Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

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Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby JackRiddler » Sat May 14, 2011 11:44 am


May 2, 2011

Don't Bet Your Bottom Dollar
China as Number One?


By TOM ENGLEHARDT


Tired of Afghanistan and all those messy, oil-ish wars in the Greater Middle East that just don't seem to pan out? Count on one thing: part of the U.S. military feels just the way you do, especially a largely sidelined Navy -- and that's undoubtedly one of the reasons why, a few months back, the specter of China as this country's future enemy once again reared its ugly head.

Back before 9/11, China was, of course, the favored future uber-enemy of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and all those neocons who signed onto the Project for the New American Century and later staffed George W. Bush's administration.


Not really. They came in fully intending to invade Iraq and topple Saddam at the first opportunity, and right away started carrot-and-stick negotiations with the Taliban and planning for an Afghanistan intervention in the context of the already revived and ongoing "Great Game" for Central Asia. Cheney's energy meetings were the key device for formulating hidden imperial strategy, and remain classified. China was for the rhetoric. Given the hubris of a potential seven-war campaign to redraw the Middle East within a few years, the other big item was to pursue RMA (revolution in military affairs), TIA and space weaponry for all they're worth, which hasn't really proved to be that much in a world where everyone is gradually catching up on the technological front. The attempt to take and hold Iraq with fewer than 150,000 soldiers (so as to keep reserves for the other hoped-for offensives) is a symptom of the faith in the empire's magic powers.

But anyway, Mr. Dispatch seems to acknowledge that:

After all, if you wanted to build a military beyond compare to enforce a long-term Pax Americana on the planet, you needed a nightmare enemy large enough to justify all the advanced weapons systems in which you planned to invest.

As late as June 2005, neocon journalist Robert Kaplan was still writing in the Atlantic about "How We Would Fight China," an article with this provocative subhead: "The Middle East is just a blip. The American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twenty-first century. And China will be a more formidable adversary than Russia ever was." As everyone knows, however, that "blip" proved far too much for the Bush administration.

Finding itself hopelessly bogged down in two ground wars with rag-tag insurgency movements on either end of the Greater Middle Eastern "mainland," it let China-as-Monster-Enemy slip beneath the waves. In the process, the Navy and, to some extent, the Air Force became adjunct services to the Army (and the Marines). In Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, U.S. Navy personnel far from any body of water found themselves driving trucks and staffing prisons.

It was the worst of times for the admirals, and probably not so great for the flyboys either, particularly after Secretary of Defense Robert Gates began pushing pilotless drones as the true force of the future. Naturally, a no-dogfight world in which the U.S. military eternally engages enemies without significant air forces is a problematic basis for proposing future Air Force budgets.

There's no reason to be surprised then that, as the war in Iraq began to wind down in 2009-2010, the "Chinese naval threat" began to quietly reemerge. China was, after all, immensely economically successful and beginning to flex its muscles in local territorial waters. The alarms sounded by military types or pundits associated with them grew stronger in the early months of 2011 (as did news of weapons systems being developed to deal with future Chinese air and sea power). "Beware America, time is running out!" warned retired Air Force lieutenant general and Fox News contributor Thomas G. McInerney while describing China's first experimental stealth jet fighter.

Others focused on China's "string of pearls": a potential set of military bases in the Indian Ocean that might someday (particularly if you have a vivid imagination) give that country control of the oil lanes.


Indeed a vivid imagination. The oil concessions that the Chinese keep winning are primary and the lanes less than secondary, unless it's the Americans who decide to attack the oil lanes in a crazy last resort. Pirates are rather inflated as a threat to delay more than one or two out of a thousand tankers.

Meanwhile, Kaplan, whose book about rivalries in that ocean came out in 2010, was back in the saddle, warning: "Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military's area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world's most rapidly growing economies." (Head of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Robert Willard claimed that China had actually taken things down a notch at sea in the early months of 2011 -- but only thanks to American strength.)

Behind the overheated warnings lay a deeper (if often unstated) calculation, shared by far more than budget-anxious military types and those who wrote about them: that the U.S. was heading toward the status of late, great superpower and that, one of these years not so far down the line, China would challenge us for the number one spot on the seas -- and on the planet.

The Usefulness of a Major Enemy

You know the background here: the victor in the Cold War, the self-proclaimed "sole superpower" ready to accept no other nation or bloc of nations that might challenge it (ever), the towering land that was to be the Roman Empire, the British Empire, and the Vulcans rolled into one. Well, those dreams are already in history's dustbin. If opinion polls are to be believed, a gloomy American populace now senses that the sun has set on American fantasies of ultimate dominance with what seems like record speed. These days, the U.S. appears capable of doing little with its still staggering military might but fight Pashtun guerillas to a draw in distant Afghanistan and throw its air power and missile-armed drones at another fifth-rate power in a "humanitarian" gesture with the usual destruction and predictable non-results.

Toss in the obvious -- rotting infrastructure, fiscal gridlock in Washington, high unemployment, cutbacks in crucial local services, and a general mood of paralysis, depression, and confusion -- and even if the Chinese are only refurbishing a mothballed 1992 Ukrainian aircraft carrier as their first move into the imperial big time, is it really so illogical to imagine them as the next "sole superpower" on planet Earth?

After all, China passed Japan in 2010 as the globe's number two economy, the same year it officially leaped over the United States to become the world's number one emitter of greenhouse gases. Its growth rate came in at something close to 10% right through the great financial meltdown of 2008, making it the world's fastest expanding major economy. By mid-2010, it had 477,000 millionaires and 64 billionaires (second only to the U.S.), and what's always being touted as a burgeoning middle class with an urge for the better things. It also had the world's largest car market (the U.S. came in second), and the staggering traffic jams to prove it, not to speak of a willingness to start threatening neighbors over control of the seas. In short, all the signs of classic future imperial success.

