Let's talk Turkey

[JackRiddler]

If you're thinking I'm going with easy exonerations of any Young Turk, even the one who was middling and not directly involved in the genocide and only later emerged as the top man and distanced himself from them and prosecuted his predecessors, you're probably looking at someone of the wrong ethnic origin to be that fair.

Here's more of a balanced view (forum on which the posters are actual historians), I think especially the second answer (jdryan). And for what it's worth, TODAY -- I realize with Ataturk dead for at least a while -- today's Kemalism and Ataturk cult and denial of the Armenian genocide are practically synonymous. And still a live issue.

What was Kemal Ataturk's involvement and view of the Armenian Genocide and how extreme were his views on Turkish Nationalism?
submitted 2 years ago by tommy_taco

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was brought up in a class I was taking about Middle Eastern Government and Politics, but it was more of a cursory glance and it showed him in a pretty positive light. While the Armenian genocide was covered briefly in the course, I am curious to what extent he was involved? My understanding is that he did not directly order it, but what were his feelings towards it? How much did he know about it at the time and how instrumental was he in suppressing it after the Treaty of Lausanne? In the same line of thought, how extreme were his views of Turkish nationalism? Thank you guys!

PS: I would love to hear some more background on the Armenian genocide in general, I figure this forum is more appropriate to ask questions like I did above, but if anyone could add more information about it I would greatly appreciate it, I am trying to become better informed on the topic.

6 commentsshare
all 6 comments

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[–]adilu 43 points 2 years ago
It should be made clear that Armenian Genocide took place in the year 1915, during the World War I, while Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was a lieutenant colonel fighting in the Battle of Gallipoli. So, he was not directly involved in the Armenian Genocide.

He came to power following his victory against the Greek army in 1922 and became the first president of the republic in 1923. On the Armenian issue, one can observe that he mostly avoided bringing up the topic but his stance can be derived from some of his speeches or interviews. Taner Akçam, an expert on Armenian Genocide, argues that Atatürk defined the incident as "a shameful act" and supported the punishment for those responsible.

In general, this stance of Atatürk can be placed within the context of the "official" history of Republic of Turkey which denounces nearly everything done before the Republic and praises everything after. Still, bringing up the Armenian issue would be risky for Atatürk and the Turkish elite of the time which was mostly occupied with creating a nationalistic narrative. So they preferred that the issue would be "forgotten".

The question on how extreme his nationalism was is a totally different topic. He was mostly a pragmatist leader but he set himself the main task of building a nation, therefore could be very extremist - even racist - at times. The Turkish Historical Society and and physical anthropology (which was popular in 1930s) departments he founded tried to "prove" that Turkey has been the land of the Turkish race for thousands of years. So, yeah, by today's standards he was as extreme as you can get when it comes to nationalism. This racialist approach to Turkish nationalism fell out of fashion towards the end of the World War II, but Atatürk was already dead then.
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[–]tommy_taco[S] 3 points 2 years ago
Thank you! Very informative!
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[–]jdryan08Modern Middle East 27 points 2 years ago
A great set of questions, and ones I can only begin to answer because to be honest, this is still very much an open question in the historiography. I'll take your individual questions one by one here:

"To what extent was he involved?": The likely answer here is that he was not very involved at all. Since Mustafa Kemal was a middle-ranking officer assigned primarily to the Dardanelles campaign and other "western" front battles he was likely not that much involved in the process of deportation. Also, he wasn't high enough in the CUP leadership to have had any special influence over the policy of deportation. That said, it is possible he may have had some role to play in the deportation or imprisonment of certain Armenians that were deemed dangerous to the state in Istanbul or western Anatolia, but, again, the evidence here is sketchy at best.

"What were his feelings towards it?" I think the best answer here is that he, like many of the CUP leaders and future leaders of the Turkish republic, viewed the Armenian population as one that was engaged in an armed rebellion against the Ottoman state during a time of war in collusion with the Entente powers (Russia especially), and one that needed to be contained by any means necessary. This is a view he shared with many in the Ottoman military, and more or less consistent with what he expressed later as president of the Republic.

"How much did he know about it at the time and how instrumental in suppressing it after the Treaty of Lausanne?" As I intimated above, it's hard to know what he knew at the time, but I doubt he had as full an understanding of the policies as most of the main actors. As far as suppression of this fact post-Lausanne, I think it's clear from a reading of his own account of Turkish War for Independence that he saw the Armenian rebellion as one that started during the WWI and continued through to 1922, thus justifying any length to which the Turkish Republic or Ottoman government would have gone to secure Anatolia. Here's a key quote from his famous six day speech ("Nutuk") regarding the formation of the Society for the Defense of National Rights of the Eastern Provinces, "...it appears to me to be clearly evident that the possible cessation of Eastern Provinces to Armenia was the most important reason for this society having been formed. They anticipated that this possibility might become a reality if those that tried to prove that Armenians were in the majority in these provinces, claiming the oldest historical rights, were to succeed in misleading the public opinion of the world by alleging scientific and historic documents and by perpetuating the calumny that the Muslim population was composed of savages whose chief occupation was to massacre the Armenians."

