Moderators: Elvis, DrVolin, Jeff
Memorandum to President Kennedy from Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith on Vietnam, 4 April 1962
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 669-671
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington
April 7, 1962
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
The President has asked me to transmit to you for your comments the enclosed memorandum on the subject of Viet-Nam to the President from Ambassador J. K. Gaibraith dated April 4, 1962.
Sincerely
Michael V. Forrestal
Encl: Memo to Pres. from Amb. Gaibraith
April 4, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Viet-Nam
The following considerations influence our thinking on Viet-Nam:
1. We have a growing military commitment. This could expand step by step into a major, long-drawn out indecisive military involvement.
2. We are backing a weak and, on the record, ineffectual government and a leader who as a politician may be beyond the point of no return.
3. There is consequent danger we shall replace the French as the colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did.
4. The political effects of some of the measures which pacification requires or is believed to require, including the concentration of population, relocation of villages, and the burning of old villages, may be damaging to those and especially to Westerners associated with it.
5. We fear that at some point in the involvement there will be a major political outburst about the new Korea and the new war into which the Democrats as so often before have precipitated us.
6. It seems at least possible that the Soviets are not particularly desirous of trouble in this part of the world and that our military reaction with the need to fall back on Chinese protection may be causing concern in Hanoi.
In the light of the foregoing we urge the following:
1. That it be our policy to keep open the door for political solution. We should welcome as a solution any broadly based non-Communist government that is free from external interference. It should have the requisites for internal law and order. We should not require that it be militarily identified with the United States.
2. We shall find it useful in achieving this result if we seize any good opportunity to involve other countries and world opinion in settlement and its guarantee. This is a useful exposure and pressure on the Communist bloc countries and a useful antidote for the argument that this is a private American military adventure.
3. We should measurably reduce our commitment to the particular present leadership of the government of South Viet-Nam.
To accomplish the foregoing, we recommend the following specific steps:
1. In the next fortnight or so the ICC will present a report which we are confidentially advised will accuse North Viet-Nam of subversion and the Government of Viet-Nam in conjunction with the United States of not notifying the introduction of men and materiel as prescribed by the Geneva accords. We should respond by asking the co-chairmen to initiate steps to re-establish compliance with the Geneva accords. Pending specific recommendations, which might at some stage include a conference of signatories, we should demand a suspension of Viet Cong activity and agree to a standstill on an introduction of men and materiel.
2. Additionally, Governor Harriman should be instructed to approach the Russians to express our concern about the increasingly dangerous situation
that the Viet Cong is forcing in Southeast Asia. They should be told of our determination not to let the Viet Cong overthrow the present government while at the same time to look without relish on the dangers that this military build-up is causing in the area. The Soviets should be asked to ascertain whether Hanoi can and will call off the Viet Cong activity in return for phased American withdrawal, liberalization in the trade relations between the two parts of the country and general and non-specific agreement to talk about reunification after some period of tranquillity.
3. Alternatively, the Indians should be asked to make such an approach to Hanoi under the same terms of reference.
4. It must be recognized that our long-run position cannot involve an unconditional commitment to Diem. Our support is to non-Communist and progressively democratic government not to individuals. We cannot ourselves replace Diem. But we should be clear in our mind that almost any non-Communist change would probably be beneficial and this should be the guiding rule for our diplomatic representation in the area.
In the meantime policy should continue to be guided by the following:
1. We should resist all steps which commit American troops to combat action and impress upon all concerned the importance of keeping American forces out of actual combat commitment.
2. We should disassociate ourselves from action, however necessary, which seems to be directed at the villagers, such as the new concentration program. If the action is one that is peculiarly identified with Americans, such as defoliation, it should not be undertaken in the absence of most compelling reasons. Americans in their various roles should be as invisible as the situation permits.
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/p ... doc112.htm
# Show #606
Original airdate: November 29, 2012
Guest: Jim DiEugenio / Bill Simpich / John Armstrong
Topics: Destiny Betrayed / The Twelve Who Built The Oswald Legend / Harvey and Lee
Play Jim DiEugenio (1:20:07) MP3 download
# Discussion of Jim's newly updated Destiny Betrayed
# Kennedy's foreign policy ideas clashed with the National Security state
# Why he was killed, the establishment of the Cold War, the Dulles'
# Sullivan & Cromwell, it was about money, imperialism and colonialism
# Overthrow of foreign leaders, reneged on the Geneva Accords
# Cuba, Fulgencio Batista sold out the country to American interests
# Eisenhower and Dulles drove Castro into the arms of the Russians
# A study of Cuba, Phillips in 1959, recruiting Cubans, a government in exile
# Kennedy, third world nationalism, 1951 trip to Southeast Asia, Edmond Gullion
# Imperialism vs. nationalism, Operation Vulture, Sen. Kennedy letter on Indochina
# Kennedy's 1957 Algerian resolution, TIME, DEMOCRATS: Man Out Front
# As President, Kennedy begins to change foreign policy, Congo, Indonesia, Laos
# Assassination of Patrice Lumumba, Sukarno, Prouty on the case of Allen Pope
# November 1961, send troops to Vietnam? NSAM 111, Galbraith report
# The Bay of Pigs the transition, from an infiltration, to a strike force
# JFK was misled, Castro was alerted, no guerilla training, myth of the air strikes
# Dulles in 1965 admitted that the operation wouldn't succeed
# Kennedy would not commit naval or air power for an invasion
# Robert Leavitt, no accountability at the CIA, fire all the Dulles'
# Men still there, with allegiance to Dulles, not Kennedy
# Bay of Pigs and Dallas, de Torres, Phillips, Hunt, Morales, Angleton
# Operation 40, Prouty on the Forty Committee
# The title of Destiny Betrayed was chosen by the original publisher
http://www.blackopradio.com/pod/black606a.mp3
Hammer of Los wrote:...