And those around the U.S. military aren't alone in sounding the alarm. Just last week, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) quietly posted a report at its website indicating that by 2016, the "age of America" would be over and, by one measure at least, the Chinese economy would take over first place from the American one.

With growing fears in the military-industrial complex of future cuts in the Pentagon budget (even though, as of now, it's still rising), there will undoubtedly be increased jockeying among the armed services for slices of the military pie. This means an increasing need for the sort of enemies and looming challenges that would justify the weapons systems and force levels each service so desperately wants.

And there's nothing like having a rising power of impressive proportions sink some money into its military (even if the sums are still embarrassingly small compared to the United States). In the Chinese case, it also helps when that country uses its control over rare earth metals to threaten Japan in a dispute over territorial waters in the East China Sea, begins to muscle neighbors on the high seas, and -- so rumor has it -- is preparing to name its refurbished aircraft carrier, which might be launched this summer, after the Qing Dynasty admiral who conquered the island of Taiwan.

The Unpredictability of China

Still, for all those naval and air power types who would like to remove American power from a quicksand planet and put it offshore, for those who would like to return to an age of superpower enmity, in fact, for all those pundits and analysts of whatever stripe picking China as the globe's next superstar or super evildoer, I have a small suggestion: take a deep breath. Then take this under advisement: we've already been through a version of this once. Might it not be worth approaching that number-one prediction with more humility the second time around?

As a start, let's take a stroll down memory lane. Back in 1979, Ezra Vogel, Harvard professor and Asian specialist, put out a book that was distinctly ahead of its time in capturing the rise to wealth and glory of a new global power. He entitled it Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, and in praising the ways Japanese industry operated and the resulting "Japanese miracle," the title lacked only an exclamation point. Vogel certainly caught the temper of the times, and his scholarly analysis was followed, in the 1980s, by a flood of ever more shrill articles and books predicting (in fascination or horror) that this would indeed someday be a Japanese world.

The only problem, as we now know: 'tweren't so. The Japanese economic bubble burst around 1990 and a "lost decade" followed, which never quite ended. Then, of course, there was the 2011 earthquake-cum-tsunami-cum-nuclear-disaster that further crippled the country.

So how about China as Number One: Lessons for America? After all, its economy is threatening to leave Japan in the dust; if you were one of its neighbors, you might indeed be fretting about your offshore claims to the mineral wealth under various local seas; and everyone knows that Shanghai is now Blade Runner without the noir, just 40-story towers as far as the eye can see. So what could go wrong?

As a specialty line, our intelligence services offer new administrations predictions on the world to come by projecting present trends relatively seamlessly into a reasonably similar future. And why shouldn't that be a logical way to proceed? So if you project Chinese growth rates into the future, as the IMF has just done, you end up with a monster of success (and assumedly a military with a global reach). It's not that hard, in other words, to end up with the U.S. Navy's nightmare enemy.

But so much on our present planet suggests that we're not in a world of steady, evolutionary development but of "punctuated equilibrium," of sudden leaps and discontinuous change. Imagine then another perfectly logical scenario: What if, like Japan, China hits some major speed bumps on the highway to number one?

As you think about that, keep something else in mind. China's story over the last century-plus already represents one of the great discontinuous bursts of energy of our modern moment. To predict most of the twists and turns along the way would have been next to impossible. In 1972, in the wake of the Cultural Revolution that Mao Zedong had set in motion six years earlier, to take but one example, no intelligence service, no set of seers, no American would have predicted today's China or, for that matter, a three-and-a-half-decade burst of Communist Party-controlled capitalist industrial expansionism. The pundit who offered such a prediction then would have been drummed out of the corps of analysts.

No one at the time could have imagined that the giant, independent but impoverished communist land would become the expansive number two capitalist economy of today. In fact, from the turn of the previous century when China was the basket case of Asia and a combined Japanese/Western force marched on Beijing, when various great powers took parts of the country as their own property or "concessions," followed by ensuing waves of warlordism, nationalism, revolutionary ferment, war with Japan, civil war, and finally the triumph of a communist regime that united the country, the essence of China's story has been unpredictability.

So what confidence should we now have in projections about China that assume more of the same, especially since, looking toward the future, that country seems like something of a one-trick pony? After all, the ruling Communist Party threw the dice definitively for state capitalism and untrammeled growth decades ago and now sits atop a potential volcano. As the country's leaders undoubtedly know, only one thing may keep the present system safely in place: ever more growth.

The minute China's economy falters, the minute some bubble bursts, whether through an overheating economy or for other reasons, the country's rulers have a problem on their hands that could potentially make the Arab Spring look mild by comparison. What many here call its growing "middle class" remains anything but -- and there are literally hundreds of millions of forgotten peasants and migrant workers who have found the Chinese success story less than a joy.

A Revolutionary Tradition for the Ages

It might take only a significant economic downturn, a period that offered little promise to Chinese workers and consumers, to unsettle that country in major ways. After all, despite its striking growth rates, it remains in some fashion a poor land. And one more factor should be taken into consideration that few of our seers ever consider. It's no exaggeration to say that China has a revolutionary tradition unlike that of any other nation or even region on the planet.

Since at least the time of the Yellow Turban Rebellion in 184 CE, led by three brothers associated with a Taoist sect, the country has repeatedly experienced millenarian peasant movements bursting out of its interior with ferocious energy. There is no other record like it. The last of these was undoubtedly Mao Zedong's communist revolution.

Others would certainly include the peasant uprising at the end of the Ming Dynasty in the seventeenth century and, around the time of the American Civil War, the Taiping Rebellion. It was led by a man we would today call a cultist who had created a syncretic mix of Chinese religions and Christianity (and who considered himself the younger brother of Jesus Christ). Before Qing Dynasty forces finally suppressed it and a series of other rebellions, an estimated 20 million people died.

