Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby matrixdutch » Sat Jan 29, 2011 9:48 am

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... s?page=0,0
Whispering at Autocrats

In one fell swoop, the candor of the cables released by WikiLeaks did more for Arab democracy than decades of backstage U.S. diplomacy.


Did the Wikileaked State Department cables that described Tunisia's deposed leader Zine el-Abedin Ben Ali as the head of a corrupt police state play any role in encouraging the democratic uprising against him -- and thus spark the wave of protests now spreading across Egypt?

I asked our experts at Human Rights Watch to canvass their sources in the country, and the consensus was that while Tunisians didn't need American diplomats to tell them how bad their government was, the cables did have an impact. The candid appraisal of Ben Ali by U.S. diplomats showed Tunisians that the rottenness of the regime was obvious not just to them but to the whole world -- and that it was a source of shame for Tunisia on an international stage. The cables also contradicted the prevailing view among Tunisians that Washington would back Ben Ali to the bloody end, giving them added impetus to take to the streets. They further delegitimized the Tunisian leader and boosted the morale of his opponents at a pivotal moment in the drama that unfolded over the last few weeks.

This point might not be worth dwelling on, except that it suggests something interesting about how the United States, and the State Department in particular, approaches the challenge of promoting human rights and democracy in countries like Tunisia. Consider the following proposition: None of the decent, principled, conscientious, but behind the scenes efforts the State Department made in recent years to persuade the Tunisian government to relax its authoritarian grip -- mostly through diplomatic démarches and meetings with top Tunisian officials -- had any significant impact on the Ben Ali regime's behavior or increased the likelihood of democratic change. Nor did the many quiet U.S. programs of outreach to Tunisian society, cultural exchanges and the like, even if Tunisians appreciated them and they will bear fruit as the country democratizes.

Instead, the one thing that did seem to have some impact was a public statement exposing what the United States really thought about the Ben Ali regime: a statement that was vivid, honest, raw, undiplomatic, extremely well-timed -- and completely inadvertent.

Had anyone at the State Department proposed deliberately making a statement along the lines of what appears in the cables, they would have been booted out of Foggy Bottom as quickly as you can say "we value our multifaceted relationship with the GOT." Most State Department professionals have long believed that explicit public criticism of repressive governments does little more than make the critic feel good. They argue that real progress toward ending human rights abuses or corruption in countries with which the United States has important relationships, like Egypt or Pakistan or Indonesia, is more likely to come when such problems are raised behind closed doors.

Indeed, one of the most delightful ironies of the leaked Tunisia cables is that they make precisely this argument. One missive -- after laying out more juicy details about how and why Ben Ali had "lost touch with the Tunisian people" (the very commentary that, when publicly revealed, actually seemed to affect the situation on the ground) -- concluded that the U.S. should "dial back the public criticism" and replace it with "frequent high-level private candor."

At least in Tunisia, the State Department did not disavow its condemnation of the Ben Ali government after its publication. Elsewhere, officials rushed to deny the obvious. In Sri Lanka, a leaked embassy cable "revealed" the supposedly stunning insight that the country's leaders can't be counted on to prosecute those who committed war crimes in their recently ended fight with the Tamil Tiger rebels, since the leaders were themselves responsible for those crimes. This only confirmed what everyone knew the U.S. government knew about Sri Lanka. Yet the U.S. embassy in Colombo issued a public statement trying to take it back.

American diplomats have many reasons to avoid saying publicly what they think privately about their less savory partners. An obvious and logical one is that they want to preserve relationships that are necessary to advance other U.S. goals -- securing Egypt's support for the Middle East peace process, for example, or shoring up Ethiopia's cooperation in fighting terrorism, or getting Kyrgyzstan's assent to hosting a U.S. military base.

I've always argued to my friends at the State Department that this kind of thinking can be catastrophic in the long run. Consider, for example, how many of the national security threats that the United States has faced in the last decade stem from the misrule of two dictators with whom Washington worked in the 1980s -- Saddam Hussein, and, arguably to a larger extent, Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan. Somewhere in the State Department archives, there is probably a cable from Islamabad circa 1980, incisively analyzing Zia's political repression, his Islamization of Pakistani society and his creation of proxy militant groups, projecting the implications for U.S. interests, yet rationalizing public silence to maintain American influence.

In the short term, there are often trade-offs between public criticism of repressive allies and working with them to advance other U.S. interests. Perhaps Pakistan in the 1980s, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was such a case -- though one could just as easily argue that the billions of dollars the U.S. provided Zia should have given Washington leverage to improve his domestic policies. In such cases, where U.S. interests truly do require "dialing back" public pressure, U.S. diplomats should at least acknowledge the pragmatic reasons for counseling quiet persuasion rather than pretending it is always the best way to influence dictators.

In reality, no amount of "high-level private candor" was going to convince Ben Ali of Tunisia that allowing free speech or free elections was in his interest, because it plainly wasn't (even if it was very much in the interest of Tunisia as a whole) -- and the same is true for President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and others like him. Authoritarian rulers do not ease repression or agree to checks on their powers because foreign officials convince them it is a good idea in a private meeting. Such rulers make political concessions when it is necessary to retain the support of key actors in their societies -- from the general population to the security services to economic and political elites.

But depending on the circumstances, public, external pressure really can influence the calculations of these domestic actors. It can help delegitimize rulers in the eyes of their people; it can cause elites to question whether tying themselves to their leader's policies serves their interests; it can encourage and amplify domestic voices calling for change. Precisely because it can be consequential, it is hard to bring such pressure to bear without causing diplomatic friction. The alternative, however, is to be inconsequential.

There is another reason why many American diplomats hesitate to challenge authoritarian governments in public: They believe that those governments will resist reform no matter what the United States says or does. I've had many conversations with State Department officials in which they have said something like: "Sure, our diplomatic engagement with Country X won't make it better on human rights. But neither will sanctions or public criticism or anything else." This cynicism is understandable. History may teach us that authoritarian regimes project a forced (and therefore false) stability -- that over a 20 or 30 year timeframe, most will experience dramatic political upheaval. But at any given moment, the prospects for real human rights progress in places like Uzbekistan, China, or Iran are very small.

If you were a State Department official, and Hillary Clinton asked you every day: "What will the weather be like tomorrow?" and gave you points that you could cash in for career advancement every time you got the answer right, the safest strategy would be to answer that the weather tomorrow will be the same as the weather today. Likewise, on any given Sunday, the safest approach to engaging most of the world's dictatorships is to assume that they will be governed in exactly the same way on Monday, and base policy on that assumption. Why risk diplomatic relationships -- and one's own reputation as a prognosticator -- on strategies for promoting change that are not likely to work before you move on to your next diplomatic post?

It would be rational, for example, for American diplomats to believe that the revolution in Tunisia is unlikely to spur similarly successful popular movements in other authoritarian Arab countries, such as Egypt and Algeria. But by the same token, it would have been rational for them to believe just a month ago that no such revolution was possible in Tunisia. Or to discount the likelihood that the people of Kyrgyzstan would overthrow their corrupt government just weeks before it happened last year. Or to dismiss as a pipe dream that the mighty Soviet Union would fall, and that the powerless Baltic nations would become independent, democratic states, just a year before it happened. If we bet on the stability of authoritarian states, we will be right most of the time, but wrong at the crucial time.

History is made when the weather suddenly changes -- by deviations from the normal course of events. The challenge for American diplomacy is not to wait for shifts in favor of human rights and democracy before scrambling to appear to support them. It is not to wait until a dictator is half-way out the door before you condemn his abuses, freeze his assets, and demand free elections. It is to promote change in repressive states before it appears inevitable. If you think there is only a 10 percent chance that Egypt's post-Mubarak transition will usher in a government that answers to its people, or that in the next few years the Burmese military junta might compromise with the democratic opposition, or that a popular movement might successfully challenge political repression in Iran, then why not do what you can to help raise the odds to 20 or 30 percent? In foreign policy, as in baseball, .300 is a Hall of Fame average.

