The Criminal N.S.A.

[DrEvil]

Looks like it's phoning home to the NSA (or possibly SAIC):

Oops, maybe not :

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013 ... oit-claim/

[seemslikeadream]

NSA Does For Cross-Border Surveillance What Gmail Does To Place Ads


The New York Times reports that the NSA is scanning all emails and texts going in and out of the country

The New York Times has the latest scoop in NSAgate. NYT national security reporter Charlie Savage noticed an important phrase in a document leaked by Edward Snowden about when the NSA can collect communications without a warrant. Here at Forbes we noted the fact that the NSA keeps everything that’s encrypted (in hope of decoding it later) meaning that attempts at privacy protection through encryption could backfire. Savage honed in on this part of the FISA court document: “in those cases where the NSA seeks to acquire communications about the target that are not to or from the target.”

He read that to mean that these would be communications to and from the U.S. about the target, which means the NSA would need to sift through Americans’ and others’ communications to see when people were talking about someone or something the NSA had in its crosshairs. (Former NSA general counsel Stewart Baker tells Savage that a phone number associated with a bombing plot is an example of something they might sift for.) After interviewing government officials, Savage reports in the Times that the NSA does for surveillance of Americans’ cross-border communications what Google GOOG +0.39% does to place ads around Gmail:


Leaked NSA Doc Says It Can Collect And Keep Your Encrypted Data As Long As It Takes To Crack It
Andy Greenberg
Forbes Staff
To conduct the surveillance, the N.S.A. is temporarily copying and then sifting through the contents of what is apparently most e-mails and other text-based communications that cross the border…

The official said that a computer searches the data for the identifying keywords or other “selectors” and stores those that match so that human analysts could later examine them. The remaining communications, the official said, are deleted; the entire process takes “a small number of seconds,” and the system has no ability to perform “retrospective searching.”

Well, that would mean that any communication sent abroad is being examined, if briefly. Officials have repeatedly said that emails of Americans are not being “read” without a warrant. If the report is accurate, it raises a big question: if a computer is scanning communications for keywords, does that count as “reading”?

The former press secretary for former Sen. Russ Feingold — who was a critic of the legislation passed in 2008 to allow this type of surveillance — tweeted this video, as a reminder that there were warnings about this potential use.


N.S.A. Said to Search Content of Messages to and From U.S. [New York Times]

[Luther Blissett]

Looks like it's phoning home to the NSA (or possibly SAIC):

Oops, maybe not :

http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013 ... oit-claim/

I was worried when this story was first presented to me as "the NSA just took down massive pedophile networks on the deep web." A PR move I couldn't criticize.

[seemslikeadream]

NSA loophole allows warrantless search for US citizens' emails and phone calls

Exclusive: Spy agency has secret backdoor permission to search databases for individual Americans' communicationsl

James Ball and Spencer Ackerman
theguardian.com, Friday 9 August 2013 12.08 EDT

Detail of Section 702 of the Fisa Amendments Act (FAA), which gives the NSA authority to target without warrant the communications of foreign targets.

The National Security Agency has a secret backdoor into its vast databases under a legal authority enabling it to search for US citizens' email and phone calls without a warrant, according to a top-secret document passed to the Guardian by Edward Snowden.

The previously undisclosed rule change allows NSA operatives to hunt for individual Americans' communications using their name or other identifying information. Senator Ron Wyden told the Guardian that the law provides the NSA with a loophole potentially allowing "warrantless searches for the phone calls or emails of law-abiding Americans".

The authority, approved in 2011, appears to contrast with repeated assurances from Barack Obama and senior intelligence officials to both Congress and the American public that the privacy of US citizens is protected from the NSA's dragnet surveillance programs.

The intelligence data is being gathered under Section 702 of the of the Fisa Amendments Act (FAA), which gives the NSA authority to target without warrant the communications of foreign targets, who must be non-US citizens and outside the US at the point of collection.

The communications of Americans in direct contact with foreign targets can also be collected without a warrant, and the intelligence agencies acknowledge that purely domestic communications can also be inadvertently swept into its databases. That process is known as "incidental collection" in surveillance parlance.

But this is the first evidence that the NSA has permission to search those databases for specific US individuals' communications.

A secret glossary document provided to operatives in the NSA's Special Source Operations division – which runs the Prism program and large-scale cable intercepts through corporate partnerships with technology companies – details an update to the "minimization" procedures that govern how the agency must handle the communications of US persons. That group is defined as both American citizens and foreigners located in the US.

"While the FAA 702 minimization procedures approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for use of certain United States person names and identifiers as query terms when reviewing collected FAA 702 data," the glossary states, "analysts may NOT/NOT [not repeat not] implement any USP [US persons] queries until an effective oversight process has been developed by NSA and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI [Office of the Director of National Intelligence]."