When Chinese leaders banned and then tried to stamp out the fast-spreading Falun Gong movement, they were not -- as reported here -- simply "repressing religion"; they were suppressing what they undoubtedly feared could be the next Taiping Rebellion. Even if few intelligence analysts in the West are thinking about any of this, rest assured that the Communist rulers of China know their own history. That's one reason why they have been so quick to crack down on any Arab-Spring-like demonstrations.

In addition, though I'm no economist, when I look around this planet I continue to wonder (as the Chinese must) about the limits of growth for all of us, but certainly for a vast country desperate for energy and other raw materials, with an aging population, and an environment already heavily polluted by the last 40 years of unchecked industrial expansion. There is no question that China has invested in its military, put together a powerful (if largely defensive) navy, elbowed its neighbors on questions of control of undersea mineral rights, and gone on a global search to lock up future energy resources and key raw materials.

Nonetheless, if predictions were to be made and trends projected into the future, it might be far more reasonable to predict a cautious Chinese government, focused on keeping its populace under control and solving confounding domestic problems than an expansively imperial one. It's almost inconceivable that, in the future, China could or would ever play the role the U.S. played in 1945 as the British Empire went down. It's hard even to imagine China as another Soviet Union in a great global struggle with the United States.

And speaking of the conjunctures of history, here's another thought for the U.S. Navy: What if this isn't an imperial planet any more? What if, from resource scarcity to global warming, humanity is nudging up against previously unimagined limits on unbridled growth? From at least the seventeenth century on, successive great powers have struggled over the control of vast realms of a globe in which expansion seemed eternally the name of the game. For centuries, one or more great powers were always on hand when the previous great imperial power or set of powers faltered.

In the wake of World War II, with the collapse of the Japanese and German empires, only two powers worthy of the name were left, each so mighty that together they would be called "superpowers." After 1991, only one remained, so seemingly powerful that it was sometimes termed a "hyperpower" and many believed it had inherited the Earth.

What if, in fact, the U.S. was indeed the last empire? What if a world of rivalries, on a planet heading into resource scarcity, turned out to be less than imperial in nature? Or what if -- and think of me as a devil's advocate here -- this turned out not to be an imperial world of bitter rivalries at all, but in the face of unexpectedly tough times, a partnership planet?

Unlikely? Sure, but who knows? That's the great charm of the future. In any case, just to be safe, you might not want to start preparing for the Chinese century quite so fast or bet your bottom dollar on China as number one. Not just yet anyway.


Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com, where this article originally appeared. His latest book is The American Way of War: How Bush’s Wars Became Obama’s (Haymarket Books).


Note: If the financial situation gets desperate enough, a hostile confrontation with China is a great way to freeze a fuck of a lot of debt.

As with Team B and Soviet power, the USG policy wonks are engaging in a shipload of projection.

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby seemslikeadream » Sat May 14, 2011 6:12 pm

Chinese oil interests attacked in Libya

By Leslie Hook and Geoff Dyer in Beijing

Published: February 24 2011 08:04 | Last updated: February 24 2011 13:27

China rushed to evacuate thousands of workers from Libya on Thursday, after CNPC and other Chinese firms were attacked in the wave of unrest sweeping the country.

Officials say 30,000 Chinese are in the country and the scramble to evacuate them—in what may be the country’s largest overseas evacuation ever—is posing a new foreign policy dilemma for China, which has for decades supported the Gaddafi regime.


http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/artic ... n-ventures
Chinese businesses drawn to the continent in search of oil, gas, copper and other resources are expected to have invested $50 billion in Africa by 2015, according to a forecast from South Africa's Standard Bank.
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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby crikkett » Sun May 15, 2011 11:44 am

Finding itself hopelessly bogged down in two ground wars with rag-tag insurgency movements on either end of the Greater Middle Eastern "mainland," it let China-as-Monster-Enemy slip beneath the waves. In the process, the Navy and, to some extent, the Air Force became adjunct services to the Army (and the Marines). In Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, U.S. Navy personnel far from any body of water found themselves driving trucks and staffing prisons


Yes, the increased influence of the Marine Corps is ruining the Navy. Effing brutes.

However, this author doesn't acknowledge that they've been patrolling shipping lanes all this time, work on rounding up 'loose nukes' and were closeby to help with the response to Fukushima, and these things are important, Somalian Pirates notwithstanding.
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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby 8bitagent » Sun May 15, 2011 5:43 pm

Call him a quack, but David Icke has long been saying the ultimate agenda is manipulating events toward an eventual war with China.

And as we continue to see, loyalty lines are being redrawn. Pakistan is being further isolated with the ISI stuff, with Pakistan buddying up more and more to China. China recently was allegedly involved in ballistic missile technology trades between Iran and North Korea, which was reported yesterday. Saudi Arabia, long America's best buddy, is now going to Russia and China.

It's scary to think that future US conflicts won't just be joysticks drone blowing up villagers and troops descending into desert mountain quack shoots...but hardcore world war scenarios. Because then, what is an anti war leftist to do..regardless if a hidden hand manipulated events into being(which is what I believe happened in WW1 and WW2), if we get into this kind of cluster fuck apocalyptic scenario...it'd be a total end game situation.
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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby JackRiddler » Sun May 15, 2011 6:35 pm

8bitagent wrote:Call him a quack, but David Icke has long been saying the ultimate agenda is manipulating events toward an eventual war with China.


Okay, I'll call him a quack.

