Dag, dawg, really? If the word "synchronicity" makes you uncomfortable, living here on Earth must really suck on a daily basis. You seem so
hip and carefree, too.
Terrible Mistake is a single sourcebook, including tons of actual document scans, it is very carefully written, and it offers a total survey of everything published before it. I will be very interested to see how an author with Albarelli's levels of quality control will treat a subject as slippery as Synchronicity.
That said, I've seen it stated pretty clearly a number of times that his next project is a biography of Federal Narcotics agent extraordinaire George Hunter White, and it will be another heavy tome of serious journalism about a very murky and important subject. Meh. Here I am, doing free PR for this guy just because he's a Vermonter or something.
Anyways, some excerpts that I thought were important enough to take notes on...
Page 463:
On December 27 [1974], five days after [Seymour] Hersh's "massive spying" story hit news-stands, White House Deputy Chief of Staff, Richard Cheney, advised President Gerald Ford to establish an executive branch blue-ribbon commission to investigate possible CIA activities. Cheney, who served in 1969-70 as a Special Assistant to Donald Rumsfeld, then director of the US Office of Economic Opportunity, told Ford he needed to act quickly to avoid the White House being "whipsawed by prolonged Congressional investigations" that were sure to come as a result of Hersh's revelations. Cheney advised that by appointing "a blue-ribbon investigative commission," the White House could seize the offensive, demonstrate leadership in troubled times, help re-establish public trust and faith in government, and perhaps circumvent "Congressional efforts to further encroach on the Executive Branch."
Cheney and Rumsfeld, along with the President's trusted counsel, Philip Buchen, futher advised Ford that he needed to exercise caution in appointing commission members so to avoid charges of initiating a whitewash effort.
Page 233. Some dubious clarity from Sidney Gottlieb...
"It's important to know I was not on the ARTICHOKE team, in the ARTICHOKE group that the Office of Security or Security Research ran. My knowledge of ARTICHOKE teams stems from my attendance at conferences and meetings at which I represented technical services [TSS]. ARTICHOKE and technical services were, in nearly every sense of the word, separate. They had separate purposes, separate supervision, not all the time in synch with one another... The Church Committee blurred the lines between all these programs, MKULTRA, ARTICHOK, Bluebird, QKHILLTOP, Chemical Corps, NAOMI, SHADE, all of them became one and I was... I didn't have any problem with answering for them all but I didn't... I didn't oversee all those projects. Let's leave it at that.
pg. 156 - CIA counsel Lawrence Houston on classified crimes...
"From time to time information is developed within the Agency indicating the actual or probably violation of criminal statutes. Normally all such information would be turned over to the Department of Justice for investigation and decision as to prosecution. Occasionally, however, the apparent criminal activities are involved in highly classified and complex covert operations. Under these circumstances investigation by outside agency could not hope for success without revealing to that agency the full scope of the covert operation involved as we as this Agency's authorities and manner of handling the operation. Even then, the investigation could not succeed without the full assistance of all interested branches of this Agency. In addition, if investigation developed a prima-facie case of a criminal violation, in many cases it would be readily apparent that prosecution would be impossible without revealing highly classified matters to public scrutiny.
The law is well settled that criminal prosecution cannot proceed in camera or on production of only part of the information. The Government must be willing to expose its entire operation if it desires to prosecute. In those cases involving cover operations, therefore, there appears to be a balancing of interest between the duty of enforece the law which is in the proper jurisdiction of the Department of Justice and the Director's responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods. This is further affected by physical considerations."