"How extreme were his views of Turkish Nationalism?" This is kind of an odd question because they were extreme insofar as his articulation of Turkish Nationalism was the standard for all iterations that followed, and had supplanted those that had preceded as normative. That said, there are a few ways to think about this. If one takes a conventional view that nationality is determined primarily by ethno-linguisitic ties, citizenship and common or shared historical experience, then at least on the face of it Atatürk's nationalism was fairly standard. However, when one takes into consideration certain events like the Greek-Turkish population exchange and the Armenian genocide, (among other policies), you realize that at least in a de facto sense Turkish nationality and citizenship was limited to Muslims living in Anatolia. This of course also included Kurds as "Turks" in a way that most Kurds would probably themselves reject. In this way, you could think of Atatürk's nationalism a bit more extreme than the standard definition, but not as openly exclusive as, say Aryan formations by the Nazi's a decade or so later.

OK, I hope that helps, there's lots of good stuff to read on this subject and I can provide more later, but I think this gets answers started to the questions you pose here.

[cptmarginal]

Turkey has a history of secret societies

I often find myself thinking about the secrecy under which Sufi orders operate in Turkey, and about the whole project of subjugating that region as a covert ideological war against the cultural influence of Sufism. Just something else to wonder about; obviously the reality is exceedingly complex and enmeshed with political and historical considerations. (Fethüllah Gülen as a sufi? I have trouble keeping this all straight...)

[FourthBase]

If you're thinking I'm going with easy exonerations of any Young Turk, even the one who was middling and not directly involved in the genocide and only later emerged as the top man and distanced himself from them and prosecuted his predecessors, you're probably looking at someone of the wrong ethnic origin to be that fair.

Here's more of a balanced view (forum on which the posters are actual historians), I think especially the second answer (jdryan). And for what it's worth, TODAY -- I realize with Ataturk dead for at least a while -- today's Kemalism and Ataturk cult and denial of the Armenian genocide are practically synonymous. And still a live issue.

What was Kemal Ataturk's involvement and view of the Armenian Genocide and how extreme were his views on Turkish Nationalism?
submitted 2 years ago by tommy_taco

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was brought up in a class I was taking about Middle Eastern Government and Politics, but it was more of a cursory glance and it showed him in a pretty positive light. While the Armenian genocide was covered briefly in the course, I am curious to what extent he was involved? My understanding is that he did not directly order it, but what were his feelings towards it? How much did he know about it at the time and how instrumental was he in suppressing it after the Treaty of Lausanne? In the same line of thought, how extreme were his views of Turkish nationalism? Thank you guys!

PS: I would love to hear some more background on the Armenian genocide in general, I figure this forum is more appropriate to ask questions like I did above, but if anyone could add more information about it I would greatly appreciate it, I am trying to become better informed on the topic.

6 commentsshare
all 6 comments

===

[–]adilu 43 points 2 years ago
It should be made clear that Armenian Genocide took place in the year 1915, during the World War I, while Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was a lieutenant colonel fighting in the Battle of Gallipoli. So, he was not directly involved in the Armenian Genocide.

He came to power following his victory against the Greek army in 1922 and became the first president of the republic in 1923. On the Armenian issue, one can observe that he mostly avoided bringing up the topic but his stance can be derived from some of his speeches or interviews. Taner Akçam, an expert on Armenian Genocide, argues that Atatürk defined the incident as "a shameful act" and supported the punishment for those responsible.

In general, this stance of Atatürk can be placed within the context of the "official" history of Republic of Turkey which denounces nearly everything done before the Republic and praises everything after. Still, bringing up the Armenian issue would be risky for Atatürk and the Turkish elite of the time which was mostly occupied with creating a nationalistic narrative. So they preferred that the issue would be "forgotten".

The question on how extreme his nationalism was is a totally different topic. He was mostly a pragmatist leader but he set himself the main task of building a nation, therefore could be very extremist - even racist - at times. The Turkish Historical Society and and physical anthropology (which was popular in 1930s) departments he founded tried to "prove" that Turkey has been the land of the Turkish race for thousands of years. So, yeah, by today's standards he was as extreme as you can get when it comes to nationalism. This racialist approach to Turkish nationalism fell out of fashion towards the end of the World War II, but Atatürk was already dead then.
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[–]tommy_taco[S] 3 points 2 years ago
Thank you! Very informative!
permalinkembedparent

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[–]jdryan08Modern Middle East 27 points 2 years ago
A great set of questions, and ones I can only begin to answer because to be honest, this is still very much an open question in the historiography. I'll take your individual questions one by one here:

"To what extent was he involved?": The likely answer here is that he was not very involved at all. Since Mustafa Kemal was a middle-ranking officer assigned primarily to the Dardanelles campaign and other "western" front battles he was likely not that much involved in the process of deportation. Also, he wasn't high enough in the CUP leadership to have had any special influence over the policy of deportation. That said, it is possible he may have had some role to play in the deportation or imprisonment of certain Armenians that were deemed dangerous to the state in Istanbul or western Anatolia, but, again, the evidence here is sketchy at best.

"What were his feelings towards it?" I think the best answer here is that he, like many of the CUP leaders and future leaders of the Turkish republic, viewed the Armenian population as one that was engaged in an armed rebellion against the Ottoman state during a time of war in collusion with the Entente powers (Russia especially), and one that needed to be contained by any means necessary. This is a view he shared with many in the Ottoman military, and more or less consistent with what he expressed later as president of the Republic.