The neocon fantasies of global full-spectrum dominance, attacks on Iran, serial Asian wars and a nuclear playoff with China are coming to an end. By the end of this year with a bit of luck you might see a declared opponent of US imperialism as Egyptian president and the last of the US soldiers forced to leave Iraq, in keeping with the schedule already set in the SOFA. You might even see Pakistan and Afghanistan inviting the US to leave, yesterday, and guess what? If covert operations can't change their minds, the US will comply. American regulars' boots are not going to touch Libyan soil (at least, not while the combat's going). An "eventual war with China" could only come about as a kabuki event to retire the debt (damn though that will be scary) or as a big civilization-ending mistake (total time of war, three and a half hours). The US is likely to complete its long arc toward techno-totalitarianism, with or without an explicitly Christian fascist regime (probably not the latter), but its imperialism will necessarily become more and more restrained. The limits of ecology are asserting themselves on the civilization as a whole, and the limits of finance and economics have already started the inevitable roll-back of US empire. In the latter case the question is how bloody it will be, and whether it will make any difference to the Pentagon and Homeland budgets (unlikely). If there is an "end game" for the empire it will not be China; it will far more likely be Mexico and Canada (and I'm not kidding).

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby DrVolin » Mon May 16, 2011 9:56 am

Geopolitics are brutally simple. Neighbours eventually fight. In the first half of the 20th century, the US and Japan were neighbours in the Pacific. The US and China supported each other against Japan. When the Americans were ready, they cut off the Japanese oil supply, which forced the Japanese to decide between surrendering or taking the fight from the economic and diplomatic fields to the battlefield. The Americans could do this because they and their allies controlled Japan's oil and mineral sources as well as its shipping lanes.

The relationship between the US and Japan having been clarified, Russia restaked the Pacific claim it had largely abandoned after 1905. The relationship between the three pacific neighbours, Russia, China, and the US, was inherently unstable. This led to 50 years of relative immobility as the unspoken alliances constantly shifted between the three, no one gaining a significant edge.

Since the mid-90s, the Russian claim has become dormant again, leaving the US and China to behave like real neighbours. They have been racing toward confrontation, each side trying to put in place the elements it thinks it needs for the inevitable showdown. While they play this game of chess, they have also been playing economic chicken. The Americans are borrowing like there is no tomorrow, and the Chinese are lending like there is no tomorrow. This suggests they are both aware that there is in fact no tomorrow. When the open confrontation comes, the debts will vapourize.

For the Americans, the value of the borrowing is clear. It allows them to spend someone else's money on protecting their own vital interests. This is even better if they're spending the money of those they are protecting against. For the Chineses, the loans are worth it because they create the time needed to setup the board for the game. The unrepayable loans are for the Chinese part of the cost of setting up their industrial base, their naval, air, and space capacity. Each side calculates that under the current arrangement, it can be ready before the other. One side miscalculates.

Iraq and Afghanistan are not responses to 9/11. They are not endless unwinnable wars against local insurgencies. They are not supposed to be pacified or made safe for democracy. They are the positioning of US assets on top of China's sources and lines of supply. China can own the concessions, the oil wells, and the mines. But they can be occupied with a few hours notice at any time. And the game continues.
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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby JackRiddler » Mon May 16, 2011 11:26 am

DrVolin wrote:Geopolitics are brutally simple. Neighbours eventually fight.... [SNIP]

They have been racing toward confrontation, each side trying to put in place the elements it thinks it needs for the inevitable showdown.... [SNIP]

Each side calculates that under the current arrangement, it can be ready before the other. One side miscalculates.... [SNIP]

Iraq and Afghanistan are not responses to 9/11. They are not endless unwinnable wars against local insurgencies. They are not supposed to be pacified or made safe for democracy. They are the positioning of US assets on top of China's sources and lines of supply. China can own the concessions, the oil wells, and the mines. But they can be occupied with a few hours notice at any time. And the game continues.


It all makes sense, in the logic of the 19th-century imperialist geostrategy.1 Insofar as things are as you lay them out,2 then both sides in this prospective conflict miscalculate. Both will lose. The only realism lies in seeking peace and just economy among the peoples of this world and an ecological balance for civilization as a whole, before die-offs and collapses make everything both, horrible for all, and incalculable. That's the only realpolitik worthy of the name. "The game" is a genocidal form of narcissism, almost always foisted on the world by men who are very old and long ago heart-dead. The real obstacle of the human condition lies in the relative longevity of the institutions, cultures and event-sequences humans create compared to the span of their own lives, and their resulting inability as groups to formulate anything but immediate time-frames for social and political actions,3 to the point where anyone trying to look at merely generational spans already qualifies as a visionary.4

Notes

1 - Actually a form of plodding mass dementia pollinated with religious fantasy and personal gain-seeking that was always destructive, and long ago became obsolete.

2 - And I think you lay them out well, as far as the highly influential and very sick men of geostrategic policymaking on all sides are concerned.

3 - Above and beyond their own families or little individual plots of interests. Humans tend to have more secure visions about their retirement plans (personal teleologies) than what policies their institutions as wholes should be pursuing over the next year. And that's among the minority who could actually identify the institutions within which they live out their lives.

4 - Usually synonymous with crackpot. Or science fiction author.

Probably more later.

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby DrVolin » Mon May 16, 2011 12:02 pm

JackRiddler wrote:...as far as the highly influential and very sick men of geostrategic policymaking on all sides are concerned.


These are still the men making decisions at that level of policy. The closest they have come to acknowledging the realities you point out is the early 70s Club of Rome stuff on targeted population reduction. That is their idea of a good deed and a sustainable future.
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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby 2012 Countdown » Mon May 16, 2011 12:06 pm

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby JackRiddler » Mon May 16, 2011 1:06 pm

DrVolin wrote:
JackRiddler wrote:...as far as the highly influential and very sick men of geostrategic policymaking on all sides are concerned.


These are still the men making decisions at that level of policy. The closest they have come to acknowledging the realities you point out is the early 70s Club of Rome stuff on targeted population reduction. That is their idea of a good deed and a sustainable future.


