subprime bonds dropped last week as investors speculated losses would not be isolated to the riskier, "BBB" rated bonds.
First Subprime, Now Europe
Revenge of the Rating Agencies
04/29/2010 03:54 PM
By Marc Pitzke in New York
Many observers assign a large part of the blame for the 2008 financial crisis to the "big three" credit rating agencies, which gave their AAA seal of approval to worthless investments. Now those same agencies are helping to bring the euro zone to its knees -- and no one is trying to stop them.
The scandal brewing over Goldman Sachs, Wall Street's biggest bank, has been sucking in more and more players. These include the bankers and traders who sold the infamously risky credit products that helped trigger the subprime crisis, the hedge fund billionaire John Paulson, who cashed in big at the expense of the victims, and the US politicians who condoned the farce for the longest time.
One group, however, has so far escaped the grip of the widening affair, although it's embroiled just as deeply. That group is the major credit rating agencies -- the same ones which are now causing Europe to shudder, having downgraded their ratings for Greece, Spain and Portugal.
It was Standard & Poor's (S&P) and Moody's, the same two agencies which are now rocking the European boat, which in 2007 had given their seal of approval to "Abacus 2007-AC1," Goldman's ill-fated credit product, by giving it the highest AAA rating -- only to cut it down to "junk" status nine months later. Goldman's investors lost more than $1 billion; the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is suing Goldman for fraud, alleging that it misled investors.
Phantoms and Puppet Masters
Wherever things blow up in the financial world, the rating agencies' tracks can be found. The anonymous analysts of S&P, Moody's and Fitch (the smallest of the "big three") were center stage during the global crash. They also appear in the SEC fraud complaint against Goldman. And now they're causing financial havoc in Europe.
They're the éminences grises of Wall Street, phantoms and puppet masters. They wield enormous power over the fate of loans, deals, companies and even countries. Yet rarely has anyone ever really questioned their actions -- let alone held them accountable.
Their role, however, is far from unblemished. In the US, the rating agencies' behavior is now finally being called into question, albeit slowly. New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman accuses them of "a deeply corrupt system." US Senator Carl Levin, a Democrat, sees them as the main culprits in the credit crisis: "If any single event can be identified as the immediate trigger of the 2008 financial crisis, my vote would be for the mass downgrades starting in July 2007," he says. "Those mass downgrades hit the markets like a hammer."
From AAA to Junk
Levin chairs the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, which on Tuesday also ripped through Goldman's top management. For 14 months, the committee has investigated the rating agencies. Last week, it published its preliminary findings -- a mountain of files, 581 pages thick. Levin's damning conclusion: "I don't think either of these companies have served their shareholders or the nation well."
The agencies "used inaccurate rating models in 2004-2007 that failed to predict how high-risk residential mortgages would perform; allowed competitive pressures to affect their ratings; and failed to reassess past ratings after improving their models in 2006," the inquiry found. "The companies failed to assign adequate staff to examine new and exotic investments, and neglected to take mortgage fraud, lax underwriting and 'unsustainable home price appreciation' into account in their models."
The result: Of all the subprime mortgage bundles which in 2006 were AAA-rated, 93 percent are "junk" today.
The Agencies Still Carry Carte Blanche
These are the same companies which are now messing with Europe's financial present and future. This is how it works: The agencies set the credit ratings for companies, even entire countries, and assess the risk of their investment products. These range from simple bonds to complex constructs like the derivatives and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) which formed the house of cards that collapsed during the 2008 financial crisis and which are also at the center of the current lawsuit against Goldman Sachs.
Despite this dubious track record, the agencies still carry a carte blanche: If they award their highest seal of approval -- an AAA rating -- it means it's safe for investors. Unfortunately, such a rating can also be a trap. An AAA rating snared the Goldman clients -- among them the German bank IKB -- who invested in "Abacus 2007-AC1."
The agencies' quasi-monopoly goes back to 1909. That year, the financial analyst and investor John Moody began to categorize and score information about railroad companies, their stocks and their management. Later he added other industries and firms to the mix.