Political realities mean that American diplomats will use a different tone when confronting human rights abuses committed by a great power like China than a small one like Ivory Coast. They will rightly follow different strategies toward countries with strong democratic opposition movements, like Burma, than toward those where civil society is atomized, as it is in Turkmenistan. But where they are serious about promoting human rights and democracy, they can afford to be bolder, sooner, than they usually are. American diplomats need not always relegate their honest impressions to the confessional of a secret cable.

America's relationship with China did not crumble when Hillary Clinton challenged its government to stop censoring the Internet last year, or when she challenged the country to account for the dissidents it has disappeared over the years just days before last week's summit between presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao. America's Arab friends did not walk away from their alliances with the United States after Clinton told them, at a recent public forum in Qatar, that "people have grown tired of [their] corrupt institutions and stagnant political order." Such public candor not only encourages dissidents in repressive societies, but stimulates debate among elites, who often privately admit that the Americans have a point. It can contribute to those magical moments -- unpredictable, infrequent, but in the longer scheme of things inevitable -- when stagnant order gives way to vibrant change.

The people of Tunisia shouldn't have had to wait for Wikileaks to learn that the U.S. saw their country just as they did. It's time that the gulf between what American diplomats know and what they say got smaller.
Our truth consists of illusions that we have forgotten are illusions - Nietzsche
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From leveymg at DU: 9/11 Team B

Postby stillrobertpaulsen » Tue Feb 01, 2011 9:35 pm

Courtesy of leveymg at DU:

Wikileaks Cable Details 9/11 Team B. 2nd Group of Hijackers Booked onto Flt. 77 Aircraft - Got Away

Here's the cable. FBI, CIA, DHS has apparently been sitting on this information for 9 years. These guys were scheduled to fly 9/10 from LA to DC on the same plane that was hijacked and crashed into the Pentagon on 9/11 by Flt. 77 hijackers al-Midhar and al-Hazmi. One has to ask: why did they abort their mission, and where are they? Did the USG ever find al-Mansoori and the others? Why has the USG sat on this information all this time?

S E C R E T DOHA 000060 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS: PINR, ASEC, CVIS, KVPR, PGOV, PTER, QA, SIPRS SUBJECT: QATAR JANUARY 2010 VISAS VIPER MEETING AND SUBMISSION Classified By: DCM Mirembe Nantongo, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (U) VISAS VIPER (State Department Terrorism Alert)

SNIP

3. (SBU) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR WATCHLISTING PURPOSES AS THE DEPARTMENT AND THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERORISM CENTER (NCTC) DEEM APPROPRIATE. WE RECOMMEND THAT MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL DAHHAM AL MANSOORI (MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL MANSOORI) BE INCLUDED IN THE TSA SELECTEE SECURITY DIRECTIVE FOR RELEASE TO U.S. AND FOREIGN CARRIERS AS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY POSE A THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD. A REVIEW OF CLASS INDICATED NO HITS FOR AL MANSOORI. POST WILL ENTER AL MANSOORI IN CLASS AFTER TRANSMITTING THIS CABLE.

4. (SBU) NAME: MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL DAHHAM AL MANSOORI ALIAS: MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL MANSOORI DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: UAE GENDER: M NATIONALITY: UAE LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx A0122037 (UAE)

5. (S) MR. AL MANSOORI IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE FBI FOR HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACKS. HE IS SUSPECTED OF AIDING PEOPLE WHO ENTERED THE U.S. BEFORE THE ATTACKS TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF POSSIBLE TARGETS AND PROVIDING OTHER SUPPORT TO THE HIJACKERS.

6. (S) THE THREE INDIVIDUALS BELOW ENTERED THE U.S. ON 15 AUGUST 2001 ABOARD BRITISH AIRWAYS (BA) FLIGHT #185 FROM LONDON, ENGLAND: NAME: MESHAL ALHAJRI ALIAS: MESHAL AL HAJRI, MESCAL ABDULLA AL HAJRI DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: QATAR GENDER: M NATIONALITY: QATAR LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx (QATAR) NAME: FAHAD ABDULLA ALIAS: FAHAD MUBARAK R ABDULLA DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: QATAR GENDER: M NATIONALITY: QATAR LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx (QATAR) NAME: ALI ALFEHAID ALIAS: ALI HAMAD S M AL FEHAID DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: QATAR GENDER: M NATIONALITY: QATAR LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx (QATAR)

7. (S) THE MEN FIRST VISITED NEW YORK, NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, D.C. THEY VISITED THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, THE STATUE OF LIBERTY, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND VARIOUS AREAS IN VIRGINA.

8. (S) THE MEN THEN FLEW TO LOS ANGELES, CA ON 24 AUGUST 2001 ABOARD AMERICAN AIRLINES (AA) FLIGHT #143. THEY CHECKED INTO ONE ROOM IN A HOTEL NEAR THE LOS ANGELES AIRPORT WITH A CHECKOUT DATE OF 10 SEPTEMBER 2001. THEY PAID FOR THE ROOM USING CASH AND, DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS OF THEIR STAY, REQUESTED THAT THEIR ROOM NOT BE CLEANED. HOTEL CLEANING STAFF GREW SUSPICIOUS OF THE MEN BECAUSE THEY NOTICED PILOT TYPE UNIFORMS, SEVERAL LAPTOPS, AND SEVERAL CARDBOARD BOXES ADDRESSED TO SYRIA, JERUSALEM, AFGHANISTAN, AND JORDAN IN THE ROOM ON PREVIOUS CLEANING VISITS. THE MEN HAD A SMASHED CELLULAR PHONE IN THE ROOM AND A CELLULAR PHONE ATTACHED BY WIRE TO A COMPUTER. THE ROOM ALSO CONTAINED PIN FEED COMPUTER PAPER PRINT OUTS WITH HEADERS LISTING PILOT NAMES, AIRLINES, FLIGHT NUMBERS, AND FLIGHT TIMES.

9. (S) ACCORDING TO AA RECORDS, THE MEN SCHEDULED RETURN FLIGHTS FOR 10 SEPTEMBER 2001 ABOARD AA FLIGHT #144 FROM LOS ANGELES, CA TO WASHINGTON, D.C., BUT FAILED TO BOARD. THE SAME PLANE USED FOR AA FLIGHT #144 ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2001 WAS USED FOR AA FLIGHT #77 ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001. AA FLIGHT #77 WAS HIJACKED ON ROUTE THE NEXT DAY AND CRASHED IN TO THE PENTAGON.

10. (S) BA RECORDS INDICATE THAT THE MEN BOARDED BA FLIGHT #268 ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2001 FROM LOS ANGELES, CA TO LONDON, ENGLAND. THE MEN RETURNED TO QATAR ON BA FLIGHT #125 FROM LONDON, ENGLAND TO DOHA, QATAR ON 13 SEPTEMBER 2001.

12. (S) A SUBSEQUENT FBI INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE MEN,S PLANE TICKETS WERE PAID FOR AND THEIR HOTEL RESERVATIONS IN LOS ANGELES, CA WERE MADE BY A CONVICTED TERRORIST. THE INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT THE MEN SPENT A WEEK WITH MR. AL MANSOORI TRAVELING TO DIFFERENT DESTINATIONS IN CALIFORNIA.