I'd note that despite their relative power to shape policy and launch initiatives, they don't always get what they want, and they're painfully aware of it. Whole schools of geostrategy since the 1970s proceed from a sense of having only relative and declining power in an intractable complex world, and from frustration with the various ways in which the human resources don't live up to expectations of easy political compliance and readiness to be cheap labor and serve as soldiers, leading among other things to recruiting difficulties and the rise of mercenary armies, the need to overcome "Vietnam syndrome," etc., and perhaps a perceived need to engage in ever-higher levels of mass deception. (Domino theory looks downright real and straightforward, compared to the terrorist hysteria. I mean, there really were millions of people who wished they could just call themselves communists in this country once, bless them.) I think this is true of trilateralist as well as neocon currents.

I also wanted to say about this:

They are not endless unwinnable wars against local insurgencies. They are not supposed to be pacified or made safe for democracy. They are the positioning of US assets on top of China's sources and lines of supply. China can own the concessions, the oil wells, and the mines. But they can be occupied with a few hours notice at any time.


Behind the general-audience propaganda talk of democracy, human rights, dictators and the possibility of unknowable dire imminent threats from Surpriseus-Stan, what you describe above is surely the ultimate realpolitik rationale for these enormously cost-intensive campaigns, weapons programs, thousand agencies and contractors, varied support industries, legal structures and webs of international alliances that comprise the military-security-homeland-imperialism-surveillance-espionage-parapolitical industrial complexes. And you can read about it in Foreign Affairs and the publications of the think tanks, sometimes between the lines, often directly stated.

But just as the general audience propaganda about the campaigns and weapons programs and related industries is almost all pure deception, to what extent are the bedrock rationales of realpolitik themselves self-delusion? Is the vision of an inevitable China supply-line war itself a dangerous fantasy to justify the industries?1

Are the geostrategists merely placing their grand rationales on top of a capitalist sector that no doubt requires rationales, but is ultimately very flexible about where these are found? As long as the campaigns and industries run and occupy millions in their bureaucracies and generate revenue for profit and support a surrounding culture and economy, is it really the case that what sets this vast machine in motion is a bunch of Brzezinskis and Huntingtons and Kissingers rolling dice around a RISK board, metaphorically speaking? Which is the dog and which is the tail, the ongoing industries and operations and related financial interests, or whatever the current geostrategic theory rationale might be? Well, you can already tell by the way I'm formulating the questions that I see these phenomena more as self-organizing processes of political economy that demand geostrategic rationales, rather than geostrategies that set the industries into motion. And I think it's been more like the former than the latter at least since the Second World War.

Note

1 - Was the vision of a future nuclear exchange with the Soviets the reason for the nuclear arms race, or was the nuclear arms build-up the reason that scenarios of nuclear gamesmanship were necessary? Having studied this subject in some depth, I agreed with the school of thought that by the early 1960s at the latest a tipping point had arrived when the development in a sense posed the demand for geostrategies that would fit the next generation of technology and keep the budgets running, rather than any geostrategy causing the nukes to be built. This was why there was a shift from original assured-destruction doctrines to flexible response and limited nuclear war scenarios. With assured destruction and "counter-population" the Pentagon was actually running out of targets requiring systems to vaporize. How to justify more nukes? RAND helped cook up flexibility and "counter-force" as the solution, and suddenly there were thousands of targets. For example, rather than one target known as Leningrad requiring just a primary and a few back-up weapons, you got 20 military targets inside Leningrad, meaning that everyone there would be exterminated without mercy for humane military reasons, as collateral damage, rather than being directly targeted (which would be dreadful, what kind of monsters do you think we are?!). This meant a near-infinite menu of variable strike options requiring just the new weapons systems that were becoming possible, and helping to generate the next-generation of the Cold War to ward off the horrific threat of detente.

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby DrVolin » Mon May 16, 2011 1:25 pm

JackRiddler wrote:...I see these phenomena more as self-organizing processes of political economy that demand geostrategic rationales, rather than geostrategies that set the industries into motion.


For reasons that would be much more obvious in a different social context, I completely agree. I wasn't talking about what drives what. I was merely describing the sequence.
all these dreams are swept aside
By bloody hands of the hypnotized
Who carry the cross of homicide
And history bears the scars of our civil wars

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby JackRiddler » Mon May 16, 2011 1:29 pm

DrVolin wrote:
JackRiddler wrote:...I see these phenomena more as self-organizing processes of political economy that demand geostrategic rationales, rather than geostrategies that set the industries into motion.


For reasons that would be much more obvious in a different social context, I completely agree. I wasn't talking about what drives what. I was merely describing the sequence.


Now you've piqued my interest.

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby DrVolin » Mon May 16, 2011 1:47 pm

Nothing very interesting. Only that part of my work deals with complexity theory. So I know what you're describing.
all these dreams are swept aside
By bloody hands of the hypnotized
Who carry the cross of homicide
And history bears the scars of our civil wars

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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby JackRiddler » Thu May 26, 2011 10:06 am

.

DrV, i'm always interested in hearing how you might apply that work to given cases such as this one, and in anything you have to say in general.

Speaking of supply lines and Great Games...

(picked up by seemslikeadream)


Pakistan Playing the China Card
By Dilip Hiro and Tom Engelhardt, May 25, 2011

In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, outrage against Pakistan has become commonplace in Washington, as exasperation grows, pressure builds, and the threats multiply. Members of Congress from both parties have urged major cuts in the third largest U.S. aid program, which has gone mainly to the Pakistani military. (Republican Congressman Ted Poe caught the mood of the moment: "Pakistan has a lot of explaining to do… Unless the State Department can certify to Congress that Pakistan was not harboring America’s number one enemy, Pakistan should not receive one more cent of American aid.”) Meanwhile, members of the White House have reportedly called for "strong reprisals" if the Pakistanis aren’t more cooperative on information-sharing in the war on terror, and Senator John Kerry traveled to Islamabad to demand from that country’s leaders "a real demonstration of commitment" in fighting terrorism at a "make it or break it moment."