Today, Moody's analyzes more than 12,000 companies in 100 countries. S&P, which also maintains the famous S&P stock market indices, has been issuing ratings since 1916. It was bought by the financial and media conglomerate McGraw-Hill in 1966. Fitch, which was founded in 1916 and is now a subsidiary of the French holding company Fimalac, is the smallest member in this elite club.
Leading the Economy to Ruin
Ratings range from AAA all the way down to D. This traditional system proved to be worthless during the credit crisis. The dubious investment products at its heart defied serious and simple ratings. They were highly overrated by the agencies -- often at the request of the same companies who managed those products, which in return paid the rating agencies.
As early as 2006, Angelo Mozilo, then CEO of Countrywide, America's largest mortgage company, called Countrywide's subprime loans "toxic." Yet it took Moody's until the summer of 2007 to downgrade them. All this happened under the watchful eye of the US government.
That example was no exception. For years, the agencies gave their blessing to subprime loans which would later become the quicksand of the crisis, even when their risks were already known. This puts much of the responsibility for the collapse that followed onto the agencies' shoulders.
Their ratings helped lead the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns into ruin and helped destroy the insurance giant AIG. They also contributed to a trillion-dollar hole in the US budget. "The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of colossal failure," says Representative Henry Waxman, the Democratic chairman of the House Oversight Committee.
'We Sold Our Soul to the Devil for Revenue'
For a century, the rating agencies have acted as Wall Street's trusted referees. "But now, that trust has been broken," states Senator Levin's committee. "And they did it for the money."
From 2002 to 2007, the three top credit rating agencies doubled their revenues, from less than $3 billion ($2.2 billion) to over $6 billion per year. Most of this increase came from ratings. Their executives got paid "Wall Street-sized salaries," according to the Senate committee.
"It's like one of the parties in court paying the judge's salary, or one of the teams in a competition paying the salary of the referee," the report continues. The New York Times put it this way: "It is as if Hollywood studios paid movie critics to review their would-be blockbusters."
Not that they weren't aware of it themselves. Back in 2006, an S&P employee wrote in an internal email: "We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we would rate it." The next year, one of Moody's executives complained to his superiors that he felt "like we sold our soul to the devil for revenue."
The agencies and the banks are not just connected by money, but also by personnel. In 2005, Goldman hired Shin Yukawa, a ratings expert, away from Fitch. Yukawa immediately put his knowledge to good use -- in Goldman's mortgage department, which created "structured" credit products and made sure they got splendid ratings. One of these products was "Abacus 2007-AC1."
Little Chance of Reform
Yet a reform of the system is not in sight. The Democrats' current proposals to further regulate the US financial industry contain little about the rating agencies, apart from a tepid appeal to "strengthen" their regulation.
Some critics are now trying a different approach. A few institutional investors -- among them the state of Ohio -- are suing the agencies for their role in the financial crisis. On Monday, a Manhattan court denied Moody's and S&P's joint motion to dismiss one of those class-action lawsuits.
Two days later, S&P's hammer fell on Spain.
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Pete Peterson's Pathological Obsession
May 21 - 23, 2010
Punking the People, Punking the Left
By JOHN HALLE
Pete Peterson has stepped up his mischief making.
The last week of April found the most odious of Wall Street billionaires having assembled a parade of A-list Washington power brokers-up to and including former President Clinton- all willing to serve as enablers for Peterson's pathological idee fixe: deficit reduction.
There was, as to be expected, much talk of "personal responsibility", "sustainability", and "fiscal discipline" though it should be understood that these and other self- help bromides were the sugar coating on a pill laced with arsenic.
For Peterson has slyly removed from the table the obvious targets for reducing deficits-significantly increased taxes on billionaire wealth and millionaire income and a cutting off of funding for useless wars and weapons systems. What deficit reduction means is "entitlement reform" a code word for cut backs in Social Security benefits.bill
And that means numerous senior citizens standing in long lines at food pantries, others dumpster-diving for food, many living out their "golden years" in homeless shelters, and others literally freezing to death in unheated apartments.
It also means high unemployment, particularly among younger workers who would otherwise have available to them entry level positions vacated by seniors who will be now be dropping dead on the job if Peterson gets his way.