The term "identifiers" is NSA jargon for information relating to an individual, such as telephone number, email address, IP address and username as well as their name.

The document – which is undated, though metadata suggests this version was last updated in June 2012 – does not say whether the oversight process it mentions has been established or whether any searches against US person names have taken place.
Ron Wyden Senator Ron Wyden. Photograph: Jacquelyn Martin/AP

Wyden, an Oregon Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee, has obliquely warned for months that the NSA's retention of Americans' communications incidentally collected and its ability to search through it has been far more extensive than intelligence officials have stated publicly. Speaking this week, Wyden told the Guardian it amounts to a "backdoor search" through Americans' communications data.

"Section 702 was intended to give the government new authorities to collect the communications of individuals believed to be foreigners outside the US, but the intelligence community has been unable to tell Congress how many Americans have had their communications swept up in that collection," he said.

"Once Americans' communications are collected, a gap in the law that I call the 'back-door searches loophole' allows the government to potentially go through these communications and conduct warrantless searches for the phone calls or emails of law-abiding Americans."

Wyden, along with his intelligence committee colleague Mark Udall, have attempted repeatedly to warn publicly about the ability of the intelligence community to look at the communications of US citizens, but are limited by their obligation not to reveal highly classified information.

But in a letter they recently wrote to the NSA director, General Keith Alexander, the two senators warned that a fact sheet released by the NSA in the wake of the initial Prism revelations to reassure the American public about domestic surveillance was misleading.

In the letter, they warned that Americans' communications might be inadvertently collected and stored under Section 702, despite rules stating only data on foreigners should be collected and retained.

"[W]e note that this same fact sheet states that under Section 702, 'Any inadvertently acquired communication of or concerning a US person must be promptly destroyed if it is neither relevant to the authorised purpose nor evidence of a crime,'" they said.

"We believe that this statement is somewhat misleading, in that it implied the NSA has the ability to determine how many American communications it has collected under Section 702, or that the law does not allow the NSA to deliberately search for the records of particular Americans."

The foreign intelligence surveillance (Fisa) court issues approvals annually authorizing such operations, with specific rules on who can be targeted and what measures must be taken to minimize any details "inadvertently" collected on US persons.

Secret minimization procedures dating from 2009, published in June by the Guardian, revealed that the NSA could make use of any "inadvertently acquired" information on US persons under a defined range of circumstances, including if they held usable intelligence, information on criminal activity, threat of harm to people or property, are encrypted or are believed to contain any information relevant to cybersecurity.

At that stage, however, the rules did not appear to allow for searches of collected data relating to specific US persons.

Assurances from Obama and senior administration officials to the American public about the privacy of their communications have relied on the strict definition of what constitutes "targeting" while making no mention of the permission to search for US data within material that has already been collected.

The day after the Guardian revealed details of the NSA's Prism program, President Obama said: "Now, with respect to the internet and emails, this doesn't apply to US citizens and it doesn't apply to people living in the United States."

Speaking at a House hearing on 18 June this year, deputy attorney general James Cole told legislators "[T]here's a great deal of minimization procedures that are involved here, particularly concerning any of the acquisition of information that deals or comes from US persons.

"As I said, only targeting people outside the United States who are not US persons. But if we do acquire any information that relates to a US person, under limited criteria only can we keep it."

Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who chairs the Senate intelligence committee, said in June 2012 that she believed the intelligence agencies and the Justice Department were sufficiently mindful of Americans' privacy.

"The intelligence community is strictly prohibited from using Section 702 to target a US person, which must at all times be carried out pursuant to an individualized court order based upon probable cause," Feinstein stated in a report provided to the Senate record.

While there are several congressional proposals to constrain the NSA's bulk collection of Americans' phone records, there has to date been much less legislative appetite to abridge its powers under Section 702 – as lawmakers are satisfied it doesn't sufficiently violate Americans' privacy.

"702 is focused outside the United States at non-citizens," said Adam Schiff, a member of the House intelligence committee. "The evidence of the effectiveness of 702 is much more substantial than 215 [the bulk phone records collection]. So I think there are fewer fourth amendment concerns and more evidence of the saliency of the program."

Wyden and Udall – both of whom say foreign surveillance conducted under Section 702 has legitimate value for US national security – have tried and failed to restrict the NSA's ability to collect and store Americans' communications that it accidentally acquires.

Wyden told the Guardian that he raised concerns about the loophole with President Obama during an August 1 meeting with legislators about the NSA's surveillance powers.

"I believe that Congress should reform Section 702 to provide better protections for Americans' privacy, and that this could be done without losing the value that this collection provides," he said.

The Guardian put the latest revelations to the NSA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence but no response had been received by the time of publication.