"How much did he know about it at the time and how instrumental in suppressing it after the Treaty of Lausanne?" As I intimated above, it's hard to know what he knew at the time, but I doubt he had as full an understanding of the policies as most of the main actors. As far as suppression of this fact post-Lausanne, I think it's clear from a reading of his own account of Turkish War for Independence that he saw the Armenian rebellion as one that started during the WWI and continued through to 1922, thus justifying any length to which the Turkish Republic or Ottoman government would have gone to secure Anatolia. Here's a key quote from his famous six day speech ("Nutuk") regarding the formation of the Society for the Defense of National Rights of the Eastern Provinces, "...it appears to me to be clearly evident that the possible cessation of Eastern Provinces to Armenia was the most important reason for this society having been formed. They anticipated that this possibility might become a reality if those that tried to prove that Armenians were in the majority in these provinces, claiming the oldest historical rights, were to succeed in misleading the public opinion of the world by alleging scientific and historic documents and by perpetuating the calumny that the Muslim population was composed of savages whose chief occupation was to massacre the Armenians."

"How extreme were his views of Turkish Nationalism?" This is kind of an odd question because they were extreme insofar as his articulation of Turkish Nationalism was the standard for all iterations that followed, and had supplanted those that had preceded as normative. That said, there are a few ways to think about this. If one takes a conventional view that nationality is determined primarily by ethno-linguisitic ties, citizenship and common or shared historical experience, then at least on the face of it Atatürk's nationalism was fairly standard. However, when one takes into consideration certain events like the Greek-Turkish population exchange and the Armenian genocide, (among other policies), you realize that at least in a de facto sense Turkish nationality and citizenship was limited to Muslims living in Anatolia. This of course also included Kurds as "Turks" in a way that most Kurds would probably themselves reject. In this way, you could think of Atatürk's nationalism a bit more extreme than the standard definition, but not as openly exclusive as, say Aryan formations by the Nazi's a decade or so later.

OK, I hope that helps, there's lots of good stuff to read on this subject and I can provide more later, but I think this gets answers started to the questions you pose here.

So, nothing. He had nothing to do with it.

And when he came to power, he...what, exonerated the Young Turks, covered up their crimes? Nope. He denounced them and had them prosecuted. Right?

[JackRiddler]

If that's all you got from the above, I feel no need to argue. Run the Kemal flag up your mast. Sail on.

[FourthBase]

If that's all you got from the above, I feel no need to argue. Run the Kemal flag up your mast. Sail on.

Is the hyper-Hellenic homer shtick your overcompensation for choosing solidarity with the EU? Which entity has harmed Greeks more, Ataturk or the EU?

[JackRiddler]

If that's all you got from the above, I feel no need to argue. Run the Kemal flag up your mast. Sail on.

Is the hyper-Hellenic homer shtick your overcompensation for choosing solidarity with the EU? Which entity has harmed Greeks more, Ataturk or the EU?

That's a pretty stupid question, don't you think? Why would I choose?

[FourthBase]

If that's all you got from the above, I feel no need to argue. Run the Kemal flag up your mast. Sail on.

Is the hyper-Hellenic homer shtick your overcompensation for choosing solidarity with the EU? Which entity has harmed Greeks more, Ataturk or the EU?

That's a pretty stupid question, don't you think? Why would I choose?

Why would you choose? Good question. You did choose. You chose to depict Ataturk, a shining force of secular democratic progress, as an accomplice to genocide. Your source for that was basically, "Meh, not really...but if you squint from just the right angle, it's not impossible he was indirectly complicit?", which you're pretending is an indictment so searing that it should stand without further comment. You also chose supporting maximum EU power over supporting an anti-EU precedent that'd benefit Greece. It isn't homeland loyalty at issue, the latter choice demonstrates that. It's your distaste for nationalism, right? Anti-nationalism prescribed by the meme system that owns your fucking soul. Ataturk was a nationalist, so fuck him, smear him, etc. Brexit was a nationalist thing, so fuck it, even if that also means fuck Greece. You could rationalize it in giant essays of bullshit, but that's it in a nutshell, no?

[seemslikeadream]

AUGUST 8, 2016
Washington Slapdown: Turkey Turns to Moscow for Help
by MIKE WHITNEY


“Turkey is slowly leaving the Atlantic system. That is the reason behind this coup. That is the reason why NATO is panicking. This is much broader and much bigger than Erdogan. This is a tectonic movement. This will affect Turkish-Syrian relations, Turkish-Chinese relations, Turkish-Russian relations and Turkish-Iranian relations. This will change the world.”

— Yunus Soner, Deputy Chairman Turkish Patriotic Party

“It is becoming clear that the attempted putsch was not just the work of a small clique of dissatisfied officers inside the armed forces; it was rather the product of a vast conspiracy to take over the Turkish state that was decades in the making and might well have succeeded.”

— Patrick Cockburn, CounterPunch

On August 9, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Saint Petersburg The two leaders will discuss political developments following the recent coup-attempt in Turkey, tourism, and the launching of Turkstream, the natural gas pipeline that will transform Turkey into southern Europe’s biggest energy hub.. They are also expected to explore options for ending the fighting in Syria. Putin will insist that Erdogan make a concerted effort to stop Islamic militants from crossing back-and-forth into Syria, while Erdogan will demand that Putin do everything in his power to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state on Turkey’s southern border. The meeting will end with the typical smiles and handshakes accompanied by a joint statement pledging to work together peacefully to resolve regional issues and to put an end to the proxy war that has left Syria in tatters.

