SVB not only did some horrific risk management, but there was also a big moral hazard at play.
Let me explain.
As a result of LCR regulation, banks all over the world have flushed their balance sheets with trillions of bonds.
Such a large amount of bonds on the balance sheet also comes with risks though, right?
Interest rate risk comes to mind: if you purchase Treasuries and yields rise, you lose money.
That’s why banks hedge (!) the lion share of the interest rate risk coming from their HQLA investments.
The problems with SVB?
SVB had a gigantic investment portfolio as a % of total assets at 57% (average US bank: 24%) and 78% was in Mortgage-Backed Securities (Citi or JPM: around 30%) and most importantly they DID NOT hedge interest rate risk at all!
The duration of their huge portfolio before and after interest rate hedges was…the same?!
Effectively, there were NO hedges.
This means SVB was not applying basic risk management practices, and exposing its investors and depositors to a gigantic amount of risk.
Economically speaking, a $120 bn bond portfolio with a 5.6y non-hedged duration means that every 10 bps move higher in 5-year interest rate lost the bank almost $700 million.
100 bps? $7 billion economic loss.
200 bps? $14 billion economic loss.
Basically the entire bank’s capital wiped out.
Can this only be the result of ignorance and mismanagement?
Well, consider these 3 interconnected points:
1. The outrageous use of accounting tricks
Booking bonds in HTM instead prevents gains/losses from showing up at all – convenient, right?
But you don’t book $90 billion of bonds in HTM by mistake or incompetence – this is moral hazard considering you are aware these bonds are unhedged.
2. Not hedging: just ignorance, you say?
In December 2021, SVB had about $10 billion of interest rate swaps.
Probably way too little to hedge the entire interest rate risk, but that’s not my point.
In their financial statement, they show a clear understanding of what these swaps are for.
Fast forward to December 2022, and basically ALL these hedges are gone - voluntarely taken off!
This is not just ignorance: a vast use of accounting tricks and a voluntary reduction of hedges.
3. That urge to stay away from tighter regulatory scrutiny…
The reason why SVB could get around with this terribly risky business model was its size.
You see, banks with assets below $250 billion are not subject to the tighter regulatory scrutiny like big banks.
Well, what’s wrong about that?
SVB isn’t the only bank with assets <$250 billion benefitting from this, right?
Yes, but would it help to know that SVB’s management repeatedly lobbied to increase the cap for lax regulatory scrutiny and conveniently remained 20-30 billion below the $250 billion threshold?
It is hard to deny a decent amount of moral hazard was at play here.
And we should not reward moral hazard with blanket bailouts.
#svb #siliconvalleybank