Was Ira Einhorn ever associated with the release of any documents concerning electro magnetic influence of the organism?
...
1972 / Washington D.C.
Richard Nixon Thinks Big
Nixon: See, the attack in the North that we have in mind… power plants, whatever’s left—POL (petroleum), the docks…. And I still think we ought to take the dikes out now. Will that drown people?
Kissinger: About two hundred thousand people.
Nixon: No, no, no… I’d rather use the nuclear bomb. Have you got that, Henry?
Kissinger: That, I think, would just be too much.
Nixon: The nuclear bomb, does that bother you? I just want you to think big, Henry, for chrissakes. The only place where you and I disagree is with regard to the bombing. You’re so goddamned concerned about civilians, and I don’t give a damn. I don’t care.
Kissinger: I’m concerned about the civilians because I don’t want the world to be mobilized against you as a butcher.
From the Nixon White House tapes, recorded on April 25, 1972, made public by the National Archives on February 28, 2002.
http://www.laphamsquarterly.org/voices-in-time/richard-nixon-thinks-big.php
justdrew wrote:semper occultus wrote:that was Silent Weapons for Quiet WarsSilent Weapons for Quiet Wars, An Introduction Programming Manual was uncovered quite by accident on July 7, 1986 when an employee of Boeing Aircraft Co. purchased a surplus IBM copier for scrap parts at a sale, and discovered inside details of a plan, hatched in the embryonic days of the "Cold War" which called for control of the masses through manipulation of industry, peoples' pastimes, education and political leanings.
ah yes. that's it!
so these documents constitute somewhat the core cannon of conspiracy codices I guess?
Report from Iron Mountain
the Gemstone File
Silent Weapons for quiet wars
all are probably no more real than the protocols?
justdrew wrote:there was then a number of these types of documents put out. I guess it's an old game really, going way way back. but didn't the gemstone file come out a few years later? Is that the one that was supposedly found by some guy who bought a surplus copier?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemstone_File
ok, no. odd that that FactSheetFive guy is involved with promulgation of the Gemstone File in some way.
but anyone know what I might be dimly recollecting regarding the supposed finding of secret documents in a surplus copier?
Hammer of Los wrote:...
I keep thinking about Ira Einhorn.
...
justdrew wrote:justdrew wrote:semper occultus wrote:that was Silent Weapons for Quiet WarsSilent Weapons for Quiet Wars, An Introduction Programming Manual was uncovered quite by accident on July 7, 1986 when an employee of Boeing Aircraft Co. purchased a surplus IBM copier for scrap parts at a sale, and discovered inside details of a plan, hatched in the embryonic days of the "Cold War" which called for control of the masses through manipulation of industry, peoples' pastimes, education and political leanings.
ah yes. that's it!
so these documents constitute somewhat the core cannon of conspiracy codices I guess?
Report from Iron Mountain
the Gemstone File
Silent Weapons for quiet wars
all are probably no more real than the protocols?
The Torbitt document is fascinating. I am reading it (very slowly). I have JFK and the Unspeakable, thanks to this board. Wonderful and sad book. I have often wondered about Aei Onassis' incolvement in all this.
another of these types of things:
the Torbitt Document
http://the-torbitt-document.blogspot.com/
justdrew wrote:I'm not aware of what criticism there may be of the Torbitt document. Looking around for that.
Explosive Jackie O tapes ’reveal how she believed Lyndon B Johnson killed JFK
the torbitt document
by Kenn Thomas - July 20, 2001
Wombaticus Rex wrote:Angletonian, indeed.
Recommend Kerry Thornley's entertaining and probably fictional account of just such a Maestro -- a very compelling and educational portrait:
http://the-puzzle-palace.com/files/kerry.txt
Just a .txt file, but I'll be damned it if wasn't one the best things I read last year.
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