Out of all the information I've found (a dot here, a dot there), the most significant, in my opinion, are the clues to Kissinger's modus operadi. Christopher Hitchens (yet another very informative source who only goes so far and then stops), in his Harper's article
The Case Against Henry Kissinger describes exactly how Henry Kissinger maneuvered himself into the White House, from which position he was able to literally take over the United States foreign policy and concentrate such awesome power in his hands alone.
He tells us about the run-up to the hotly contested 1968 presidential elections between Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon, when Kissinger had already managed to ingratiate himself as an insider with all three camps: President Johnson's administration, in which Kissinger had used his contact with informants in Vietnam to embed himself as a trusted advisor and go-between with the Vietnamese, the Humphrey camp, by offering to turn over Nelson Rockefeller's secret files on Nixon to Humphrey's close advisor Samuel Huntington ("
I've hated Nixon for years," he confessed to Brzezinski, another close Humphrey advisor), and the Nixon camp, by leaking extremely sensitive information to Nixon about the peace negotiations with the Vietnamese, along with specific tips on how to sabotage them. In other words, all three were deliberately led to believe that Kissinger was "theirs".
As a result, when Nixon won the close elections, his very first appointment was of Kissinger, as a National Security Adviser.
...when he made this choice Richard Nixon had only once, briefly and awkwardly, met Henry Kissinger in person. He clearly formed his estimate of the man's abilities from more persuasive experience than that. "One factor that had most convinced me of Kissinger's credibility," wrote Nixon later in his own delicious prose, "was the length to which he went to protect his secrecy."
That ghastly secret is now out. In the January 1969 issue of the Establishment house organ Foreign Affairs, published a few days after his appointment as Nixon's right-hand man, there appeared Henry Kissinger's own evaluation of the Vietnam negotiations. On every point of substance, he agreed with the line taken in Paris by the Johnson-Humphrey negotiators. One has to pause for an instant to comprehend the enormity of this. Kissinger had helped elect a man who had surreptitiously promised the South Vietnamese junta a better deal
than they would get from the Democrats. The Saigon authorities then acted, as Bundy ruefully confirms, as if they did indeed have a deal. This meant, in the words of a later Nixon slogan, "Four More Years." But four more years of an unwinnable and undeclared and murderous war, which was to spread before it burned out, and was to end on the same terms and conditions as had been on the table in the fall of 1968.
This was what it took to promote Henry Kissinger. To promote him from a mediocre and opportunistic academic to an international potentate. The signature qualities were there from the inaugural moment: the sycophancy and the duplicity; the power worship and the absence of scruple; the empty trading of old non-friends for new non-friends. And the distinctive effects were also present: the uncounted and expendable corpses; the official and unofficial lying about the cost; the heavy and pompous pseudo-indignation when unwelcome questions were asked. Kissinger's global career started as it meant to go on. It debauched the American republic and American democracy, and it levied a hideous toll of casualties on weaker and more vulnerable societies.
Link
Now that we know much more about how Henry Kissinger was able to manipulate the short-sightedness and greed of various conflicting "U.S. elites" to not only insinuate himself into the White House but literally take over the presidency and command of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy decisions, and even of America's global military forces, the only question that remains is, was he, as most analysts assume, serving only his own personal agenda?
Hitchens dismisses yet another clue about Kissinger's possibly central preoccupation, provided by Kissinger himself in his Memoir,
The White House Years:
The context is a meeting with General de Gaulle, in which the old warrior demanded to know by what right the Nixon Administration subjected Indochina to devastating bombardment. In his own account, Kissinger replies that "a sudden withdrawal might give us a credibility problem." (When asked "where?" Kissinger hazily proposed the Middle East.)
Page 12-13
Bottom line: if there is one constant in Kissinger's career, it is his uncanny ability to be all things to all people, particularly very greedy and power-hungry people, and persuading each that he is a willing lackey, before ultimately betraying and discarding them when they have outlived their usefulness. Exactly like the zionist state itself.
Most amazingly, although Kissinger has been called many things, including "a servant of power" the one label that is (very) rarely used to describe him is "zionist". In fact, even JackRiddler has repeated several times that Kissinger is not a zionist at all, and implied that even the idea smacks of 'anti-semitism'.
And yet, with the sole exception of the run-up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which, as I demonstrated in the OP, a closer look reveals to have served zionist interests incredibly well, it's hard to imagine how any single human being could have done more to fulfill Israel's hegemonic ambitions. Furthermore, he not only walks the walk, he even talks the talk. In the excerpt below from a 2004 interview with PBS, he sticks precisely to the classic zionist talking points in attributing the growing European grassroots solidarity with the Palestinians to: 1) insufficient concern about the Holocaust; 2) the 'misguided Left'; 3) "Islamic minorities" corrupting Western societies; 4) a lack of understanding that the Palestinian cause is about 'exterminating' the other side, and of course 5) 'anti-semitism':
Ben Wattenberg: Henry Kissinger, welcome to Think Tank. Let me go back to something if I might, because I have it here in my notes. We were talking about Europe. What do you think of this new wave of anti-Semitism? Is it real? Is it a press story? Is it uh...
Henry KISSINGER: No...
Ben WATTENBERG: Do you pick it up in your travels? What do you...?
KISSINGER: Well, it has a number of components. There’s a new generation. For them the Holocaust is not anything of their experience. Secondly, the media in most countries are more or less dominated by the traditional left, and the traditional left has sort of slid Israel into the position they had Vietnam in. And thirdly in many of these countries there are significant Islamic minorities who create temptations for politicians. And the current problems in the Israeli/Palestinian relations are then put through all these filters. You rarely read in Europe that Israel is after all the country about whose extermination the dispute is. Israel isn’t saying that the Arabs should disappear. The Israelis are sometimes, often, clumsy and not necessarily long-range statesmen. But this fundamental fact, that you have one side that wants to do away with the other, is not sufficiently recognized in Europe and there is undoubtedly now a worrisome anti-Semitic trend. ...
Ben WATTENBERG: You wrote in August of 2002, it is not true that the road to Baghdad leads through Jerusalem; much more likely the road to Jerusalem will lead through Baghdad. What does that mean?
Henry KISSINGER: First of all, what we had to do in Iraq was essentially independent of the Israeli/Palestinian issue. What we had to do in Iraq had to do with the international stability and the necessity of demonstrating in the region that to challenge the West, or at any rate the United States, had consequences that could not be controlled by the perpetrators. So, I also believed, and I think this will turn out to be correct, and has already partly turned out to be correct, that a demonstration of American determination in Iraq would change the perception of some Arab or Islamic countries and that change in perception in turn will influence other Islamic countries. We’ve already seen a different tone out of Libya, Syria and more or less out of Iran to some extent. So, in that sense, I believe the terrorist elements in the Palestinian Authority can be isolated. And even though I don’t say victory in Iraq automatically brings peace in Israel and Palestine, I think it contributes to a better atmosphere.
Ben WATTENBERG: The argument was made - I’d be curious to know your view - that this - I mean a Jewish conspiracy of neoconservatives to go into Iraq in order to help Israel. Is that um...
Henry KISSINGER: I have disagreed, as you’ve already pointed out, with some of the neoconservatives because many of them were around Senator Jackson.
Ben WATTENBERG: Like me. [laughing]
Henry KISSINGER: Like you. But it is not a Jewish conspiracy. Of course, many of them are pro-Israel, but that does not mean they would advocate an American war with a third country.
http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/transcript1139.html"If you're not careful the newspapers will have you hating the oppressed and loving the people doing the oppressing." - Malcolm X