13. (SBU) MR. AL MANSOORI,S VISA WAS REVOKED AFTER THIS INFORMATION CAME TO LIGHT, BUT HIS NAME WAS NOT WATCHLISTED IN THE CLASS SYSTEM. POST RECOMMENDS THAT MR. AL MANSOORI,S INFORMATION BE ENTERED INTO THE CLASS SYSTEM ON THE BASIS OF THE ONGOING FBI INVESTIGATION AND HIS POSSIBLE TIES TO TERRORISM.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikilea ... R-IMO.html


http://www.democraticunderground.com/di ... 439x325373
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Re: From leveymg at DU: 9/11 Team B

Postby slimmouse » Tue Feb 01, 2011 10:49 pm

stillrobertpaulsen wrote:Courtesy of leveymg at DU:

Wikileaks Cable Details 9/11 Team B. 2nd Group of Hijackers Booked onto Flt. 77 Aircraft - Got Away

Here's the cable. FBI, CIA, DHS has apparently been sitting on this information for 9 years. These guys were scheduled to fly 9/10 from LA to DC on the same plane that was hijacked and crashed into the Pentagon on 9/11 by Flt. 77 hijackers al-Midhar and al-Hazmi. One has to ask: why did they abort their mission, and where are they? Did the USG ever find al-Mansoori and the others? Why has the USG sat on this information all this time?

S E C R E T DOHA 000060 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 TAGS: PINR, ASEC, CVIS, KVPR, PGOV, PTER, QA, SIPRS SUBJECT: QATAR JANUARY 2010 VISAS VIPER MEETING AND SUBMISSION Classified By: DCM Mirembe Nantongo, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (U) VISAS VIPER (State Department Terrorism Alert)

SNIP

3. (SBU) THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR WATCHLISTING PURPOSES AS THE DEPARTMENT AND THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERORISM CENTER (NCTC) DEEM APPROPRIATE. WE RECOMMEND THAT MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL DAHHAM AL MANSOORI (MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL MANSOORI) BE INCLUDED IN THE TSA SELECTEE SECURITY DIRECTIVE FOR RELEASE TO U.S. AND FOREIGN CARRIERS AS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY POSE A THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD. A REVIEW OF CLASS INDICATED NO HITS FOR AL MANSOORI. POST WILL ENTER AL MANSOORI IN CLASS AFTER TRANSMITTING THIS CABLE.

4. (SBU) NAME: MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL DAHHAM AL MANSOORI ALIAS: MOHAMED ALI MOHAMED AL MANSOORI DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: UAE GENDER: M NATIONALITY: UAE LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx A0122037 (UAE)

5. (S) MR. AL MANSOORI IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE FBI FOR HIS POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN THE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 ATTACKS. HE IS SUSPECTED OF AIDING PEOPLE WHO ENTERED THE U.S. BEFORE THE ATTACKS TO CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE OF POSSIBLE TARGETS AND PROVIDING OTHER SUPPORT TO THE HIJACKERS.

6. (S) THE THREE INDIVIDUALS BELOW ENTERED THE U.S. ON 15 AUGUST 2001 ABOARD BRITISH AIRWAYS (BA) FLIGHT #185 FROM LONDON, ENGLAND: NAME: MESHAL ALHAJRI ALIAS: MESHAL AL HAJRI, MESCAL ABDULLA AL HAJRI DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: QATAR GENDER: M NATIONALITY: QATAR LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx (QATAR) NAME: FAHAD ABDULLA ALIAS: FAHAD MUBARAK R ABDULLA DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: QATAR GENDER: M NATIONALITY: QATAR LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx (QATAR) NAME: ALI ALFEHAID ALIAS: ALI HAMAD S M AL FEHAID DOB: xxxxxxxxxxxx POB: QATAR GENDER: M NATIONALITY: QATAR LOCATION: UNK PPT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxxxxx (QATAR)

7. (S) THE MEN FIRST VISITED NEW YORK, NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, D.C. THEY VISITED THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, THE STATUE OF LIBERTY, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND VARIOUS AREAS IN VIRGINA.

8. (S) THE MEN THEN FLEW TO LOS ANGELES, CA ON 24 AUGUST 2001 ABOARD AMERICAN AIRLINES (AA) FLIGHT #143. THEY CHECKED INTO ONE ROOM IN A HOTEL NEAR THE LOS ANGELES AIRPORT WITH A CHECKOUT DATE OF 10 SEPTEMBER 2001. THEY PAID FOR THE ROOM USING CASH AND, DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS OF THEIR STAY, REQUESTED THAT THEIR ROOM NOT BE CLEANED. HOTEL CLEANING STAFF GREW SUSPICIOUS OF THE MEN BECAUSE THEY NOTICED PILOT TYPE UNIFORMS, SEVERAL LAPTOPS, AND SEVERAL CARDBOARD BOXES ADDRESSED TO SYRIA, JERUSALEM, AFGHANISTAN, AND JORDAN IN THE ROOM ON PREVIOUS CLEANING VISITS. THE MEN HAD A SMASHED CELLULAR PHONE IN THE ROOM AND A CELLULAR PHONE ATTACHED BY WIRE TO A COMPUTER. THE ROOM ALSO CONTAINED PIN FEED COMPUTER PAPER PRINT OUTS WITH HEADERS LISTING PILOT NAMES, AIRLINES, FLIGHT NUMBERS, AND FLIGHT TIMES.

9. (S) ACCORDING TO AA RECORDS, THE MEN SCHEDULED RETURN FLIGHTS FOR 10 SEPTEMBER 2001 ABOARD AA FLIGHT #144 FROM LOS ANGELES, CA TO WASHINGTON, D.C., BUT FAILED TO BOARD. THE SAME PLANE USED FOR AA FLIGHT #144 ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2001 WAS USED FOR AA FLIGHT #77 ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2001. AA FLIGHT #77 WAS HIJACKED ON ROUTE THE NEXT DAY AND CRASHED IN TO THE PENTAGON.

10. (S) BA RECORDS INDICATE THAT THE MEN BOARDED BA FLIGHT #268 ON 10 SEPTEMBER 2001 FROM LOS ANGELES, CA TO LONDON, ENGLAND. THE MEN RETURNED TO QATAR ON BA FLIGHT #125 FROM LONDON, ENGLAND TO DOHA, QATAR ON 13 SEPTEMBER 2001.

12. (S) A SUBSEQUENT FBI INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE MEN,S PLANE TICKETS WERE PAID FOR AND THEIR HOTEL RESERVATIONS IN LOS ANGELES, CA WERE MADE BY A CONVICTED TERRORIST. THE INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT THE MEN SPENT A WEEK WITH MR. AL MANSOORI TRAVELING TO DIFFERENT DESTINATIONS IN CALIFORNIA.

13. (SBU) MR. AL MANSOORI,S VISA WAS REVOKED AFTER THIS INFORMATION CAME TO LIGHT, BUT HIS NAME WAS NOT WATCHLISTED IN THE CLASS SYSTEM. POST RECOMMENDS THAT MR. AL MANSOORI,S INFORMATION BE ENTERED INTO THE CLASS SYSTEM ON THE BASIS OF THE ONGOING FBI INVESTIGATION AND HIS POSSIBLE TIES TO TERRORISM.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikilea ... R-IMO.html


http://www.democraticunderground.com/di ... 439x325373



With the greatest respect, Im far more fascinated in how these hijackers actually pulled off the feat of avianautics that they did - convinced as I might be that it was flight whatever number it was.

I mean , the names and all that ? Really ?
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Re: From leveymg at DU: 9/11 Team B

Postby stillrobertpaulsen » Wed Feb 02, 2011 2:50 pm

slimmouse wrote: With the greatest respect, Im far more fascinated in how these hijackers actually pulled off the feat of avianautics that they did - convinced as I might be that it was flight whatever number it was.

I mean , the names and all that ? Really ?


