S E C R E T CAIRO 002091
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND INR/NESA
OSD FOR AGUIRRE
JCS FOR YODER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2028
TAGS: PARM PGOV ECON EG
SUBJECT: ACADEMICS SEE THE MILITARY IN DECLINE, BUT
RETAINING STRONG INFLUENCE
REF: A. CAIRO 1851
¶B. CAIRO 530
¶C. CAIRO 524
¶D. 07 CAIRO 1417
Classified By: DCM Matthew Tueller for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C)
Summary: Recently, academics and civilian analysts
painted a portrait of an Egyptian military in intellectual
and social decline, whose officers have largely fallen out of
society's elite ranks. They describe a disgruntled mid-level
officer corps harshly critical of a defense minister they
perceive as incompetent and valuing loyalty above skill in
his subordinates. However, analysts perceive the military as
retaining strong influence through its role in ensuring
regime stability and operating a large network of commercial
enterprises. Regarding succession, analysts highlight the
armed forces' uneasiness with Gamal Mubarak, but largely
agree that the military would support Gamal if President
Mubarak resigns and installs him in the presidency, a
scenario we view as unlikely. One professor opined that
since 2003, the regime has tried to strengthen the economic
elite close to Gamal at the expense of the military in an
effort to weaken potential military opposition to Gamal's
path to the presidency. Other analysts believe the regime is
trying to co-opt the military through patronage into
accepting Gamal and that despite tensions between the
military and business, their relationship remains
cooperative. End summary.
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An Institution in Decline
-------------------------
¶2. (C) A series of recent conversations with academics and
other civilian analysts reveals their sense that while
Egypt's military is in decline, it nevertheless remains a
powerful institution. (Note: These academics' expertise in
Egyptian politics and willingness to comment on the sensitive
issue of the military's current role makes them valuable
interlocutors for us. End note.) An XXXXXXXXXXXX professor with XXXXXXXXXXXX ties to
the officer corps told us that the military reached its peak
of influence in the late 1980's before the ouster of the
recently deceased former Defense Minister Abu Ghazalah, who
was dismissed because of his growing political popularity.
He asserted that since 1989, the MOD's influence in Egyptian
society has been gradually waning, and the privileged social
position of its elite members has been in decline as
society's respect for the military fades. One
XXXXXXXXXXXX analyst at the XXXXXXXXXXXX
who is a retired XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that
military salaries have
fallen far below what is available in the private sector, and
that a military career is no longer an attractive option for
ambitious young people who aspire to join the new business
elite instead.
¶3. (S) A senior XXXXXXXXXXXX professor
opined that before the 1967 war, military officers were
"spoiled," and constituted a social elite. Following the
military's poor performance in the 1967 war, he said,
officers began a descent out of the upper ranks of society
that accelerated after Abu Ghazalah's ouster in 1989. Since
Abu Ghazalah, a senior AUC political science professor noted,
the regime has not allowed any charismatic figures to reach
the senior ranks. "(Defense Minister) Tantawi looks like a
bureaucrat," he joked. The AUC professor described
the
mid-level officer corps as generally disgruntled, and said
that one can hear mid-level officers at MOD clubs around
Cairo openly expressing disdain for Tantawi. These officers
refer to Tantawi as "Mubarak's poodle," he said, and complain
that "this incompetent Defense Minister" who reached his
position only because of unwavering loyalty to Mubarak is
"running the military into the ground." He opined that a
culture of blind obedience pervades the MOD where the sole
criteria for promotion is loyalty, and that the MOD
leadership does not hesitate to fire officers it perceives as
being "too competent" and who therefore potentially pose a
threat to the regime.
¶4. (C) A XXXXXXXXXXXX analyst with an academic
background at the XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that
the government's increasing opposition to dialogue with
academia is symptomatic of its social and intellectual
decline. He said that up until 6 years ago, the MOD had
assigned a military representative to the XXXXXXXXXXXX to
participate in academic discussions; subsequently, the MOD
jailed the representative because his views were becoming too
independent, and has not sent a replacement to the center.
He claimed that Tantawi has become increasingly intolerant of
intellectual freedom and in 2006 refused to allow the
XXXXXXXXXXXX to pursue a research project with the XXXXXXXXXXXX on military reform in XXXXXXXXXXXX and
XXXXXXXXXXXX. In his view, Tantawi has made clear that the
military is "off-limits" as a subject for academic research,
and that the MOD will not tolerate independent thought within
its own ranks.