[Project Willow]

Encrypted email service shuts down due to surveillance efforts.

http://lavabit.com/

My Fellow Users,

I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years of hard work by shutting down Lavabit. After significant soul searching, I have decided to suspend operations. I wish that I could legally share with you the events that led to my decision. I cannot. I feel you deserve to know what’s going on--the first amendment is supposed to guarantee me the freedom to speak out in situations like this. Unfortunately, Congress has passed laws that say otherwise. As things currently stand, I cannot share my experiences over the last six weeks, even though I have twice made the appropriate requests.

What’s going to happen now? We’ve already started preparing the paperwork needed to continue to fight for the Constitution in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. A favorable decision would allow me resurrect Lavabit as an American company.

This experience has taught me one very important lesson: without congressional action or a strong judicial precedent, I would _strongly_ recommend against anyone trusting their private data to a company with physical ties to the United States.

Sincerely,
Ladar Levison
Owner and Operator, Lavabit LLC

Defending the constitution is expensive! Help us by donating to the Lavabit Legal Defense Fund here.

[justdrew]

Today President Obama held a press conference to address the situation surrounding the NSA's surveillance activities. (Here is the full transcript.) He announced four actions the administration is undertaking to restore the public's confidence in the intelligence community. Obama plans to work with Congress to reform the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to give greater weight to civil liberties, and to revisit section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which is the section that allowed bulk collection of phone records. (Of course, "will work with Congress" is a vague term, and Congress isn't known for getting things done lately. Thus, it remains to be seen if anything substantive happens.) Obama is ordering the Dept. of Justice to make public their legal rationale for data collection, and there will be a new NSA official dedicated to transparency efforts. There will also be a new website for citizens to learn about transparency in intelligence agencies. Lastly, a group of outside experts will be convened to review the government's surveillance capabilities. Their job will include figuring out how to maintain the public's trust and prevent abuse, and to consider how the intelligence community's actions will affect foreign policy. In addition to these initiatives, President Obama made his position very clear about several different aspects of this controversy. While acknowledging that "we have significant capabilities," he said, "America is not interested in spying on ordinary people." He added that the people who have raised concerns about privacy and government overreach in a lawful manner are "patriots." This is in stark contrast to his view of leakers like Edward Snowden: "I don't think Mr. Snowden was a patriot." (For his part, Snowden says the recent shut down of encrypted email services is 'inspiring.') When asked about how his opinion of the surveillance programs have changed, he said his perception of them have not evolved since the story broke worldwide. "What you're not seeing is people actually abusing these programs." Obama also endorsed finding technological solutions that will protect privacy regardless of what government agencies want to do.

[Elvis]

Encrypted email service shuts down due to surveillance efforts.

http://lavabit.com/

My Fellow Users,

I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years of hard work by shutting down Lavabit. After significant soul searching, I have decided to suspend operations. I wish that I could legally share with you the events that led to my decision. I cannot. I feel you deserve to know what’s going on--the first amendment is supposed to guarantee me the freedom to speak out in situations like this. Unfortunately, Congress has passed laws that say otherwise. As things currently stand, I cannot share my experiences over the last six weeks, even though I have twice made the appropriate requests.

What’s going to happen now? We’ve already started preparing the paperwork needed to continue to fight for the Constitution in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. A favorable decision would allow me resurrect Lavabit as an American company.

This experience has taught me one very important lesson: without congressional action or a strong judicial precedent, I would _strongly_ recommend against anyone trusting their private data to a company with physical ties to the United States.

Sincerely,
Ladar Levison
Owner and Operator, Lavabit LLC

Defending the constitution is expensive! Help us by donating to the Lavabit Legal Defense Fund here.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit

[...] Lavabit offered significant privacy protection for their users' email, including asymmetric encryption. The strength of the cryptographic methods used was of a level that is difficult for even intelligence agencies to crack. Ghacks called it "probably the most secure, private email service right now". In August 2013, they had about 410,000 users and offered free and paid accounts with levels of storage ranging from 128 megabytes to 8 gigabytes.[5][6][7]

On June 10, 2013, a search warrant was executed against Lavabit user Joey006@ lavabit.com for alleged possession of child pornography.[8] It is unclear whether this warrant was in any way related to Lavabit's subsequent shutdown.

