Post-EnlightenmentSadeHowever, there were dissenting voices on this matter even within the French Enlightenment, most notably (but not only) the Marquis de Sade. By contrast with atheists such as d'Holbach and Naigeon,
De Sade's atheistic moral nihilism endorsed violence; indeed, like Nietzsche a century after, De Sade encouraged violence as a way in which the superior sort of human being honoured nature (which itself is prodigiously violent).[1] According to De Sade, Christians have succeeded in enslaving and weakening the aggressive type of person which nature created as a free and cruel being.[2] Notwithstanding the Christian 'slave morality', in De Sade's view everything is allowed, from prostitution, divorce, incest, rape, and infanticide; nothing forbids us from seeking our desires at the cost of others, and nothing is more satisfying than exercising our will to destroy and to inflict cruelty.[3]What one in fact finds in De Sade, as in Nietzsche whom he strikingly prefigures, is a disturbing form of 'ethics' which belongs quite outside conventional morality. As Schroeder has noted, De Sade held that nature, which acts destructively, demands from us the harming and destruction of others: in fact,
he raises aggression and cruelty to a norm that should be pursued, being as it were a 'true law of nature'.[4] He does not deny that we also have natural altruistic feelings, but he believes that they should be snuffed out since the law of nature primarily demands cruelty. Every failure to act with cruelty is a crime against nature.[5] What fundamentally distinguishes De Sade from men such as d'Holbach and Naigeon is his willingness to recognise in human beings not just tendencies towards altruism but also towards the most unbridled sort of egoism.
Schopenhauer and StirnerNot all atheists who subsequently diverged from mainstream Enlightenment atheism in their view of human nature took the Sadist view. As Robert Wicks has noted, Schopenhauer diverged just as deeply from d'Holbach and Naigeon in his view of human nature.
He regarded the human world as essentially one of constant struggle, where each individual thing strives against every other in a permanent war and as a result advocated a morality very much in the spirit of Christianity, as well as the sacred scriptures of India.[6]
Not all of the 'pessimistic' psychologising atheists took this view however; Max Stirner, for example, stood closer to Sade in promoting unbridled egoism, which did not take account of the interests of others. This attitude is encapsulated in Stirner's disturbing formulation
'What you have the power to do, you also have the right to do' ('Was Du zu sein die Macht hast, dazu hast Du das Recht').[7]
NietzscheThe definitive representative of this strand of European atheism is Friedrich Nietzsche, who alongside Feuerbach is often regarded as the best known modern atheist.
It is striking, then, that the New Atheists fail to engage with his thought (Nietzsche does not appear in Dawkins' The God Delusion or Hitchens' God is Not Great; he is only mentioned in a footnote in Sam Harris' The End of Faith and only in passing in Dennett's Breaking the Spell). As Winfried Schroeder notes, the late
Nietzsche, like De Sade, explicitly encouraged violence; according to him, the superior type of human being (or Übermensch) was entitled (indeed, obliged) to exercise cruelty and violence over his inferiors. Nietzsche believed that morality constituted a 'capital crime' against life, by which he meant that it frustrated those forms of individual behaviour by which (according to him) the superior sorts of people most authentically express themselves - such as sexuality, greed, the will to dominate, and cruelty. As such, it stood in the way of the realisation of a future elite race of 'supermen'.[8]
According to Schroeder, Nietzsche's fully developed critique of morality in Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On the Genealogy of Morality (1887) leaves the reader in no doubt that
Nietzsche saw the destruction of the most basic moral principles - including the fundamental moral obligation not inflict gratuitous harm on others - as the only position consistent with a genuine rejection of God. According to Nietzsche, traditional morality was essentially a product of Jewish, and subsequently Christian, resentment against the original aristocratic values of strength, pride, and hardness of heart of their pagan political masters.[9]Nietzsche traces the Judeo-Christian moral principles of non-violence, impartiality and altruism to the particular group interests of the subordinated Jews and Christians.[10]Consequently, since traditional morality is merely the product of particular group interests, it loses its claim to universal validity.[11]
Schroeder notes that having exposed Judeo-Christian egalitarianism and universalism as a mere disguise for the promotion of their particular interests,
Nietzsche promotes a particularist morality for the 'strong'. Hardness of heart, cruelty, and the will to annihilate the inferior sort of human beings constitute the basic components of his 'ethics' which he proposes should replace the old (religious) morality.[12] As Schroeder further observes, Nietzsche did not stop at seeking the physical annihilation of those human beings whom he considered the detritus of life ('Ausschuss und Abfall des Lebens').[13]
Like De Sade, the harming - and also the killing - of supposed inferiors is not only allowed by Nietzsche but positively encouraged, for the sake of the improvement of the race.Marx and Marxist-LeninismAnother very influential strand of atheism which condoned violence was Marxist dialectical materialism. Marxism and Marxist-Leninism undoubtedly permitted violence as a means to an end, namely, the establishment of the communist society. The Marxist theory of ideology, as well as Marxist-Leninism which interpreted Marx faithfully in this respect, regarded morality as a mere ideological product or epiphenomenon of material conditions prevailing within a given society. It saw in morality no binding reason not to exercise violence in the achievement of its political ends, since the ideological critique had supposedly exposed morality and its claims to universal validity as the mere expression of particular interests.[14]
It is for this reason that Dawkins appears to be wrong in claiming that the insinuation that Stalin and Hitler 'did their terrible deeds because they were atheists' is 'false'.[15] Just as
the connection between Nietzsche's atheism and his amoralism lies in his supposed exposure of Judeo-Christian morality as a mere disguised expression of its essentially partial will to power, equally
the connection between Marx's atheism and his amoralism lies in his similar exposure of bourgeois Enlightenment morality as a mere disguise for the pursuit of the partial socio-economic interests of a particular class (the bourgeoisie). It can be argued that
Lenin was only being consistent in regarding morality as just one more instrument in the political struggle. It was not immoral to commit violence, since morality was just ideology, and could be ignored in pursuing the aims of the communist revolution; as Schroeder notes, the events post-1917 in Russia were merely a consistent application of the atheistic and amoral principles of dialectical materialism.[16]
Difficulties for the New AtheistsGiven the deeply ambivalent relationship between different forms of modern atheism and violence, there is an urgent need to debate the grounds for the New Atheists' confidence that a contemporary widespread promotion of atheism would realise the hopes of d'Holbach and Naigeon rather than repeat the failures of Marxism or Nazism.