All in all, the confab will seem like another public relations charade devoid of any larger meaning, but that’s certainly not the case. The fact is, the normalizing of relations between Russia and Turkey will foreshadow a bigger geopolitical shift that will link Ankara to Tehran, Damascus and other Russian allies across Eurasia. The alliance will alter the global chessboard in a way that eviscerates the imperial plan to control the flow of energy from Qatar to Europe, redraw the map of the Middle East and pivot to Asia. That strategy will either be decimated or suffer a severe setback. The reasons for this should be fairly obvious to anyone who can read a map. Turkey’s location makes it the indispensable state, the landbridge that connects the wealth and modernity of the EU with the vast resources and growing population of Asia. That vital connecting piece of the geopolitical puzzle is gradually slipping out of Washington’s orbit and into enemy territory. The July 15 coup is likely the final nail in the NWO coffin for reasons we will discuss later. Here’s a clip from Eric Draitser’s insightful piece titled “Erdogan’s Checkmate: CIA-Backed Coup in Turkey Fails, Upsets Global Chessboard” that summarizes what’s going on:

“Ultimately, the failed 2016 coup in Turkey will have lasting ramifications that will impact the years and decades ahead. With Turkey now clearly breaking with the US-NATO-EU axis, it is rather predictable that it will seek to not only mend fences with both Russia and China, but to place itself into the non-western camp typified by BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China’s One Belt One Road strategy, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, etc.” (“Erdogan’s Checkmate: CIA-Backed Coup in Turkey Fails, Upsets Global Chessboard“, Global Research)

In an earlier part of the article, Draitser correctly identifies the followers of Fethullah Gulen as the perpetrators of the coup. As he and others have pointed out, Gulen’s agents have penetrated all levels of the Turkish state and military acting as a shadow government (aka- “parallel state”) that poses a direct threat to Turkey’s national security.. Here’s journalist Patrick Cockburn making the same point in a recent article in CounterPunch:

“There is little question left that the followers of Fethullah Gulen were behind the coup attempt, despite his repeated denials. “I don’t have any doubt that the brain and backbone of the coup were the Gulenists,” says Kadri Gursel, usually a critic of the government. He adds that he is astonished by the degree to which the Gulenists were able to infiltrate and subvert the armed forces, judiciary and civil service. ….

…it is difficult to find anybody on the left or right who does not suspect that at some level the US was complicit in the coup attempt. Erdogan is probably convinced of this himself, despite US denials, and this will shape his foreign policy in future….

…if the coup had more successful, Turkey would have faced a full-blown military dictatorship or a civil war, or both. Erdogan said in an interview that foreign leaders who now counsel moderation would have danced for joy if he had been killed by the conspirators….” (“After the Coup, Turkey is Being Torn Apart“, Patrick Cockburn, CounterPunch)

If the coup had succeeded, then it is quite likely that Erdogan would have been savagely murdered like Gadhafi while the state was plunged into a long-term civil war. This is why Erdogan has removed tens of thousands of Gulen sympathizers or operatives from their positions in the state, the media, the military and the universities. These prisoners will now be charged with supporting the coup (treason?) and could face the death penalty. Critics in the Obama administration and western media have lambasted Erdogan for violating civil liberties in his effort to rid the country of fifth columnists and traitors, but the Turkish President will have none of it. He has angrily responded saying that Washington was “taking the side of the coup leaders.”

“Now I ask”, said Erdogan, “does the West give support to terror or not? Is the West on the side of democracy or on the side of coups and terror? Unfortunately, the West gives support to terror and stands on the side of coups….We have not received the support we were expecting from our friends, neither during nor after the coup attempt.”

Erdoğan lamented that no Western leader had come to Turkey to express condolences and show solidarity with the Turkish people.” (Hurriyet, Turkish Daily)

He has a point, doesn’t he? While I am no fan of the autocratic and narcissistic Erdogan, it’s very suspicious that Washington is so eager to criticize and so reluctant to help. After all, the two countries are allies, right?

And what does Erdogan want?

He wants the US to extradite Gulen (who currently lives in exile in Pennsylvania) so he can face charges of treason in Turkey.. According to Erdogan, “Documents have been sent to the U.S.” establishing Gulen’s guilt. But the Obama administration remains unmoved, even though Turkey has handed over terrorists to the US in the past without evidence. Apparently, sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander.

It’s worth repeating what Cockburn said in the excerpt above. He said: “it is difficult to find anybody on the left or right who does not suspect that at some level the US was complicit in the coup attempt.”

Why is that? Why does everyone in Turkey –regardless of their politics or ethnicity–think the US had a hand in the coup?

Take a look at this clip from an article at the World Socialist Web Site which helps to explain:

“US claims that Washington had no advance warning of the coup are simply not credible. Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base, which hosts more than 5,000 American soldiers and is the main base for the US-led bombing campaign against Syria and Iraq, was the organizing center of the putsch. Pro-coup fighter jets flew in and out of Incirlik as the coup unfolded. Shortly after the coup failed, the base commander, General Bekir Ercan Van, was arrested along with other pro-coup soldiers at the base.

