"End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby Nordic » Sat Jul 17, 2010 8:40 pm

http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2010/07/ ... onomy.html

The Financial Reform Bill Will (Not) Fix the Economy


As usual with this guy, the hyperlinks are so fast and furious in his article you just have to go there.
"He who wounds the ecosphere literally wounds God" -- Philip K. Dick
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby vanlose kid » Sun Jul 18, 2010 7:36 pm

*

"There's something [Michael] Douglas says in the movie [Wall Street 2].
He says that in 2008, of the corporate profits in the US, 47%
were from finance-related companies. In the old America, it was 17%.
It became the main business of America. We became a giant casino."
-- Oliver Stone

http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2010/jul ... all-street

*
"Teach them to think. Work against the government." – Wittgenstein.
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby Nordic » Mon Jul 19, 2010 2:48 am

I used to write at this blog quite a bit, then they censored me, so I left. But this particular guy is awesome, and he's one of my favorite writers on economics anywhere:

http://www.docudharma.com/diary/22189/w ... recovering

A sample:


The Secular Problem

Most Americans aren't aware that America once had a national economic plan, and it existed from the days of President Lincoln to President Nixon in one form or another. During that 112 year period America grew from an agrarian, frontier nation, to the most mighty economic power the world had ever seen.
Obviously there had to be something good in that economic plan.

The roots of the American School of Economics go back to Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List, and Henry Clay of the Whig Party.
The American School of Economics was far different from the dominant economic thought of today.

The key components of the American School directly confront, deny and refute the economic imperialism that the so-called "Free Trade" school championed then by England and imposed by means mostly foul upon Europe over the years. It rejects free trade by imposing a system of duties, tariffs and other measures designed to defend the nation against economic threats by foreign predators. It uses government-directed spending projects meant to provide the infrastructure necessary for individuals to develop into the highly-educated and highly-trained people capable of being the ambitious and enterprising productive people we are famous for being. It chartered a national bank, owned wholly by the government, that administered the lines of credit necessary to get all of this done and otherwise oversaw the monetary policy of the state- and thus remained utterly accountable to the people by way of Congress and the Presidency.

The American School of Economics also involved government support for the development of science and a public school system. Through this economic philosophy America set the standard in manufacturing, higher education, scientific research and development, finance, and general standard of living.
So what happened? Under President Nixon the decision was made to remove protective trade barrier and go to a Free Trade model in 1973.

According to The Myth of Free Trade by Dr. Ravi Batra:

"Unlike most of its trading partners, real wages in the United States have been tumbling since 1973, the first year of the country's switch to laissez-faire...Before 1973, the U.S. economy was more or less closed and self-reliant, so that efficiency gains in industry generated only a modest price fall, and real earnings soared for all Americans....Moreover, it turns out that 1973 was the first year in its entire history when the United States became an open economy with free trade.
"Since 1973 and free trade, the link between real wages and productivity was severed, where its commitment to free trade soared faster than domestic economic activity. Real wages for 80% of the labor force have been steadily shrinking in spite of rising productivity. Free trade skews the real value of manufactured goods, through cheaper foreign labor or weaker foreign currencies in relative prices, despite increased productivity and innovation, in turn creating a shrinking consumer base."

A good example is NAFTA. Despite predictions that NAFTA would create 170,000 American jobs in just the first two years, Congress set up the NAFTA-TAA (Trade Adjustment Assistance) program for displaced workers. Between 1994 and the end of 2002, 525,094 specific U.S. workers were certified for assistance under this program. Because the program only applied to certain industries, only a small fraction of the total job losses were covered by this program.

Remember those car companies that the American taxpayer saved so we could keep some well-paying manufacturing jobs in America? Well, guess what?

General Motors and Volkswagen have invested billions in China, starting more than a decade ago. Ford is rushing to catch up by adding production capacity and expanding its dealer network in China. Ford and its joint-venture partner, Chang'an Ford Mazda Automobile, plan to start producing next-generation Ford Focus models at a new, $490 million plant in Chongqing in 2012.

How can American workers compete with Chinese workers making $5 a day? You can't live on that in America. You literally couldn't keep a roof over your head on that wage. Our "free trade" philosophy is killing the working class of this country.

Any serious national economist who objectively reviews the reality of free trade must eventually come to the conclusion that it is ruinous to a nation. Granted it may seem to work short term in providing "cheap goods" but in the longer perspective it destroys the productive wealth-creating base of a community.

The only ones who benefit from the free trade policy are multi-national corporations and the the wealthy who own them. The workers of this country were never meant to benefit from the free trade policies, but there is an entire industry of talking heads who try to convince you not to believe your own "lying eyes".

The free trade model is a fallacy and every thinking person knows it. However, our corrupt and compromised politicians can't admit it because they are owned by the very people who benefit the most from it.

Besides adopting a free trade model, America has turned away from the other tenants of the American School of Economics. Specifically, it has neglected public infrastructure projects in the hope that privatization of public assets would do a more capable and efficient job. This strategy has also failed miserably.

The third leg of the American School of Economics was to create a financial infrastructure that would "use of sovereign powers for the regulation of credit to encourage the development of the economy, and to deter speculation."

In a trifecta, our rejection of this principle has been an utter failure.

Even after the credit cycle finally runs its course, the country has to overcome its more intractable systemic problems. Fortunately, we have a working model with 112 years of success to operate from.

The primary obstacles between our present situation and a return to wealth-producing prosperity is our politicians and the wealthy class who own them.


I had never heard of American School of Economics, nor its relation to the real economic prosperity of this country. But when I read this, I think "yeah". That's what I've been realizing for years now. It seems like plain old common sense but God knows you can't run a country based on common sense. Not any more.
"He who wounds the ecosphere literally wounds God" -- Philip K. Dick
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby semper occultus » Mon Jul 19, 2010 2:26 pm

this was in today's FT & covers rather similar ground - the differences in analysis are interesting given the socio-economic perspective of the source - although we can apparently all agree Nixon was a complete c**t

Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy, By Anatole Kaletsky,

www.ft.com

Capitalism 1 was a world of laisser faire. This concept dominated economics and economic policy from The Wealth of Nations to the Great Depression. Capitalism 2, the product of that depression, recognised the interdependence of politics and economics, and gave government a role in macroeconomic management and the direction of industry. It fell apart in the inflationary malaise of the 1970s.

The coming of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher inaugurated Capitalism 3, a regime of market fundamentalism in which inequality widened and the financial sector flourished. The credit crunch of 2007-08 is the trigger for an equally substantial revision. Today we face the prospect, not of the demise of capitalism, but of a new form – Capitalism 4.

This is a very different view of capitalism from market fundamentalism, which believes that human progress is best achieved by imposing as few restrictions as possible on a natural impetus towards greed, and that economic decisions are based on rational expectations in efficient markets in which prices incorporate all possible knowledge of the future. In my view Kaletsky is absolutely spot on in this analysis of why capitalism works, and in his explanation of why market fundamentalism has proved such a dangerously misleading guide to policy.

So what does Kaletsky’s Capitalism 4.0, which rejects both laisser faire and any economic model derived from efficient markets or rational expectations, look like? Capitalism 4 controls government spending but prefers Keynesian stimulus to budget-balancing austerity. It favours free markets, but not uncritically, and is concerned to mitigate inequality. Capitalism 4 is, above all, pragmatic. In fact, it looks distinctly like Capitalism 2.

If we could delete the years 1965-85 from history, Capitalism 2 mostly worked pretty well. Why did it go wrong? For Kaletsky, the decisive event was President Richard Nixon’s abandonment of the dollar’s link to gold in 1971, which inaugurated the era of floating exchange rates. But Nixon’s devaluation was less the cause of inflation than the result: price levels around the developed world had been rising at an accelerating rate since the 1950s.

The explanation lies elsewhere. The stability and widely distributed growth achieved under Capitalism 2 created rising expectations that growth was eventually insufficient to satisfy. Inflation was the easiest political response. Capitalism 3 was a reaction to that failure.

....ahh so it was all the fault of pesky voters expecting their lives to improve.....well they sure showed us....

It is good to be pragmatic, but pragmatic policies that are not rooted in any guiding principles are incoherent. That was the experience of Kaletsky’s two principal villains – Nixon; and the man whom Kaletsky holds personally responsible for the credit crunch, Hank Paulson, the former Treasury secretary. The criticism is not unfair – even among politicians Nixon was unusually unprincipled and Mr Paulson unusually incompetent. But Kaletsky’s view of history is one that exaggerates the role of particular individuals and decisions. The collapse of Capitalism 2 was not caused by Nixon, nor the collapse of Capitalism 3 by Mr Paulson: the collapse of these modes of capitalist behaviour was the product of their own internal contradictions, to borrow a phrase, and Capitalism 4 can only thrive if it resolves the contradictions of Capitalism 2 more effectively than did the politicians of the era of the Great Society and “you’ve never had it so good”.


I also can't help mischievoulsy pointing out Ravi Batra also wrote :
Image

worth remembering when the doom-sayers get on top of you
this economic forecasting business sure is tough !

I might even cross post this in the apocolyptic memes thread !
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby seemslikeadream » Fri Jul 23, 2010 9:53 pm

7 Banks in Europe Fail ‘Stress Test’ for Scant Capital
Banks to flunk were Hypo Real Estate, a Munich-based bank that is already government-owned after a bailout, ATEBank of Greece and five Spanish savings banks.
By JACK EWING
Published: July 23, 2010


FRANKFURT — Seven of Europe’s 91 largest banks would struggle to survive an unexpected decline in economic growth or a sharp deterioration in the value of European government bonds, and will need to raise more capital, regulators said Friday in releasing results of closely watched bank stress tests.
Multimedia


Document: European Regulators’ Findings in Bank Stress Tests

Image

Banks to flunk were Hypo Real Estate, a bank based in Munich that is already government-owned after a bailout, ATEBank of Greece and five Spanish savings banks.

Several other banks passed the test, but narrowly enough that they may also face market pressure to increase their reserves. That group included Postbank, one of Germany’s biggest publicly traded banks, which is 25 percent owned by Deutsche Bank.

Governments in the countries affected, or the banks themselves, said they were ready with measures to raise more money for banks whose reserves were considered too low to withstand the worst-case outlooks.

After months of turmoil in markets caused by Europe’s sovereign debt crisis and its effects on the banking system, governments and investors alike were looking to the tests to see if Europe could demonstrate that it was finally confronting the problems and dealing with them head on. Whether the tests succeed in reviving confidence depends on whether investors and analysts believe they were severe enough to expose vulnerable banks.

“The stricter the better for the euro,” said Adam Cole, global head of foreign exchange strategy at RBC Capital Markets.

Nicolas Véron, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, called the level of detail released “disappointing.”

“Investors cannot reverse-engineer the results and apply their own assumptions,” he said.

Bank regulators and central bankers insisted that the tests were rigorous and that fears about the stability of European banks were overblown.

“It is a very serious test,” Franz-Christoph Zeitler, a member of the executive board of the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, said at a news conference in Frankfurt. “All this criticism was absolutely premature.”

The stress tests, similar to an exercise conducted in the United States last year, were intended to rebuild confidence in European financial institutions that has been shaken by the sovereign debt crisis. Uncertainty about which banks may be sitting on piles of Greek debt and other potentially toxic assets has made institutions reluctant to lend to each other as well as to businesses, and acted as a drag on economic growth.

