How do we shut down the FBI?

Moderators: Elvis, DrVolin, Jeff

How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby fruhmenschen » Sat Aug 23, 2014 1:44 pm

I need help in locating the posts dealing with the government-us military posting at forums to create consensus.
fruhmenschen
 
Posts: 5712
Joined: Thu Aug 12, 2010 7:46 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby Wombaticus Rex » Mon Aug 25, 2014 2:12 pm

Man, I'm bummed -- we were all relying on you to take down the FBI, and now you're asking us?

Image

the posts dealing with the government-us military posting at forums to create consensus.


Revealed: US spy operation that manipulates social media

US Gov. Software Creates 'Fake People' on Social Networks to Promote Propoganda

10 pages: How the Spooks Would Attack YOU and ME Too.

20 pages: The first global cyber war has begun

IT scams, sockpuppet armies, and the rest...

SockPuppet/AstroTurf Alerts

Edit: Also, and mayhap most especially -- Subversion of Social Movement by Adversarial Agents
User avatar
Wombaticus Rex
 
Posts: 10896
Joined: Wed Nov 08, 2006 6:33 pm
Location: Vermontistan
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby brainpanhandler » Tue Sep 16, 2014 2:46 pm

Is this for clear to everyone?
"Nothing in all the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity." - Martin Luther King Jr.
User avatar
brainpanhandler
 
Posts: 5089
Joined: Fri Dec 29, 2006 9:38 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby 82_28 » Tue Sep 16, 2014 3:27 pm

I hate to be a dick here, but in some ways your FBI obsession/posts are kind of ending "the FBI" as in, I don't care about the FBI. Let them come and go, far and wide, hither and yon. They're going to do what they want anyways. If we don't give a shit about them and break no laws, then fuck 'em. 99.99% of the country does not have to deal with the FBI. I still stroll around and do what I want when I want to. Barring nuclear war, the FBI will never be "shut down".
There is no me. There is no you. There is all. There is no you. There is no me. And that is all. A profound acceptance of an enormous pageantry. A haunting certainty that the unifying principle of this universe is love. -- Propagandhi
User avatar
82_28
 
Posts: 11194
Joined: Fri Nov 30, 2007 4:34 am
Location: North of Queen Anne
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby zangtang » Tue Sep 16, 2014 3:58 pm

'truth-seeking info-warrior freedom fighter single-handedly and painstakingly collates all known cases and incidents of FBI corruption collusion and
all-round nasty shittiness into one power-packed continental-wide 'stick-it-to-the-man' indictment and bugger me, deep-six shitcans
the entire federal law enforcement behemoth in its tracks in what is surely an wholly unprecedented herogasm-tastic starts to fade at the end..............................................
zangtang
 
Posts: 1247
Joined: Fri Jun 10, 2005 2:13 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby fruhmenschen » Tue Sep 16, 2014 4:28 pm

I was looking for the expression
cognitive dissonance
which came after posting this
thought I saw previous material
on this site re: CD
Also realized this post would be a shit magnet
and I would get busted for being...you
guessed it ...a CD errrrrrrr
ugh


Please help bring agnosticism to

http://ldsfreedomforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=28268


I think we got the essence of something festering here
Let's get out our 3 D printer and replicate it,eh?
fruhmenschen
 
Posts: 5712
Joined: Thu Aug 12, 2010 7:46 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby MacCruiskeen » Tue Sep 16, 2014 4:41 pm

fruhmenschen wrote:How do we shut down the FBI?


That worthy task will only be accomplished when the entire front page of the RI discussion board consists of further minor variations on your question. In other words, we can now be confident that the FBI will be shut down within days.

Some humble suggestions for those world-changing thread-titles:

O how I wish I could shut down the FBI

Let's all shut down the FBI together

George Orwell would shut down the FBI

The FBI needs a haircut and a shave

Blogging is behavior that can shut down the FBI

Help me make up more FBI thread-titles

Fuck the FBI

FBIDS: FBI Delusional Syndrome

The FBI poisoned my cat

101 Uses For A Dead FBI


...

- Continue ad libitum, then get out the flags and bunting.
"Ich kann gar nicht so viel fressen, wie ich kotzen möchte." - Max Liebermann,, Berlin, 1933

"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts." - Richard Feynman, NYC, 1966

TESTDEMIC ➝ "CASE"DEMIC
User avatar
MacCruiskeen
 
Posts: 10558
Joined: Thu Nov 16, 2006 6:47 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby fruhmenschen » Tue Sep 16, 2014 10:17 pm

MacCruiskeen » Tue Sep 16, 2014 4:41 pm wrote:
fruhmenschen wrote:How do we shut down the FBI?