Given that Incirlik is the site of dozens of US nuclear weapons, no credibility can be given to claims that US intelligence was unaware that a coup against Erdogan was being organized from there. Were that truly the case, it would represent a CIA intelligence breakdown of stunning proportions….

A pro-coup officer captured by the Turkish government, Lieutenant Colonel Murat Bolat, told the conservative Yeni Savak newspaper that his unit was designated to detain and possibly murder Erdogan after receiving precise information on Erdogan’s location from US sources.

“A person in the meeting, whom I guess was an officer from the Special Forces, said, ‘Nobody will be allowed to rescue the president from our hands,’” he said, indicating that this meant Erdogan was to be shot after he was captured if the forces who had arrested him faced any counterattack.” (“Erdogan accuses US of supporting failed coup in Turkey“, World Socialist Web Site)

While the information is not conclusive, it is suspicious. At the very least, Washington knew a coup was being planned and looked the other way. This except from a post by Harvard professor, Dani Rodrik seems like a very plausible explanation of US involvement to me. Here’s a brief clip:

“The U.S. government may not have had a direct hand in Gulen’s activities, but it is more difficult to dismiss the argument that it provided tacit support – or that some parts of the U.S. administration prevailed on other parts who were less keen on Gulen.

…As the Wikileaks cables I referred to above make clear, the State Department, at least, has been well aware of Gulenist infiltration of the Turkish military for quite some time. The Gulenists’s role in Sledgehammer, which led to the discharge of many of the most Kemalist/secularist officers in the military is equally clear. Beyond Sledgehammer, the Gulenists’ wide range of clandestine operations against opponents in Turkey must be well known to American intelligence…..

…the head of the Turkish military, who was held hostage by the putschists during the coup attempt, has said that one of his captors offered to put him in touch with Gulen directly. This, on its own, is prima facie evidence of Gulen’s involvement, and likely passes the “probable cause” test that is required for extradition. Incredibly, administration officials are still quoted as saying “there is no credible evidence of Mr. Gulen’s personal involvement.” In other words, these officials must think that the army chief of their NATO ally is lying.” (“Is the U.S. behind Fethullah Gulen?“, Dani Rodrik’s Blog)

The Obama administration’s support for the Kurds in Syria as well as its behavior following the coup of July 15, has led to a dramatic deterioration in US-Turkey relations. This will undoubtedly effect Erdogan’s willingness to allow the US to use its airbases for conducting bombing raids in Syria in the future. It’s also bound to accelerate the pace at which Turkey strengthens relations with Russia, Iran and others as it will need the protection of new allies to better defend itself against threats from the west.

The Obama administration is still uncertain of how to proceed mainly because no one had expected that Erdogan would break with Washington, purge his enemies, pursue rapprochement with Moscow, Tehran and Damascus, and throw a wrench in Uncle Sam’s plan for redrawing the map of the Middle East. At present, the administration is trying to ease tensions by dispatching one high-ranking official after the other to persuade Erdogan that the US was not involved in the coup. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford visited Ankara just this week while Secretary of State John Kerry and Vice President Joe Biden are scheduled for later in the month. Eventually, even Obama will be asked to make the trek. No effort will be spared to bring Erdogan back into the fold.

If, however, the charm offensive fails, as I expect it will, Erdogan will be crucified in the western media (Hitler Erdogan) while covert operatives and NGOs try to foment political instability. At least, that’s the way things normally play out
http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/08/08/ ... -for-help/

[PufPuf93]

Here is some information on Kemalism and Turkey.

This first article is from 2012 but is sill relevant to the failed coup and other recent events in Turkey (where Erdogen leads a movement away from secular Kemalism back to an Islamic state).

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turke ... HQ20131118

Turkey's Kemalists see secularist legacy under threat

For decades his picture dominated Turkey, piercing blue eyes staring from hoardings, keeping watch over city streets and army barracks. Schoolyards echoed every morning to his oath:

"Happy is he who can say 'I am a Turk!'"

Now that oath rings out no more and the image of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of the secular republic, seems for some to be retreating into the shadows, victim of a new ruling class they suspect of cherishing a new more 'Islamic' Turkey.

Turkey's "Kemalists" flinch at Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan advising women on the number of children they should have, fostering restrictions on alcohol and expressing moral outrage over male and female students living together in the same house or flat.

The natural place to turn, as in hard times before, was to Ataturk's tomb, the Anitkabir, a columned stone monument atop a hill in Ankara. Over a million people descended on it this month on the anniversary of his death, the highest number in more than a decade. Tens of thousands more marked the ritual at Istanbul's Dolmabahce Palace where Ataturk spent his last days.

"They're stepping on everything Ataturk stands for and I felt the need to show my reaction," said Ozgur Diker, a 36-year old insurance salesman from Istanbul who travelled with five friends to Anitkabir.

"Whatever little democracy we have today, we owe it to Ataturk," he said, one of many first-time visitors to the tomb to mark the anniversary this year.

Tension between religious and secular elites has long been one of the underlying fault lines in the predominantly Muslim but constitutionally secular republic, forged from the ruins of an Ottoman theocracy by Ataturk 90 years ago.

But a stream of provocative comments from Erdogan, who is expected to stand for president in elections next year, has heightened accusations of religiously-motivated interference in private life and exacerbated secularists' sense of siege.

Erdogan suggested this month that rules could be drawn up to stop male and female students living together, one ruling party official suggesting such unregulated cohabitation could be used to harbor criminals.