Some banks had already moved to raise capital ahead of the results. National Bank of Greece, which passed the test, said Friday that it sold €450 million, or $580 million, of 10-year bonds to bolster its regulatory capital. “The sale process was completed within just four days, reflecting the investment community’s confidence in N.B.G.,” the lender said.

Banca Cívica, a merger of three smaller savings banks in Spain, failed the test. But it said ahead of the results that it had signed an agreement with J.C.Flowers, a U.S. buyout firm, to place €450 million in convertible bonds.

Hypo Real Estate said the stress test had “limited relevance” because it was already in the process of transferring troubled assets to a so-called bad bank underwritten by the German government.

Miguel Ángel Fernández Ordóñez, governor of the Bank of Spain, told a news conference that the stress test results vindicated the recent push to force the savings banks, or cajas, to consolidate, as well as the regulatory overhaul to open up their capital to more investors.

The tests were evidence of “the enormous means” of the Spanish banking sector to overcome a crisis, he said. “When there are doubts, you have to be absolutely transparent, and this is what we have done.”

In addition to Banca Cívica, four other unlisted Spanish savings banks failed: Diada, Unnim, Espiga and CajaSur, which was bailed out by the Bank of Spain in May.

In a potential blow to the tests’ credibility, regulators did not examine whether banks could withstand a debt default by Greece or any other European country. European authorities — in contrast to many economists — consider such a possibility unthinkable.

In a compromise, banks were scheduled to detail their holdings of Greek, Spanish, Portuguese and other sovereign bonds. But a report released by the European bank supervisors did not contain that information, which would clear up intense speculation about which banks are most exposed.

To pass the tests, a bank’s Tier 1 capital, a measure of reserves, had to not drop below 6 percent of assets in the face of a new recession and a sovereign debt crisis.

The authorities across Europe were clearly nervous about market reaction to the tests and delayed releasing the results until after European stock markets closed. Trading was relatively flat Friday, although bank shares were down.

Germany’s nine public-sector landesbanks all passed — a result that could encourage skepticism about whether the criteria were harsh enough. Many analysts regard the state-controlled landesbanks, which suffered billions in losses from subprime assets and other ill-advised investments, as overly susceptible to political influence and lacking a strategy to be consistently profitable.

Norddeutsche Landesbank, based in Hanover, passed narrowly, but Mr. Zeitler said it would not need to raise new capital.

The authorities argued that, in contrast to the U.S. stress tests last year, the European tests came after a huge rescue effort in which E.U. countries staked more than a quarter of the bloc’s gross domestic product to prevent the landesbanks and other troubled institutions from failing. Therefore, the authorities said, the comparatively high pass rate was justified. In the United States, 10 of the 19 banks tested were told they needed to raise a total of $75 billion in new capital.

The four main French banks, representing 80 percent of the banking assets in the country, all passed easily. “These result shows that they remain capable of ensuring a strong financing of the economy both under the central scenario and under the highly stressed scenario,” said Christian Noyer, governor of the Bank of France.

Coming days will reveal whether the tests will end banks’ mistrust of one another’s creditworthiness and encourage interbank lending, which is crucial to normal functioning of the financial system and ultimately the overall economy. In May, money markets nearly froze as prices for Greek bonds plummeted, prompting the authorities to take extraordinary measures to prevent a crisis that could have threatened the solvency of some banks.

On May 10, E.U. officials and the International Monetary Fund pledged €750 billion, or nearly $1 trillion, to guarantee the sovereign debt of member nations. The European Central Bank also began buying Greek and other government and corporate debt on open markets to restore trading in the sovereign paper, an unprecedented decision that provoked dissent within the bank.

The E.C.B. is anxious to wean institutions off the almost unlimited cheap loans it has been providing since the beginning of the financial crisis, but cannot do so unless banks resume lending to one another.

In a second round due in two weeks, the tests will be expanded to bank subsidiaries, like the East European institutions owned by banks based in Vienna.

The stress tests were the most extensive ever conducted in Europe, covering 65 percent of the total banking market and 20 countries from Ireland to Poland. Regulators nearly tripled the number of banks participating in part because of prodding from the U.S. Treasury secretary, Timothy F. Geithner, who had expressed concern that the European authorities did not have the sovereign debt crisis under control.

Disclosure of the test results was also unprecedented, and came only after extensive negotiations with banks, which in Germany and some other countries could not legally be compelled to release the data. Previous stress test exercises covered far fewer banks, and the authorities released only general information about the results.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby seemslikeadream » Fri Jul 23, 2010 9:59 pm

I'm gonna post Mx32 OP here.....interesting isn't it?



Guest Post: Gold Swap Signals the Roadmap Ahead
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 07/23/2010 09:34 -0500

Bank of England Bank of New York Banking Practices Ben Bernanke CDO Central Banks Collateralized Debt Obligations Commodity Futures Trading Commission European Central Bank Federal Reserve Federal Reserve Bank Federal Reserve Bank of New York Germany Global Economy Goldman Sachs Greece Guest Post Hank Paulson International Monetary Fund Mervyn King Money Supply Paul McCulley PIMCO Portugal Quantitative Easing Reality Reserve Currency Shadow Banking Sovereign Debt Switzerland Transparency Trichet

Submitted by Gordon T. Long of Tipping Points

Sultans of Swap: Gold Swap Signals the Roadmap Ahead

The news rocked the global gold market when an almost obscure line item in the back of a 216 page document released by an equally obscure organization was recently unearthed. Thrust into the unwanted glare of the spotlight, the little publicized Bank of International Settlements (BIS) is discovered to have accepted 349 metric tons of gold in a $14B swap. Why? With whom? For what duration? How long has this been going on? This raises many questions and as usual with all $617T of murky unregulated swaps, we are given zero answers. It is none of our business!

Considering the US taxpayer is bearing the burden of $13T in lending, spending and guarantees for the financial crisis, and an additional $600B of swaps from the US Federal Reserve to stem the European Sovereign Debt crisis, some feel that more transparency is merited. It is particularly disconcerting, since the crisis was a direct result of unsound banking practices and possibly even felonious behavior. The arrogance and lack of public accountability of the entire banking industry blatantly demonstrates why gold manipulation, which came to the fore in recent CFTC hearings, has been able to operate so effectively for so long. It operates above the law or more specifically above sovereign law in the un-policed off-shore, off-balance sheet zone of international waters.

Since President Richard Nixon took the US off the Gold standard in 1971, transparency regarding anything to do with gold sales, leasing, storage or swaps is as tightly guarded by governments as the unaudited gold holdings of Fort Knox. Before we delve into answering what this swap may be all about and what it possibly means to gold investors, we need to start with the most obvious question and one that few seem to ask. Who is this Bank of International Settlements and who controls it?

BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS)

The history of the BIS reads with all the intrigue of a spy novel and comes with a very checkered past. According to the BIS web site, as a privately held bank, it decided in recent years to become wholly owned and controlled by the Central Banks of the world - a highly unusual decision for a private enterprise. Lengthy court cases in Le Hague were involved by private members who objected. Something like this is usually called a buy out or takeover, but there are no public records of any of the central banks making such an acquisition - an extremely strange set of events with little media coverage.

I am sure it can all be explained very logically until we get to the size of the balance sheet. We are talking close to a half trillion dollar balance sheet, or more specifically 259 billion SDR’s, which is approximately $400B. Where did the capital or deposits come from? The BIS goes out of its way to specifically assert it only accepts deposits from member central banks, though it does also state confusingly in the financial notes that there are deposits from previous financial statements from recognized international banks. Therefore, are we to conclude that the US Federal Reserve has huge deposits at the BIS? Though I couldn’t find the assets on the Fed’s balance sheet, I’m sure they are there in the small print or on the New York Feds balance sheet somewhere. It would be a legal requirement. It is a forensic accounting nightmare to find these items based on public documents of the various private organizations. Apparently it is just none of our business. For such a major element of the world’s operating financial structure to have such poor visibility, it seems preposterous until you actually do the research. It should be laid out so a freshman Economics class could easily follow the ownership acquisition and money flows. It isn’t and it appears to this researcher that it is intentionally opaque.

Since the BIS goes out of its way to ensure readers in its annual financial report that no private funds are accepted, maybe all we really need to know is what the BIS officially tells us. The BIS is owned and controlled by their member Central Banks. Therefore if the BIS was to do a gold swap of the magnitude of 349 metric tonnes, then board member Ben Bernanke would have known of it in advance and approved it. He would know exactly who the transaction was with and why. If he didn’t then he is legally negligent in his fiduciary responsibility as a BIS board member, because of the size of the transaction and its material effect. Other board members include: Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, Axel Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank and William C Dudley, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. You can’t have it both ways.

Though we can suspect many things, there is no other conclusion we can reach than the swap is part of an agreed upon plan or concurrence between these board members. So what is the possible understanding or plan?

WHO GAVE UP THE GOLD?

There are not a lot of institutions who possess 349 metric tonnes of gold. So who needs $14B worth of cash and has this amount of gold? That shouldn’t be too hard to find.

Sovereign governments have historically created their wealth by invading other countries to pillage their treasuries which held gold, silver and the crown jewels. The winning and seizure of more land allowed the sovereign to give it to the nobles who used it to tax and tithe the feudal tenets. Recurring wealth flowed upward to the sovereign treasury.

Considering today’s EU membership, where sovereign countries can no longer print their own currency (the politicians first weapon of choice), there are three channels (other than the very politically unpopular increase in taxes and fees) open in modern times to raising money for the treasury:

The public sale of debt offerings instruments such as Bills, Notes and Bonds
The more recent and stealthy approach of selling assets, including revenue streams from such things as taxes, fees, licensing etc. These are sold into the securitization market through complex derivative structures such as Interest Rate and Currency Swaps contracts. This approach, as recently discovered, has been rampant throughout Europe even prior to the creation of the EU.
When you exhaust all of the above, you then sell the family jewels – the sovereign treasury of gold holdings.
The BIS was very quick to respond to public speculation about the massive gold swap when they immediately clarified that the gold swap was with a commercial bank. Since by its own statements, as I mentioned above, it doesn’t accept deposits from non member banks, this seems confusing on the surface. Does it or doesn’t it accept private deposits? It would be respectful to assume that the BIS is telling the truth and that they did in fact conduct the transaction with a private bank who was transacting the swap on behalf of a central bank or sovereign treasury. This would sort of make everything work. For the BIS to be telling the truth in all their statements, the transaction must be with a member central bank with the involvement of an intermediary commercial bank. But something still isn’t right here.

When you work through the details you quickly arrive at an astounding coincidence. Portugal shows it has 348 tonnes of sovereign gold. The swap was for 346. Portugal is a member bank, though does not sit on the Board, but attends the General Meeting as an observer only. Portugal, as a member of the PIIGS, only days after the unearthing of the swap, was again downgraded by Moody’s, thereby making its lending costs even higher than the already elevated levels being demanded by the financial markets. There is a very strong possibility that the swap is with Portugal. Though who the swap is with is important to those trading debt and credit derivatives it isn’t quite as important to those interested in the gold market.

Ben Davies the CEO of Hinde Capital in London and a player in the gold market suspects (12:40) we may have a modified form of swap emerging. There is the possibility that the commercial bank is in fact a major gold bullion bank. Some of the bullion banks have major short positions on gold that far outstrip the annual physical production of gold. The disconnect between physical and paper gold along with rising gold prices is likely causing serious strains on their balance sheet. As Davies points out the gold may be transacted from a central bank to the BIS through a bullion bank while the gold physically remains with the originating central bank; is classified as ‘unallocated’ at the BIS but in fact remains on the books of the bullion bank. It effectively is double accounted for. The increase in gold would allow gold prices to be pushed lower, which in fact is what has been happening. A careful reading of the BIS financial statements shows more clearly the accounting for such a transaction.