That worthy task will only be accomplished when the entire front page of the RI discussion board consists of further minor variations on your question. In other words, we can now be confident that the FBI will be shut down within days.

Some humble suggestions for those world-changing thread-titles:

O how I wish I could shut down the FBI

Let's all shut down the FBI together

George Orwell would shut down the FBI

The FBI needs a haircut and a shave

Blogging is behavior that can shut down the FBI

Help me make up more FBI thread-titles

Fuck the FBI

FBIDS: FBI Delusional Syndrome

The FBI poisoned my cat

101 Uses For A Dead FBI


...


http://justsecurity.org/15018/justice-d ... veillance/



Justice Department Proposal Would Massively Expand FBI Extraterritorial Surveillance
By Ahmed Ghappour
Tuesday, September 16, 2014 at 9:10 AM


A Department of Justice proposal to amend Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would make it easier for domestic law enforcement to hack into computers of people attempting to protect their anonymity on the Internet. The DOJ has explicitly stated that the amendment is not meant to give courts the power to issue warrants that authorize searches in foreign countries—but the practical reality of the underlying technology means doing so is almost unavoidable.

The result? Possibly the broadest expansion of extraterritorial surveillance power since the FBI’s inception.

This post highlights key issues raised by the international aspect of the DOJ proposal, in the attempt to encourage wider public debate before the FBI is granted such expansive powers.

The FBI brand of hacking: Network Investigative Techniques.

Broadly, the term “Network Investigative Techniques,” (NIT) describes a method of surveillance that entails “hacking,” or the remote access of a computer to install malicious software without the knowledge or permission of the owner/operator. Once installed, malware controls the target computer.

The right Network Investigative Technique can cause a computer to perform any task the computer is capable of—covertly upload files, photographs and stored e-mails to an FBI controlled server, use a computer’s camera or microphone to gather images and sound at any time the FBI chooses, or even take over computers which associate with the target (e.g. by accessing a website hosted on a server the FBI secretly controls and has programmed to infect any computer that accesses it).

Network Investigative Techniques are especially handy in the pursuit of targets on the anonymous Internet—defined for the purposes of this post as those using Tor, a popular and robust privacy software, in order to obscure their location (and other identifying information), and to utilize so-called “hidden” websites on servers whose physical locations are theoretically untraceable.

Since Network Investigative Techniques work by sending surveillance software over the Internet (at 9), the physical location of the target computer is not essential to the execution of the search. Indeed, the DOJ proposal is justified as the only reasonable way to confront the use of anonymizing software, “because the target of the search has deliberately disguised the location of the media or information to be searched.” (at 9).

The DOJ Proposal

The proposed amendment addresses a jurisdictional limitation in the current version of Rule 41(b)(1) that prevents a judge from issuing a warrant unless the target is known to be located within her district.

The proposed amendment addresses a jurisdictional limitation in the current version of Rule 41(b)(1) that prevents a judge from issuing a warrant unless the target is known to be located within her district.

(6) a magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored information located within or outside of that district if (A) the district where the media or information is located has been concealed through technological means F.R.Cr.P. Rule 41(b)(6)(A) (proposed) (emphasis added).

The amendment mirrors language setting out the jurisdictional scope of terrorism investigations under Rule 41(b)(3) (emphasized above), but applies to investigations for general crimes:

“The Department’s proposal is intended to clarify that the issuance of such a warrant is proper in other criminal investigations as well” Jonathan J. Wroblewski, director of the Department Justice’s Office of Policy and Legislation, in a memo to the chair of the subcommittee considering the rule change. (at 179).

As for extraterritorial hacking, the DOJ commentary explicitly states that the proposal does not seek power to extend search authority beyond the United States:

In light of the presumption against international extraterritorial application, and consistent with the existing language of Rule 41(b)(3), this amendment does not purport to authorize courts to issue warrants that authorize the search of electronic storage media located in a foreign country or countries. AUSA Mythili Raman, Letter to Committee.

Yet the commentary also articulates a standard of searches that “are within the United States or where the location of the electronic media is unknown.”

Under this proposed amendment, law enforcement could seek a warrant either where the electronic media to be searched are within the United States or where the location of the electronic media is unknown. In the latter case, should the media searched prove to be outside the United States, the warrant would have no extraterritorial effect, but the existence of the warrant would support the reasonableness of the search. AUSA Mythili Raman, Letter to Committee (emphasis added).

The latter standard seems to be a significant loophole in the DOJ’s own formulation of the approach, particularly given the global nature of the Internet. For instance, over 85% of computers directly connecting to the Tor network are located outside the United States. And since (according to the DOJ) each computer’s “unknown location” is virtually indistinguishable from the next, any law enforcement target pursued under this provision of the amendment may be located overseas.

When the FBI finds itself abroad.