Ataturk forged a Western model of a woman, wearing Western clothes and pursuing a professional and independent life.

"This debate about males and females staying in the same dormitory was the very last straw," said Nese Yildiz, a 46-year old former banker visiting Anitkabir.

"The state is trying to enter our homes. And they create this impression that their kids have the moral values and ours don't," she said.

SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER

Turks who share Yildiz's views say this sense of 'us' and 'them' has become a increasing part of the fabric of Turkish society under Erdogan, accusing him of alienating anyone who does not live according to the Islamic values he espouses.

His comments earlier this year that Turkey's existing alcohol laws had been made by "two drunkards" was taken by many as a reference to Ataturk, part of a polarizing rhetoric that contributed to a summer of violent protest a few weeks later.

"We are not talking about Turkey becoming an Iran here," said Tanil Bora, a writer and an academic at Ankara University.

"But no one can deny the rise of a moral authoritarianism."

Erdogan, founder of the ruling AK Party whose roots lie in political Islam, bristles at the suggestion he is anything other than a democrat. His supporters argue he is simply redressing the balance and restoring religious freedom to a Muslim majority after decades of restrictive secularist rule.

For some his colorful words have a revanchist edge.

"These people have drunk their whiskies for years overlooking the Bosphorus ... and have looked down on everyone else," Erdogan told a rally in the conservative central Anatolian province of Kayseri at the height of the summer protests, referring to the country's secular elite.

Lifting a ban on Islamic head scarves in state institutions last month was one such redress. The ban, based on a 1925 cabinet decree when Ataturk introduced clothing reforms meant to banish overt symbols of religious affiliation from public life, had kept many women from joining the public work force.

The schoolyard oath was seen by many Kurds as denying their ethnic identity - why could they not be happy to be Kurds? - and a complication to Erdogan's efforts to end a three decades old insurgency that has killed 40.000.

Erdogan has made curbing the clout of the army - self-appointed guardians of secularism who carried out three coups between 1960 and 1980 and pushed an Islamist-led government from power in 1997 - a central mission of his decade in power.

Hundreds of top generals have been jailed for plots to overthrow his government, prompting accusations of a witch-hunt. Where once a deliberate or unintended public slight of the army or of Ataturk might land someone in court, these days religious offence can have the same result. Times are changing.

Erdogan's force of character has ushered in unprecedented political stability which has also brought wealth, per capita income tripling in nominal terms and the days of hyperinflation and chronic currency instability fading to a distant memory.

CRITICS

Despite the secularist backlash and the fierce protests of summer, Erdogan remains the most popular politician in Turkey, his polarizing rhetoric and emotionally blunt manner rallying supporters in the country's conservative Anatolian heartlands.

the AK years, since Erdogan's party was first elected in 2002, has seen a boom in business in that heartland, the emergence of the "Anatolian Tiger" in a country long dominated by a number of large sometimes family-owned companies

A series of opinion polls since the summer protests show zero or little fall in his AK Party's popularity.

"The AK Party and Erdogan's supporters usually take the more grotesque examples of Kemalism and portray it like a form of extremism, which reinforces the resentment against secularists," said Ankara University's Bora.

But his critics - including a growing number within his own party - fear the uncompromising reluctance to tolerate dissenting voices which have become increasingly evident during his third term in office are making him a liability.

Under party rules, Erdogan cannot run again as prime minister in elections in 2015 and is widely expected instead to stand for the presidency next year, potentially under a deal with fellow party founder and current president, Abdullah Gul, a more moderate voice who could then become prime minister.

Erdogan has failed to push through the constitutional changes he wanted to create an executive presidency to replace the current largely ceremonial role ahead of the vote; but he is nonetheless unlikely to take a quiet back seat.

"They have the power," said Mustafa Ozel, 52, an Ankara-based artist visiting Anitkabir. "And they can dictate everything; how we give birth, at what time we are allowed to have a drink, how many kids we should have."

Kemalism defined in Wiki:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemalism

Kemalism

Kemalism (Turkish: Kemalizm), also known as Atatürkism (Turkish: Atatürkçülük, Atatürkçü düşünce), or the Six Arrows (Turkish: Altı ok), is the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey.[1] Kemalism, as it was implemented by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was defined by sweeping political, social, cultural and religious reforms designed to separate the new Turkish state from its Ottoman predecessor and embrace a Westernized way of living,[2] including the establishment of democracy, secularism, state support of the sciences and free education, many of which were first introduced to Turkey during Atatürk's presidency in his reforms.[3]

Many of the root ideas of Kemalism began during the late Ottoman Empire under various reforms to avoid the imminent collapse of the Empire, beginning chiefly in the early 19th-century Tanzimat reforms.[4] The mid-century Young Ottomans attempted to create the ideology of Ottoman nationalism, or Ottomanism, to quell the rising ethnic nationalism in the Empire and introduce limited democracy for the first time while maintaining Islamist influences. In the early 20th century, Young Turks abandoned Ottoman nationalism in favor of early Turkish nationalism, while adopting a secular political outlook. After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk, influenced by both the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks,[5] as well as by their successes and failures, led the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, borrowing from the earlier movements' ideas of secularism and Turkish nationalism, while bringing about, for the first time, free education. [6] and other reforms that have been enshrined by later leaders into guidelines for government of Turkey.