For all these reasons, any street corner peddler would recognize the product as a tough sell and that's why Peterson has committed, by his own accounting, a full one billion dollars of his personal fortune to try to an attempt to apply a metallic shine on the turd he is hawking.
Peterson's marketing blitz will reach a crescendo with his sponsorship of America Speaks!, "a national town hall meeting", taking place in 20 cities on June 26, according to its tastefully designed website. These astro-turf fora will encourage us "to weigh-in on the difficult choices involved with putting our federal budget on a sustainable path." Those who don't regard the choices required to address the deficit as "difficult" at all-rather a simple matter of reducing spending on the military and increasing taxes on billionaires, have no place at America Speaks, evidently. Nor do those who, quite reasonably, do not regard deficits as at all "unsustainable."
America Speaks coincides with the deliberations of Obama's deficit reduction commission, most members of which have already, in whole or in part, signed off on Peterson's austerity program.
Peterson thinks now is the time for the coup de grace to be delivered to the last remnants of the New Deal safety net, the pea under the mattress troubling the sleep of economic royalists since FDR.
But he's wrong. For unlike banking reform, climate change, the war in Afghanistan, and EFCA, where the corporate, oligarchic right steamrolled all opposition, it's not just the fringe left who will be on the streets when Peterson institutes his final solution. Even the most addled tea partier wants to "keep the government's hands off of our Social Security." It is not for nothing that Social Security is called the third rail of american politics.
America Speaks should be mobbed: with high school and college students facing a comatose job market, families trying to survive on a single income following the death or injury of their spouses, and current retirees whose current benefits have reduced them to near destitution and who are seeing their children's future in the pages of Dickens novels. And it should even include relatively privileged middle aged men whose retirement crucially depends on at least one of the stools of the retirement triad (now more than ever with our 401 Ks in the toilet.
After a series of humiliating defeats, the left should relish the chance to take ownership of June 26th.
Rather than the bullet putting the left out of its misery, as Peterson intends it, June 26th should be the first step in turning the tide.
John Halle is Director of Studies in Music Theory and Practice at Bard College. He can be reached at: halle@bard.edu
Banking System Collapse: Wake Up America Your Banks Are Dying
U.S. banks are being shut down by federal regulators at a staggering pace this year, and yet most Americans seem completely oblivious to it. In fact, federal officials have already shut down 81 U.S. banks this year, which is about double the number that were shut down at this time last year. So why aren't more people upset about this? Well, part of the reason is because the FDIC is doing it very, very quietly. The bank closings for each week are announced every Friday, which means that they pass through the news cycle over the weekend almost unnoticed. For example, banks in Nebraska, Mississippi and Illinois with total deposits of almost $2.3 billion were shut down by federal regulators on Friday. So did you hear about it before now? If not, why not? Shouldn't the fact that we are experiencing a banking system collapse be headline news? But most Americans are more than happy to remain blissfully ignorant of what is going on. In fact, most Americans seem far more interested in what is happening on American Idol or Dancing With The Stars. But when the American Dream starts dying for tens of millions of Americans as the economy collapses perhaps more people will start to care.
So just how bad is the banking system crisis?
Well, FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair says that 775 banks (approximately ten percent of all banks in the United States) are now on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's list of "problem" banks.
So should we be alarmed by that?
Well, there were only 252 U.S. banks on the FDIC's problem list at the end of 2008.
There were 702 U.S. banks on the FDIC's problem list at the end of 2009.
Now there are 775.
Do you know if your bank is on the verge of failing?
You might want to check.
But even if all of our banks fail the FDIC has plenty of money to cover our federally-insured banking accounts, don't they?
Unfortunately, they do not.
The FDIC is backing nearly 8,000 U.S. banks that have a total of $13 trillion in assets with a deposit insurance fund that is pretty close to flat broke.
It was recently reported that the FDIC's deposit insurance fund now has negative 20.7 billion dollars in it, which actually represents a slight improvement from the end of 2009.
But the bank failures on Friday drained another $313.6 million from the FDIC’s deposit-insurance fund.