The FBI’s extraterritorial authority is nothing new. Indeed, the agency’s extraterritorial responsibilities date back to the mid-1980′s when Congress first passed laws authorizing the FBI to exercise federal jurisdiction overseas when a U.S. national is murdered, assaulted, or taken hostage by terrorists.

The FBI’s extraterritorial activities have generally fallen in line with customary international law, where it is considered an invasion of sovereignty for one country to carry out law enforcement activities within another country without that country’s consent. To that end, the FBI avoids acting unilaterally—relying instead on the United States’ diplomatic relations with other countries and the applicability of any treaties, seeking permission from the host country before deploying personnel, and requesting assistance from local authorities when possible.

Radical departures from current policy.

The DOJ proposal will result in significant departures from the FBI’s customary practice abroad: overseas cyber operations will be unilateral and invasive; they will not be limited to matters of national security; nor will they be executed with the consent of the host country, or any meaningful coordination with the Department of State or other relevant agency.

Under the DOJ’s proposal, unilateral state action will be the rule, not the exception, in the event an anonymous target “prove[s] to be outside the United States.” The reason is simple: without knowing the target location before the fact, there is no way to provide notice (or obtain consent from) a host country until after its sovereignty has been encroached.

Without advanced knowledge of the host country, law enforcement will not be able to adequately avail itself to protocols currently in place to facilitate foreign relations. For example, the FBI will not be able to coordinate with the Department of State before launching a Network Investigative Technique. This puts the U.S. in a position where a law enforcement entity encroaches on the territorial sovereignty of foreign states without coordination with the agency in charge of its foreign relations.

The encroachments that result will be public—bound to arise in the event of a criminal trial. In 2002, for example, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) filed criminal charges against an FBI agent for “illegally accessing” servers in Chelyabinsk, Russia in order to seize evidence against Russian hackers later used in their criminal trial. The FSB was tipped off to the fact when the defendants were indicted in Seattle, Washington.

Reportedly, an FBI press release stated that this was “the first FBI case to ever utilize the technique of extraterritorial seizure of digital evidence.” The FBI accessed the overseas server through the web, using login information it obtained from a suspect in custody.

The next accidental cyber war?

When a state’s sovereignty is encroached upon, its response depends on the nature and intensity of the encroachment. In the context of cyberspace, states (including the United States) have asserted sovereignty over their cyber infrastructure, despite the fact that cyberspace as a whole, much like the high seas or outer space, is considered a “global common” under international law.

To be sure, the FBI’s known arsenal of Network Investigative Techniques, if executed properly, do not rise to the level of a cyber “armed attack”—as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter—for which a use of (cyber or kinetic) force in response would be permissible. Doing so would require the attack be reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects of a significant scale. Forceful responses to cyber attacks below that threshold are only permissible with UN Security Council authorization.

As a general matter, there are no prohibitions on cyber espionage (clandestine information gathering by one state from the territory of another) in international law. Perhaps, then, law enforcement hacking (as with other forms of espionage by organs of the State) will be regulated by the violated state’s domestic criminal law, counterespionage, or other countermeasures. Given the public nature of the U.S. criminal justice system, it is hard to see how the FBI will avoid risk of prosecution (similar to that in the Chelyabinsk incident) if the DOJ proposal is approved.

Too fast too soon.

In light of the above, I would be hesitant to amend Rule 41 at this time without first having a thorough discussion of the potentially far-reaching consequences of the change. The technologies involved are rapidly developing and poorly understood, as are the existing international legal norms that apply to them. It is critical that these issues be approached with comprehensive deliberation (between technologists, policy makers and lawyers) that looks beyond the operational frame.

Nonetheless, if we do amend the Rule, we should certainly take steps to minimize the encroachment on other states’ sovereignty, leaving open the possibility for diplomatic overtures. To that end, the Rule should require Network Investigative Techniques to return only country information at first, prompting the executing FBI agent to utilize the appropriate protocols and institutional devices.

The Rule should also insure that Network Investigative Techniques are used sparingly and only when necessary by requiring a showing similar to that required by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, namely, that less intrusive investigative methods have failed or are reasonably unlikely to succeed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)). Another way to do this might be to narrow the class of potential targets, from targets whose location is “concealed through technological means” to those whose location is not “reasonably ascertainable” by less invasive means.

The Rule should also limit the range of hacking capabilities it authorizes. “Remote access” should be limited to the use of constitutionally permissible methods of law enforcement trickery and deception that result in target-initiated access (e.g., requiring the target to click a link contained within a deceptive email in order to initiate delivery and installation of malware). “Search” capabilities should be limited to monitoring and duplication of data on the target (e.g., copying a hard drive or monitoring keystrokes).