There can be little doubt that the Gold Swap is with a central bank where the physical gold remains. The transaction is considered a deposit at the BIS (liability) but has been lent to a commercial bank (likely a bullion bank) as a loan (asset). The question is only why a bullion bank needs to borrow this quantity of gold, remembering it never gets the physical gold because it remains at the originating central bank. The reader is encouraged to read the Financial Policy notes #4,5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 19 within the BIS Financial Statement for a clearer understanding along with Notes to the Financial Statements #4 and #11.


The BIS is known as the central bank to the central bankers.
The BIS may equally be referred to as the Central Gold Bullion Bank to the Gold Bullion Banks.


The March 31 2010 Financial Statement of the BIS shows 43.0B SDR’s of gold or 16.6% of total assets. According to note #4 to the BIS Financial Statements: “ Included in ’Gold bars held at central banks” is SDR 8,160.1 million (346 tonnes) (2009: nil) of gold, which the Bank held in connection with gold swap operations, under which the Bank exchanges currencies for physical gold. The Bank has an obligation to return the gold at the end of the contract.” It is very important to appreciate this note is pertaining specifically to BIS ‘assets’ which in the case of banks are what the reader would consider ‘loans’. Under Financial Policy notes #5 to the Financial Statement the BIS is clear that under banking portfolios “all gold financial assets in these portfolios are designated as loans and receivables”. Separately, but very interestingly the BIS additionally states “ the remainder of the Banks equity is held in gold. The Bank’s own gold holdings are designated as available for sale”.

SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHT (SDR)

If problems get worse for Portugal, as possibly the global economic climate worsens, then the gold may never legally belong to Portugal. The contracted swap terms at some point may simply reclassify it a net zero sale, if Portugal fails to return the cash portion of the swap. The BIS would have 346 tonnes of gold and Portugal the $14B of Euros it has long since spent to solve a 2010 problem. By then Portugal likely would need even more loans in whatever currency would replace a crumpling or possibly extinct Euro.

Up until 2004 the BIS denominated its financial statements in Gold Francs. It now has made a major shift to denominating itself into Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). The calculation is exactly the same as used for the IMF. The SDR is operating as a defacto currency.



It takes a little arithmetic (which is not done in the financial statements) to be able to get values in any currency that can give the reader a perspective of the scope of the activities at the BIS. The SDR reporting obscures the BIS’s significant size and scope.

FUNDING

For those who followed the European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the negotiations with Greece, you know that the IMF was an unwelcomed intruder into EU financial affairs. Greece on more than one occasion held the IMF as a negotiating ploy and as a funding alternative to the EU’s procrastination and lack of decisiveness.

The IMF’s willingness to interfere created a lot of bad feelings within the EMU and Germany specifically. As Ambrose Evans-Prichard reported: “The ECB is barely on speaking terms with the IMF – the "Inflation Maximizing Fund" as it was dubbed in a Bundesbank memo - - The IMF has not caught up to the reality in Europe said ECB über-hawk Jürgen Stark on July 9th” The final EU bailout in fact heavily involved the IMF participation. The very busy IMF is the dominant crisis lender of last resort throughout all Central & Eastern European current financial problems.

What we are seeing is the emergence of another funding structure based on the SDR - SDR’s that have a degree of gold backing. The BIS now has a total of 12.4% of its deposits (32B SDR) in the form gold deposits. Note #11 to the BIS financial statements states: “Gold deposits placed with the Bank originate entirely from Central Banks. They are all designated as financial liabilities measured as amortized cost”.

ARE WE SETTING THE PINS UP FOR AN ALTERNATIVE RESERVE CURRENCY?

Are we moving towards the BIS and IMF being fractional reserve banks that will create money & credit - a reserve currency that will satisfy Russia and China with an element of Gold backing? A bank such as the BIS could easily assume this role (if it hasn’t already) as could the IMF with possible banking charter adjustments.

The chances are high that this is the roadmap we will find ourselves taking. Like all banking that started as Gold backed you could expect that in this case the little gold backing that starts the process is quickly diminished so a limitless money machine could begin functioning. The gold backing would likely be an initial requirement by Russia and China. The partial gold backing would lend credibility to the acceptance and a possible reserve currency alternative and eventual establishment as the global reserve currency.

SHADOW BANKING REPLACEMENT

The collapse of the Shadow Banking system and its attendant SIV / CDO structures were at the root of the financial crisis. That structure which is representative of a huge amount of the credit growth since the dotcom bubble burst isn’t coming back soon, if ever. The world needs more liquidity than the central banks or sovereign treasuries can currently deliver politically. The central bankers, huddled in their bimonthly board meeting at the BIS in Basel, Switzerland, know this better than anyone. Their discussions in the very halls of the BIS must resonate with them to use all the tools available at their disposal - quickly.

Paul McCulley and Richard Clarida at Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO) have written extensively about the Shadow Banking System and its growth. An extensive slide presentation on the Shadow Banking System can be found on my web site at TIPPING POINTS. I won’t go into the detail here, but suffice it to say that the shadow banking system collapse has created a massive hole in credit creation that central bankers can’t fill in the manner in which they presently appear to be approaching the problem. Of course appearances can be deceiving

The problem has now reached crisis proportions and the central bankers know they must urgently act in a coordinated manner. Deflation now has a firm hand on the global economy and this must be reversed. I have been calling for a US Quantitative Easing QE II of $5T in my writings for some time. This amount is required for the US alone. The entire global requirement is three to four times this amount.

Image

The above chart serves as an illustration to simplify the essence of the Shadow Banking System . The international bankers prefer to refer to the process as Capital Arbitrage. An arms-length agreement allowed the banks to invest in a Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV) as an affiliate investment. The large spread that an SIV captured made it an excellent investment, but more importantly it allowed the banks to use their fractional reserve (10X) money creation abilities to buy risky securitization products without them appearing on their balance sheet. The banks received huge multiplier leveraged returns from the high yielding Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) until the crisis imploded the game.

Image

HOW MUCH LEVERAGE WILL THE CENTRAL BANKER CHOOSE TO COMPOUND? => “x” times “y”

Image

When the financial crisis unfolded you may recall that then US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson’s (former Chairman and CEO of Goldman Sachs during the explosion of Shadow Banking structures) first solution was to create a $100B Super SIV. The SIV leverage thinking was so entrenched that this was the first ‘go to’ solution to fight de-leveraging. If we were to jump forward to today when we are further along in increasing and unprecedented de-leveraging, what the central bankers need to replace the shadow banking system is a vehicle that will deliver the previous scale of leverage PLUS an order of magnitude more. The answer is the Bank of International Settlements. The SIV model is used as illustrated ‘Shadow Central Banking System’ above.

With the use of the SDR ‘currency’, central bankers can compound fractional reserve lending.

IT’S ALREADY HAPPENING

It is my view this process is already well along. The following Bloomberg global money supply growth chart graphically shows this. As the circles indicate, once again money is flowing into the pipeline or at least into global bank reserves.

Image

CONCLUSION

The advantage of this approach is:

Leverage: Compounding money creation between banks
Partial gold backing: Present BIS levels of 12.4%
SDR: Offers a basket of currencies approach versus a single currency dependency.
Former Communist bloc regime backing: China and Russia would likely support this approach for a number of reasons, which they have already expressed as short comings to the current global reserve situation.
Reserve Currency: The SDR approach offers a migration path from today’s US$ reserve currency to an alternative bank reserve currency to a future global reserve currency.


This may be the final lever required to initiate a Minsky Melt-Up (see: EXTEND & PRETEND - Manufacturing a Minsky Melt-Up) and the $5T in QE II (see: EXTEND & PRETEND: A Guide to the Road Ahead) I have been writing about for some time now.

There are many questions that are raised in the above discussion - many about the future role and safety of gold. Time and space don’t allow for this here. I hope to work through the answers in forthcoming articles.

If you would like to be notified as the articles are released, then sign-up and additionally follow the ongoing daily developments at Tipping Points.

The following gave me concern when I first read it many years ago and something for you to think about:


"...the powers of financial capitalism had another far-reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be controlled in a feudalist fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreements arrived at in frequent private meetings and conferences. The apex of the system was to be the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a private bank owned and controlled by the world's central banks which were themselves private corporations."


Professor Carroll Quigley
Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (1966)
President Bill Clinton’s Georgetown Professor



seemslikeadream

Thanks

Banking with Hitler


This investigative film shows in detail the roles played by the Anglo-German banking Cartel (notably the Bank of England controlled by the Rothschild and the Chase National Bank controlled by the Rockfeller as well as the Harriman/Bush’s Bank) through the BIS the Bank of International Settlement not only before the war but during the war. The BIS was originally established in May 1930 by bankers and diplomats of Europe and the United States to collect and disburse Germany’s World War I reparation payments (hence its name).

On its board were key Nazis such as Walther Funk and Hjalamar Schact The president of BIS was an American, Thomas McKittrick, who readily socialized with leading Nazis. Not only the BIS, but other allied banks worked hand in hand with the Nazis. One of the biggest American banks (Chase Bank) kept a branch open in Occupied Paris and, with full knowledge of the managers in the U.S., froze the accounts of French Jews. Deprived of money to escape France, many ended up in death camps.



Former Nazi Bank To Rule The Global Economy

The global elite has chosen the Bank For International Settlements, which financed Hitler’s war machine, to boss the financial arm of the new world order

Paul Joseph Watson
Prison Planet.com
Friday, April 30, 2010
European Central Bank chief Jean-Claude Trichet’s announcement that the Bank for International Settlements is to become the primary engine for global governance is a shocking admission given the fact that this ultra-secretive menagerie of international bankers was once controlled by top Nazis who, in collusion with global central banks, funneled money through the institution which directly financed Hitler’s war machine.
During a speech to the elitist CFR organization earlier this week, ECB head Trichet said that the Global Economy Meeting (GEM), which regularly meets at the BIS headquarters in Basel, “Has become the prime group for global governance among central banks”.
The GEM is basically a policy steering committee under the umbrella of the Bank for International Settlements. In its current form, the BIS, which itself is not accountable to any national government, is comprised of banking chiefs from global central banks, most of which are private and also have no responsibility to their nation states or their citizens.
The board of directors who control the BIS include Federal Reserve chief Ben Bernanke and Bank of England head Mervyn King, as well as Trichet himself.
So how did the Bank for International Settlements get started? The BIS was founded in 1930 by Governor of The Bank of England, Montague Norman and his German colleague Hjalmar Schacht, who later became Adolf Hitler’s finance minister.
The bank was initially founded in order to facilitate money transfers related to German reparations arising out of the Treaty of Versailles, but by the start of the second world war, the BIS was largely controlled by top Nazi officials, people like Walter Funk, who was appointed Nazi propaganda minister in 1933 before going on to become Hitler’s Minister for Economic Affairs. Another BIS director during this period was Emil Puhl, who as director and vice-president of Germany’s Reichsbank was responsible for moving Nazi gold. Both Funk and Puhl were convicted at the Nuremberg trials as war criminals.
Other BIS directors included Herman Schmitz, the director of IG Farben, whose subsidiary company manufactured Zyklon B, the pesticide used in Nazi concentration camp gas chambers to kill Jews and political dissidents during the Holocaust. IG Farben worked closely with John D. Rockefeller’s United States-based Standard Oil Co during the second world war.
Baron von Schroeder, the owner of the J.H.Stein Bank, the bank that held the deposits of the Gestapo, was also a BIS director during the war period.
As Charles Higham’s widely acclaimed book Trading With The Enemy, How the Allied multinationals supplied Nazi Germany throughout World War Two points out, several parties at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944 wanted to see the Bank for International Settlements liquidated, because its role in aiding Nazi Germany loot occupied European countries during the war. Norway called for the bank to be shut down, a view supported by Harry Dexter White, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and Henry Morgenthau, but the BIS survived despite its highly contentious Nazi influence.
Higham writes that the BIS became, “A money funnel for American and British funds to flow into Hitler’s coffers and to help Hitler build up his machine,” founded by Nazi finance minister Hjalmar Schacht on the basis that the “Institution that would retain channels of communication and collusion between the world’s financial leaders even in the event of an international conflict. It was written into the Bank’s charter, concurred in by the respective governments, that the BIS should be immune from seizure, closure or censure, whether or not its owners were at war.”
(ARTICLE CONTINUES BELOW)