And the way things are trending, the banking crisis could get a whole lot worse?
Why?
Well, Americans are simply not doing a very good job of paying their bills.
During the first quarter of 2010, the total number of loans at U.S. banks that were at least three months past due increased for the 16th consecutive quarter.
16 quarters in a row.
Just let that sink in.
If that is not a trend, then what is?
Oh, but the U.S. government will never let the entire banking system fail, right?
Well, they won't let the "too big to fail" banks go under, we have seen that.
But the small and mid size banks?
They fall into the "not big enough to bail out" category.
And where in the world is the U.S. government going to get more money to bail anyone out?
The reality is that the U.S. government is now over 13 trillion dollars in debt.
To give you an idea of just how horrific that is, if you started spending a million dollars a day on the day that Christ was born, you still would not have spent a trillion dollars by now.
That is how big a trillion is.
But for this year alone it is being projected that the U.S. government will have a budget deficit of approximately 1.6 trillion dollars.
So, yes, pretty much wherever you turn we are facing a financial nightmare.
What should we do about all this? Feel free to leave a comment with your thoughts....
Why State's Should Own Their Own Banks
How Banks Make Money on Low-Interest Loans
June 7, 2010
By ELLEN BROWN
Keeping interest rates low is considered the first line of defense for central banks bent on easing the credit crisis and getting banks to lend again. The Federal Reserve’s target for the federal funds rate -- the overnight interest rate that banks charge each other – has been kept at a rock-bottom 0% to 0.25% ever since December 2008. A growing number of economists now think it could stay there well into 2011 or even 2012, prompted by fears that a spreading debt crisis in Europe could hurt a budding U.S. recovery.
Dirk van Dijk, writing for the investor website Zacks.com, explains what a good deal this is for the banks:
“Keeping short-term rates low . . . is particularly helpful to the big banks like Bank of America (BAC) and JPMorgan (JPM). Their raw material is short-term money, which is effectively free right now. They can borrow at 0.25% or less, and then turn around and invest those funds in, say, a 5-year T-note at 2.50%, locking in an almost risk-free profit of 2.25%. On big enough sums of money, this can be very profitable, and will help to recapitalize the banking system (provided they don’t drain capital by paying it out in dividends or frittering it away in outrageous bonuses to their top executives).”
This can be very profitable indeed for the big Wall Street banks, but the purpose of the near-zero interest rates was supposed to be to get the banks to lend again. Instead, they are investing this virtually interest-free money in risk-free government bonds, on which we the taxpayers are paying 2.5% interest; or are using the money to engage in the same sort of unregulated speculation that nearly brought down the economy in 2008, or to buy up smaller local banks, or to pay “outrageous bonuses to their top executives.” Even when banks do deign to use their nearly-interest-free funds to support loans, they do not pass these very low rates on to borrowers. The fed funds rate was lowered by 5% between August 2007 and December 2008; yet the 30 year fixed mortgage rate dropped less than 1%, from 6.75% to only about 6%.
Why Do Banks Need to Borrow? Because They Don’t Really Have the Money They Lend
Dirk van Dijk writes that “short-term money” -- meaning money borrowed short-term from other banks -- is the “raw material” of the big banks. Why, you may ask, do banks need to borrow from each other? Don’t they just take in money from their depositors and relend it?
The answer is no. Banks do not lend their depositors’ money or their own money. As the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas explains on its website:
“Banks actually create money when they lend it. Here’s how it works: Most of a bank’s loans are made to its own customers and are deposited in their checking accounts. Because the loan becomes a new deposit, just like a paycheck does, the bank . . . holds a small percentage of that new amount in reserve and again lends the remainder to someone else, repeating the money-creation process many times.”
A bank simply advances bank credit created on its books. This credit becomes a deposit in the account of the borrower, who can write checks on it. The checks then get deposited in other banks and trade in the economy as what we all know as “money.”