The Rule should not authorize drive-by-downloads that infect every computer that associates with a particular webpage, the use of weaponized software exploits in order to establish “remote access” of a target computer, or deployment methods that risk indiscriminately infecting computer systems along the way to the target. Nor should the Rule authorize a “search” method that requires taking control of peripheral devices (such as a camera or microphone).

There are other suggestions, of course. As it stands, the proposed amendment allows the FBI to use a wide array of invasive (and potentially destructive) hacking techniques where it may not be necessary to do so, against a broad pool of potential targets that could be located virtually anywhere.

The public has until Feb. 17, 2015, to comment on the preliminary draft.

Filed Under: Executive & Military, Surveillance
About the Author

Ahmed Ghappour is a Visiting Professor at UC Hastings College of the Law and Director of the Liberty, Security and Technology Clinic where he litigates constitutional issues that arise in espionage, cybersecurity and counterterrorism prosecutions. Follow him on Twitter (@ghappour).
fruhmenschen
 
Posts: 5712
Joined: Thu Aug 12, 2010 7:46 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby norton ash » Wed Sep 17, 2014 11:54 am

MacCruiskeen is a policeman, after all. And a Glaswegian. Who lives in fucking Germany. So he's likely a doss fucking cunt. :angelwings:
Zen horse
User avatar
norton ash
 
Posts: 4067
Joined: Wed Nov 08, 2006 5:46 pm
Location: Canada
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby MacCruiskeen » Wed Sep 17, 2014 12:40 pm

norton ash » Wed Sep 17, 2014 10:54 am wrote:MacCruiskeen is a policeman, after all. And a Glaswegian. Who lives in fucking Germany. So he's likely a doss fucking cunt. :angelwings:


Step this way, sir, if you don't mind. Now blow into this.
"Ich kann gar nicht so viel fressen, wie ich kotzen möchte." - Max Liebermann,, Berlin, 1933

"Science is the belief in the ignorance of experts." - Richard Feynman, NYC, 1966

TESTDEMIC ➝ "CASE"DEMIC
User avatar
MacCruiskeen
 
Posts: 10558
Joined: Thu Nov 16, 2006 6:47 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby norton ash » Wed Sep 17, 2014 12:51 pm

I will always love you. And I will blame this song on your unholy alliance with the Swiss.

Zen horse
User avatar
norton ash
 
Posts: 4067
Joined: Wed Nov 08, 2006 5:46 pm
Location: Canada
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby fruhmenschen » Sun Sep 21, 2014 2:16 pm

see link for all the documents
site is to large to copy


google title if FBI agents change link

https://sites.google.com/site/cointelpr ... ther-party


COINTELPRO Docs

The FBI's Covert Action Program to Destroy the Black Panther Party

AUTHOR: US Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities ("Church Committee")
TITLE: Final Report - Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans
DATE: 23 April 1976
PAGES: 185-223
TRANSCRIBED BY: Paul Wolf
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

A. The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and Other Well-Armed, Potentially Violent Organizations

1. The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and the United Slaves (US), Inc.

2. The Effort To Promote Violence Between the Blackstone Rangers and the Black Panther Party

B. The Effort To Disrupt the Black Panther Party by Promoting Internal Dissension

1. General Efforts to Disrupt the Black Panther Party Membership

2. FBI Role in the Newton-Cleaver Rift

C. Covert Efforts To Undermine Support of the Black Panther Party and to Destroy the Party's Public Image

1. Efforts To Discourage and To Discredit Supporters of the Black Panthers

2. Efforts To Promote Criticism of the Black Panthers in the Mass Media and To Prevent the Black Panther Party and Its Sympathizers from Expressing Their Views

D. Cooperation Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Local Police Departments in Disrupting the Black Panther Party
↩ INTRODUCTION

In August 1967, the FBI initiated a covert action program -- COINTELPRO -- to disrupt and "neutralize" organizations which the Bureau characterized as "Black Nationalist Hate Groups." [1] The FBI memorandum expanding the program described its goals as:

1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist groups....

2. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and electrify the militant nationalist movement ... Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position....

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups....

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them....

5. . . . prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. [2]

The targets of this nationwide program to disrupt "militant black nationalist organizations" included groups such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), and the Nation of Islam (NOI). It was expressly directed against such leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokley Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Maxwell Stanford, and Elijah Muhammad.

The Black Panther Party (BPP) was not among the original "Black Nationalist" targets. In September 1968, however, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover described the Panthers as:

"the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.

"Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the teaching of Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, its members have perpetrated numerous assaults on police officers and have engaged in violent confrontations with police throughout the country. Leaders and representatives of the Black Panther Party travel extensively all over the, United States preaching their gospel of hate and violence not only to ghetto residents, but to students in colleges, universities and high schools is well." [3]

By July 1969, the Black Panthers had become the primary focus of the program, and was ultimately the target of 233 of the total authorized "Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO actions. [4]

Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau's COINTELPRO tactics was to prevent violence, some of the FBI's tactics against the BPP were clearly intended to foster violence, and many others could reasonably have been expected to cause violence. For example, the FBI's efforts to "intensify the degree of animosity" between the BPP and the Blackstone Rangers, a Chicago street gang, included sending an anonymous letter to the gang's leader falsely informing him that the the Chicago Panthers had "a hit out" on him. [5] The stated intent of the letter was to induce the Ranger leader to "take reprisals against" the Panther leadership. [6]

Similarly, in Southern California, the FBI launched a covert effort to "create further dissension in the ranks of the BPP." [7] This effort included mailing anonymous letters and caricatures to BPP members ridiculing the local and national BPP leadership for the express purpose of exacerbating an existing "gang war" between the BPP and an organization called the United Slaves (US). This "gang war" resulted in the killing of four BPP members by members of US and in numerous beatings and shootings. Although individual incidents in this dispute cannot be directly traced to efforts by the FBI, FBI officials were clearly aware of the violent nature of the dispute, engaged in actions which they hoped would prolong and intensify the dispute, and proudly claimed credit for violent clashes between the rival factions which. in the words of one FBI official, resulted in "shootings, beatings, and a high degree of unrest in the area of southeast San Diego." [8]

James Adams, Deputy Associate Director of the FBI's Intelligence Division, told the Committee:

None of our programs have contemplated violence, and the instructions prohibit it, and the record of turndowns of recommended actions in some instances specifically say that we do not approve this action because if we take it it could result in harm to the individual. [9]

But the Committee's record suggests otherwise. For example, in May 1970, after US organization members had already killed four BPP members, the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles FBI office wrote to FBI headquarters:

Information received from local sources indicate that, in general, the membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physically afraid of US members and take premeditated precautions to avoid confrontations.

In view of their anxieties, it is not presently felt that the Los Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in an internecine struggle between the two organizations. . . .

The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US Inc. will be appropriately and discreetly advised of the time and location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be brought together and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due course. [Emphasis added.] [10]

This report focuses solely on the FBI's counterintelligence program to disrupt and "neutralize" the Black Panther Party. It does not examine the reasonableness of the basis for the FBI's investigation of the BPP or seek to justify either the
fruhmenschen
 
Posts: 5712
Joined: Thu Aug 12, 2010 7:46 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby fruhmenschen » Wed Sep 24, 2014 11:12 pm

Blurry Street by Thomas Hawk
Documents in ACLU Case Reveal More Detail on FBI Attempt to Cover Up Stingray Technology
09/24/2014

Print
Email
RSS
Facebook
Twitter
See more sharing options

Stingray tracking devices
By Nathan Freed Wessler, Staff Attorney, ACLU Speech, Privacy & Technology Project at 11:46am

What is used by dozens of local law enforcement agencies around the country, featured in numerous news stories, and discussed in court, yet treated by the FBI like it is top secret? That would be "Stingray" cell phone surveillance gear, of course.

This week, MuckRock released a mostly redacted copy of the nondisclosure agreement that the FBI makes local police departments sign before they are permitted to buy a Stingray from the Florida-based Harris Corporation. We have seen the FBI pressure local law enforcement agencies to withhold basic information about purchase and use of Stingrays before, but now we have greater insight into how it does so.

According to the agreement, released by the Tacoma, Washington, Police Department, the Harris Corporation notifies the FBI whenever a local police department wants to buy a Stingray, and then the FBI requires the local agency to sign a lengthy nondisclosure agreement before buying the device. The FBI's role in the process is a condition of the Federal Communication Commission's equipment authorization issued to the Harris Corporation.

The result is that members of the public, judges, and defense attorneys are denied basic information about local cops' use of invasive surveillance gear that can sweep up sensitive location data about hundreds of peoples' cell phones. For example, when we sought information about Stingrays from the Brevard County, Florida, Sheriff's Office, they cited a non-disclosure agreement with a "federal agency" as a basis for withholding all records. When the ACLU of Arizona sued the Tucson Police Department for Stingray records, an FBI agent submitted a declaration invoking the FBI nondisclosure agreement as a reason to keep information secret.

In fact, the FBI agent's declaration in the Arizona case quotes extensively from the nondisclosure agreement, thus filling in some of the text blacked out in the Tacoma document. The Tacoma Police Department can't redact text from an FBI document that the FBI has already disclosed in court proceedings.

According to the Arizona declaration, the nondisclosure agreement states that:

Disclosing the existence of and the capabilities provided by [cell site simulator equipment] to the public would reveal sensitive technological capabilities possessed by the law enforcement community and may allow individuals who are the subject of investigation…to employ countermeasures to avoid detection by law enforcement.

