Windows 8 to be put on new computers permanently

[Stephen Morgan]

Windows 8 secure boot would 'exclude' Linux
Microsoft wants firmware to only start authorised OSes

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/09/21 ... ion_fears/

Computer scientists warn that proposed changes in firmware specifications may make it impossible to run “unauthorised” operating systems such as Linux and FreeBSD on PCs.

Proposed changes to the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) firmware specifications would mean PCs would only boot from a digitally signed image derived from a keychain rooted in keys built into the PC. Microsoft is pushing to make this mandatory in a move that could not be overridden by users and would effectively exclude alternative operating systems, according to Professor Ross Anderson of Cambridge University and other observers.

UEFI is a successor to the BIOS ROM firmware designed to shorten boot times and improve security. The framework, a key part of Windows 8, is designed to work on a variety of CPU architectures.

If the draft for UEFI is adopted without modification, then any system that ships with only OEM and Microsoft keys will not boot a generic copy of Linux. A signed version of Linux would work, but this poses problems, as tech blogger Matthew Garrett explains.

Garrett writes:

Firstly, we'd need a non-GPL bootloader. Grub 2 is released under the GPLv3, which explicitly requires that we provide the signing keys. Grub is under GPLv2 which lacks the explicit requirement for keys, but it could be argued that the requirement for the scripts used to control compilation includes that. It's a grey area, and exploiting it would be a pretty good show of bad faith.

Secondly, in the near future the design of the kernel will mean that the kernel itself is part of the bootloader. This means that kernels will also have to be signed. Making it impossible for users or developers to build their own kernels is not practical. Finally, if we self-sign, it's still necessary to get our keys included by ever OEM.

There's no indication that Microsoft will prevent vendors from providing firmware support for disabling this feature and running unsigned code. However, experience indicates that many firmware vendors and OEMs are interested in providing only the minimum of firmware functionality required for their market.

Garrett concluded that there is no need to panic just yet.

The upshot of the changes is that considerable roadblocks might be placed in the way of running alternative operating systems on PCs. Anderson describes this as a return to the rejected Trusted Computing architecture – which at that point involved force-feeding DRM copy-protection restrictions – which may be far worse than its predecessor.

The professor said:

These issues last arose in 2003, when we fought back with the Trusted Computing FAQ and economic analysis. That initiative petered out after widespread opposition. This time round the effects could be even worse, as 'unauthorised' operating systems like Linux and FreeBSD just won’t run at all. On an old-fashioned Trusted Computing platform you could at least run Linux – it just couldn’t get at the keys for Windows Media Player.

The extension of Microsoft’s OS monopoly to hardware would be a disaster, with increased lock-in, decreased consumer choice and lack of space to innovate.

Anderson concludes that the technology might violate EU competition law in a rallying call on Cambridge University's Light Blue Touchpaper blog here. ®

[elfismiles]

Hope this backfires and government IT folk will boycott it.

[Seamus OBlimey]

You mean?.. I'll never have to reinstall?

[Nordic]

The entire 3d animation industry will just build their own computers then. They use linux and they ain't switching over. Seems this would kill MS as an OS for anything other than consumer grade pc's.

[dqueue]

You mean?.. I'll never have to reinstall?

No. You'll absolutely have to reinstall. But, you can't!

[Gnomad]

I hope the situation is not quite that dark. I find it a little bit difficult to believe that there wouldn't be enough backlash from this to prevent the worst case scenario from happening. Linux is popular enough in server use that at least part of motherboard vendors will take care to have their offerings work under Linux as well.
Not a nice development, in any case. And it well might go to hell just as well.

Here is another take:
http://www.itworld.com/it-managementstr ... linux-mess

A snippet:

...
Which is why I don't think Linux Australia's complaint has a hope of succeeding. Microsoft will argue--in fact, has argued in a rebuttal on this matter on Sept. 22--that this is a security matter for Microsoft Windows deployments, and they are in no way influencing what the hardware vendors are doing with their keys. Microsoft is not preventing other operating systems' keys from being handed out, and it's not their problem if the OEMs aren't accommodating to other operating systems.

The funny thing is, they're right. In one fell swoop, Microsoft has shifted the blame from their requirements to the actions (or inactions) of the OEMs. And why should the hardware vendors feel any pressure to provide keys, as Garrett summarizes?

