Bostrom suggested three possibilities: "The chances that a species at our current level of development can avoid going extinct before becoming technologically mature is negligibly small," "almost no technologically mature civilizations are interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours,” or we are "almost certainly" a simulation.
He forgot the fourth possibility, "Even a technologically mature civilization" (whatever that is) "interested in running computer simulations of minds like ours" (whatever those are) "won't be able to make punching a philosopher in the nose* feel quite this good."
* Oh, okay, let's just drop an apple on his head.
His hubris seems to be (I didn't read the paper) to jump over the matter of creating such a simulation with the attendant feel of being a living a body, as if it would eventually be a trifle for a "technologically mature civilization" to accomplish. I suppose it would be a lot easier if using actual living brains in vats, but then those would be real, as opposed to one-one-zero-one-zeros.
My own hubris is that I'm certain I'm real. And will have been, once it's over.
Then again:

I found that one looking for this one, which I was reminded of by the writeup on Bostrom:

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