Therefore, "any information" about Stingrays "shall be protected from potential compromise by precluding disclosure…to the public."

Extensive information about Stingray devices and other forms of cell phone tracking is already in the public domain. Withholding basic data about how Stingrays are used, what rules govern their use, how the privacy of innocent bystanders is protected, and whether police are getting probable cause warrants from judges doesn't keep us any safer. It only functions to subvert our right to keep tabs on what our government is up to. This kind of secrecy allows the government to keep constitutional violations hidden in the shadows.

In the midst of the government's excessive secrecy, the ACLU continues to push for transparency and reform. On Monday, the ACLU of Florida filed a motion to unseal applications submitted by the Sarasota Police Department seeking court orders authorizing Stingray use, as well as the resulting orders. Those records had originally been taken from the court by the police and kept in the police station—an unusual and illegal practice—and then, incredibly, spirited away by the U.S. Marshals Service when the ACLU filed a public records request. A judge subsequently instructed the government to deposit sealed copies of the applications and orders back with the court. We are asking for them to be made public.

And in Texas, the ACLU's Chris Soghoian testified at the state legislature about Stingrays and other police surveillance tactics, prompting one local paper to dig into the Houston Police Department's purchase of hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of Stingray equipment.

As demonstrated by our interactive map of police Stingray purchases across the country, more information about Stingray surveillance is becoming public by the week. Yet, the FBI and local police departments keep trying to hide the ball. The public deserves to know whether the police are violating the Constitution. Secrecy agreements with federal agencies shouldn't be used to circumvent open records laws, or hide facts that are already in the news.
fruhmenschen
 
Posts: 5712
Joined: Thu Aug 12, 2010 7:46 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby fruhmenschen » Fri Sep 26, 2014 10:57 pm

two stories



1st



http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/column/98 ... g-america/



The FBI: Honor, Leadership, Protecting America
By Vincent J. Bove | September 26, 2014


FBI SWAT team member (Photo Courtesy FBI)
Vincent J. Bove receiving award from Special Agent in Charge Aaron T. Ford of the Newark Division. Bove was the keynote speaker at the division’s Sept. 17, 2014 leadership retreat. (John F. Baroud)

Vincent J. Bove receiving award from Special Agent in Charge Aaron T. Ford of the Newark Division. Bove was the keynote speaker at the division’s Sept. 17, 2014 leadership retreat. (John F. Baroud)
FBI Washington Field Office Evidence Response Team Vehicle (Courtesy FBI)

FBI Washington Field Office Evidence Response Team Vehicle (Courtesy FBI)
Vincent J. Bove receiving the FBI Community Leadership Award for his violence prevention initiatives on Oct. 30, 2007. Bove is accompanied by local, county, and federal law enforcement officials. (Courtesy Vincent J. Bove)

Vincent J. Bove receiving the FBI Community Leadership Award for his violence prevention initiatives on Oct. 30, 2007. Bove is accompanied by local, county, and federal law enforcement officials. (Courtesy Vincent J. Bove)
FBI training initiative. (Courtesy FBI)

FBI training initiative. (Courtesy FBI)

As the United States of America—with allies against militant extremists—strikes targets in Iraq and Syria, all in America must remain vigilant here in our homeland.

Vigilance is critical to protecting America as the current state of affairs includes extremists calling for attacks against civilians and soft targets. Security concerns are intensified and all who love America, freedom, democracy, and liberty must collaborate to safeguard the nation.

Citizens and law enforcement all must have our eyes wide open to potential dangers that threaten innocent people and our way of life. We must never take for granted the privileges of a dinner out, a trip to visit loved ones, or a day with coworkers—life can change in a heartbeat. An abundance of caution is the order of the day—suspicious activities must immediately be reported to authorities. We must expect the unexpected and remain vigilant.

Apathy, indifference, or negligence with respect to current events is not acceptable. Acts of terror are preventable. Innocent lives, as well as the morale of America are at stake. There is no room for failure, for even one act of terror can be catastrophic and every life is sacred. The world has changed and all of us must have a terrorism awareness and prevention mindset.

As the darkness of evil intentions unfolds, America must remain vigilant, collaborative, and courageous.
4 Things IT Managers Need to Know
4 Things IT Managers Need to Know
Promoted by IBM
The FBI: Protecting America

The top priority of the FBI is protecting America from terrorist attacks. This mission is only possible through collaboration with law enforcement partners nationally and worldwide.

Extremist networks, lone wolfs, and terrorist sympathizers can be neutralized and dismantled through the investigative and intelligence resources of the FBI. But this is only possible with public-private collaboration.