"Microsoft can require that hardware vendors include their keys. Their competition can't. A system that ships with Microsoft's signing keys and no others will be unable to perform secure boot of any operating system other than Microsoft's. No other vendor has the same position of power over the hardware vendors. Red Hat is unable to ensure that every OEM carries their signing key. Nor is Canonical. Nor is Nvidia, or AMD or any other PC component manufacturer. Microsoft's influence here is greater than even Intel's."

When this issue first came to light, it seemed to be a worry for desktop Linux alone. But as time went on, I began to wonder how many blade and rack servers come with that Windows Server certified logo. If Microsoft gets around to requiring UEFI secure booting for server hardware in a future version of Windows Server, then vendors like Red Hat and SUSE, who really don't play much in the desktop space, would take a serious hit if OEMs opted not to bother giving them keys. So would all the other Linux server distros.

For what it's worth, I don't see it coming to that. In server-space at least, vendors like IBM, HP, and Dell have too much invested in Linux, cloud, and virtual systems to prevent Linux installs. But in a world where barely any OEMs will even ship with Linux now, what incentive will hardware vendors have to provide keys for Linux distros?

For now, Microsoft isn't even bothering to argue these points, and from where I stand, they won't. If they are smart, they won't even mention complaints about other operating systems, and keep hammering home the point about security and malware. And, like a politician on a stump speech, that message will be drilled so many times it will even start to sound like the truth.

Scheming software fascist assholes.

This means that in the future, I will need to be even more vigilant when obtaining hardware, to make sure I am able to run Linux on it. Finding out beforehand whether a certain motherboard allows me to boot or not.
Not a new thing as such, since that's what I have needed to do for years already, to make sure hardware is supported under Linux as well. Been Microshit free for around 6-7 years, now. But this mess has the potential to make it massively harder to find hardware that works - very rarely in the past would some motherboard not work at all.

[Simulist]

When programmers shut a door, hackers open some windows.

[Gnomad]

Yeah, there is that too.

[justdrew]

I would think most motherboard manufacturers would have an option in their bios/firmware, "do not required signed boot" - now I wouldn't expect much of that from Dell, at least not in their enterprise optiplex line, but I bet consumer targeted Dell's would have an off switch for this. Or people would hack the bios and you could flash the computer to disable this.

there is a very real security concern... all modern cpu's support hardware level virtualization, and if some malware loaded a hypervisor, that malware could reliably be nigh-undetectable. but I'm not at all sure requiring crypto-signed boot loaders is t he answer.

[Gnomad]

Probably so, justdrew.

Also (a bit poorly written but couldn't find a more concise article on this, for now):
http://www.techpowerup.com/154326/Windo ... ents-.html

Ross Anderson, professor of Security Engineering at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, has written in the Light Blue Touchpaper blog, about this issue. He starts off by explaining how secure boot could limit the purchase Metro apps to only the official Microsoft app store, saying. "Even if users can opt out, most of them won't. That's a lot of firms suddenly finding Steve Ballmer's boot on their jugular." That sounds very well put and really doesn't paint a pretty picture, does it? It's exactly the same tactic as all these firms that require you to opt out of receiving their junk mail, toolbars etc when installing software, knowing full well that the majority won't.

However, this control can turn from monopolistic to sinister, because governments could potentially lean on Microsoft to give them an official key in order to install malware on user's PC's, which could be next to impossible to remove. The particular example he gives is that of Tubitak, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, saying that he has removed their key from his web browser, but how would he identify all foreign governments' keys?
We’ve also been starting to think about the issues of law enforcement access that arose during the crypto wars and that came to light again with CAs. These issues are even more wicked with trusted boot. If the Turkish government compelled Microsoft to include the Tubitak key in Windows so their intelligence services could do man-in-the-middle attacks on Kurdish MPs' gmail, then I expect they'll also tell Microsoft to issue them a UEFI key to authenticate their keylogger malware. Hey, I removed the Tubitak key from my browser, but how do I identify and block all foreign governments' UEFI keys?
Sounds nasty, doesn't it? This isn’t something that anyone should want on their computer.

Anderson has also written an 8-page paper (PDF http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/sefa-pr11.pdf ) entitled "Can We Fix the Security Economics of Federated Authentication?" which covers this problem in great detail.