More at link.

[PufPuf93]

Looks to me like the USA has made a mess regards to Turkey which was in many ways the most strategic ally in the Middle East.

I have a hard time conceiving that the USA / CIA was not complicit in the failed coup.

Not much is known about the USA's inner workings now regards Turkey aside from not extraditing Gulen to Turkey.

Meanwhile inside Turkey:

http://www.seattlepi.com/news/world/art ... 127411.php


Giant Turkish anti-coup rally packs Istanbul waterfront area

Cinar Kiper and Elena Becatoros, Associated Press

Updated 9:45 pm, Sunday, August 7, 2016

Good article plus slide show I could not get to copy here about an over 1,000,000 person march in support of Erdogan on August 7, 2016. Lots of bright red Turkish flags.

[PufPuf93]

Here is a recent article from the NY Times. There are photos and a video at the link. All Turks (including secularists and liberals) think that the USA primarily CIA and via Gulen were behind the coup.

Turks Can Agree on One Thing: U.S. Was Behind Failed Coup


By TIM ARANGO and CEYLAN YEGINSUAUG. 2, 2016


Continue reading the main story at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/03/world ... .html?_r=0

[Harvey]

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices...what-future-holds-a7180551.html

Erdogan’s meeting with Putin will tell us what the future holds for Syria

Not long ago, it was Hillary Clinton who wanted to press the ‘reset’ button with Putin. Now it’s Erdogan – with, one suspects, a far greater effect

Robert Fisk, The Independent 9 August 2016



So the Sultan travels to see the Tsar at the royal seat of St Petersburg. And the Caliph of Damascus will watch from Syria with the conviction that Ba’ath Party policy has once again proved its worth. The policy? Wait. And wait. And wait.

For just as Turkey’s power over Syria – its Pakistan-like role of conduit for Arab Gulf money and arms to the civil war, its smuggling routes to Isis, al-Qaeda (or Jabhat al-Nusra or Fatah el-Sham or whatever) – seemed an overwhelming threat to Damascus, along comes Turkey’s mysterious coup, its army neutered, and Sultan Erdogan scurrying off to St Petersburg to move his country from Nato to Mother Russia.

And all this when the rebel armies in Syria have re-surrounded government troops in Aleppo with the aim of reopening their supply routes to Turkey.

For with Russian forces scarcely 30 miles south of the Turkish border, and its pilots daily bombing the very same rebels who are besieging Aleppo, Tsar Putin is not going to tolerate any more missiles smuggled across the Turkish border to shoot down his helicopters.

And if Nato and the EU believe they can rely on their faithful ally Sultan Erdogan to pursue the destruction of the Assad regime or curb refugee flows to Europe – or tolerate US jets flying out of Incirlik airbase and other former Armenian properties in Anatolia – they can think again.

You only have to read the Russian versions of the Sultan’s grovelling statements prior to his Ottoman visit to grasp how the sick man of Europe is breathing in the fresh air of the Steppes.

“This visit seems to me a new milestone in bilateral relations, beginning with a clean slate,” quoth the Sultan, “and I personally, with all my heart and on behalf of the Turkish nation, salute President Putin and all Russians.”

That was Russian television for you. Then take the Russian news agency Tass, through which the Sultan refers to his “friend Vladimir” and promises that “there is yet much for our countries to do together”.

Now let’s abandon the Tsar-Sultan stuff. This was more like the fraternal greetings a Brezhnev or a Podgorny might have expected from an erring member of the Warsaw Pact, full of “bilateral relations” and “salutes” and “friendship” (though not “eternal friendship”, as brotherly nations might once have pledged to the Kremlin).

The first post-coup visit of Recep Tayyip Erdogan is to Russia – and there’s a coup of a different kind.

Here’s another line from the Tass version of Erdogan’s pre-St Petersburg declarations: “A solution to the Syrian crisis cannot be found without Russia. We can resolve the Syrian crisis only in cooperation with Russia.”

And in cooperation with Bashar al-Assad? It’s a thought that must warm the heart of Bashar who was once – let us remember this – close family friends with Erdogan and his wife. If you can shoot down a Russian plane and then embrace your “friend” Putin, why could Erdogan not do the same to Bashar all over again?

That’s also, of course, a question for Hillary Clinton and The Donald to ponder – although Donald Trump, who seems to hold the same views about the Tsar as the Sultan now boasts, could possibly live with that.

There is a long list of the potential losers in the theatre of St Petersburg. First, Isis and al-Qaeda/Nusra/Fatah el-Sham, and all the other Islamist outfits now fighting the regime in Syria, who suddenly find that their most reliable arms conduit has teamed up with their most ferocious enemy, the owner of the Russian air force. Then there’s the Saudi and Qatari billionaires who have been supplying the cash and guns for the Sunni warriors who are trying to overthrow both Damascus and Baghdad, and humble the Shia of Iran, Syria (the Alawites) and Lebanon.

And then, above all others perhaps, those who will fear for their lives in the aftermath of this fraternal jaunt to the Tsar’s palace: the Turkish army. For what is becoming ever clearer is that – and this is called the kicker to the story – Russia and, indeed, Iran played an intelligence role in warning Erdogan of the military coup plotted against him.