About that leadership, high American officials have lately minced few words. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was typical. At a press conference, he answered a question about whether the Pakistani senior leadership shouldn’t "pay a price" for someone there knowing about bin Laden’s Abbottabad hideout in the following way: "If I were in Pakistani shoes, I would say I’ve already paid a price. I’ve been humiliated. I’ve been shown that the Americans can come in here and do this with impunity." Impunity? It’s not a word secretaries of defense usually wield when it comes to allies and was clearly meant to register in Islamabad – and to humiliate.

Here’s what’s curious though: as Dilip Hiro, TomDispatch regular and author most recently of After Empire: The Birth of A Multipolar World, points out, the Pakistanis control American supply lines to Afghanistan and so the fate of the war there, a simple fact seldom highlighted in the U.S. And here is a simple reality to go with that: The U.S., which has contributed $20 billion in aid to Pakistan since 2001, certainly could cut back or cut off future infusions of financial support. It could also launch those "strong reprisals," but only if it first made a basic decision – to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan and end its war there. Otherwise it remains in an uncomfortable marriage with Pakistan till, as they say, death do us part, a coupling in which, as Hiro indicates, Pakistan for all its internal weaknesses has a potentially stronger position than most Americans might imagine. ~ Tom
Has the Obama Administration Miscalculated in Pakistan?

By Dilip Hiro

Washington often acts as if Pakistan were its client state, with no other possible patron but the United States. It assumes that Pakistani leaders, having made all the usual declarations about upholding the "sacred sovereignty" of their country, will end up yielding to periodic American demands, including those for a free hand in staging drone attacks in its tribal lands bordering Afghanistan. This is a flawed assessment of Washington’s long, tortuous relationship with Islamabad.

A recurring feature of the Obama administration’s foreign policy has been its failure to properly measure the strengths (as well as weaknesses) of its challengers, major or minor, as well as its friends, steadfast or fickle. To earlier examples of this phenomenon, one may now add Pakistan.

That country has an active partnership with another major power, potentially a viable substitute for the U.S. should relations with the Obama administration continue to deteriorate. The Islamabad-Washington relationship has swung from close alliance in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad years of the 1980s to unmistakable alienation in the early 1990s, when Pakistan was on the U.S. watch list as a state supporting international terrorism. Relations between Islamabad and Beijing, on the other hand, have been consistently cordial for almost three decades. Pakistan’s Chinese alliance, noted fitfully by the U.S., is one of its most potent weapons in any future showdown with the Obama administration.

Another factor, also poorly assessed, affects an ongoing war. While, in the 1980s, Pakistan acted as the crucial conduit for U.S. aid and weapons to jihadists in Afghanistan, today it could be an obstacle to the delivery of supplies to America’s military in Afghanistan. It potentially wields a powerful instrument when it comes to the efficiency with which the U.S. and its NATO allies fight the Taliban. It controls the supply lines to the combat forces in that landlocked country.

Taken together, these two factors make Pakistan a far more formidable and independent force than U.S. policymakers concede publicly or even privately.

The Supply Line as Jugular

Angered at the potential duplicity of Pakistan in having provided a haven to Osama bin Laden for years, the Obama administration seems to be losing sight of the strength of the cards Islamabad holds in its hand.

To supply the 100,000 American troops now in Afghanistan, as well as 50,000 troops from other NATO nations and more than 100,000 employees of private contractors, the Pentagon must have unfettered access to that country through its neighbors. Among the six countries adjoining Afghanistan, only three have seaports, with those of China far too distant to be of practical use. Of the remaining two, Iran – Washington’s number one enemy in the region – is out. That places Pakistan in a unique position.

Currently about three-quarters of the supplies for the 400-plus U.S. and coalition bases in Afghanistan – from gigantic Bagram Air Base to tiny patrol outposts – go overland via Pakistan or through its air space. These shipments include almost all the lethal cargo and most of the fuel needed by U.S.-led NATO forces. On their arrival at Karachi, the only major Pakistani seaport, these supplies are transferred to trucks, which travel a long route to crossing points on the Afghan border. Of these, two are key: Torkham and Chaman.

Torkham, approached through the famed Khyber Pass, leads directly to Kabul, the Afghan capital, and Bagram Air Base, the largest U.S. military facility in the country. Approached through the Bolan Pass in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan, Chaman provides a direct route to Kandahar Air Base, the largest U.S. military camp in southern Afghanistan.

Operated by some 4,000 Pakistani drivers and their helpers, nearly 300 trucks and oil tankers pass through Torkham and another 200 through Chaman daily. Increasing attacks on these convoys by Taliban-allied militants in Pakistan starting in 2007 led the Pentagon into a desperate search for alternative supply routes.

With the help of NATO member Latvia, as well as Russia, and Uzbekistan, Pentagon planners succeeded in setting up the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). It is a 3,220-mile railroad link between the Latvian port of Riga and the Uzbek border city of Termez. It is, in turn, connected by a bridge over the Oxus River to the Afghan town of Hairatan. The Uzbek government, however, allows only non-lethal goods to cross its territory. In addition, the Termez-Hairatan route can handle no more than 130 tons of cargo a day. The expense of shipping goods over such a long distance puts a crimp in the Pentagon’s $120 billion annual budget for the Afghan War, and couldn’t possibly replace the Pakistani supply routes.