The Free Software Foundation has also also started a petition against secure boot, which people are encouraged to sign.

http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2011 ... uting-2-1/

[Gnomad]

Here is one from The Register, it refers to the same blog post from prof. Anderson:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/10/25 ... _reloaded/

Cryptoboffin: Secure boot a boon for spooks' spyware

State-sponsored trojans will be harder to get rid of

A leading computer scientist has warned that the latest so-called Trusted Computing proposals may restrict the market for anti-virus and security software.

Cambridge University Professor Ross Anderson warns that the secure boot features in the UEFI firmware specification - understood to be required on certified Windows 8 machines - might even make it easier to smuggle state-sponsored trojans onto victims' machines.

The secure boot system is designed to stop malware from being introduced into a computer's boot sequence - but without the secret cryptographic keys, the firmware will also block non-harmful code, such as non-Windows OSes and legit anti-virus software.

"Building signed boot into UEFI will extend Microsoft’s power over the markets for AV software and other security tools that install around boot time; while ‘Metro’ style apps (ie, web, tablet and HTML5-style stuff) could be limited to distribution via the MS app store. Even if users can opt out, most of them won’t.

"That’s a lot of firms suddenly finding Steve Ballmer’s boot on their jugular."

Anderson - who previously criticised UEFI (the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) for making it "impossible" to run “unauthorised” operating systems such as Linux and FreeBSD on Windows 8 PCs - argued that the technology could make life easier for intelligence agencies at the expense of ordinary users.

"If the Turkish government compelled Microsoft to include the Tubitak key in Windows so their intelligence services could do man-in-the-middle attacks on Kurdish MPs’ Gmail, then I expect they’ll also tell Microsoft to issue them a UEFI key to authenticate their keylogger malware," Anderson writes.

"Hey, I removed the Tubitak key from my browser, but how do I identify and block all foreign governments’ UEFI keys?"

The cryptoguru added: "Our Greek colleagues are already a bit cheesed off with Wall Street. How happy will they be if in future they won’t be able to install the security software of their choice on their PCs, but the Turkish secret police will?"

Anderson's latest criticism of UEFI on the Light Blue Touchpaper blog is here. ®

http://www.mabula.net/tbfw/2011/10/29

Sat, 29 Oct 2011

Who are you trusting
The "Secure Boot" proposal from Microsoft - to turn on digital signatures on new UEFI-enabled motherboards so that only signed operating systems get booted, allowing them to get motherboard manufacturers to lock Linux out under the guise of "preventing malware" - is worrying enough as it is. Several large Linux companies - Canonical and Red Hat amongst them - have already been working on white papers, and an expert in the field has proposed IMO a better solution to the problem. But really, if you think about it, Microsoft should be working to prevent the whole thing working at all.

Why? Very simple. Just think of the number of state-level attacks on software and Internet infrastructure in recent years. "Hackers" getting fraudulent SSL certificates issued for *.google.com and other sites. People requesting Mozilla remove CNNIC from the certificate authority list because of the Chinese government similar faking of SSL certificates. Malware created by the German government for spying on people. British companies selling malware to the Egyptian government. The list goes on.

One can easily imagine any government in the world telling motherboard manufacturers that they need to install the government's own public keys in order to import motherboards into the country. It's obvious in the case of countries like Iran, Syria, and Jordan, and it's no stretch to imagine the US, Australian or any other 'Western' government doing it under the guise of "protecting our citizens". After all, we do want the government to snoop on those evil child molesters, dont' we? Or at least, the people the government tells us are child molesters. Or, at least, the people who turn out to have child abuse material on their computers after the government has done their investigation. They wouldn't use those powers to spy on ordinary citizens, right? Right?

Wrong. For state-level actors, it's not about the ordinary citizens. It's about protecting the status quo. It's about protecting their access to information and protecting their powers. The idea that someone can lock government spyware out of their computer has an easy solution - make sure that the computer itself will always install the spyware. And they have the power to go to motherboard manufactuers and get these keys installed. It's a no-brainer for them, really.

I also have no doubt that secure booting to a secure operating system will do little to stop real malware. There's always flaws to be exploited in something as large and kludgy as Microsoft's software. The phenomena Microsoft is allegedly trying to protect against - rootkits that start at boot time - are a relatively small portion of the malware spectrum. And if you're going to let an unsigned binary run - the alternative being to lock all but the large players out of the Windows software market - then malware is already exploiting the user's trust in the system and their lack of knowledge about what is good software and what isn't. "Your PC is already infected" and all that; it's trojan horses all the way down.