“The BIS was completely under Hitler’s control by the outbreak of World War II,” writes Higham. “Among the directors under Thomas H. McKittrick were Hermann Shmitz, head of the colossal Nazi industrial trust I.G. Farben, Baron Kurt von Schroder, head of the J.H. Stein Bank of Cologne and a leading officer and financier of the Gestapo; Dr. Walther Funk of the Reichsbank, and, of course, Emil Puhl. These last two figures were Hitler’s personal appointees to the board.”
Higham details how the gold looted from countries invaded by the Nazis was packed into vaults controlled by the Bank for International Settlements, and how Nazis who controlled the bank then forbade any discussion of the theft.
“The BIS was an instrument of Hitler, but its continuing existence was approved by Great Britain even after that country went to war with Germany, and the British director Sir Otto Niemeyer, and chairman Montagu Norman, remained in office throughout the war,” writes Higham, explaining how Washington State Congressman John M. Coffee objected to American money being invested with the bank in 1944.
“The Nazi government has 85 million Swiss gold francs on deposit in the BIS. The majority of the board is made up of Nazi officials. Yet American money is being deposited in the Bank,” complained Coffee.
In 1948, the BIS was finally compelled to hand over a mere £4 million in looted Nazi gold to the allies, and thanks to people like Harry Truman and the Rockefeller family, the bank was not dissolved. One of its most influential directors, Nazi banker Emil Puhl was later invited to the United States as a guest of honor in 1950.
Despite its inglorious past, the Bank For International Settlements continues today as a major management arm of the global elite. The bank wields power through its control of vast amounts of global currencies. The BIS controls no less than 7% of the world’s available foreign exchange funds, as well as owning 712 tons of gold bullion, presumably a sizeable portion of which is the bullion which was stolen from occupied countries by the Nazis who controlled the bank during the war.
“By controlling foreign exchange currency, plus gold, the BIS can go a long way toward determining the economic conditions in any given country,” writes Doug Casey. “Remember that the next time Ben Bernanke or European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet announces an interest rate hike. You can bet it didn’t happen without the concurrence of the BIS Board.”
The BIS is basically a huge slush fund for global government through which secret transfers of wealth from citizens are surreptitiously handed to the IMF.
“For example, U.S. taxpayer monies can be passed through BIS to the IMF and from there anywhere. In essence, the BIS launders the money, since there is no specific accounting of where particular deposits came from and where they went,” writes Casey.
The fact that top Nazis were intimately involved in the activity of a global central bank that is now being touted as the primary powerhouse of the economic arm of world government is frightening. Every time we delve into the origins of the march towards world government, we find that top Nazis were instrumental in setting up and managing the same institutions that today seek to manage the imposition of global government.
Just as with the institutions that comprised the embryonic stages of the European Union, Nazi fingerprints are all over the origins of the move towards a global authority ruling the planet with nation states and sovereignty playing second fiddle. This fact demolishes any notion that global government is benevolent, humanitarian or progressive. Centralization of power into the hands of the few is inherently undemocratic, elitist, and to the detriment of the people.
The Nazis who breathed life into the same framework of global authoritarianism being used to set up world government today may have been usurped by an elite altogether more patient in their bid to impose a dictatorship run by banking dynasties, but the ultimate agenda remains the same – world government by consent or conques
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby beeline » Wed Aug 25, 2010 9:48 am

http://www.cnbc.com/id/38826988


Dow Faces Bouncy Ride to 5,000: Strategist

The Dow Jones Industrial Average will lose about half of its value over the next couple of years as it follows a Nikkei-like pattern of several sharp rallies in an overall decline, according to Charles Nenner, founder and president of Charles Nenner research.

Stocks are currently in a bear-market rally, and looking at charts and past trends, unemployment and leading indicators suggest the Dow will drop to 5,000 in the next two to two-and-a-half years, Nenner told CNBC in an e-mail.

Deflation will arrive, along with a sharp double-dip recession, pushing the Dow lower, although, like the Japanese market, stocks will see several jumps of 30 percent to 40 percent, he said.

"Things look really bad for the next 10 years," Nenner said.

While most stocks will get caught in the downturn, the exception will be those with exposure to soft commodities like wheat, corn and soybeans, he added.

Last week, JPMorgan strategist David Kelly said there is still a lot of opportunity in stocks and that a double-dip scenario is "very unlikely."

Nenner is also bullish on gold and silver over the longer term and expects the precious metals to start a new leg higher by the end of the year.

Bond yields should go lower for the next three or four years and the Japanese yen should gain against the dollar, he said, adding that his target was 80 yen per dollar.

Nenner also said that there is a strong case to suggest that the Federal Reserve will ease monetary policy further.
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby MinM » Fri Aug 27, 2010 2:03 pm

Image
Banks’ Self-Dealing Super-Charged Financial Crisis - ProPublica

Over the last two years of the housing bubble, Wall Street bankers perpetrated one of the greatest episodes of self-dealing in financial history.

Faced with increasing difficulty in selling the mortgage-backed securities that had been among their most lucrative products, the banks hit on a solution that preserved their quarterly earnings and huge bonuses:

They created fake demand
.

A ProPublica analysis shows for the first time the extent to which banks -- primarily Merrill Lynch, but also Citigroup, UBS and others -- bought their own products and cranked up an assembly line that otherwise should have flagged.

The products they were buying and selling were at the heart of the 2008 meltdown -- collections of mortgage bonds known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs.

As the housing boom began to slow in mid-2006, investors became skittish about the riskier parts of those investments. So the banks created -- and ultimately provided most of the money for -- new CDOs. Those new CDOs bought the hard-to-sell pieces of the original CDOs. The result was a daisy chain [1] that solved one problem but created another: Each new CDO had its own risky pieces. Banks created yet other CDOs to buy those.

Individual instances of these questionable trades have been reported before, but ProPublica's investigation, done in partnership with NPR's Planet Money [2], shows that by late 2006 they became a common industry practice.

Image

An analysis by research firm Thetica Systems, commissioned by ProPublica, shows that in the last years of the boom, CDOs had become the dominant purchaser of key, risky parts of other CDOs, largely replacing real investors like pension funds. By 2007, 67 percent of those slices were bought by other CDOs, up from 36 percent just three years earlier. The banks often orchestrated these purchases. In the last two years of the boom, nearly half of all CDOs sponsored by market leader Merrill Lynch bought significant portions of other Merrill CDOs [3].

ProPublica also found 85 instances during 2006 and 2007 in which two CDOs bought pieces of each other's unsold inventory. These trades, which involved $107 billion worth of CDOs, underscore the extent to which the market lacked real buyers. Often the CDOs that swapped purchases closed within days of each other, the analysis shows.

There were supposed to be protections against this sort of abuse. While banks provided the blueprint for the CDOs and marketed them, they typically selected independent managers who chose the specific bonds to go inside them. The managers had a legal obligation to do what was best for the CDO. They were paid by the CDO, not the bank, and were supposed to serve as a bulwark against self-dealing by the banks, which had the fullest understanding of the complex and lightly regulated mortgage bonds.

It rarely worked out that way. The managers were beholden to the banks that sent them the business. On a billion-dollar deal, managers could earn a million dollars in fees, with little risk. Some small firms did several billion dollars of CDOs in a matter of months.

"All these banks for years were spawning trading partners," says a former executive from Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, a major insurer of the CDO market. "You don't have a trading partner? Create one." ...
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby semper occultus » Sun Sep 05, 2010 7:36 am

No defence left against double-dip recession, says Nouriel Roubini
The United States, Japan and large parts of Europe have exhausted their policy arsenal, leaving them defenceless against a double-dip recession as recovery slows to ‘stall speed’.

By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor in Cernobbio, Italy
Published: 9:49AM BST 05 Sep 2010

telegraph.co.uk

“The US has run out of bullets,” said Nouriel Roubini, professor at New York University, and one of a caste of luminaries with grim forecasts at the annual Ambrosetti conference on Lake Como.

“More quantitative easing (bond purchases) by the Federal Reserve is not going to make any difference. Treasury yields are already down to 2.5pc yet credit spreads are widening again. Monetary policy can boost liquidity but it can’t deal with solvency problems,” he told Europe’s policy elite.

Dr Roubini said the US growth rate was likely to fall below 1pc in the second half of the year, despite the biggest stimulus in history: a cut in interest rates from 5pc to zero, a budget deficit of 10pc of GDP, and $3 trillion to shore up the financial system.

The anaemic pace compares with rates of 4pc-6pc at this stage of recovery in normal post-war recoveries.


“We have reached stall speed. Any shock at this point can tip you back into recession. With interbank spreads rising, you can get a vicious circle like 2008-2009,” he said, describing a self-feeding process as the real economy and the credit system hurt each other.

“There is a 40pc chance of double-dip recession in the US, and worse in Japan. Even if it is not technically a recession it will feel like it,” he added.

Hans-Werner Sinn, head of Germany’s IFO Institute, said the US would have to purge its debt excesses the hard way.

“The bitter truth is that there is no way out of this with monetary and fiscal policy. They will just have to see their living standards go down. I see a decade of difficulties for the US,” he said.


Dr Sinn said the US the market for mortgage securities (CDOs) had collapsed from $1.9 trillion in 2006 to just $50bn last year, leaving the US property market reliant on federal agencies.

“The world is simply not willing to buy these dubious financial products again. Germany is leaving, China is no longer there, and Japan is pulling away. The US system of mortgage finance is on government life support and that cannot drive a sustainable upswing,” he said.

Harvard Professor Niall Ferguson said the US has exhausted fiscal stimulus given warnings from the Congressional Budget Office that interest payments as a share of tax revenues will reach 20pc by 2020 and 36pc by 2030 without drastic retrenchment.

“The fiscal crisis seems to be out of control. The 'big crossover’ is approaching when the US spends more on debt service costs than on security, and historically that is the tipping point for any global power,” he said.


Mr Ferguson said the “Chimerica” marriage of recent years is on the rocks. China is no longer willing to fund the US Treasury bond market, cutting its share of holdings from 13pc to 10pc of the total debt stock.

While China must find ways to recycle its trade surplus and hold down the yuan, it is doing this by stockpiling commodities, buying hard assets around the world, or rotating into Asian bonds.

Dr Roubini said US companies have plenty of cash but are boosting profits by a policy of “slash and burn” on labour costs.


“We’ve lost 8.4m jobs and if you include the loss of hours worked it is equivalent to another 3m. We need to generate an extra 450,000 jobs every month for three years to get it back,” he said.