There is also the Manas Transit Center leased by the U.S. from the government of Kyrgyzstan in December 2001. Due to its proximity to Bagram Air Base, its main functions are transiting coalition forces in and out of Afghanistan, and storing jet fuel for mid-air refueling of U.S. and NATO planes in Afghanistan.

The indispensability of Pakistan’s land routes to the Pentagon has given its government significant leverage in countering excessive diplomatic pressure from or continued violations of its sovereignty by Washington. Last September, for instance, after a NATO helicopter gunship crossed into Pakistan from Afghanistan in hot pursuit of insurgents and killed three paramilitaries of the Pakistani Frontier Corps in the tribal agency of Kurram, Islamabad responded quickly.

It closed the Khyber Pass route to NATO trucks and oil tankers, which stranded many vehicles en route, giving Pakistani militants an opportunity to torch them. And they did. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a written apology to his Pakistani counterpart General Ashhaq Parvez Kayani, conveying his "most sincere condolences for the regrettable loss of your soldiers killed and wounded on 30 September." Anne Patterson, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, issued an apology for the "terrible accident," explaining that the helicopter crew had mistaken the Pakistani paratroopers for insurgents. Yet Pakistan waited eight days before reopening the Torkham border post.

Pakistan’s Other Cards: Oil, Terrorism, and China

In this region of rugged terrain, mountain passes play a crucial geopolitical role. When China and Pakistan began negotiating the demarcation of their frontier after the 1962 Sino-Indian War (itself rooted in a border dispute), Beijing insisted on having the Khunjerab Pass in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Islamabad obliged. As a result, the 2,000-square-mile territory it ceded to China as part of the Sino-Pakistan Border and Trade Agreement in March 1963 included that mountain pass.

That agreement, in turn, led to the building of the 800-mile-long Karkoram Highway linking Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Region and the Pakistani town of Abbottabad, now a household name in America. That road sealed a strategic partnership between Beijing and Islamabad that has strong geopolitical, military, and economic components.

Both countries share the common aim of frustrating India’s aspiration to become the regional superpower of South Asia. In addition, the Chinese government views Pakistan as a crucial ally in its efforts to acquire energy security in the coming decades.

Given Pakistan’s hostility toward India since its establishment in 1947, Beijing made an effort to strengthen that country militarily and economically following its 1962 war with India. After Delhi exploded a "nuclear device" in 1974, China actively aided Islamabad’s nuclear-weapons program. In March 1984, its nuclear testing site at Lop Nor became the venue for a successful explosion of a nuclear bomb assembled by Pakistan. Later, it passed on crucial missile technology to Islamabad.

During this period, China emerged as the main supplier of military hardware to Pakistan. Today, nearly four-fifths of Pakistan’s main battle tanks, three-fifths of its warplanes, and three-quarters of its patrol boats and missile crafts are Chinese-made. Given its limited resources, Islamabad cannot afford to buy expensive American or Western arms and has therefore opted for cheaper, less advanced Chinese weapons in greater numbers. Moreover, Pakistan and China have an ongoing co-production project involving the manufacture of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, similar to America’s versatile F-16.

As a consequence, over the past decades a pro-China lobby has emerged in the Pakistani officer corps. It was therefore not surprising when, in the wake of the American raid in Abbottabad, Pakistani military officials let it be known that they might allow the Chinese to examine the rotor of the stealth version of the damaged Black Hawk helicopter left behind by the U.S. Navy SEALS. That threat, though reportedly not carried out, was a clear signal to the U.S.: if it persisted in violating Pakistan’s sovereignty and applying too much pressure, the Pakistanis might choose to align even more closely with Washington’s rival in Asia, the People’s Republic of China. To underline the point, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani traveled to Beijing two weeks after the Abbottabad air raid.

Gilani’s three-day visit involved the signing of several Sino-Pakistani agreements on trade, finance, science, and technology. The highpoint was his meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Following that summit, an official spokesperson announced Beijing’s decision to urge Chinese enterprises to strengthen their economic ties with Pakistan by expanding investments there.

Among numerous Sino-Pakistani projects in the pipeline is the building of a railroad between Havelian in Pakistan and Kashgar in China, a plan approved by the two governments in July 2010. This is expected to be the first phase of a far more ambitious undertaking to connect Kashgar with the Pakistani port of Gwadar.

A small fishing village on the Arabian Sea coastline of Baluchistan, Gwadar was transformed into a modern seaport in 2008 by the China Harbor Engineering Company Group, a subsidiary of the China Communications Construction Company Group, a giant state-owned corporation. The port is only 330 miles from the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Persian Gulf through which flows much of China’s supplies of Middle Eastern oil. In the wake of the Gilani visit, China has reportedly agreed to take over future operation of the port.

More than a decade ago, China’s leaders decided to reduce the proportion of its oil imports transported by tanker because of the vulnerability of the shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf and East Africa to its ports. These pass through the narrow Malacca Strait, which is guarded by the U.S. Navy. In addition, the 3,500-mile-long journey – to be undertaken by 60% of China’s petroleum imports – is expensive. By having a significant part of its imported oil shipped to Gwadar and then via rail to Kashgar, China would reduce its shipping costs while securing most of its petroleum imports.

At home, the Chinese government remains wary of the Islamist terrorism practiced by Muslim Uighurs agitating for an independent East Turkestan in Xinjiang. Some of them have links to al-Qaeda. Islamabad has long been aware of this. In October 2003, the Pakistani military killed Hasan Mahsum, leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, and in August 2004, the Pakistani and Chinese armies conducted a joint anti-terrorism exercise in Xinjiang.

Almost seven years later, Beijing coupled its satisfaction over the death of Osama bin Laden with praise for Islamabad for pursuing what it termed a "vigorous" policy in combatting terrorism. In stark contrast to the recent blast of criticism from Washington about Pakistan’s role in the war on terrorism, coupled with congressional threats to drastically reduce American aid, China laid out a red carpet for Gilani on his visit.