I agree, that is a fascinating subject. If there was a Wikileak cable regarding prior military flight training for the piloting hijackers or remote control operation making the point of hijackers receiveing flight training moot, I'll be sure to post it here.
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby JackRiddler » Thu Feb 10, 2011 3:23 am

Leaks show US concerns over Mexico

Washington does not believe Mexico is able to win the country's fight against drug cartels, WikiLeaks cables reveal.
Last Modified: 03 Dec 2010 03:36 GMT

More than 28,000 people have died in drug-related violence since war was declared on the cartels in 2006 [AFP]



The US does not believe that Mexico's military is capable of winning the country's violent drug war, classified memos released by WikiLeaks have revealed.

US diplomats drew a highly critical picture of the country's armed forces, which were described as bureaucratic and unfit to take on "sophisticated" drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), in cables published on Thursday.

The diplomatic memos paint a picture of an embattled Mexican government, nervous about losing whole areas of the country to the drug cartels.

The leaked material also shows Mexican officials petitioned the US government to assist in focusing the crackdown on the country's most violent cities.

"The military was not trained to patrol the streets or carry out law enforcement operations," said one memo referring to the failure of military-led operations to reduce violence in the country's most deadly city of Ciudad Juarez.

"It does not have the authority to collect and introduce evidence into the judicial system.

"The result: arrests skyrocketed, prosecutions remained flat, and both the military and public have become increasingly frustrated."

Federal police took over control in Juarez in January.

The leaks showed the Mexican military was also perceived "to be seen slow and risk-averse even where it should succeed".

Sophisticated cartels

The perceived picture in the US of Mexico's military contrasted with its views of the country's drug gangs, which Mexican officials blame for more than 28,000 deaths in the past four years as violence has erupted across the country.

"The DTOs are sophisticated players: they can wait out a military deployment; they have an almost unlimited human resource pool to draw from in the marginalised neighborhoods," said the comments in a cable to Washington earlier this year.

Felipe Calderon, the Mexican president, has gambled his presidency on a high-profile military crackdown on the drug gangs, involving about 50,000 troops and launched when he took office four years ago, following disputed elections.

The cables' assessments contrasted with Calderon's insistence that as a US ally, Mexico is gaining ground over the drug gangs.

"Prosecution rates for organised crime-related offenses are dismal; two percent of those detained are brought to trial," a US cable read, only a day after Calderon lauded the record number of drug lords arrested under his administration.

"Mexican security institutions are often locked in a zero-sum competition in which one agency's success is viewed as another's failure," the cable added.

The cable, however, praised Mexico's navy - who killed Arturo Beltran Leyva, a drug lord, in December, 2009, in the government's biggest victory yet against the cartels - as a sharper force than the army.

But it warned of "considerable tension" between the two forces.


Source:
Agencies

LINK
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/ameri ... 74202.html
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby JackRiddler » Mon Feb 14, 2011 1:50 pm

.

Not sure if I posted this here before but I used a DU thread about Greenwald's list of Wikileaks "hits" to compile a great many additional links to cable stories. I wanted a provisional general resource and also a single link that counteracts the "old news" and "trivial gossip" talking points. Here's a listing of some of what's on there...

Glenn Greenwald: What WikiLeaks revealed to the world in 2010
http://www.democraticunderground.com/di ... 5699#67951

The Usual Anti-Wikileaks Talking Points

...WHERE TO RESEARCH THE CABLES YOURSELF...

...And remember, everyone, we've only scratched the surface here because...

FAIR Press Release: What We Learn from Wikileaks

2007: US, YEMEN COOK UP MINI-GULF OF TONKIN AGAINST IRAN

2008: LEBANESE DEFENSE MINISTER OFFERED ADVICE TO ISRAEL ON WHAT TO BOMB

2005: WASHINGTON ENCOURAGED ARMS TO SOUTH SUDAN EVEN THOUGH IT WAS MAIN ENFORCER OF TREATY BAN

2010 - AUSTRALIA: KEY LABOR POWER BROKER ARBIB OUTED AS US INFORMANT

2009: US CONTRACTOR DYNCORP HELPED PIMP CHILDREN FOR SEX

SHELL'S GRIP ON NIGERIAN STATE REVEALED

THE 25 DAYS OF WIKILEAKS (David Swanson with links to 40+ explosive stories about the cables)

STATE DEPARTMENT DELUDED INTO THINKING MICHAEL MOORE'S "SICKO" WAS BANNED IN CUBA!

US INTERVENED IN MICHAEL MOORE NEW ZEALAND SHOWING (Fahrenheit 9/11)

ISRAEL TO PARIS: "SECRET ACCORD" WITH US TO ALLOW SETTLEMENT GROWTH (June 2009)

MOSSAD TEAM THAT KILLED AL-MABHOUH IN DUBAI HAD CREDIT CARDS FROM US BANK

Afterposten publishing cables not available elsewhere...

MUMBAI TERROR PLOTTER HAD HISTORY WITH US D.E.A.

ZIMBABWE PRIME MINISTER SECRETLY URGED US & Co. TO KEEP CRIPPLING SANCTIONS IN PLACE...

US SOUGHT TO RETALIATE AGAINST EUROPE FOR REFUSING MONSANTO GM CROPS

D.E.A. GOES GLOBAL, BEYOND DRUGS

CBS COMPILATION: WHAT WIKILEAKS REVEALED TO THE WORLD IN 2010

Right Now: US CONTINUING COVERT INFILTRATION AND DESTABILIZATION IN VENEZUELA

Aftenposten: Germany, U.S. plan secret spy project

FRANCE HEADS INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE (according to State Dept cable)

US WORKS WITH JAPAN TO WEAKEN ANTI-WHALING CAMPAIGNS.

Uribe and Chavez Almost Come to Blows

HAMBURG VS. SCIENTOLOGY
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby vanlose kid » Fri Mar 11, 2011 1:55 pm

Yudhoyono's top adviser a Timor war crimes suspect
Philip Dorling
March 12, 2011

THE United States has blackballed one of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's closest advisers for alleged involvement in East Timor war crimes, according to leaked US diplomatic cables.

But Washington kept secret the reasons for denying a visa to former Indonesian army general Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and President Yudhoyono subsequently appointed his friend deputy defence minister.

In September 2009, the US withheld the issue of a visa that would allow Mr Sjamsoeddin, a former army general then serving as a senior presidential adviser, to accompany President Yudhoyono, who was about to attend the G20 leaders summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Mr Sjamsoeddin was subject to a US Department of Homeland Security recommendation that he be denied entry owing to suspected involvement in "terror activities" and "extrajudicial killings''.

The US embassy cables leaked to WikiLeaks, and provided exclusively to The Saturday Age, show that the US embassy in Jakarta urged that Mr Sjamsoeddin still be allowed entry, lest the issue become an "irritant" in relations between Jakarta and Washington.

"We note that as a key adviser to the Indonesian President and possible cabinet appointee, Sjamsoeddin's travel to the United States would facilitate and strengthen US-Indonesian ties,'' the Jakarta embassy argued. "Sjamsoeddin provides guidance and counsel to President Yudhoyono on a number of issues of importance to the US, such as mil[itary]-to-mil[itary] ties, which are a cornerstone of our efforts to ensure regional stability."

The allegations against Mr Sjamsoeddin included that, while serving as an Indonesian special forces commander in East Timor, he was responsible for directing the Santa Cruz massacre that claimed the lives of more than 250 East Timorese pro-independence demonstrators on November 12, 1991.

It was also alleged that Mr Sjamsoeddin was responsible for widespread violence committed by Indonesian troops in Dili after East Timor's August 30, 1999, independence ballot.

Mr Sjamsoeddin submitted a statement to the US embassy seeking to rebut the allegations, claiming that he had not been at the Santa Cruz massacre but had been rescuing ''journalists from Timorese [Indonesian army] officials who were angered that the journalists had accused them of being involved in clandestine activities''. Mr Sjamsoeddin also claimed he had been cleared by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission for any wrongdoing in relation to the violence that swept Dili in September 1999.