The US non-farm payrolls data released on Friday was better then expected but still showed a net loss of 54,000 jobs.

Dr Roubini said average public debt in the rich countries would rise to 120pc of GDP by 2015 in the rich countries, leaving no scope for a further fiscal stimulus. If they push their luck, they too risk the sort of bond crises seen in Southern Europe this year.

In the US, the fiscal boost has faded, switching to tightening over coming months The lift from the inventory cycle is finished. Capex spending by companies has held up well, but this slowed sharply in July. Housing is already in a double dip. The last support for the US economy is consumption, barely growing at 1pc.

“All we did was kick the can down the road and stole demand from the future,” he said.
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby vanlose kid » Sun Sep 05, 2010 9:16 am

THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISIS THIS TIME

(paper prepared for the American Sociological Association Meetings in Atlanta, August 16th, 2010)

David Harvey

There are many explanations for the crisis of capital that began in 2007. But the one thing missing is an understanding of “systemic risks.” I was alerted to this when Her Majesty the Queen visited the London School of Economics and asked the prestigious economists there how come they had not seen the crisis coming. Being a feudal monarch rather than an ordinary mortal, the economists felt impelled to answer. After six months of reflection the economic gurus of the British Academy submitted their conclusions. The gist was that many intelligent and dedicated economists had worked assiduously and hard on understanding the micro-processes. But everyone had somehow missed “systemic risk.” A year later, a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund said “we sort of know vaguely what systemic risk is and what factors might relate to it. But to argue that it is a well-developed science at this point is overstating the fact.” In a formal paper, the IMF described the study of systemic risk as “in its infancy.”1 In Marxian theory (as opposed to myopic neoclassical or financial theory), “systemic risk” translates into the fundamental contradictions of capital accumulation. The IMF might save itself a lot of trouble by studying them. So how, then, can we put Marx’s theorization of the internal contradictions of capitalism to work to understand the roots of our contemporary dilemmas?

This is the task I set myself in writing The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism.2 In writing it I found, however, that conventional versions of the Marxian theory of crisis formation were inadequate and that it was necessary to take a fresh look at the arguments on crisis formation laid out in Capital and, even more importantly, in The Grundrisse. In the latter work Marx argues that the circulation and accumulation of capital cannot abide limits. When it encounters limits it works assiduously to convert them into barriers that can be transcended or by-passed. This focuses our attention upon those points in the circulation of capital where potential limits, blockages and barriers might arise, since these can produce crises of one sort or another.

Capital, Marx insists, is a process of circulation and not a thing. It is fundamentally about putting money into circulation to make more money. There are various ways to do this. Financiers lend money in return for interest, merchants buy cheap in order to sell dear and rentiers buy up land, resources, patents, and the like, which they release to others in return for rent. Even the capitalist state can invest in infrastructures in search of an improved tax base that yields greater revenues. But the primary form of capital circulation in Marx’s view was that of production capital. This capital begins with money which is used to buy labor power and means of production which are then brought together in a labor process, under a given technological and organizational form, that results in a new commodity to be sold on the market for the initial money plus a profit.

A part of the profit, for reasons we will take up later, has to be capitalized and launched into circulation to seek even more profit. Capital is thereby committed to a compounding rate of growth. The quantity of global goods and services traded through the market (which now stands at around $55 trillion) has grown at an average rate of around 2.25 per cent since 1750 or so.3 In some places and times it has been much higher and elsewhere much lower. This fits with the conventional wisdom that a growth rate of three per cent is the minimum acceptable level at which a “healthy” capitalism can operate. The average global growth rate from 2000 to 2008 was exactly three percent (with plenty of local variation). Anything less that three percent is problematic, while zero or negative growth defines a crisis which, if prolonged, as in the 1930s, defines a depression. So the problem for capital is to find a path to a minimum compound three percent growth for ever.

There are abundant signs, however, that capital accumulation is at an historical inflexion point where sustaining a compound rate of growth is becoming increasingly problematic. In 1970 this meant finding new profitable global investment opportunities for $0.4 trillion. Resumption of three percent growth right now would mean finding profitable investment opportunities for $1.5 trillion. If that rate of growth were to be sustained by 2030 or so we would be looking at $3 trillion. Put in physical terms, when capitalism in 1750 was about everything going on around Manchester and Birmingham and a few other hot spots in the global economy then three percent compound growth posed no problem. But we are now looking at compounding growth on everything going on in North America, Europe, much of East Asia, Latin America and increasingly South Asia, the Middle East and Africa….The implications socially, politically and environmentally are nothing short of gargantuan.

Note that the operative term here is profitable investment opportunities as opposed to socially necessary and socially valuable investment opportunities. So where, then, are the potential limits to this profitability? Since capital is a process not a thing, then the continuity of the process (along with its speed and geographical adaptability and mobility) becomes a crucial feature to sustaining growth. Any slow-down or blockage in capital flow will produce a crisis. If our blood flow stops then we die. If capital flow stops then the body politic of capitalist society dies. This simple rule was most dramatically demonstrated in the wake of the events of 9/11. Normal processes of circulation were stopped dead in and around New York City with huge ramifications for the global economy. Within five days, then Mayor Guiliani was pleading with everyone to get out their credit cards and go shopping, go to the restaurants and the Broadway shows (seats are now available!) and shortly thereafter the President of the United States did an unprecedented thing: he appeared in a collective commercial for the airlines pleading with people to start flying again. When the banks stopped lending and credit froze in the wake of the Lehman collapse on September 15th, 2008, the survival of capitalism was threatened and political power went to extraordinary lengths to loosen the constrictions. It was a matter of life or death for capital as everyone in power recognized.

Inspection of the circulation of capital reveals, however a series of potential blockage points any one of which could induce a crisis by constricting capital flow. Let us consider each of these.

1) Assemblage of the Initial Capital
Capital accumulation presumes that adequate amounts of money can be brought together in the right place at the right time and in the right quantities in order to launch that money into circulation as capital. Marx for the most part treated this problem of the initial capital in terms of primitive accumulation (the robbery of moneys from the rest of the world). This is inadequate because, as Saint-Simon had earlier pointed out, the association of many capitals (eventually achieved via the corporate form, stock markets, etc) is required to undertake large scale projects such as railways, canals and even large scale industrial undertakings. It is the job of the financial system – almost invariably incorporating state powers – to assemble small-scale savings and surpluses and to redistribute the moneys so assembled across a range of potentially profitable projects. The Pereire brothers, for example, schooled in the ways of thought of Saint Simon, created new credit institutions to facilitate the rebuilding of Paris in order to mop-up surpluses of both capital and labor left dangling in the aftermath of the economic crisis of 1848. They soon found that they themselves need not engage with production, that leveraging (borrowing at 3 percent and lending out at 5 percent) could yield them hefty profits.4 The creation of a modern mortgage finance system in the United States dates back to the 1930s (when a third of the unemployment was attributable to depression in the construction trades) and this laid the basis for the post-war suburban boom that played such a crucial role in preventing the US sliding back into depression.

Continuous financial innovation has been crucial to the survival of capitalism. But finance and money capitalists also demand their cut of the surplus value produced. Excessive power within the financial system can itself then become a problem, generating a conflict between finance and production capital. Financial institutions, furthermore, have always integrated with the state apparatus to form what I call a “state-finance nexus.”5 This usually stays in the background except in a crisis, as happened in the United States in the wake of the Lehman collapse: the Secretary of the Treasury (Henry Paulson) and the Chair of the Federal Reserve (Ben Bernanke) were making all the key decisions (President Bush was rarely seen). To the degree that state power favored City of London finance over production capital in Britain after the First World War, so it contributed to the malaise of industrial production in the same way that Wall Street finance connived at the deindustrialization of the United States after the mid-1970s. Crises have frequently centered on the financial sector and associated state powers either because finance is over-regulated or not innovative enough (producing what is called “financial repression”6 – a term often used in the 1970s) or because it is too powerful and too uncontrollable for the good of the system (as is often argued now).

At various points Marx contemplates, as we must too, the possibility of autonomous financial or monetary crises forming from within the financial system and spreading to the rest of the economy. Financial innovation is absolutely fundamental to achieving compound growth and capital cannot do without it. But this innovation can all too easily get out of hand, go insanely speculative or simply empower excessively the financiers who often look to their own self-interest rather than to the stability of capitalism. The deregulation of the financial system, seen as a necessary step in the 1970s in order to overcome the barrier of financial repression, has played a critical role in the crisis this time. But why the necessity of that financial innovation and deregulation from the 1970s onwards?

2) The Labor Market
When labor is scarce or too well-organized, then this can check the free circulation of capital. Wages rise at the expense of profits. The long history of class struggle over wage rates, conditions of contract (length of the working day, the working week and the working life) along with struggles over levels of social provision (the social wage) is testimony to the importance of this potential limit to capital accumulation. This constriction was very marked in the core regions of capitalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was the primary blockage that had to be overcome.

Labor markets (always geographically fragmented) were largely organized on a national basis in the period 1945-80 and were insulated from international competition by constraints on international capital flow. Nation states could design their own fiscal policies and these could be influenced politically by organized labor and left political parties. The social wage tended to increase at the expense of capital. The answer to this problem partly lay in the successful political assault (led by Reagan, Thatcher and military leaders in Latin America) upon organized labor and its political institutions. But the other prong of attack was to mobilize global labor surpluses through off-shoring. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system in the early 1970s and the subsequent deregulation of finance, constraints to international capital flow were loosened and capital began to exercise greater discipline over nation-state fiscal policies. Welfare-states were undermined, real wages stagnated or declined and the share of wages in total GDP in the OECD countries fell. Capital gained access to a vast disposable labor reserve living under marginal conditions. By the mid-1980s, the labor problem (in the market, on the shop floor and politically in social democracies) had disappeared. Wage repression was experienced almost everywhere. Note well, however, that the labor problem could not have been overcome without the financial deregulation and innovations that dismantled barriers to cross-border capital flows. The labor problem was solved at the expense of opening up the possibility of crises within the financial system (of which there were many after 1975 or so). But what converted that possibility into a certainty?

3) The Availability of the Means of Production and Scarcities in Nature
Several technical issues arise around access to adequate means of production. Supply bottlenecks can easily occur, sometimes for systemic reasons that cannot be elaborated upon here. But beneath this lies the possibility of so-called “natural” limits to raw material supplies and to the capacity of the environment to absorb wastes. The history of capitalism is replete with many phases when “nature” is held to be an ultimate limit to growth. But the Malthusian scenario has never as yet really grabbed hold. This history is a very good example of how capital, when it encounters limits, exhibits considerable ingenuity is turning them into barriers that can be transcended or circumvented (by technological changes, opening up new resource regions and the like). Because capital has successfully done this in the past does not necessarily mean, of course, that it is destined to do so in perpetuity. Nor does it imply that past episodes of supposed natural limits were negotiated smoothly and without crises. Whether or not this is a moment when what O’Connor calls “the second contradiction of capitalism” (the relation to nature as opposed to the capital-labor relation that Marxists typically privilege) comes to the fore as the main barrier to sustained accumulation is a matter for debate.7

But, in exactly the same way that financiers have sometimes gained too much power and produced a general crisis by pursuing their narrow interests, so landlords and rentiers can do the same thing, as happened when the oil cartel, OPEC, added fuel (actually subtracted it!) to the crisis of the 1970s or when speculators drove up the price of oil and other raw materials such as food grains in the summer of 2008. Excessive political and price manipulation in raw materials markets, in rents on intellectual property rights or in the built environment, can threaten the continuous accumulation of capital. When the rentier is the state (as it often is in the case of oil), then geopolitical struggles can also produce barriers and limits to the release of so-called “natural” resources into the circulation of capital. I write “so-called” because resources are always technological, cultural and economic appraisals and in the form of the built environment – sometimes referred to as “second nature” – are actively produced as a new landscape for accumulation. Scarcities that threaten compound growth are largely socially produced.