Despite Dawkins' protestations there does seem to be a case for finding a connection between atheist tyrannies and the atheism of the doctrines they apply; this is the case both for Marxism and for the influence of Nietzsche on the intellectual justification of Nazism.[17]
The
New Atheists have tended up to the present to bracket aside these difficult issues. Dawkins denies that there is any essential connection between atheism and the readiness to commit violence on a large scale ('even if we accept that Hitler and Stalin shared atheism in common, they both also had moustaches...so what?').[18] Hitchens largely sets aside the question of whether atheism and violence are connected and instead concentrates on showing religious complicity with the Nazi government. It is, of course, to the great discredit of elements of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in Germany and elsewhere that they were complicit with the Hitler regime, and Hitchens brings forward some very embarrassing evidence on this score -
but the deeper issue is avoided, namely, whether atheist tyrannies would be any less likely to arise if the world were to witness a drastic diminution in (or total disappearance of) religious practice? It is not sufficient to say that the alternative to religion should be the 'defence of secular pluralism' and not secular dictatorship (Hitchens): what concrete reasons can the New Atheists offer for their confidence that a future without religion would be one without violence?
The principle difficulty here is that modern evolutionary ethics (to which all the principle New Atheists seem to subscribe) acknowledges that humans have both altruistic and egoistic urges, but produce no compelling justification for why we should pursue our altruistic rather than our egoistic urges. According to Dawkins, Dennett (although he also elsewhere denies it), and Harris, there is no such thing as moral objectivism: morality is a natural phenomenon which has evolved from our basic survival urges and will continue to evolve. Furthermore, morality is entirely analysable in terms of self-interest (in crude or 'enlightened' forms).
But if morality is finally a natural fact and is fully analysable in terms of self-interest, what ultimate sanction is there against humans interpreting their self-interest (as De Sade, Stirner and Nietzsche do) to include the infliction of cruelty and violence on others? Nature, after all, it will be objected, seems to have programmed its products for cruelty as well as altruism.John Gray, in his recent and influential work Straw Dogs (2002)[19] takes an atheistic but entirely disillusioned view of human beings which might be seen as posing a contemporary Nietzschean-style challenge to the Enlightenment optimism and implicit progressivism of the New Atheists.
Gray, with his typical black humour, describes genocide as just as human as art or prayer: 'from the stone age onwards, humans have used their tools to slaughter one another. Humans are weapon-making animals with an unquenchable fondness for killing'.[20] Gray, however, is not inclined to blame the human propensity for violence on religion, but on our biological inheritance: 'if you seek the origins of ethics, look to the lives of other animals';[21] nor is he coy about spelling out the fundamentally moral ambivalence of humans, who are both 'peace-loving animals, but [also]...have an itch for violence'. If, as Gray argues, 'There is no way of life in which all these needs can be satisfied'[22], then the atheist would do better to reconcile themselves to a tragic vision of the human future (Godless or not) rather than the optimistic one of the New Atheists.
The biologically reductionist picture of human nature which Dawkins, Dennett and others present to us does not seem to provide us with any particularly good reason to suppose that morality will develop towards greater perfection and a diminution of violence, or even for why humanity should develop in this direction. Neither the history of modern atheism nor the political history of the twentieth century nor the New Atheists' own depiction of human nature seem to supply any obvious reasons for believing that a dramatic diminution of religious belief in the world would significantly reduce human violence.ReferencesDawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. London: Bantam Press, 2006.
Gray, John. Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals. London: Granta Books, 2002.
Schroeder, Winfried. Moralischer Nihilismus: Radikale Moralkritik von den Sophisten bis Nietzsche. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005.
Wicks, Robert. "Arthur Schopenhauer " In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed Edward N. Zalta, 2007.
Wicks, Robert. "Friedrich Nietzsche." In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed Edward N. Zalta, 2007.
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