Mr Sjamsoeddin's denials were accepted by the US embassy in Jakarta, which argued that "circumstantial evidence" linking Mr Sjamsoeddin to human rights violations was insufficient to deny him a visa. But this advice drew a sharp critique from the US embassy in Dili, which drew on United Nations and East Timorese human rights investigations to argue that Mr Sjamsoeddin repeatedly had command responsibility for Indonesian troops that committed atrocities.

The US embassy in Dili concluded that "Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin held senior positions of command responsibility in both 1991 and 1999, moments when atrocities undeniably occurred, and strongly indicate his personal culpability''.

http://www.smh.com.au/world/yudhoyonos- ... 1brc7.html


President rejects corruption claim
Tom Allard, Jakarta
March 12, 2011

INDONESIA demanded, and received, an expression of regret from the US ambassador in Jakarta yesterday as President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono emphatically denied allegations in US diplomatic cables that he and his family were implicated in corruption.

The allegations, revealed in The Age yesterday and based on cables obtained by WikiLeaks, created a media storm in Indonesia as the country's foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, hauled in US ambassador Scot Marciel to formally lodge a ''strong protest''.

At an extraordinary and, at times, awkward press conference after the meeting, Mr Marciel declined to confirm or deny the veracity of the cables or comment on the specific allegations they contained.

But he said, generally speaking, such cables contained ''candid and often raw information'' that was ''often incomplete and unsubstantiated''.

''We express our deepest regrets to President Yudhoyono and to the Indonesian people,'' he said, adding that the publication of the cables was ''extremely irresponsible''.

Mr Marciel abruptly left the press conference shortly afterwards, leaving Mr Natalegawa to answer questions alone.

Dr Yudhoyono, meanwhile, said The Age had breached the ''universal journalism code of ethics'' by publishing details of the cables without asking him for comment beforehand. ''The President is absolutely not happy with the false coverage, full of lies, run in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age,'' according to a statement ''sent on behalf of the President'' by his senior spokesman, Daniel Sparingga. ''The content is full of sensation and disrespect, full of nonsense.''

The cables from the US embassy in Jakarta, sent between 2004 and 2010, contained a series of startling but unverified allegations about the conduct of Dr Yudhoyono, his wife and family. Among the allegations were that Dr Yudhoyono ordered a corruption investigation into political powerbroker Taufik Kiemas be dropped and that he received funds from controversial businessman Tomy Winata via a middleman.

http://www.smh.com.au/world/president-r ... 1brc5.html


Tsunami gives Indonesian leader a reprieve from WikiLeaks
Newly leaked US cables accuse Indonesia President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of spying on his opponents and paying off judges to protect allegedly corrupt allies.


By Sara Schonhardt, Correspondent / March 11, 2011Jakarta, Indonesia

The Indonesian government is scrambling to defend President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s fairly tidy reputation against newly leaked US diplomatic cables that accuse the leader of bribery, intimidation, and influence peddling.

The incident was overshadowed today by an 8.9-magnitude earthquake that struck off the coast of Japan, giving Mr. Yudhoyono at least an initial reprieve from the accusations. The quake triggered tsunami warnings from Indonesia to Hawaii, and hundreds have already been killed in Japan, leaving the government here struggling to locate some 31,000 nationals living there.

But the accusations could have deep political implications for the president’s image as a reformer and even lead to a shake-up within the country’s already fragile governing coalition.

Some political analysts say Yudhoyono’s squeaky clean image has been overdue for a reality check.

“Like other professional soldiers-turned-reformist-politicians Yudhoyono, has represented a cluster of business and political interests under the guise of broadly conceived reform,” says John Sidel, a professor at the London School of Economics and the author of several books on Indonesia’s political history.

Yudhoyono’s image as an honest broker and committed reformer – albeit a former general with deep ties to past president Suharto’s strong-arm political establishment – has been highly exaggerated, adds Mr. Sidel.

Spying on opponents, paying off judges

The cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and provided early to Australian newspaper The Age for an article published today, accuse Mr. Yudhoyono of spying on his political opponents and paying off judges to protect allegedly corrupt political allies. They also blame the first lady for trying to profit financially from the family’s political position.

The cables are not yet provided online at WikiLeaks.ch, the current home base for Australian founder Julian Assange's gradual leak of more than 251,000 secret US diplomatic cables. Since late November, only 5,440 of the cables have been revealed on WikiLeaks.ch.

During a hastily prepared news conference Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told reporters the claims were baseless. “We find it especially unacceptable that it has been suggested as facts,” he said.

In response to the firestorm, the US State Department issued a statement calling the release of the cables “extremely irresponsible. Scot Marciel, the US deputy assistant secretary of the East Asia and Pacific Bureau, expressed regret to Mr. Yudhoyono that the documents had become public.

“These documents should not be seen as having standing on their own or as representing US policy,” Mr. Marciel told reporters today, according to the Associated Press.

Cables won't hit where it hurts most

Yudhoyono took over from former president Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2004 on a platform aimed at transforming Indonesia’s weighty bureaucracy and curbing corruption in a country ranked near the bottom of transparency indexes.

He was reelected by a landslide in 2009, but in recent months his popularity has waned among a populace that accuses him of not doing enough to tackle corruption or clamp down on religious intolerance.

Social inequality, infrastructure improvements, and judicial accountability have made little progress in this nation of roughly 238 million people despite economic and security advances.

In recent weeks US diplomats have also issued statements of concern against Yudhoyono’s lack of action in response to ongoing sectarian violence, echoing sentiment from civil society groups, bureaucrats, and Indonesian observers that the president is unwilling to alienate powerful political players.

Aside from serving as ammunition for the opposition to attack the president, political economists say the financial impact of the leaked cables will be minor for a country that drew huge amounts of foreign investment last year.

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pac ... -WikiLeaks




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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby JackRiddler » Mon Mar 14, 2011 2:49 pm

.

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31490&p=389548

Analysis of Iraq war logs released by Wikileaks finds that only 20 percent of the 66,000 civilian-designated deaths documented by US forces were also documented in the published reports of civilian deaths compiled by Iraq Body Count. This very low overlap suggests both data sets are minority samples and that the total number of deaths from hostilities since the 2003 invasion runs into the several hundreds of thousands. (See above thread, "To the Hell That Is Iraq?")
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby seemslikeadream » Sun Mar 20, 2011 3:05 pm

U.S. ambassador to Mexico resigns after WikiLeaks revelations

By Mary Beth Sheridan, Saturday, March 19, 11:05 PM
The U.S. ambassador to Mexico has resigned after the publication of U.S. diplomatic cables that criticized that government’s anti-drug fight, infuriating the Mexican president.


Carlos Pascual appears to be the first senior U.S. diplomat to lose his job because of the WikiLeaks revelations. He had been stationed in Mexico for 19 months.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said in a statement Saturday evening that she had accepted Pascual’s resignation “with great regret.”

“Carlos has relayed his decision to return to Washington based upon his personal desire to ensure the strong relationship between our two countries and to avert issues raised by President [Felipe] Calderon that could distract from the important business of advancing our bilateral interests,” she said.

Calderon has publicly criticized Pascual, telling The Washington Post early this month that he was angered by the U.S. ambassador’s characterization of the Mexican army as “risk-averse” in going after drug traffickers. Calderon also said the cables laid bare U.S. attempts to play Mexican agencies off against one another in the drug fight. Calderon said he intended to talk to President Obama in a meeting on March 3 about his troubles with Pascual.


The White House and Clinton have steadfastly expressed support for Pascual, a 23-year veteran of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development.