The importance and power of the rentier classes has always been underestimated. There is evidence that the British upper classes (the landed aristocracy in particular) accumulated far more wealth from rising rents from the mid seventeenth century onwards than they did from the exploitation of factory labor in Manchester. The power of rentiers has been growing in recent times, as we have seen in land markets, in pursuit of intellectual property rights and patents, and in speculation in commodity futures. It is significant also that during this crisis the well-healed as well as state powers (the Chinese in particular) are buying up land and resources galore in Latin America and Africa. Land and property values in combination with finance capital were at the epicenter of the current crisis and continue to constitute a dangerous potential barrier to the recovery of compound growth in the long run.

4) Technological and Organization Forms
How labor power and means of production are brought together depends upon the technological and organizational forms available to capitalists in a given time and place. The history of capitalism has been deeply affected by the ways in which productivity gains are achieved. New organizational forms such as just-in-time systems, subcontracting, the use of optimal scheduling, and the like have been just as important as new machines, robotization and automation in achieving increases in productivity and in disciplining labor on the shop floor. Two general points are important to note. Excessive innovation can generate crises by displacing labor too rapidly or rendering production systems obsolete well before investments have been amortized. Innovation can, on the other hand, lag when “the coercive laws of competition” slacken because of monopolization.8 The balance between monopoly and competition here is crucial. Excessive monopolization and centralization of capital can produce stagnation (as happened in the period of “stagflation” in the 1970s) whereas competition can be “ruinous” for many capitalists when it becomes too fierce and cut-throat (as became apparent in the deindustrialization of the 1980s).9

A low profit-margin regime arose in almost all lines of conventional production in the 1980s even as real wages stagnated. With the dismantling of capital controls over international movement, uneven geographical development and inter-territorial competition became key features in capitalist development, further undermining the fiscal autonomy of nation states. This also marked the beginnings of a shift of power towards East Asia. But it also led capital to invest more and more in control over assets – capturing rents and capital gains – rather than in production. The speculative asset bubbles that formed from the 1980s onwards were the price that was paid for unleashing the coercive laws of competition world-wide as a disciplinary force over the powers of labor and over the previously autonomous powers of the nation state with respect to fiscal and social policies.

Deregulating and empowering the most fluid and highly mobile form of capital – money capital – to reallocate capital resources globally (eventually through electronic markets and a “shadow” unregulated banking system) facilitated the deindustrialization in traditional core regions. Capital then accelerated its reliance on a series of “spatial fixes” to absorb overaccumulating capital. Cascading patterns of foreign direct investments coursed around the world fundamentally changing the geography of capitalist production, facilitating new forms of (ultra-oppressive) industrialization and natural resource and agricultural raw material extractions in emerging markets. The hegemonic shift of economic power towards East Asia, a shift that that Giovanni Arrighi had long been presciently anticipating, began to be more and more evident.10

Two corollaries then followed. One was to enhance the profitability of financial corporations relative to industrial capital and to find new ways to globalize and supposedly absorb risks through the creation of fictitious capital markets (the leveraging ratio of banks in the US rose from around three to thirty). Non-financial corporations (such as auto companies) often made more money from financial manipulations than from making things. The other impact was heightened reliance on “accumulation by dispossession” as a means to augment capitalist class power. The new rounds of primitive accumulation against indigenous and peasant populations (particularly in Asia and Latin America) were augmented by asset losses of the lower classes in the core economies, as witnessed by losses of pension and welfare rights as well as, eventually, huge asset losses in the sub-prime housing market in the US. Intensifying global competition translated into lower non-financial corporate profits.

5) The Labor Process
The labor process is where profit originates and capital is produced. What happens on the shop floor, in the fields or on the construction sites is therefore crucial. The discipline and cooperation of the worker is here essential to accumulation. Indiscipline and lack of cooperation on the part of labor is a perpetual threat that needs to be overcome either by cooptation and persuasion (the creation of quality circles, the mobilization of company loyalties and pride in work) or by coercion (threats of job loss or in some instances physical violence). The shop stewards movements, the factory councils and all manner of other forms of shop-floor organization empower labor while the capitalists have to negotiate or fight their way to achieve a modicum of labor discipline. Capital here uses differences of gender, ethnicity, race and even religion to great effect to divide and rule in the workplace if it possibly can. While such differences have obviously played a crucial role in the labor market as well, it is here at the point of production where they become all-important. Towards the end of the 1960s and well into the 1970s the problem of labor discipline loomed large in the core regions of capitalism. Off-shoring to more docile labor pastures proved helpful to capital as did the availability of immigrants and undocumented workers. As in labor markets, the power balance within the labor process shifted markedly towards capital and much of the shop-floor resistance crumbled from 1980 onwards. But, as the autonomista Marxists insist, labor discipline can never be fully assured. It is always a potential point of revolutionary resistance.11

6) Demand and Effective Demand
The new commodity produced has to be sold for the original money plus a profit. Someone, somewhere, must need, want or desire the product and have enough money to pay for it. Capitalism exhibits an astonishing history of the production of new needs, wants and desires, in part through the production of new lifestyles (consider what is needed to maintain a suburban household) but also an incessant barrage of advertisements and other subliminal means to manipulate the human psyche for commercial reasons. Not all such attempts are successful (history is littered with new products that never found a market) but in a world where the consumer accounts for more than two-thirds of the driving force for capital accumulation, at least in the core regions of capital accumulation, then the human limits to wants, needs and desires constitutes a potential barrier to which capital must perpetually attend in the search for compound growth.

But the other issue here is finding consumers with sufficient money to pay. Compounding growth supposes that there is more money available at the end of the day than there was at the beginning and the big question is: where does the extra money come from? There are three basic answers. Firstly, the moneys held by non-capitalist factions can be drawn into the system. The “gold reserves” of the feudal classes played a very important role in the early years of capitalism. Sucked out by usury and other forms of indebtedness as well as through normal marketing practices, this source of effective demand has much diminished (though the Catholic Church may yet have to melt down a lot of its gold plate to pay for the sins of its priests). The second option, which Rosa Luxemburg emphasized, was the gold and silver reserves of countries largely outside of the orbit of capitalist development. Imperialism and colonialism here played a usually violent role in opening up new markets (e.g. the nineteenth century opium wars in China) thus draining wealth from the once rich regions of China, India, Africa and Latin America.12 But with the integration of many of these regions into the full circulation of capital, these forms of effective demand are now insufficient to sustain the compound growth of capital accumulation. The third option is to produce effective demand from within the capitalist dynamic. The total wage bill is insufficient and has in any case been falling in relation to GDP over the last thirty years. Capitalist consumption, no matter how conspicuous, cannot do it either. The answer is that the money spent on the expansion of investment tomorrow forms the effective demand to mop up the expanded product created yesterday. Tomorrow’s growth creates the effective demand for yesterday’s expanded product. The effective demand problem today is thereby converted into a problem of finding profitable new investment opportunities tomorrow. This explains why compound growth is so essential to the perpetuation of capitalism.

Three issues then arise. Firstly, the time gap between yesterday’s product and tomorrow’s reinvestment has to be bridged and this entails the use of money as money of account. The finance capitalists come back in as crucial players who operate not only at the beginning of the circulation of capital sequence but also at the end. For example, financiers lend to property developers who hire labor to build houses which are then purchased by the workers with a mortgage loan often from the very same financiers. Such a system is inherently speculative and prone to produce housing bubbles of the sort already noted.

But it is not only the financiers who do this. Commercial and merchant capitalists buy from the producers and specialize in marketing to consumers. Merchant capitalists, like financiers and rentiers, extract a rate of return from their own efforts and can come to exert an independent class factional power, which has often played a significant role in crisis formation. The pressures put on producers by merchant capitalist organizations like Walmart, Carrefour and a whole host of supermarket chains along with merchant organizations like Benneton, the Gap, Nike and the like steps into the forefront of what capital circulation is about, both smoothing out potential barriers while also creating potentially dangerous concentrations of economic power. As with the landlords and rentiers, the merchant capitalist class self-interest is not necessarily concordant with that of the whole capitalist class. When we track what happens to the price of sugar, for example, as it moves from the cane fields of the Dominican Republic to the supermarkets of the USA, we see that the actual producers receive less than 5 percent of the final retail price. Most of the profit is taken by merchant intermediaries.

The third issue is less easy to identify even as it seems to be assuming more and more importance in the way capital circulation works. When capital primarily produced long-lasting things, it was always in danger of satiating markets. I am still using the silver plated forks made in Sheffield that graced my grandmother’s table. The lifetime of consumer products has therefore to be shortened if capital is to survive. This happens to some degree by resort of fashion, by planned obsolescence and making things that break down easily, by continuous innovation (from i-pods to i-pads) and so on. This pressure has, in recent years, produced a shift from the production of things to the production of spectacle – a shift that Guy Debord presciently understood when he wrote The Society of the Spectacle back in 1967.13 Just consider what goes into the production of the Olympic Games, not only the new physical infrastructures but the vast employment and resources entailed in opening ceremonies (remember the spectacle of Barcelona and then later the astonishing spectacle of Beijing). More and more capital therefore circulates in the production of spectacular and ephemeral events with all sorts of consequences for consumerism as well as for urban life. But productions of this sort are invariably debt financed and, as the history of the Olympics clearly demonstrates, finding the money to pay off the debts afterwards is often problematic. It is perhaps no accident that Greece, which staged the Olympics in 2004, is now in a leading crisis role because of its sovereign debt.

With real wages stagnant or falling after 1980, the deficit in effective demand was largely bridged by resort to the credit system. In the United States in particular, household debt tripled from 1980 to 2005 and much of that debt was accumulated around the housing market, particularly from 2001 onwards. All sorts of innovations in finance along with state policies that often had the effect of subsidizing or even paying people and corporations to go into debt, kept the compounding rate of growth going. This was the fictional bubble that eventually burst in 2008. But, again, notice the sequence. Wage repression produces a deficit of effective demand that is covered by increasing indebtedness that ultimately leads into a financial crisis which is resolved by state interventions which translates into a fiscal crisis of the state that can best be resolved, according to conventional economic wisdom, by further reductions in the social wage.

7) Capital Circulation as a Whole
When viewed as a whole, we see a series of potential blockage points to the circulation of capital, any one of which has the potentiality to be the source of a crisis. There is, therefore, no single causal theory of crisis formation as many Marxist economists like to assert. There is, for example, no point in trying to cram all of this fluidity and complexity into some unitary theory of, say, a falling rate of profit. In fact profit rates can fall because of the inability to overcome any one of the blockages identified here. It is the task of historical materialist analysis to wrestle with the question as to where the primary blockages are this time around. But solutions at one point have implications for what happens elsewhere. The labor problem (both in the market and on the shop floor) that was central in the late 1960s in the core regions, could not be overcome except by opening up the coercive laws of competition across a global space. This required a revolution in the architecture of the world’s financial system which increased the likelihood of “irrational exuberance” within the financial system. The consequent wage repression depressed effective demand which could be overcome only by resort to the credit system. And so on.

