Sovereignty and the UFO
Alexander Wendt
The Ohio State University
Raymond Duvall
University of Minnesota
Modern sovereignty is anthropocentric, constituted and organized by reference to human beings alone. Although a metaphysical assumption, anthropocentrism is of immense practical import, enabling modern states to command loyalty and resources from their subjects in pursuit of political projects. It has limits, however, which are brought clearly into view by the authoritative taboo on taking UFOs seriously. UFOs have never been systematically investigated by science or the state, because it is assumed to be known that none are extraterrestrial. Yet in fact this is not known, which makes the UFO taboo puzzling given the ET possibility. Drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, the puzzle is explained by the functional imperatives of anthropocentric sovereignty, which cannot decide a UFO exception to anthropocentrism while preserving the ability to make such a decision. The UFO can be "known" only by not asking what it is.
Key Words: sovereignty • UFOs • state of exception • undecidability • epistemology of ignorance • Agamben
Wendt was one of the original proponents of Constructivism in IR theory. Instead of positting some kind of system of reified nation-states, constructivism sought to break down how aspects of the state interacted with one another. It attempted to show how socially created constructs mediated the behavior of actors in regard to one another.
This is the definition per wiki:
Constructivism primarily seeks to demonstrate how many core aspects of international relations are, contrary to the assumptions of Neorealism and Neoliberalism, socially constructed, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. Alexander Wendt calls two increasingly accepted basic tenets of Constructivism "(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature"[2].
Constructivism, particularly in the formative work of Wendt, challenges this assumption by showing that the causal powers attributed to 'Structure' by Neorealists are in fact not 'given', but rest on the way in which Structure is constructed by social practice. Removed from presumptions about the nature of the identities and interests of the actors in the system, and the meaning that social institutions (including Anarchy) have for such actors, Neorealism's 'structure' reveals, Wendt argues, very little, "it does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on"[6]. Because such features of behaviour are not explained by Anarchy, and require instead the incorporation of evidence about the interests and identities held by key actors, Neorealism's focus on the material structure of the system (Anarchy) is misplaced[7]. But Wendt goes further than this - arguing that because the way in which Anarchy constrains states depends on the way in which States conceive of Anarchy, and conceive of their own identities and interests, Anarchy is not necessarilly even a 'self-help' system. It only forces states to self-help if they conform to Neorealist assumptions about states as seeing security as a competitive, relative concept, where the gain of security for any one state means the loss of security for another. If States instead hold alternative conceptions of security, either 'co-operative', where states can maximise their security without negatively affecting the security of another, or 'collective' where states identify the security of other states as being valuable to themselves, Anarchy will not lead to self-help at all[8]. Neorealist conclusions, as such, depend entirely on unspoken and unquestioned assumptions about the way in which the meaning of social institutions are constructed by actors. Crucially, because Neorealists fail to recognise this dependence, they falsely assume that such meanings are uncheageable, and exclude the study of the processes of social construction which actually do the key explanatory work behind Neorealist observations.
Had I an advisor that was in the least sympathetic to these methods, I would not have gone to law school. But then again, the academy doesn't want their professors going on about ufos and the limits of knowledge. Most are happy to get defense grants for coming up with discreet alogrithms that explain everything and say nothing.
Below is a response to the respectible/skeptical critics at the [url]monkeycage.org[/url]. The authors share the same fascination that I do over the certainty exhibitted by so-called social scientists.
The fundamental question at stake in our paper is whether human beings know that UFOs are not ETs. To know, in a scientific sense, is to have solid empirical and/or theoretical grounds for rejecting the ET hypothesis. We argued that the current grounds for doing so are not even close to being epistemically satisfactory. Empirically the sustained and systematic inquiry that would be necessary to disprove the ET hypothesis has never been done; and theoretically the arguments adduced against its possibility are far too easily contested. That’s not to say UFO skeptics are wrong that UFOs are not ETs, but that human beings simply do not know. If this claim to human ignorance about UFOs is correct – and we are pretty confident that it is – then the puzzle that drives the paper is unavoidable. Namely, given the profound political ramifications of the possibility of aliens in the solar system, why haven’t the authorities tried seriously to find out, through procedures more rigorous and systematic than simply compiling reported sightings (if that)?
Farrell is “highly skeptical” that UFOs are ETs. Indeed on most days so are we; after all, the idea is mind-boggling. However, the question here is, is his skepticism warranted by good science – is it something he knows – or is it a claim to knowledge that in fact has no scientific warrant, and thus which he only believes? Our view is that no one knows what UFOs are. We are all in the domain of belief here, and nothing that Farrell offers so far on this score changes our agnosticism. He points to the poor quality of the UFO evidence overall, which is a given – but says nothing about the anomalous cases that have resisted explanation, which are the only cases that really matter. Fermi’s Paradox doesn’t help either, since the whole paradox is based on the assumption that “They” are not “Here,” which begs the very question at issue. Farrell undoubtedly has good reasons for his skepticism, but we see no basis for treating it as scientific knowledge as opposed to a personal belief like God.
We have said that human ignorance about UFOs is the most fundamental question at stake in the paper, because only if we are right about that is there a puzzle then to be explained (the state’s inaction). Judging from the comments on the Monkey Cage and other blogs in response to Farrell’s post many readers will not concede their ignorance, and as such are unable to take the paper seriously. We remain to be convinced by those who dismiss the existence of the puzzle, and indeed are tempted to interpret the haste and surety of the dismissals as evidence of the very taboo our article sets out to explain. However, to his credit Farrell gives us the benefit of the doubt and moves on to engage our solution to the puzzle as well. Here he makes three basic criticisms of our claim that the failure of modern states to seriously investigate UFOs stems from a metaphysical threat to anthropocentric sovereignty.
The fact that this kind of openmindedness to the anamolous is the exception not the norm, makes me even more suspicious of the motives behind the scientific skeptics - especially in a field that supposedly explores the absurd political behavior of earth's current residents in chief.
The weird thing about all this was the fact that I was just discussing and thinking about contructivism Wendt this last week. something I haven't done for at least several years. The woo-woo effect, I guess.
On a final note, I would like to recoomend the writings of Bruce Duensing at
His writing can be obtuse and recondite at times but by using a discplined method of Hegelian analysis and synthesis, he some how manages to make concrete ideas and realities that are by nature ineffable.http://materialintangible.blogspot.com/
