JackRiddler wrote:What the hell drives all these other powerheaded generals and autocrats and plutocrats to resist and tear-gas such a simple thing for their own countries?
That's the wrong question, Jack. No bully willingly gives up power (duh!), whatever it costs others. The only thing that distinguishes them is the extent to which they believe they can get away with it. That's the main difference between the situation in Tunisia and those in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen.
In my opinion, the decisive factor in all these cases is foreign intervention. In Tunisia's case, the world was taken by surprise. The uprising had been building up for weeks, but because Tunisia is a relatively small country, with limited geo-strategic value, and because Ben Ali had ruled it with an iron fist for so long, it remained under the radar until the last fateful days when it exploded onto the world's consciousness. The element of surprise and the very lack of precedent worked in the favor of the Tunisian revolutionaries -- the West and Ben Ali's Arab allies were caught with their pants down. In their panic, they abandoned him and, with the sole exception of Saudi Arabia, did everything they could to distance themselves and avoid being tainted by association.
Since then, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies have been working quietly and with devastating success to contain and subvert the Tunisian revolution to ensure that it poses no threat to their or the West's economic or strategic interests in the region. Their "weapon" of choice has been money, enormous sums of it, channeled to the Islamist elements in Tunisia, who have taken great pains to reassure the West that they will not be rocking any boats. In this, they have been given a big boost by the two main pan-Arab media networks controlled by Gulf monarchies, Al-Jazeera (Qatar) and Al-Arabiya (Saudi Arabia).
In Yemen and Bahrain, the stakes are much higher: both countries border the big kahuna itself, Saudi Arabia. In the case of Bahrain, like Saudi Arabia, it is an anachronistic and artificially-imposed monarchy, and also like Saudi Arabia, the ruling family is fundamentalist Sunni while a substantial number of the subjects are Shi'ite. These two factors alone have made it imperative that any revolution be decisively and permanently put down, no matter what. How imperative can be judged by the line of Saudi tanks that rumbled into Bahrain to help the government crush the uprising. Saudi Arabia is one of the world's biggest buyers of weapons, but they have rarely been used. The last time, I believe, was in Yemen in the 1960s, during the proxy war there between the "reactionary" pro-West regimes led by Saudi Arabia (in which the Saudis covertly collaborated with Israel) and the "progressive" front led by Egypt. Saudi Arabia has heavily invested in its soft power as a "religious" rather than a political authority figure among Arab states, and very, very rarely has it been willing to undermine that image by engaging in direct warfare or even using its huge arsenal of weapons.
Yemen not only shares a border directly with Saudi Arabia, its location right at the junction where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden (the precious gateway from the Mediterranean to Africa and Asia) makes it a priceless asset that the West will do anything to keep under its tight control.
To make a long story short, in Bahrain and Yemen, powerful interests in the West and Saudi Arabia are committed to ensuring that the regime is not forced out, especially by pro-democracy revolutionaries, especially since no replacements for the current rulers are readily available**. Thus, US and Saudi support is a decisive factor in the regime's ability to persevere.
In Egypt, multiply that by 10. Even after the Tunisians rose up, most pundits failed to predict that the Egyptians would follow suit, so initially they had the advantage of taking the world by surprise. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies still have traumatic memories of when the Egyptian revolution in the 1950s and 1960s sparked anti-monarchist revolutions and uprisings all over the region and will do whatever they can to make sure history doesn't repeat itself.
Furthermore, if Yemen and Bahrain border Saudi Arabia, Egypt borders Israel. For nearly 40 years, the Israelis not only had no worries on their western front, but through the Americans, Israel was able to use Egypt to enforce its own policies in the Arab world. Israeli, and therefore American and, to a slightly lesser extent, European stakes in Egypt are astronomical. When Mubarak was forced out, it was problematic, but given how deeply the US and Israel had penetrated Egyptian state institutions, there was a Plan B and a Plan C and so on.
Plan B was to replace Mubarak with Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman (one of Israel's best friends in Egypt), a proposal that was vehemently rejected by the Egyptian people. Plan C was to have Mubarak's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) take control and oversee the transition from Mubarak to a civilian government that would be acceptable to Egypt's American patrons.
Mubarak's Defense Minister, Field-Marshall Hussein Tantawy, and the other members of the SCAF are firmly in the Americans' pockets: not only is there no public oversight whatsoever on how the US's $1.3 billions in military aid are spent, it is estimated that all the SCAF members have richly profited from illegal kickbacks and commissions on weapons purchases during the past several decades.
However, it suited neither the Americans nor the SCAF for Egypt to be ruled openly by a military junta that is financially and militarily supported by the US. The SCAF, whose members have enjoyed tremendous privileges, has always cultivated a paranoid level of secrecy that not only preserved its mystique, but prevented unwelcome inquiry into its business interests.
In the past 9 months, it has become painfully clear that Plan C involved having the SCAF ostensibly transfer power to an elected parliament and president, while maintaining an iron grip on power from behind the scenes. I won't go into why this is so obvious, but it seems the idea was to allow a weak and deeply divided parliament to be elected (by fraud, if necessary), that would be dominated by the Islamists and the remnants of Mubarak's NDP, with a few others sprinkled here and there for show, but that this parliament would have no real power to make fundamental economic or foreign policy changes. Real power would remain in the hands of the SCAF, but would be later be manifested in the person of the president, whose job would be to ensure that nothing be done to threaten either the US', Saudi Arabia's or Israel's domination of Egypt. The SCAF gave itself until around 2013 to groom a suitable president and get him elected.
During the past 9 months, everything was done to isolate, fragment and demoralize the revolutionaries. As recently as last Friday, they had been written off by pretty much all the political players. The elections that would drive the final nail in their coffin were mere days away. The Islamists and the members of Mubarak's NDP strutted around and talked like they had the country all sewn up.
But, wait! ....
On Edit: My bad. Clearly the replacements were in fact readily available. Ali Abdullah Saleh has agreed to step down and hand over power to his vice president who, like Egypt's SCAF, will be tasked with what the US and its totalitarian allies laughingly call 'overseeing the transition to democracy'.