As documented on the FBI website, the scope of FBI operations and collaborative efforts includes:

Joint Terrorism Task Forces
National Counterterrorism Center
Public Internet Tip Line
Terrorist Explosives Device Analytical Center
Terrorist Screening Center
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Strategic Command Center
Terrorist Financing Operations Section
Terrorism Fly Team

FBI Model: Leadership Retreat

In my travels throughout America since 1999, I have highlighted leadership, vigilance, and collaboration as central to my mission of character development, violence prevention, and crisis planning.

These principles have been shared at hundreds of presentations and with many published works and FBI initiatives.

But in my opinion, the seriousness of what these principles signify has never been so important as at this very moment in America’s history.

On Sept. 17, I was privileged to conduct a keynote for the FBI Newark Division Management Retreat. This retreat was made possible through the leadership of the division’s Special Agent in Charge Aaron T. Ford.

Aside from the remarkable motivational and educational aspects of the event, this retreat is a model not only for other FBI divisions but also for all law enforcement agencies as it builds leadership, morale, and partnerships.

During my keynote speech, “The FBI: Honor, Leadership, America,” I used the metaphor of a catastrophic head-on collision train wreck to punctuate the nation’s crisis of leadership and culture of violence. As highlighted with a graphic slide presentation, this violence includes not only domestic, school, and workplace violence, but also acts of terror as demonstrated by the 9/11 and Boston Marathon attacks.

My keynote followed a patriotic leadership presentation by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Caslen Jr., superintendent of West Point. Caslen highlighted that the “Duty, Honor, Country” motto of the United States Military Academy was applicable to all because throughout the nation, even in the military, there is a crisis of leadership. I complemented Caslen’s thoughts by encouraging the FBI to live the principles of “Honor, Leadership, America.”

The FBI and all dedicated to protecting America must be appreciated and their efforts supported. Each of us must work collaboratively and continually enhance our own level of vigilance to protect our homeland and reawaken the nation




2nd


see link for full story


http://m.sltrib.com/sltrib/mobile3/5833 ... g.html.csp



FBI to probe tampering claims in OKC bombing records case
Courts » Witness denies being threatened in Oklahoma City case, but plaintiff alleges the man was told to “stand down.”

Aug 25 2014 05:13 pm




Lawyer Jesse Trentadue seeks documents and videotapes from the FBI probe of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing ó he believes the records will provide information about the death of his brother, Kenneth Trentadue, in a federal prison.

A federal judge on Monday ordered the FBI to investigate an allegation of witness tampering in a July trial on Utah attorney Jesse Trentadue’s lawsuit seeking Oklahoma City bombing records.

U.S. District Judge Clark Waddoups — who rejected arguments by an attorney for the FBI that an email from witness John Matthews declaring that he was never threatened settles the matter — scheduled a Nov. 13 hearing to hear testimony on the allegation, which he said goes to the integrity of the court process.

"I would like very much to have all this resolved," Waddoups said.

The trial focused on whether the FBI has done an adequate search for bombing records requested by Trentadue under the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). On the second day of trial, Trentadue said he had just learned Matthews was backing out of testifying.

According to court documents, Matthews planned to testify that he believed the FBI was monitoring bomber Timothy McVeigh in the run up to the 1995 detonation at the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City — information that Trentadue believes the agency wants to suppress.

Trentadue, a Salt Lake City attorney, alleges that Matthews — who he describes as a former undercover operative for the government — was threatened by the FBI with the loss of his disability and other veteran benefits if he took the stand, and told that he should get a case of the "I-don’t-remembers" if he did testify.

Matthews — who has said he is very ill from exposure to toxic chemicals while serving with the Marines in Vietnam — was contacted numerous times by the agency and also talked to his former "handler," who is now retired from the FBI, Trentadue says.

Both Trentadue and Roger Charles, a freelance journalist and investigator, have submitted written statements saying that when they called Matthews during the four-day trial to discuss his absence, the man said he had been threatened by the FBI.

But Department of Justice attorney Kathryn Wyer, who represents the FBI, denies any coercion.

After Waddoups directed the DOJ lawyers in July to look into the allegation, Wyer reported that Matthews had called FBI’s Salt Lake City office asking how he could get out of testifying and an agent told him he should obey a valid subpoena.

On Monday, Wyer acknowledged that Matthews and Don Jarrett, his alleged former handler, were not contacted by DOJ lawyers as part of the witness tampering probe, and that no documentation of the alleged call from Matthews to the FBI was gathered.

Wyer argued that an email sent by Matthews on Aug. 2, after the trial had ended, was sufficient to show there was no tampering.