---------------------------------------------
...But Still Retaining Economic Clout For Now
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Although analysts see a small number of regime and
business elites exercising increasing political and economic
control over the country, they acknowledge the military's
strong influence in Egypt's economy. A senior XXXXXXXXXXXX professor opined that the regime gives the
six businessmen in the cabinet carte blanche to pursue
commercial activities, but that the defense minister can put
a hold on any contract for "security concerns." Contacts
told us that military-owned companies, often run by retired
generals, are particularly active in the water, olive oil,
cement, construction, hotel and gasoline industries. The
senior XXXXXXXXXXXX professor pointed out that military
companies built the modern road to the Ain Souknah Red Sea
resorts 90 minutes from Cairo and Cairo University's new
annex. He noted the large amounts of land owned by the
military in the Nile Delta and on the Red Sea coast,
speculating that such property is a "fringe benefit" in
exchange for the military ensuring regime stability and
security. (Comment: We see the military's role in the
economy as a force that generally stifles free market reform
by increasing direct government involvement in the markets.
End comment.)
¶6. (C) Most analysts agreed that the military views the GOE's
privatization efforts as a threat to its economic position,
and therefore generally opposes economic reforms. The senior
XXXXXXXXXXXX professor speculated that privatization has
forced military-owned companies to improve the quality of
their work, specifically in the hotel industry, to compete
with private firms and attract critical foreign investment.
One of the XXXXXXXXXXXX analysts
predicted that the growing power of the economic elite at the
military's expense is inevitable as economic necessity drives
the government to maintain its economic reform policies in
order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). He said
that FDI is essential to the government's plans to maintain
economic growth and political stability.
--------------------------------------------- -
Influence in the Bureaucracy and Civil Society
--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (C) The senior XXXXXXXXXXXX professor pointed to a
"concerted effort" from the "top of the regime" to penetrate
the civilian bureaucracy with retired senior military
officers. He highlighted retired officers filling top
civilian jobs, such as governors, and chief of staff
positions and other senior slots at the Information,
Transportation and Education ministries. Other contacts
noted their anecdotal experience with military officers
running civil society organizations and charities. The
senior AUC political science professor remarked that a
literacy campaign in his neighborhood recently hired a
retired military officer to run its operations. He told us
that thet XXXXXXXXXXXX where his XXXXXXXXXXXX volunteers
recently hired a retired general as its director, believing
that the general's competence, experience with bureaucracies,
and network of colleagues and contacts in the ministries
would serve the charity well.
---------------------------
The Military and Succession
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Contacts agree that presidential son Gamal Mubarak's
power base is centered in the business community, not with
the military. The senior XXXXXXXXXXXX
professor said
officers told him recently that the military
does not support Gamal and if Mubarak died in office, the
military would seize power rather than allow Gamal to succeed
his father. However, analysts agreed that the military would
allow Gamal to take power through an election if President
Mubarak blessed the process and effectively gave Gamal the
reigns of power. The XXXXXXXXXXXX professor
opined that after Gamal became active in the NDP in 2002, the
regime empowered the reformers in the 2004 cabinet to begin
privatization efforts that buttressed the wealthy businessmen
close to Gamal. In his estimation,
the regime's goal is to
create a business-centered power base for Gamal in the NDP to
compensate for his lack of military credentials. A necessary
corollary to this strategy, he claimed, was for the regime to
weaken the military's economic and political power so that it
cannot block Gamal's path to the presidency.
¶9. (S) Comment: The military still remains a potent
political and economic force. Its recent interventions,
using the MOD's considerable resources, to produce bread to
meet shortages in March and extinguish the Shoura Council
fire in August (refs A and B) demonstrate that it sometimes
can successfully step in where other government agencies
fail. The military helps to ensure regime stability and
operates a large network of businesses as it becomes a
"quasi-commercial" enterprise itself. While there are
economic and political tensions between the business elite
and the military, the overall relationship between the two
still appears to be cooperative, rather than adversarial.
The military's loss of some prestige is partly due to the
disappearance of an imminent, external military threat
following the 1979 Camp David Accords. The regime, aware of
the critical role the MOD can play in presidential
succession, may well be trying to co-opt the military through
patronage into accepting Gamal's path to the presidency. We
agree with the analysis that senior military officers would
support Gamal if Mubarak resigned and installed him in the
presidency, as it is difficult to imagine opposition from
these officers who depend on the president and defense
minister for their jobs and material perks.
In a messier
succession scenario, however, it becomes more difficult to
predict the military's actions. While mid-level officers do
not necessarily share their superiors' fealty to the regime,
the military's built-in firewalls and communication breaks
make it unlikely that these officers could independently
install a new leader.
SCOBEY
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/09/08CAIRO2091.html