A bank can create as much money on its books as it can find creditworthy borrowers for, up to the limit of its capital requirement. The hitch comes when the checks drawn on these loans-turned-deposits are cleared, usually through the Federal Reserve. A bank with a 10% reserve requirement must keep 10% of its deposits either as “vault cash” or in a reserve account at the Fed, and when checks are cleared by the Fed, it is through this account. The effect is to make the bank short of reserves, which it can try to replenish by attracting back the customers of the bank where the credit was deposited. But as was explained by the Winterspeak blogging team:
“If bank A [the lending bank] fails to [attract new depositors], then it simply borrows the reserves it needs overnight from . . . bank B [the bank where the reserves wound up]. The overnight lending market is designed to do exactly this. Bank B, in this case, happens to have exactly the quantity of reserves bank A needs, and since reserves earn no interest, is happy to lend to bank A at the federal funds rate, which is the overnight interbank lending rate.”
In effect, a bank can create money on its books, lend the money at interest (today about 4.7% on a fixed rate mortgage), then clear the outgoing check by borrowing back the money it just created, at a cost to the bank of only the very low fed funds rate (now .2%). The bank creates bank credit, lends it at 4.7%, then borrows it back at .2% to clear the outgoing checks, collecting 4.5% interest as its profit. The credit the bank has lent is not an asset it has labored to earn but is simply “the full faith and credit of the United States” – the credit of the people collectively. Yet the bank is allowed to pocket a hefty interest spread on this credit-generating scheme; and that is assuming it lends at all, something that is happening less and less these days, since bankers find it safer and more lucrative to use their nearly interest-free credit lines to invest in risk-free government bonds at taxpayers’ expense, engage in speculation, or pay themselves sizeable bonuses.
Avoiding Another Lehman-style Credit Collapse
The reason banks are highly dependent on loans from each other, then, is that they need these low-cost loans to keep the credit shell game going. This is particularly true for large Wall Street banks. Small banks get their funds mainly from customer deposits, and usually have more deposits than they can find creditworthy borrowers for. Large banks, on the other hand, generally lack sufficient deposits to fund their main business -- dealing with large companies, governments, other financial institutions, and wealthy people. Most borrow the funds they need from other major lenders in the form of short term liabilities that must be continually rolled over.
That helps shed light on what really caused the credit crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The Lehman bankruptcy triggered a run on the money markets, causing interbank lending rates to soar. The London interbank lending rate (LIBOR) normally adheres closely to official interest rate expectations (meaning, in the U.S., the targeted fed funds rate); but after Lehman went bankrupt, the LIBOR rate for short-term loans shot up to around 5%. Since the cost of borrowing the money to cover their loans was too high for banks to turn a profit, lending abruptly came to a halt.
Interest rates on variable rate mortgages and big corporate deals tend to be based on LIBOR rates, which are moving up again now, although the fed funds rate has not changed. LIBOR rates are moving up due to tensions arising from the possibility that Europe’s sovereign debt crisis could turn into another global banking crisis.
This is just one of many reasons that states should consider following the model of North Dakota, the only state that currently owns its own bank. The state-owned Bank of North Dakota (BND) helped North Dakota escape the credit crisis. The BND has a very large and captive deposit base, since all of the revenues of the state are deposited in the bank by law, keeping the bank solvent regardless of what is happening in the interbank lending market. North Dakota is currently the only state not struggling with a budget deficit.
Nations could follow this model as well. A recent article in The Economist noted that the strong and stable publicly-owned banks of India, China and Brazil helped those countries weather the banking crisis afflicting most of the world in the last two years.
If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them
While the banks responsible for today’s economic crisis are enjoying unprecedented benefits, state and local governments are forced to maintain very large and wasteful rainy day funds, even as they are slashing services to balance their budgets. They have to do this because they do not have the secure, nearly-interest-free credit lines available to private banks. Owning their own banks can allow local governments to avail themselves of the very low interest rates accessible to private banks, by giving them the same authority to create “bank credit” on their books that private banks have. North Dakota, which has had its own government-owned bank for over 90 years, not only is the only state to sport a budget surplus but has the lowest unemployment rate in the U.S. It evidently has no funding problems at all. Five other states currently have bills on their books to consider forming their own banks, and several others have discussed that option in their legislatures.