Pascual has been a leading architect of U.S. policy toward Mexico, particularly the latest developments in the Merida Initiative, a joint effort to fight soaring drug violence. He is highly regarded at the senior levels of the State Department, and Clinton’s statement said he will assume a new position there.

Analysts say the opinions expressed by Pascual and other U.S. diplomats in the classified documents aren’t surprising to most people who follow the drug fight in Mexico. But the Mexican government clearly felt exposed upon publication of the criticism by a close ally, which became a media sensation.
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Apr 11, 2011 2:20 am

WikiLeaks and the Media
By Glenn Greenwald

I participated yesterday in a panel on WikiLeaks and the media at the National Conference for Media Reform in Boston. The entire panel discussion, moderated by Amy Goodman, can be viewed below; my presentation -- focusing on the reaction of the establishment press to WikiLeaks and the reasons why the controversy is so important -- begins at the 54:45 mark, and there is an interesting Q-and-A session that follows.







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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Apr 18, 2011 9:24 am

U.S. secretly backed Syrian opposition groups, cables released by WikiLeaks show


By Craig Whitlock, Sunday, April 17, 11:01 PM

The State Department has secretly financed Syrian political opposition groups and related projects, including a satellite TV channel that beams anti-government programming into the country, according to previously undisclosed diplomatic cables.

The London-based satellite channel, Barada TV, began broadcasting in April 2009 but has ramped up operations to cover the mass protests in Syria as part of a long-standing campaign to overthrow the country’s autocratic leader, Bashar al-Assad. Human rights groups say scores of people have been killed by Assad’s security forces since the demonstrations began March 18; Syria has blamed the violence on “armed gangs.”

Barada TV is closely affiliated with the Movement for Justice and Development, a London-based network of Syrian exiles. Classified U.S. diplomatic cables show that the State Department has funneled as much as $6 million to the group since 2006 to operate the satellite channel and finance other activities inside Syria. The channel is named after the Barada River, which courses through the heart of Damascus, the Syrian capital.

The U.S. money for Syrian opposition figures began flowing under President George W. Bush after he effectively froze political ties with Damascus in 2005. The financial backing has continued under President Obama, even as his administration sought to rebuild relations with Assad. In January, the White House posted an ambassador to Damascus for the first time in six years.

The cables, provided by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks, show that U.S. Embassy officials in Damascus became worried in 2009 when they learned that Syrian intelligence agents were raising questions about U.S. programs. Some embassy officials suggested that the State Department reconsider its involvement, arguing that it could put the Obama administration’s rapprochement with Damascus at risk.

Syrian authorities “would undoubtedly view any U.S. funds going to illegal political groups as tantamount to supporting regime change,” read an April 2009 cable signed by the top-ranking U.S. diplomat in Damascus at the time. “A reassessment of current U.S.-sponsored programming that supports anti-[government] factions, both inside and outside Syria, may prove productive,” the cable said.

It is unclear whether the State Department is still funding Syrian opposition groups, but the cables indicate money was set aside at least through September 2010. While some of that money has also supported programs and dissidents inside Syria, The Washington Post is withholding certain names and program details at the request of the State Department, which said disclosure could endanger the recipients’ personal safety.

Syria, a police state, has been ruled by Assad since 2000, when he took power after his father’s death. Although the White House has condemned the killing of protesters in Syria, it has not explicitly called for his ouster.

The State Department declined to comment on the authenticity of the cables or answer questions about its funding of Barada TV.

Tamara Wittes, a deputy assistant secretary of state who oversees the democracy and human rights portfolio in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, said the State Department does not endorse political parties or movements.

“We back a set of principles,” she said. “There are a lot of organizations in Syria and other countries that are seeking changes from their government. That’s an agenda that we believe in and we’re going to support.”

The State Department often funds programs around the world that promote democratic ideals and human rights, but it usually draws the line at giving money to political opposition groups.

In February 2006, when relations with Damascus were at a nadir, the Bush administration announced that it would award $5 million in grants to “accelerate the work of reformers in Syria.”

But no dissidents inside Syria were willing to take the money, for fear it would lead to their arrest or execution for treason, according to a 2006 cable from the U.S. Embassy, which reported that “no bona fide opposition member will be courageous enough to accept funding.”

Around the same time, Syrian exiles in Europe founded the Movement for Justice and Development. The group, which is banned in Syria, openly advocates for Assad’s removal. U.S. cables describe its leaders as “liberal, moderate Islamists” who are former members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Barada TV

It is unclear when the group began to receive U.S. funds, but cables show U.S. officials in 2007 raised the idea of helping to start an anti-Assad satellite channel.

People involved with the group and with Barada TV, however, would not acknowledge taking money from the U.S. government.

“I’m not aware of anything like that,” Malik al-Abdeh, Barada TV’s news director, said in a brief telephone interview from London.

Abdeh said the channel receives money from “independent Syrian businessmen” whom he declined to name. He also said there was no connection between Barada TV and the Movement for Justice and Development, although he confirmed that he serves on the political group’s board. The board is chaired by his brother, Anas.

“If your purpose is to smear Barada TV, I don’t want to continue this conversation,” Malik al-Abdeh said. “That’s all I’m going to give you.”

Other dissidents said that Barada TV has a growing audience in Syria but that its viewer share is tiny compared with other independent satellite news channels such as al-Jazeera and BBC Arabic. Although Barada TV broadcasts 24 hours a day, many of its programs are reruns. Some of the mainstay shows are “Towards Change,” a panel discussion about current events, and “First Step,” a program produced by a Syrian dissident group based in the United States.
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Apr 18, 2011 5:28 pm

Published on Monday, April 18, 2011 by Reuters
US Nuclear Regulator a Policeman or Salesman?
by Ben Berkowitz and Roberta Rampton

NEW YORK/WASHINGTON - The Nuclear Regulatory Commission exists to police, not promote, the domestic nuclear industry -- but diplomatic cables show that it is sometimes used as a sales tool to help push American technology to foreign governments.

A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission sign is pictured at the headquarters building in Rockville, Maryland, March 21, 2011. (Credit: Reuters/Larry Downing) The cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and provided to Reuters by a third party, shed light on the way in which U.S. embassies have pulled in the NRC when lobbying for the purchase of equipment made by Westinghouse and other domestic manufacturers.

While the use of diplomats to further American commercial interests is nothing new, it is far less common for regulators to be acting in even the appearance of a commercial capacity, raising concerns about a potential conflict of interest.

The subject is particularly sensitive at a time when there are concerns about whether the operator of the stricken Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was designed by U.S. conglomerate General Electric Co., had been properly supervised by the NRC's equivalent in Japan.

The NRC's own chairman has said that in the nuclear business, avoiding conflicts of interest is paramount.

"The important point is that all countries should strive to maintain a strict independence between the regulator and the industries that it oversees," Gregory Jaczko said in an April 2010 speech to an international forum in Seoul.

EMBRACING THE MODEL

But the cables -- from 2006 to early 2010 -- show that the NRC's role in promoting its regulatory model around the world can easily turn it into an advocate for U.S. nuclear technology, whether its officials realize it or not.

For example, an unclassified January 2009 cable from the U.S. embassy in Kuala Lumpur noted that the Malaysian government, as it pursued a nuclear policy, preferred to work with contractors the NRC had already approved.

The diplomatic corps there was quick to point out how that might be used to financial advantage.

The stance "places the (U.S. Government) and US companies in a favorable position to build stronger relations with both representatives and (Government of Malaysia) officials," the embassy said.

In other countries the message was even more pointed, as in Italy in late 2009. Former NRC Chairman Dale Klein, then still a commissioner, visited the country to discuss nuclear cooperation as the government looked to restart the country's civilian nuclear program and build as many as 10 new plants.

Klein was there to talk regulation, but he also unwittingly figured in the embassy's efforts to promote American vendors.