The Arabs have already been told by their Russian collocutors that Putin, being the old KGB boss that he was, personally sent a message to Erdogan after learning of the coup from Turkish army communications, which were picked up and listened to by Russian technicians at their air base just outside Latakia in Syria.

The Iranians – who would be happy to see Turkey turned against their Sunni Islamist enemies in Syria – also tipped off Erdogan about the coup, so the Arabs have been told.

Not long ago, it seems, it was Hillary who wanted to press the “reset” button with Putin. Now it’s Erdogan – with, one suspects, a much greater effect.

The word “terror" is now used with such promiscuity that it seems to have been invented in the United States. Actually, its first common usage after the French Revolution appears to have been in Moscow where it described the bomb-throwing “terrorists” who were trying to overthrow the Tsar.

So watch out for that word “terrorists” in the communiqués that follow the Sultan-Tsar Summit. The Grand St Petersburg Alliance Against Terror. Terror, terror, terror. If you hear that from Mother Russia in the coming hours, you’ll know that things are going to change in Syria.

[PufPuf93]

If a segment of the USA security state was involved in the failed coup of Erdogan, they (CIA et al) really screwed up in a major way.

However legitimate or illegitimate post 9-11 USA actions have been in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, the timing and failure of the Turkey coup are a huge set back for US and western Europe interests in the Middle East with a resounding rippling effect across the globe. The impacts are nascent.

There is little doubt that Gulen and followers are proxies for neoliberal / neoconservative agendas and Gulen a CIA asset.

The USA has had various think tanks and economic and political interests conducting foreign policy not in the interests of the USA as a whole but for private parties and foreign governments. A round robin of folks go in and out of government and on and off government and private payrolls representing various interests with little say by or concern for the common citizen.

[FourthBase]

If a segment of the USA security state was involved in the failed coup of Erdogan, they (CIA et al) really screwed up in a major way.

However legitimate or illegitimate post 9-11 USA actions have been in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, the timing and failure of the Turkey coup are a huge set back for US and western Europe interests in the Middle East with a resounding rippling effect across the globe. The impacts are nascent.

There is little doubt that Gulen and followers are proxies for neoliberal / neoconservative agendas and Gulen a CIA asset.

The USA has had various think tanks and economic and political interests conducting foreign policy not in the interests of the USA as a whole but for private parties and foreign governments. A round robin of folks go in and out of government and on and off government and private payrolls representing various interests with little say by or concern for the common citizen.

It's almost as if there are other global powers whose interests and agendas are antithetical to America's.

[seemslikeadream]

US nuclear bombs at Turkey base at risk of seizure: Report
WASHINGTON - Agence France-Presse

Dozens of U.S. nuclear weapons stored at a Turkish air base near Syria are at risk of being captured by “terrorists or other hostile forces,” a Washington think tank claimed on Aug. 15.

Critics have long been alarmed by the United States’ estimated stockpile of about 50 nuclear bombs at İncirlik in the southern province of Adana, just 110 kilometers from the border with war-torn Syria.

The issue took on fresh urgency last month following the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey, in which the base’s Turkish commander was arrested on suspicion of being a member of the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ), believed to have masterminded the failed takeover.

“Whether the U.S. could have maintained control of the weapons in the event of a protracted civil conflict in Turkey is an unanswerable question,” said the report from the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think tank working to promote peace.

İncirlik is a vital base for the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria, with the strategically located facility affording drones and warplanes fast access to ISIL targets.

But the Pentagon in March ordered families of U.S. troops and civilian personnel stationed in southern Turkey to quit the region due to security fears.

“From a security point of view, it’s a roll of the dice to continue to have approximately 50 of America’s nuclear weapons stationed at İncirlik Air Base in Turkey,” report co-author Laicie Heeley said.

“There are significant safeguards in place. ... But safeguards are just that, they don’t eliminate risk. In the event of a coup, we can’t say for certain that we would have been able to maintain control,” she told AFP.

While the Pentagon does not discuss where it stores nuclear assets, the bombs are believed to be kept at İncirlik as a deterrent to Russia and to demonstrate the U.S.’ commitment to NATO, the 28-member military alliance that includes Turkey.

The İncirlik nuclear issue has been the subject of renewed debate in the U.S. since the failed putsch attempt.

“While we’ve avoided disaster so far, we have ample evidence that the security of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Turkey can change literally overnight,” Steve Andreasen, who was director for defense policy and arms control on the White House National Security Council staff from 1993 to 2001, wrote in an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times last week.

Kori Schake, a fellow at the California-based Hoover Institution, noted in a written debate in the New York Times that “American nuclear forces cannot be used without codes, making the weapons impossible to set off without authorization.”

“The fact that nuclear weapons are stationed in Turkey does not make them vulnerable to capture and use, even if the country were to turn hostile to the U.S.,” she said.

The Pentagon declined to comment on questions arising from the Stimson study.

“We do not discuss the location of strategic assets. The [Department of Defense] has taken appropriate steps to maintain the safety and security of our personnel, their families, and our facilities, and we will continue to do so,” it said in a statement.

The İncirlik concerns were highlighted as part of a broader paper into the Pentagon’s nuclear modernization program, through which the U.S. would spend hundreds of billions of dollars to update its atomic arsenal.

The authors argue that a particular type of bomb – the B61 gravity bomb – should be immediately removed from Europe, where 180 of the weapons are kept in Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/us-nuc ... sCatID=358