Referring to the "economic losses" Pakistan had suffered in its ongoing counter-terrorism campaigns, the Chinese government called upon the international community to support the Pakistani regime in its attempts to "restore national stability and development in its economy."

The Chinese response to bin Laden’s killing and its immediate aftermath in Pakistan should be a reminder to the Obama administration: in its dealings with Pakistan in pursuit of its Afghan goals, it has a weaker hand than it imagines. Someday, Pakistan may block those supply lines and play the China card to Washington’s dismay.


I think the bottom line is that concessions will trump supply lines, because thinking you can control the latter under modern conditions will prove to be military folly (in a war) or fantasy (one hopes they don't dare a war).

.
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Re: Relativizing the myth of China as future overlord

Postby semper occultus » Thu May 26, 2011 11:55 am

this could equally well go in the empty Chinese cities thread - as could the titdal wave of rebuttals that have followed it :

China’s Bad Growth Bet
Nouriel Roubini
2011-04-14

www.project-syndicate.org

LONDON – I recently took two trips to China just as the government launched its 12th Five-Year Plan to rebalance the country’s long-term growth model. My visits deepened my view that there is a potentially destabilizing contradiction between China’s short- and medium-term economic performance.


China’s economy is overheating now, but, over time, its current overinvestment will prove deflationary both domestically and globally. Once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible – most likely after 2013 – China is poised for a sharp slowdown. Instead of focusing on securing a soft landing today, Chinese policymakers should be worrying about the brick wall that economic growth may hit in the second half of the quinquennium.

Despite the rhetoric of the new Five-Year Plan – which, like the previous one, aims to increase the share of consumption in GDP – the path of least resistance is the status quo. The new plan’s details reveal continued reliance on investment, including public housing, to support growth, rather than faster currency appreciation, substantial fiscal transfers to households, taxation and/or privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), liberalization of the household registration (hukou) system, or an easing of financial repression.

China has grown for the last few decades on the back of export-led industrialization and a weak currency, which have resulted in high corporate and household savings rates and reliance on net exports and fixed investment (infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacity for import-competing and export sectors). When net exports collapsed in 2008-2009 from 11% of GDP to 5%, China’s leader reacted by further increasing the fixed-investment share of GDP from 42% to 47%.

Thus, China did not suffer a severe recession – as occurred in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere in emerging Asia in 2009 – only because fixed investment exploded. And the fixed-investment share of GDP has increased further in 2010-2011, to almost 50%.

The problem, of course, is that no country can be productive enough to reinvest 50% of GDP in new capital stock without eventually facing immense overcapacity and a staggering non-performing loan problem. China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure, and property. To a visitor, this is evident in sleek but empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, thousands of colossal new central and provincial government buildings, ghost towns, and brand-new aluminum smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging.

Commercial and high-end residential investment has been excessive, automobile capacity has outstripped even the recent surge in sales, and overcapacity in steel, cement, and other manufacturing sectors is increasing further. In the short run, the investment boom will fuel inflation, owing to the highly resource-intensive character of growth. But overcapacity will lead inevitably to serious deflationary pressures, starting with the manufacturing and real-estate sectors.

Eventually, most likely after 2013, China will suffer a hard landing. All historical episodes of excessive investment – including East Asia in the 1990’s – have ended with a financial crisis and/or a long period of slow growth. To avoid this fate, China needs to save less, reduce fixed investment, cut net exports as a share of GDP, and boost the share of consumption.
The trouble is that the reasons the Chinese save so much and consume so little are structural. It will take two decades of reforms to change the incentive to overinvest.


Traditional explanations for the high savings rate (lack of a social safety net, limited public services, aging of the population, underdevelopment of consumer finance, etc.) are only part of the puzzle. Chinese consumers do not have a greater propensity to save than Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan; they all save about 30% of disposable income. The big difference is that the share of China’s GDP going to the household sector is below 50%, leaving little for consumption.

Several Chinese policies have led to a massive transfer of income from politically weak households to politically powerful companies. A weak currency reduces household purchasing power by making imports expensive, thereby protecting import-competing SOEs and boosting exporters’ profits.

Low interest rates on deposits and low lending rates for firms and developers mean that the household sector’s massive savings receive negative rates of return, while the real cost of borrowing for SOEs is also negative. This creates a powerful incentive to overinvest and implies enormous redistribution from households to SOEs, most of which would be losing money if they had to borrow at market-equilibrium interest rates. Moreover, labor repression has caused wages to grow much more slowly than productivity.

To ease the constraints on household income, China needs more rapid exchange-rate appreciation, liberalization of interest rates, and a much sharper increase in wage growth. More importantly, China needs either to privatize its SOEs, so that their profits become income for households, or to tax their profits at a far higher rate and transfer the fiscal gains to households. Instead, on top of household savings, the savings – or retained earnings – of the corporate sector, mostly SOEs, tie up another 25% of GDP.

But boosting the share of income that goes to the household sector could be hugely disruptive, as it could bankrupt a large number of SOEs, export-oriented firms, and provincial governments, all of which are politically powerful. As a result, China will invest even more under the current Five-Year Plan.

Continuing down the investment-led growth path will exacerbate the visible glut of capacity in manufacturing, real estate, and infrastructure, and thus will intensify the coming economic slowdown once further fixed-investment growth becomes impossible. Until the change of political leadership in 2012-2013, China’s policymakers may be able to maintain high growth rates, but at a very high foreseeable cost.

Nouriel Roubini is Chairman of Roubini Global Economics (http://www.roubini.com), professor of Economics at the Stern School of Business at NYU and co-author of Crisis Economics, whose paperback edition is forthcoming this month.

Why Roubini may be wrong on China’s property doom
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