"Commissioner Klein's visit gave additional support to U.S. nuclear energy companies. A (embassy) co-sponsored public forum on nuclear energy featuring Commissioner Klein as keynote speaker and U.S. companies as panel members attracted a large audience of senior public and private Italian officials and local press coverage," a cable said.

Klein, now a vice chancellor at the University of Texas System and a board member at two utility companies with nuclear operations, said that while he was a firm believer in the NRC playing a more international role, commercial advocacy was never part of his job.

"As a regulator we would never take a position of recommending one reactor over another. The NRC's position was safety and security, and you can get the safety and security in a variety of ways," Klein said. "I never recall having been asked the question of what reactor should a country use."

ALLERGY TO COMMERCIALISM

The NRC was created in 1975 because its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, had been criticized for conflicts in both policing and promoting an industry. The NRC was tasked with regulation, while a separate agency, later folded into the Energy Department, promoted nuclear power.

It's common for NRC staff and commissioners to be asked to attend international meetings, but they accept only invitations where they can press for strong safety regulations, said Margie Doane, director of the NRC's international programs, who declined to comment directly on the cables.

"You want to talk about safety right at the very inception of someone's thinking about nuclear power," Doane said.

"As long as we make sure our role is only safety and only regulation, it's a very important aspect, and it doesn't have anything to do with whether they buy U.S. technology or not," she said. "If we're invited into something which looks promotional, we make sure that there's a good opportunity for us to get the safety message out, and that it's going to be understood in the right way."

BEAT THE FRENCH

The fear for diplomats is that U.S. equipment companies need government help, lest they be elbowed aside by foreign state-owned competitors such as France's Areva.

The main concern is for the two nuclear reactor builders most closely tied to the United States -- General Electric Co.'s nuclear joint venture with Japan's Hitachi Ltd and Westinghouse Electric Co, the U.S.-based nuclear reactor builder 77 percent owned by Japan's Toshiba Corp. and 20 percent owned by Shaw Group.

That beat-the-French theme comes up over and over again in cables from around the world -- embassies noting with a sense of urgency that foreign competitor X is already on the ground meeting with government officials, and U.S. interests need to act fast at the highest levels to counteract the threat.

"U.S. company representatives and their Italian allies are apprehensive that absent high-level U.S. lobbying, French pressure will push the decision toward a purchase of their technology. We clearly need to engage at the highest level, given the stakes involved ...ens of billions of dollars in contracts and substantial numbers of high-technology jobs could be involved," a cable from the Rome embassy said in February 2009.

In some cases, NRC officials, while not lobbying for American companies, may have smoothed their way. In February 2007, former NRC commissioner Jeffrey Merrifield visited Hanoi to discuss cooperation on nuclear regulation with Vietnam.

According to the embassy, the Vietnamese told Merrifield they had already been approached by French and Japanese companies about a proposed nuclear plant scheduled to start up by 2020. Merrifield, the embassy said, responded in kind that the Vietnamese should expect to hear from American firms like GE and Westinghouse as well.

A spokeswoman for Merrifield's current employer, Shaw Group, was not available for comment.

That push for American counter-action sometimes resulted in overt lobbying, but sometimes the response was more subtle. One striking example came from South Africa in November 2008.

The embassy in Pretoria, so the story goes, helped the American Society of Mechanical Engineers hold a workshop on nuclear codes and standards in Johannesburg. The workshop was sponsored by Westinghouse and Areva, and featured speakers including NRC engineering officials.

While the official purpose of the event was to promote ASME standards to South African suppliers looking to participate in the global nuclear supply chain, the embassy was not shy about explaining its real purpose.

But the embassy indicated there was another purpose: "The unofficial purpose of the workshop was to support Westinghouse's bid as a global supplier committed to localization in South Africa and the ASME standard in its global supply chain, although ASME was technically neutral on the bidding competition," it said.

Their argument was subtle but unmistakable - standards are important, and Westinghouse uses a key international standard, but Areva doesn't, so go Westinghouse instead.

An ASME spokesman declined to comment.

One NRC critic said the very idea of the commission was to divorce the commercial from the professional.

"The whole point in creating the NRC was to get out of the business of looking like they were in the business of promoting anything other than safety," said Henry Sokolski, a conservative nuclear proliferation expert.

"That they should somehow be seen as advantageous to making people comfortable about getting into the business so to speak is itself an abomination. They should be allergic to that," Sokolski said.
Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby seemslikeadream » Mon Apr 18, 2011 11:48 pm

Mazars and Deutsche Bank could have ended this nightmare before it started.
They could still get him out of office.
But instead, they want mass death.
Don’t forget that.
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby JackRiddler » Thu May 19, 2011 6:54 pm


http://license.icopyright.net/user/view ... NTM0NjE%3D

May 18, 2011

Canadians secretly added to U.S. security list: WikiLeaks

By Neil Macdonald,
CBC News

Despite the experience with Maher Arar, CSIS continues to pass along to the U.S. the names of Canadians suspected of being security risks, WikiLeaks cables reveal. Neil Macdonald reports.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Canada's principal intelligence agency, routinely transmits to U.S. authorities the names and personal details of Canadian citizens who are suspected of, but not charged with, what the agency refers to as "terrorist-related activity."

The criteria used to turn over the names are secret, as is the process itself.

But a new cache of WikiLeaks documents pertaining to Canada lays bare the practice. It contains not only frank assessments by U.S. officials of Canadian co-operation, but the names of 27 Canadian citizens turned over by their own government as possible threats, along with 14 other names of foreign nationals living in Canada.

In at least some cases, the people in the cables appear to have been named as potential terrorists solely based on their associations with other suspects, rather than any actions or hard evidence.

Of the 41 people named, 21 do not appear to have ever been charged, and some had never come to the attention of the Americans before being named by their own government. Most of the remaining 20 names comprise the group known as the Toronto 18 [http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/06/02/f-toronto-timeline.html]. Some of that group were charged and convicted; others had charges against them stayed.

The cables are a snapshot of periods in 2009 and 2010. Over the years, the number of names handed over is certainly much higher.

The first stop for these names is usually the so-called Visa Viper list maintained by the U.S. government. Anyone who makes that list is unlikely to be admitted to the States.

Given Washington's policy of centralizing such information, though, the names also go into the database of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Centre. Inclusion in such databases can have several consequences, such as being barred from aircraft that fly through U.S. airspace.

Or, as Canadian Maher Arar [http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar] discovered in 2002, the consequences can be much worse - arrest, interrogation, even "rendition" to another country.

Paul Cavalluzzo, who acted as chief counsel for the Canadian commission of inquiry that cleared Arar of any wrongdoing, put it this way after being briefed on the cables: "Once you give the name to the Americans, that's the end of the game."
Long-standing practice

Interviews with several Canadian security sources confirm that the practice of naming people who are suspected, but not charged, has been going on for many years.

One security official with deep knowledge of the subject said the cables go to "the nub of some of the most sensitive communications between our side and the Americans."

He stressed that any decision to hand over names is the result of a detailed process, in which an individual's threat level is assessed by a committee of Canadian security officials, including a senior executive at CSIS.

Lawyers from the Department of Justice also participate, and often a representative of the RCMP.

As part of the process, someone plays the part of devil's advocate, challenging the information gathered on the individual being considered.

Even then, said the official, the decision to hand over a name to the Americans is subject to written ministerial directives and internal CSIS policies.

Still, as Cavalluzzo points out, the process is secret, with no judicial oversight, and takes place without the knowledge of the individual being "targeted."

"It certainly doesn't meet any criteria of due process in the sense that the individual has no representation whatever. Don't tell me there's a devil's advocate. That and a dollar will get you a cup of coffee."
The consequences of inaction

The Canadian security official said two considerations loom over the CSIS committee's deliberations.