The fundamental theoretical conclusion is: capital never solves its crisis tendencies, it merely moves them around. This is what Marx’s analysis tells us and this is what the history of the last forty years has been about. No one now claims that the excessive power of labor is the source of the current problem as it was back in the 1970s. If anything, the problem is that capital in general and finance capital in particular are far too powerful and that the state cannot step in to re-balance affairs because it is captive – politically and economically – to capitalist class financial, rentier, producer and commercial interests. The dynamic shift from a crisis within the financial system centered on the banks to a fiscal crisis of states, is now producing a renewed assault upon labor, particularly in the public sector, as well as upon the social wage. But if purchasing power and consumer confidence then sags, then where is the market? The big intangible here is, however, whether mass resistance will arise to contest the austerity required to reduce state deficits.

THE UNEVEN GEOGRAPHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS

We know that the crisis for capital (as opposed for many homeowners and workers who had long been distressed) began in the housing markets of Southern California, Arizona, Nevada and Florida in 2007. This was the primary epicenter of the crisis.14 But why there and why then? The crisis then quickly spread through the mortgage finance companies (like Countrywide in the US) to the major financial institutions (like Bear Stearns) that still held a goodly amount of what became “toxic” securitized mortgage debt. It then spread to other institutions that either held the debt (like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), invested in the debt (everyone that invested in collateralized debt obligations) or insured the debt or other financial transactions (like AIG). The parallel crash of Northern Rock in Britain indicated that there were problems lurking in property markets elsewhere (as ultimately became apparent in Spain and Ireland in particular). The financial institutions located in New York and London then became the epicenter of the crisis. It largely fell to the US and British Governments along with the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England to stabilize the situation.

The crash of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 sent the contagion global (was this a deliberate move to transform the crisis from the local to global scale, a cave-in to populist pressure to punish the sinners on Wall Street, or just a huge mistake?). The crisis was probably bound to go global anyway, given the interdependency within global financial networks. Banks elsewhere (e.g. in Germany and France) had bought into the toxic debt as had municipal and state governments and pension funds from Norway to Florida. All of them felt the distress. No matter where located, the holders of the toxic debt were in difficulty. Canadian and East Asian financial institutions, on the other hand, remained unaffected because they had little exposure.

But after Lehman the whole global credit system (in which inter-bank lending is crucial) froze and this formed the immediate primary blockage to the continuity of capital flows. Perfectly good enterprises suddenly found themselves in difficulty because they could not roll over their debt. Many firms rescued themselves by laying off workers by the droves and intensifying wage repression. Debt-fuelled consumerism and effective demand was halted, consumer confidence fell off a cliff, and unemployment surged though at radically different rates both within and between countries: compare, e.g. Minnesota and Ohio in the US or Spain (20 percent) and the Netherlands (6 percent) in Europe in 2009. The major export economies then took a hit as world trade contracted by some twenty percent in early 2009, sparking huge difficulties for businesses and emphatic surges in unemployment in East Asia as well as in Germany, Brazil, and elsewhere. An earlier boom in raw material prices (oil in particular) that turned out to be largely speculative, likewise collapsed in the face of declining growth. Raw material producers were in trouble. The global economy was clearly headed towards a huge depression, unless government acted.

What then followed depended crucially upon the imperatives, ability and the willingness of different governments to use their powers (either individually or collectively) to confront the crisis. Given the threat of a depression on the scale of the 1930s, there was a growing initial clamor to resurrect Keynesian style solutions. The immediate response after the Lehman debacle was to rescue, stabilize and eventually reform the financial architecture (both locally and globally) and to construct a debt-financed stimulus to deal with the collapse of effective demand. The US could not, however, act alone and so the G8 was replaced by the G20, a coalition of leading states that accounted for most of the world’s market-based economic activity. The search for a systemic exit from the crisis was hindered, however, by a number of overwhelming difficulties, not least of which were the very different political ideologies, needs and the configurations of class forces and special interests within the G20 states.

The United States, for example, was already deeply in debt to the rest of the world.15 One question was whether the “safe-haven” of dollar denominated assets would sustain dollar inflows to support the debt and keep long-term interest rates down into the foreseeable future. The fact that long-term interest rates have declined since 2008 suggests there is no problem. But in the first half of 2010, foreign government were net sellers of US securities. It took rising savings rates in the US, loss of confidence in the stock market and the flight of internal savings into US treasuries to keep interest rates down. It was always dangerous for the US to attempt a stimulus on a large-enough scale (say $2 trillion rather than the $800 billion) to work internally, let alone entrain the rest of the world back onto a compound growth path (as it had done after 1945). In the US, there were also strong political objections from a Republican Party that pandered to the hysterical populist right wing fears of excessive government intervention and saw opposing further deficit financing as a means to prevent any recovery that might redound to Obama’s and the Democratic Party’s electoral advantage. Whatever stimulus could be had was also pushed, for ideological reasons, towards tax cuts to a class that might not spend as opposed to needy population groups that would. Finally, the best forms of stimulus lie in provision of social and physical infrastructures that would raise productivity and improve efficiency within the national space. But the US had no clear projects of either sort in mind. The initial refusal of the Republicans to support aid for State and local finances indicated a determination to cut social services rather than to expand them (a determination partly offset by short-term stimulus funds to education and later by a tardy but weak infusion of support for State and local governments). And the physical infrastructures had to be “shovel ready” which meant they were for the most part a continuation of investments in urban and suburban development that had led into the crisis rather than an innovative move towards a national urban development policy that would help exit the crisis in the long-term (e.g. by saving on energy rather than expanding demand for it). The only innovation was weak support for alternative energy sources. Finally, many key aspects of a full Keynesian program were kept off the table. Chief of these was the greater empowerment of labor as a way to reverse chronic income inequalities. Mitigating the huge social inequalities that had arisen in the 1920s was viewed in the 1930s as a way to stimulate effective demand. The neoliberal politics of the 1980s and 1990s had produced inequalities in wealth and income not seen since the 1920s and needed similar reversal. But the imbalance of power between capital and labor could not be addressed for fear of being dubbed and damned as “socialist” or “communist” by a powerful right wing propaganda machine. Dominant class forces (the “Party of Wall Street”) with strong influence within both political parties refused point-blank to accept a state-led re-calibration of the relative powers of capital and labor. The power imbalance that lay at the root of the crisis was to remain untouched.

After an early phase of recovery in which “green shoots” were spied all over the economic landscape, the US economy lapsed back into slow growth and high unemployment in the Spring of 2010, with little prospect of any dramatic revival. Corporate profits and the stock market began to revive, but under conditions of lower turnover and savage cost cutting, particularly with respect to wages. The revival of profits came at the expense of increasing unemployment rather than alleviating wage repression with negative effects upon consumer confidence and internal effective demand (the wage concessions taken from the auto workers in the GM bailout is a prime example). This was not a path towards sustainable growth. If it pointed anywhere, it was towards deflation. Revival of a more robust sort would have to come from elsewhere.

Possessed of huge surpluses and an untroubled banking system easily manipulated by the central government, China had the means to act in a more full-blooded Keynesian way. The crash of export-oriented industries and the threat of mass unemployment and unrest in early 2009 forced the government’s hand. The stimulus package devised had two forks. Close to $600 billion were put largely into infrastructural projects – highway building on a scale that dwarfs that of the US interstate highway system of the 1960s, new airports, vast water projects, high-speed rail lines and even whole new cities. Secondly, the central government forced the banks to loosen credit for local state and private projects.

The big question is whether these investments will increase national productivity. Given that the spatial integration of the Chinese economy is far from complete, there are reasons to believe it will do so. But whether the debts can be paid off when due or whether China will later be the epi-center of yet another global capitalist crisis is an open question. One negative effect has been a renewal of speculation in housing markets with a doubling of property prices in Shanghai in 2009. There are other troubling signs of overcapacity in manufacturing and infrastructures and many banks are rumored to be overextended. There is evidence of the emergence of an uncontrolled “shadow banking” system that is repeating some of the mistakes that occurred in the US from the 1990s on. But the Chinese have dealt with non-performing loans before, as high as 40 percent of assets in the late 1990s. They then used their foreign exchange reserves to erase non-performing loans. Unlike the TARP program in the US, which was passed by a reluctant Congress and which promoted much public resentment, the Chinese can take immediate action to re-capitalize their banking system. Whether or not they can crack down on and control shadow banking behaviors appears to be a more open question.

The Chinese eventually embraced other aspects of a Keynesian program: the stimulation of the internal market by increasing the empowerment of labor and addressing social inequality. The Central Government suddenly appeared willing to tolerate or unable to resist spontaneous strikes (not organized by the official unions controlled by the Communist Party) at major producers such as Toyota, Honda and FoxConn in the summer of 2010. These strikes resulted in significant wage increases (in the range of 20 or 30 percent or so). The politics of wage repression was being reversed. The government increased investments in health care and social services and it pushed hard on the development of environmental technologies to the point where China is now a global leader. The fear of being called a socialist or a communist that bedevils political action in the United States, obviously sounds comical to the Chinese. But there are dangerous signs of inflation and serious pressures (both internal and external) to revalue the remnimbi. The banking system may not be as sound as it appears. As wages rise so capital is moving offshore to lower-wage locations in Bangladesh, Cambodia and other parts of SouthEast Asia.

China has emerged from the crisis faster and more successfully than anywhere else with growth rates quickly reviving towards 8 or even 10 percent. The increase in internal effective demand has not only worked within China, but entrained other economies, particularly raw material producers. Australia has flourished, for example. General Motors makes more cars and profits in China than anywhere else. China had stimulated a partial revival in international trade and of demand for its own export goods (trade with Latin America has increased tenfold since 2000, for example). The export-oriented economies in general, particularly throughout much of East and SouthEast Asia along with Latin America have revived faster than others. China’s investments in US debt have helped sustain effective demand for its low-cost products there, but there are signs that it is gradually diversifying its holdings. The effect has been to alter the balance of economic power, to produce a hegemonic shift within the global economy.

The revival of the export-oriented economies has extended to Germany. But this brings us to the problem of the fractious responses to the crisis across the European Union. After an initial burst of stimulus politics, Germany took the lead, dragging a more reluctant France along with it, in turning the Eurozone to a monetary policy of deficit reduction through draconian reductions in public expenditures. This policy is now echoed by the new Conservative-led coalition in Britain. This politics coincided with the sudden deterioration in public finances elsewhere. The so-called PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) found themselves in dire financial straights, in part through their own mismanagement but even more significantly because their economies were particularly vulnerable to the credit collapse and the sudden decline in property markets and tourism. Lacking the industrial base of countries like Germany, they could not respond adequately to the fiscal crisis that threatened them.

The big question then was: has the financial crisis been stabilized at the expense of creating a fiscal crisis of the capitalist states (with California looking more and more like one of the biggest failed states in the world)? Rumors flew as to the state of Britain’s finances and the fact that many other weaker states, such as Latvia and Hungary were already on the ropes, suggested serious underlying problems in state finances that could even, at some point, focus on the sustainability of the US deficit. It was in this climate that much of the capitalist world shifted its focus to deficit reduction rather than deficit stimulus financing of the Keynesian sort. Once the crisis shifted from being a financial crisis in the banking sector to being a fiscal crisis of the state, then the political opportunity immediately arose to take another savage cut at what remained of the welfare state. The banks had been saved and it was, in classic neoliberal fashion, evidently time to sock it to the people by draconian austerity rather than stimulus measures.

As a result, the political fault-lines shifted in many places back towards the more classic forms of class struggle, as unions (particularly in the public sector) and affected populations (students, retirees, etc) fought back against the austerity from California to Greece. Why should the people pay for the errors and corruptions of a capitalist class that continued to consolidate its wealth and power?