The Federal Reserve and the U.S. government have gone to extraordinary lengths to keep a corrupt banking system afloat, including buying toxic assets off their books and making credit available nearly interest-free, all in the name of turning the credit spigots back on on Main Street; but the banks have not kept their end of the bargain. In fact, they are just doing what their business models require of them – making the highest possible return for their shareholders. Publicly-owned banks operate on a different model: they must serve the community. Like China, India and Brazil, U.S. states would be well served to set up publicly-owned banks that could provide credit to the local economy when the private banking scheme fails.
Ellen Brown is the author of Web of Debt: the Shocking Truth About Our Money System and How We Can Break Free. She can be reached through her website.
FBI Uses Terror-Probe Tactics on Fraud
By DEVLIN BARRETT
Federal Bureau of Investigation officials in New York are increasingly employing tools and techniques used to hunt terrorists to take aim at a different kind of criminal: white-collar con artists and inside traders.
At a time when the public has grown suspicious of Wall Street and lost confidence in the government's ability to police it, investigators say they are expanding a number of methods, including the use of human sources, so-called tripwire programs, and internal intelligence reports, to try to get a better handle on crimes in the marketplace.
"We're trying to apply the principles of the national-security side so we can prevent something from becoming a $50 billion fraud by catching it early on," FBI Special Agent-in-Charge James Trainor said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.
Mr. Trainor, who is head of the New York field office's intelligence division, said he is trying to change what he says is the culture of silence on Wall Street along with the culture of investigative work in his office.
"Say there's somebody at a hedge fund who is considering investing. The folks who do this kind of research are very bright, and presumably many people did not invest in Bernard Madoff or somebody like Madoff. Instead of just not investing, I'd like them to also give me a call," he said.
Both the FBI and the Securities and Exchange Commission have faced criticism for not catching Mr. Madoff earlier in his decades of defrauding investors. As part of its own overhaul, the SEC launched an effort earlier this year to cultivate more informants and sources.
That sort of increased human intelligence-gathering is also at the root of the FBI's efforts.
Mr. Trainor, who oversees hundreds of intelligence analysts and agents, said he believed there was a "keep it quiet" culture among financial-sector workers who are afraid of being blackballed in the industry if they report their suspicions to authorities. He said that reluctance to talk must be worn down over time.
To get a better sense of Ponzi schemes and other crimes, the FBI has created a system of internal intelligence reports on ongoing investigations into financial crimes. The contents of the reports, called domain intelligence notes, can give early warning to agents not involved in the investigation about new frauds that have been uncovered.
Mr. Trainor said the bureau is also using tripwire programs aimed at encouraging citizens who might get the first signs of something nefarious to contact an investigator.
In terror cases, tripwires have been set up for large purchases of household chemicals that can be used to make explosives.
In the financial sector, tripwire programs focus on a range of areas where workers might see the first glimmers of a criminal conspiracy. For example, employees of trading firms would be encouraged to report questionable buying or selling or stock; those working at rating agencies would be asked to report suspcious lobbying to improve ratings.
Toby Vick, a lawyer who handles white-collar cases in Washington and around the country, said the FBI's new approach may help catch con artists, but he voiced doubts it would ensnare those involved in securities fraud. He said that finding a crooked investment banker within a corporation can often be a needle-in-a-haystack search, so using methods designed to map out terror networks may not work.
"It sends a chilling message to Wall Street, and I think practically speaking, it's a hard thing to do," said Mr. Vick. "All drug dealers are drug dealers, all terrorists are terrorists, but very few bond dealers are crooks."
Marvin Pickholz, a former SEC enforcement official now in private practice in New York, said investigators should maintain a healthy skepticism of the people supplying the FBI information, because they may be acting more out of self-interest than civic virtue.
"If the idea is to get more boots on the ground and more eyeball contact, that's wonderful, because that's where the system kind of went off the tracks in the sense that the SEC didn't understand what it was looking at," said Mr. Pickholz.
The veteran lawyer said he always offered up a particular strategy to investigators trying to catch more white-collar crooks: "Go down on the Street and go hang out in a bar, because people say things in a bar they would never admit elsewhere."
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