The first is Arar, who was secretly traduced by the RCMP to American authorities and, as a result, was removed from a commercial flight at John F. Kennedy airport in 2002, then forcibly deported to Syria, where he was tortured.

Arar subsequently received an apology and $10.5 million in compensation from Ottawa. Significantly, though, he remains on the U.S. no-fly list. He, too, was named to American authorities based solely on association.

"We don't want another Arar," said the security official. But at the same time, he said, CSIS is acutely aware that if it did not pass on information about someone it suspected, and that person then carried out some sort of spectacular attack in the U.S., the consequences could be cataclysmic for Canada.

U.S. authorities, already suspicious that Canada is "soft on terror," would likely tighten the common border, damaging hundreds of billions of dollars worth of vital commerce.

A former senior official, who also spoke to CBC on the basis of anonymity, put it more bluntly: "The reality is, sorry, there are bad people out there.

"And it's very hard to get some of those people before a court of law with the information you have. And so there has to be some sort of process which allows you to provide some sort of safeguard to society on both sides of the border."

Furthermore, he said, "it's not a fundamental human right to be able to go to the United States."
Current realities

Both security officials said they are absolutely certain that individuals they've had a hand in naming posed threats to Canada's security.

Cavalluzzo, though, is uncomfortable with the practice. He says the names should be vetted by a judge before being handed to the Americans. He says there should be guarantees that any information turned over is accurate and that any person named could be delisted if it turns out the intelligence was poor. (One Canadian security official said at least two people named over the years have indeed been delisted at Canada's request, although he acknowledged that once you are in the American system, you are most likely in for life).

Despite Cavalluzzo's discomfort, though, he agrees that, given the current reality, the names of suspects must be shared: "It would seem to me that it's reasonable so long as it is done in a way that provides Canadian citizens with adequate controls, and I don't know if you can ever do that when you're dealing with the Americans."

Toronto lawyer Clayton Ruby, who also has had considerable experience in national security cases, took a different view. The practice, he said, is "abhorrent."

"This is information that is being handed over with the knowledge that it will have adverse consequences on Canadian citizens. And Canadian citizens have a right to be protected by their government."

Ruby described the committee practice as a "bureaucratic process" that falls far short of what a citizen is due. "Due process would involve some standards such as, well, more than 'we suspect he's involved in something nasty.'"

A third source, also highly placed in the Canadian intelligence apparatus, objected to the accusation that the process is hidden from scrutiny. He pointed out that the Security Intelligence Review Committee, created to oversee CSIS, has access to all the names and all the deliberations.

"We [CSIS] are the most reviewed service in the world," he said. He added that he felt sorry for some of those whose names have been released by Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks. "They were not charged or convicted."

When it was pointed out that they are nonetheless now in the American databases, courtesy of CSIS, the official replied: "Yes, and so are you, and so am I."

The databases are vast, he said, and the Americans are capable of distinguishing dangerous threats from individuals of concern, or simply of interest.
Reasonable suspicion of a crime

But Ruby said the threshold for naming someone to the Americans should be "reasonable suspicion of a crime."

In other words, that the authorities have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the individual has planted a bomb, or is planning to plant a bomb.

Canadians have a constitutional right to privacy and to protection from unreasonable search and seizure, said Ruby.

"This is clearly a search. They're searching out information about you. They're invading your privacy. And the question is whether it's reasonable.

"Well, clearly it's reasonable when there's an actual crime being investigated. But short of that, some generalized threat to the state because the state says so? All in secret? I'm not sure it's legal. I think it isn't."

In another of the WikiLeaks cables, though, U.S. Embassy officials in Canada make it clear they think Canada already accords too many rights to suspects.

"Canadian services do not appear to be as proactive as U.S. law enforcement regarding terrorist cell penetration and source development," says the cable, which is classified as both secret and "noforn," meaning not for foreign eyes.

"Both [CSIS and the RCMP] are supportive and co-operative with U.S. law enforcement for the most part, although restricted by the Canadian Charter of Rights, which is the basis for Canada's strict privacy laws."

CSIS declined a request for an on-the-record interview, instead putting out a lengthy written statement that essentially urged Canadians to trust the agency's secret proceedings. The executive director of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, Susan Pollak, would not discuss the criteria CSIS uses to name people to U.S. authorities, but told CBC she is satisfied that CSIS operates within the law.


Canadian Broadcasting Corporation


CBC News 2011. Permission granted for up to 5 copies. All rights reserved.
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Re: Cables Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels WIKI!

Postby JackRiddler » Tue May 24, 2011 5:04 pm

It never ends... Thanks to seemslikeadream for pick-up.

Benazir Bhutto sought US security but was denied: WikiLeaks

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury | New Delhi, May 23, 2011 | Updated 09:03 IST

Bhutto: FIA given 2 weeks to arrest Musharraf


WikiLeaks has revealed that the US embassy in Islamabad had refused to provide security to former Pakistani PM Benazir Bhutto months before her assassination in December 2008 despite her personal requests to US Congressmen.


Former Pakistani PM Benazir Bhutto.
It is no secret that Bhutto faced threat from extremist forces including the Taliban. In fact her very return to Pakistan on Oct 18, 2007 was marked by bloodshed when a suicide attack on her motorcade at Karachi killed 140 people mostly her supporters and PPP activists.
Bhutto survived that attack but it was obvious that she was the target.

Subsequently the PPP president did not trust the state apparatus as she thought that it was hand in glove with the Taliban.

This was much before Abbottabad and 26/ 11 and Washington had then refused to acknowledge any link between Pak authorities, Taliban and al-Qaeda.

WikiLeaks also revealed that several US Embassy cables between Oct and Dec 2007 reflect Bhutto's concerns and her attempts to impress upon the US authorities particularly the then ambassador at Islamabad, Anne W. Patterson the need to provide her physical security in the run up to the elections.

According to a cable dated Oct 29, 2007 Bhutto in a meeting with Patterson expressed her angst over the probe by the Musharraf government into the Oct 18 attack.

She claimed that as authorities were involved in the attack and that they cannot be trusted with the probe. But Patterson disagreed.

Yet another cable dated Oct 23, 2007 also reflects Washington's unwillingness to meet Bhutto's request.



For Immediate Release: December 27, 2007
Sen. Kerry on the Death of Benazir Bhutto



BOSTON, MA- Sen. John Kerry, (D-Mass.), issued the following statement about the murder of Former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto today. Kerry is the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs, which includes Pakistan. He introduced a Sense of the Senate Resolution expressing concern for Ms. Bhutto’s safety in the fall of this year.



"This is both a horrific and heartbreaking tragedy, and a lightning bolt wakeup call for anyone who had taken their eye off of the turmoil in Pakistan. Teresa and I send our deepest condolences to Ms. Bhutto's family. Benazir Bhutto returned home after years in exile knowing fully that she was taking a great personal risk to fight for change and democracy. When I met with her this fall just days before her return to Pakistan, she raised the issue of her own personal security. Subsequent to the bombing and assassination attempt that greeted her return home, I spoke to Secretary Rice about ways the United States might work with President Musharraf to ensure her safety.


“Her loss underscores the fragility of the situation in Pakistan and the perils of a volatile mix of unrest, tension, radicalism, and nuclear weapons. Her killing embodies everyone’s worst possible fears and reinforces how tenuous the circumstances in Pakistan really are. The loss of Ms. Bhutto demands of the United States and our allies an urgent focus on developing a Pakistan strategy that will crush extremists and provide freedom, peace, and security for the country that mourns her loss today."
We meet at the borders of our being, we dream something of each others reality. - Harvey of R.I.

To Justice my maker from on high did incline:
I am by virtue of its might divine,
The highest Wisdom and the first Love.

TopSecret WallSt. Iraq & more
User avatar
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