But there were and are abundant variations both in impacts and responses. Lebanon was so busy reconstructing from the Israeli bombardment of 2006 that it scarcely noticed the onset of the global financial crisis (though it had political crises of its own galore). Brazil quickly recovered in part on the back of the China trade but also because of the surge of internal demand based on Lula’s redistributive policies towards the poor (the bolsa familia). India was relatively insulated from the crisis since its main export of services was less affected and its financial system relatively sound. Certain states, like Kerala, suffered from the loss of remittances from the Gulf States but elsewhere a gathering but questionable boom, particularly in construction, underpinned high rates of growth. The number of Indian billionaires doubled in 2009 alone. Haiti, on the other hand, suffered a serious loss of remittances from the US and then collapsed entirely as a result of the earthquake and its appalling aftermath.

The shifting of the crisis around the world in both its form and in its intensity created a dynamic of cascading geographical effects to the point where nothing could easily be predicted. From an epicenter in the US SouthWest and Florida to the collapse of Dubai World to the Greek Sovereign debt crisis, no one could easily predict or anticipate where the next aftershock would hit and how severe the shock or what the political response would be. By the same token, the rapid recovery of China, India and Brazil has been surprising. The geography of it all can, with a lot of effort, be tracked but not easily predicted. Yet the vulnerabilities within the global system are clear. A collapse of the property market and surging inflation in China, a fall in oil prices that hits Russia very hard along with Venezuela and the Gulf States, a surge of political protests from Greece to Spain, France, Britain and California, or simply a sudden further collapse of consumer confidence in the United States or of foreign investors in the viability of US debt, will likely send the whole system into either a downward tailspin or a lurch into a different configuration of global power that sees one half of the world (almost certainly Asia) grow rapidly at the expense of the other half.

THE LEFT ALTERNATIVE

Many have long dreamed that an alternative to capitalist (ir)rationality can be rationally arrived at through the mobilization of human passions in the collective search for a better life for all. These alternatives – historically called socialism or communism – have, in various times and places been tried. In former times, such as the 1930s, the vision of one or other of them provided a beacon of hope. The practices that flowed from this source arguably improved the lives of many and saved capitalism from auto-destruction after 1945. But in recent times such alternatives have lost their luster, in part because of the failure of historical experiments with communism to make good on their promises. Political protest at the crisis conditions has been spotty but in some instances vociferous (from both the left and the right) in response to the crash of 2008.

It could be that 2009 marks the beginning of a prolonged shake out in which the question of grand and far-reaching alternatives to capitalism will step-by-step bubble up to the surface in one part of the world or another. The longer the uncertainty and the misery is prolonged, the more the legitimacy of the existing way of doing business will be questioned and the more the demand to build something different will escalate.

The central problem to be addressed is clear enough: compound growth for ever is not possible: capital accumulation can no longer be the central force impelling social evolution. The troubles that have beset the world these last thirty years signal that a limit is looming that cannot be transcended. Add to this the fact that so many people in the world live in conditions of abject poverty, that environmental degradations are spiraling out of control, that human dignities are everywhere being offended even as the rich are piling up more and more wealth at the expense of everyone. Meanwhile, in most places the levers of ideological, political, institutional, judicial, military and media power are under tight political control. This serves to perpetuate the political status quo and frustrate opposition even as the economy and living standards deteriorate. “Freedom” then becomes just another word to justify repression.

A revolutionary politics that can grasp the nettle of endless compound capital accumulation and eventually shut down the class power that propels it forwards, requires an appropriate theory of social change. Marx’s account of how capitalism arose out of feudalism in fact embodies such a “co-revolutionary theory.”16 Social change arises, he argues, through the dialectical unfolding of relations between seven moments within the social body politic:

a) technological and organizational forms of production, exchange and consumption
b) relations to nature
c) social relations between people
d) mental conceptions of the world, embracing knowledges and cultural understandings and beliefs
e) labor processes and production of specific goods, geographies, services or affects
f ) institutional, legal and governmental arrangements
g) the conduct of daily life and the activities of social reproduction.

Each one of these moments is internally dynamic, marked by tensions and contradictions (just think of our diverse and contested mental conceptions of the world) but all of them are co-dependent and co-evolve in relation to each other within a totality, understood as a Gramscian or Lefebvrian “ensemble” or Deleuzian “assemblage” of moments. The transition to capitalism entailed a mutually supporting movement across all seven moments within the totality. New technologies could not be identified and applied without new mental conceptions of the world (including that of the relation to nature and of new labor processes and social relations).

Social theorists often take just one of these moments and view it as the “silver bullet” that causes all change. We have technological determinists (Tom Friedman), environmental determinists (Jared Diamond), daily life determinists (Paul Hawken), labor process determinists (the autonomistas), class struggle determinists (most Marxist political parties), institutionalists, and so on and so forth.17 From Marx’s perspective they are all wrong. It is the dialectical motion across the moments that really counts, even as there is uneven development in that motion.

When capitalism itself undergoes one of its phases of renewal, it does so precisely by co-evolving all moments, obviously not without tensions, struggles, fights and contradictions. Consider how these seven moments were configured around 1970 before the neoliberal surge and consider how they look now; all have changed in relation to each other and thereby changed the workings of capitalism as a whole.

This theory tells us that an anti-capitalist political movement can start anywhere (in labor processes, around mental conceptions, in the relation to nature, in class or other social relations, in the design of revolutionary technologies and organizational forms, out of daily life or through attempts to reform institutional and administrative structures including the reconfiguration of state powers). The trick is to keep the political movement moving from one moment to another in mutually reinforcing ways.18 This was how capitalism arose out of feudalism and this is how a radically different alternative can arise out of capitalism. Previous attempts to create a communist or socialist alternative fatally failed to keep the dialectic between the different moments in motion and failed to embrace the unpredictable and uncertain paths in the dialectical movement between them.

The problem for the anti-capitalist left is to build organizational forms and to unleash a co-revolutionary dynamic that can replace the present system of compounding accumulation of capital with some other forms of social coordination, exchange and control that can deliver an adequate style and standard of living for the 6.8 billion people living on planet earth. This is no easy task and I do not pretend to have any immediate answers (though I do have some ideas) as to how this might be done. But I do think it imperative that the organizational forms and political strategies match the diagnoses and descriptions of how contemporary capitalism is actually working. Unfortunately, the fierce attachment of many movements to what can best be termed a “fetishism of organizational form” gets in the way of any broad revolutionary movement that can address this problem. Anarchists, autonomists, environmentalists, solidarity economy groups, traditional left revolutionary parties, reformist NGO’s and social democrats, trade unions, institutionalists, social movements of many different stripes, all have their favored and exclusionary rules of organization often derived from abstract principles and sometime exclusionary views as to who might be the principle agent sparking social revolution. There is some serious barrier to the creation of some overarching umbrella organization on the left that can internalize difference but take on the global problems that confront use. Some groups, for example, abjure any form of organization that smacks of hierarchy. But Elinor Ostrom’s study of common property practices shows that the only form of democratic management that works when populations of more than a few hundred people are involved, is a nested hierarchy of decision making. Groups that rule out all forms of hierarchy thereby give up on any prospect whatsoever for democratic response not only to the problem of the global commons but also to the problem of continous capital accumulation.19 The strong connection between diagnosis and political action cannot be ignored.20 This is a good moment, therefore, for all movements to take a step back and examine how their preferred methods and organizational forms relate to the revolutionary tasks posed in the present conjuncture of capitalist development.

Notes

Schneider, H., 2010, “’Systemic risk’ is the new buzz word as officials try to prevent another bubble,” Washington Post, July 26, 2010. ↩
Harvey, D., 2010, The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism, London, Profile Books. ↩
Maddison, A., 2007, Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD: Essays in Macro-Economic History, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ↩
Harvey, D., 2003, Paris: Capital of Modernity, New York: Routledge. ↩
Bonney, R. (ed), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200-1815, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. ↩
McKinnon, R., 1973, Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington D.D.: Brookings Institution Press. ↩
O’Connor, J., 1997, Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism, New York: Guilford Press. ↩
Arrighi, G., 1978, “Towards a theory of capitalist crisis, New Left Review, 1/111, September-October, 1978, 3-24. ↩
Bellamy Foster, J and Magdoff, F., 2009, The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences, New York, Monthly Review Press. ↩
Arrighi, G., 1994, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times, London: Verso. ↩
Cleaver, H., 1979, Reading Capital Politically, Austin: University of Texas Press. ↩
Luxemburg, R., 2003, The Accumulation of Capital, New York, Routledge Second Edition. ↩
Debord, G., 2000, The Society of the Spectacle, Detroit: Black and Red Books edition. ↩
Bardhan, A. amd Walker, R. 2010, “California, Pivot of the Great Recession,” Working Paper Series, Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UC Berkeley. ↩
The following argument, now updated, was first laid out in early 2009 in Harvey, D., “Why the Stimulus Package is Bound to Fail” available on http://DavidHarvey.org. ↩
What follows is based on Harvey, D., The Enigma of Capital, op.cit., chapter 8. ↩
Friedman, T. 2006 edition, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, New York, Farrar,Strauss and Giroux; Diamond, J. op.cit.; Hawken, P., 2007, Blessed Unrest: How the Largest Movement in the World Cme into Being and Why No One Saw It Coming, New York: Viking; Holloway, J. 2005, Change the World Without Taking Power, London: Pluto Press; Held, D., 1995, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, London: Polity Press. ↩
Harvey, D., 2010, “Organizing for the Anti-Capitalist Transition,” on http://DavidHarvey.org
Ostrom, E., 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ↩
In a recent critical assessment of some of my theses, several commentators readily accepted my diagnoses but fiercely criticized my comments on organizational forms. See “Debating David Harvey,” Interface, Volume 2, No.1 (May, 2010); Crises, Social Movements and Revolutionary Transformations; http://www.interfacejournal.net/

*

http://davidharvey.org/2010/08/the-enig ... this-time/

*
"Teach them to think. Work against the government." – Wittgenstein.
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby JackRiddler » Mon Sep 06, 2010 1:02 pm

Big Picture: US Interest Rates, FF, postwar

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We meet at the borders of our being, we dream something of each others reality. - Harvey of R.I.

To Justice my maker from on high did incline:
I am by virtue of its might divine,
The highest Wisdom and the first Love.

TopSecret WallSt. Iraq & more
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby JackRiddler » Wed Oct 13, 2010 3:04 pm

Sell.

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We meet at the borders of our being, we dream something of each others reality. - Harvey of R.I.

To Justice my maker from on high did incline:
I am by virtue of its might divine,
The highest Wisdom and the first Love.

TopSecret WallSt. Iraq & more
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby freemason9 » Wed Oct 13, 2010 10:54 pm

at what point does this become a crisis as predicted by marx
The real issue is that there is extremely low likelihood that the speculations of the untrained, on a topic almost pathologically riddled by dynamic considerations and feedback effects, will offer anything new.
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby barracuda » Wed Oct 13, 2010 10:58 pm

About thirty years ago Soon.
The most dangerous traps are the ones you set for yourself. - Phillip Marlowe
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Re: "End of Wall Street Boom" - Must-read history

Postby seemslikeadream » Thu Oct 14, 2010 10:44 am

freemason9 wrote:at what point does this become a crisis as predicted by marx



crisis? Amerikkans are in and playing catchup with the rest of humanity. It's only a crisis when someone you know gets hurt
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Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
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