I don't think Microsoft is going to care that state-level players can exploit the system their proposing. It's not like they don't already give the source code to the Chinese government and so forth. But I think the rest of the PC using world has a right to be very worried about a system that will tell you that it's running signed software without you being able to choose which signatories you trust. And choice is never going to be on the agenda with Microsoft.

[82_28]

Looks like I just bought my last computer and it also looks like fascism is good and well.

This newish dual core computer that runs linux I type on does everything I need it to do. I keep Win7 for the games I may want to play though I never do, but outta here MSFT. You've been a small partition of meaninglessness since WINE covered the spread.

#OccupyMSFT

[Stephen Morgan]

I hope the situation is not quite that dark. I find it a little bit difficult to believe that there wouldn't be enough backlash from this to prevent the worst case scenario from happening. Linux is popular enough in server use that at least part of motherboard vendors will take care to have their offerings work under Linux as well.
Not a nice development, in any case. And it well might go to hell just as well.

It's not long since Linus was declaring victory in the battle for global domination due to having taken over majorities of the markets for servers, and various other categories. But what does he know? He thinks emacs is better than vi, can't listen to him.

[Stephen Morgan]

[MinM]

@CNET

Keylogger discovered pre-installed on some HP laptops http://cnet.co/2pDDRIP

@CNET

A keylogger has been found in an audio driver installed in several HP laptops. From our sister site @ZDNet http://cnet.co/2qZcLjN

Real time keyword hijacking hijacking....


GOVERNMENT AND COMPUTER MANUFACTURERS CAUGHT INSTALLING HARD-WIRED KEYSTROKE LOGGERS INTO ALL NEW LAPTOP COMPUTERS!

Turner Radio Network | October 4, 2005

Devices capture everything you ever type, then can send it via your ethernet card to the Dept. of Homeland Security without your knowledge, consent or a search warrant each time you log onto the internet!



Freedom Of Information Act Requests For Explanation From DHS, refused.

I was opening up my almost brand new laptop, to replace a broken PCMCIA slot riser on the motherboard. As soon as I got the keyboard off, I noticed a small cable running from the keyboard connection underneath a piece of metal protecting the motherboard.

I figured "No Big Deal", and continued with the dissasembly. But when I got the metal panels off, I saw a small white heatshink-wrapped package. Being ever-curious, I sliced the heatshrink open. I found a little circuit board inside.


Being an EE by trade, this piqued my curiosity considerably. On one side of the board, one Atmel AT45D041A four megabit Flash memory chip.




On the other side, one Microchip Technology PIC16F876 Programmable Interrupt Controller, along with a little Fairchild Semiconductor CD4066BCM quad bilateral switch.

Looking further, I saw that the other end of the cable was connected to the integrated ethernet board.

What could this mean? I called the manufacturer's tech support about it, and they said, and I quote, "The intregrated service tag identifier is there for assisting customers in the event of lost or misplaced personal information." He then hung up.



A little more research, and I found that that board spliced in between the keyboard and the ethernet chip is little more than a Keyghost hardware keylogger .

The reasons a computer manufacturer would put this in their laptops can only be left up to your imagination. It would be very impractical to hand-anylze the logs, and very CPU-intensive to do so on a computer for every person that purchased a laptop. Why are these keyloggers here? I recently almost found out.

I called the police, as having a keylogger unknown to me in my laptop is a serious offense. They told me to call the Department of Homeland Security. At this point, I am in disbelief. Why would the DHS have a keylogger in my laptop? It was surreal.

So I called them, and they told me to submit a Freedom of Information Act request. This is what I got back:



Under the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) the only items exempt from public disclosure are items relating to "law enforcement tools and techniques" and "items relating to national security."

The real life implications of this are plain: Computer manufacturers appear to be cooperating with the Department of Homeland Security to make every person who buys a new computer subject to immediate, unrestricted government recording of everything they do on those computers! EVERYTHING !

This information can be sent to DHS, online, without your knowledge or consent, without a search warrant or even probable cause! That's why this device is hard-wired directly into the ethernet card, which communicates over the internet!

I am not certain how long this information will be permitted to remain online for all the world to see before the government takes some type of action to attempt to have it removed from public view. I URGE you to take copy of this page immediately and spread this information to everyone you know immediately! The more people who find out about this, the more can protect themselves and raise a HUGE outcry to force government and computer manufacturers to immediately CEASE installing these devices in new computers!