Matthews’ email — addressed to Wyer, another DOJ attorney, Jarrett, Trentadue and Charles — says: "I am sending you all this, for I want the record straight. I talk (sic) with Don Jarrett (he was my handler for the FBI and now a friend) about this court case. Like we both agree, I had nothing to do with the Oklahoma City Bombing or the tapes. I did not want to testify and I did not want to get caught in a crossfire with both sides. Seeing there was no subpoena I did not have to show up. If I took a trip no one could fine (sic) me to give a subpoena to."

Jarrett told Matthews to contact the FBI in Salt Lake City to inform the agency what he was going to do, Matthews said in his email message. It was his understanding, he wrote, that the agent who answered the phone was supposed to inform the court he was not going to testify.

Matthews also wrote, "NO ONE FROM THE FBI OR DOJ HAS MADE ANY THREATS TO ME OR MY FAMILY."

Trentadue pointed out that Matthews had agreed to testify voluntarily and there was no subpoena. And he said Matthews had told Charles the day before he was to testify that the FBI had told him "to stand down," which he believes influenced his decision against taking the stand.

Trentadue filed suit in 2008 seeking bombing records from the FBI and CIA, which since has been dropped as a defendant. He believes the records will provide information about his brother’s death in a federal prison in Oklahoma City a few months after the April 19, 1995, bombing that killed 168 people.

The death of Kenneth Trentadue was ruled a suicide, but his family believes he was mistaken for a bombing conspirator and killed in an interrogation that got out of hand. Federal officials deny the allegation.

Waddoups has taken the FOIA trial case under consideration and will issue a ruling later.

Trentadue is asking for an order allowing him to search for tapes and documents at FBI locations, including field offices in Oklahoma City and Los Angeles, and requiring the bureau to produce the records he requested, including a videotape of the detonation. The FBI says it spent weeks searching its massive bombing investigation archive and that it has no tape of the explosion or the other requested materials that Trentadue claims are being withheld.
fruhmenschen
 
Posts: 5712
Joined: Thu Aug 12, 2010 7:46 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Re: How do we shut down the FBI?

Postby fruhmenschen » Mon Sep 29, 2014 10:21 pm

Mayor Menino is a made member of the Boston FBI Crime Family.


Ex-Mayor Meninio's new book "Mayor for a New America"

Monday, September 29, 2014


http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinio ... in_wake_of


Former Mayor Thomas M. Menino says the FBI dragged its feet on releasing videos of the suspected Marathon bombers in the days after the horrific terrorist attacks, such that he “silently vowed” to go to President Obama if the feds waited any longer, he says in his new book about his 20 years in office.

“Mayor for a New America,” penned by Menino with WBUR analyst Jack Beatty and due out Oct. 14, devotes its introduction to the April 15, 2013, bombings when Menino, in a wheelchair, checked out of the hospital to address the city hours after the deadly blasts on Boylston Street.

Menino said his “feelings are mixed” about the FBI, noting their commitment to catching the bombers but also what he said was “caution (that) seemed motivated by a fear of making a mistake.” Agents had footage of the suspected bombers by late Wednesday but were “resisting pressure” to release the images, fearing the bombers could show up at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross on Thursday when President Obama was scheduled to speak.

“I hope that risky plan wasn’t the only reason the FBI was reluctant to share the tapes,” Menino writes, adding he sought to “notch up the pressure” when he mentioned the surveillance footage in a CNN interview.

“I silently vowed to appeal to the president if the bureau didn’t budge,” Menino wrote. “On Thursday afternoon, it budged.”

Menino also calls the controversial shelter-in-place order given by Gov. Deval Patrick that Friday as police hunted a suspect an “overreaction.”

“Absent shelter-in-place, (Watertown boat owner David) Henneberry might have discovered Dzhokhar Tsarnaev earlier,” Menino said.

The book’s behind-the-scenes looks reveal a man who embraces his image as an iron hand ruling the city he loves:

• When he learned a “senior” City Hall staffer was supporting Mitt Romney for Senate in 1994, he ordered him to a traffic circle to hold a “Kennedy for Senate” sign all day.

• On criticisms he micro-managed the Boston Redevelopment Authority: “BRA directors can get lulled into thinking they head an independent agency. ... I never relaxed my grip.” He said donations from preferred developers did not determine his decisions. “They were one among many factors.”

• Menino also devotes a large chunk of one chapter to his running battles with the police and fire unions, which nearly upended the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston.

“I lucked out on the timing,” he writes of an August 2001 contract agreement. “After 9/11, I couldn’t have denied anything to our firefighters”

Of his style, Menino said, “I’ve been labeled ‘an increm
fruhmenschen
 
Posts: 5712
Joined: Thu Aug 12, 2010 7:46 pm
Blog: View Blog (0)

Next

Return to General Discussion

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: No registered users and 41 guests