Connection to Edward Snowden[edit source | editbeta]

Lavabit received media attention in July 2013 when it was revealed that National Security Agency leaker Edward Snowden was using the Lavabit email address edsnowden@lavabit.com to email human rights lawyers and activists to a press conference during his confinement at Sheremetyevo International Airport in Moscow.[9]
Suspension[edit source | editbeta]

On August 8, 2013, Lavabit suspended its operations, and the email service log-in page was replaced by a message from the owner and operator Ladar Levison.[1] The New Yorker suggested that the suspension might be related to the National Security Agency’s "domestic-surveillance practices".[10] Levison wrote on his site that he was legally unable to explain why he ended the service, and instead asked for donations to "fight for the Constitution" in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Wired speculated that Levison was fighting a warrant or national security letter seeking customer information under extraordinary circumstances, as Lavabit had complied with at least one routine warrant in the past.[9][11] Lavabit is believed to be the first technology firm which chose to suspend/shut down its operation rather than comply with an order from the United States government to reveal information or grant access to information.[3] Silent Circle, an encrypted email, mobile video and voice service provider, followed the example of Lavabit by discontinuing its encrypted email services.[12]

http://cryptome.org/2013/08/joey006/usa-v-joey006.htm
Note: I added spaces to deactivate the Joey email link. --Elvis

9 August 2013

USA v Lavabit LLC Email Account of Joey006

U.S. District Court
District of Maryland (Baltimore)
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13-mj-00607-SAG-1


Case title: In the Matter of the Search of: Lavabit LLC Email Account for Joey006@ lavabit.com
Date Filed: 04/11/2013
Assigned to: Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher

Defendant (1)
Lavabit LLC Email Account for Joey006@ lavabit.com

Pending Counts
Disposition
None

Highest Offense Level (Opening)
None

Terminated Counts
Disposition
None

Highest Offense Level (Terminated)
None

Complaints
Disposition
None

Plaintiff
USA represented by Judson Thomas Mihok
Office of the United States Attorney
36 S Charles St Fourth Fl
Baltimore, MD 21201
14102094903
Fax: 14109623091
Email: judson.mihok@usdoj.gov
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Designation: Assistant US Attorney

Date Filed # Docket Text
04/11/2013 2 Application for Search Warrant by USA as to Lavabit LLC Email Account for Joey006 @lavabit.com (hsg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
04/11/2013 3 Affidavit in support of application for Search Warrant. (hsg, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/17/2013)
06/10/2013 4 Search Warrant Returned Executed on 3/28/13 in case as to Lavabit LLC Email Account for Joey006 @lavabit.com. (hsgs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/12/2013)

[Luther Blissett]

http://boingboing.net/2013/08/10/lavabi ... ed-us.html

Lavabit founder has stopped using email: "If you knew what I know, you might not use it either"

Cory Doctorow at 4:48 am Sat, Aug 10, 2013
Earlier this week, Xeni reported on the shutdown of Lavabit, the email provider used by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden. Ladar Levison, Lavabit's founder, has given an interview to Forbes about his reasoning for the shutdown, which comes -- apparently -- as a result of a secret NSA search-warrant complete with a gag order.

After discussing the general absurdity and creepiness of not being allowed to freely criticize the government for the order they brought to his company, he concludes by saying that he's stopped using email altogether, and "If you knew what I know about email, you might not use it either."

“This is about protecting all of our users, not just one in particular. It’s not my place to decide whether an investigation is just, but the government has the legal authority to force you to do things you’re uncomfortable with,” said Levison in a phone call on Friday. “The fact that I can’t talk about this is as big a problem as what they asked me to do.”

Levison’s lawyer, Jesse Binnall, who is based in Northern Virginia — the court district where Levison needed representation — added that it’s “ridiculous” that Levison has to so carefully parse what he says about the government inquiry. “In America, we’re not supposed to have to worry about watching our words like this when we’re talking to the press,” Binnall said.

[conniption]

http://www.alternet.org/comics/tom-tomorrow-nsa-spying

[seemslikeadream]

Mike Rogers’ Double Secret Invitation to Dance
Posted on August 11, 2013 by emptywheel

I’m working on a very weedy post on the White Paper’s duplicitous presentation of what it calls support for Congress for the Section 215 dragnet.

But I’d like to compare a claim from this WaPo story on how secrecy makes it difficult for Congress to exercise oversight with a detail from the White Paper.

Rogers said “very few members” take advantage of his invitations to receive quarterly staff briefings on counterterrorism operations, and others skipped briefings on the NSA bulk surveillance.

“If you have individual members who say they don’t have time to be on the intelligence committee, then I say get off the intelligence committee,” he said.

Ruppersberger said all members benefit from an expert staff and a push in recent years for greater bipartisanship on the panel. The issues are complex and time-consuming, he said, “but we have to learn them. We have to hold these agencies accountable, but we also have to give them the resources they need to protect our country.”

Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee who expressed anger that Congress was kept in the dark about interrogation and surveillance tactics under the George W. Bush administration, now feels that Congress has what it needs. He credits Feinstein and the Senate panel’s ranking Republican, Sen. Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, for inviting every senator into the committee offices to examine classified materials.

“The intelligence oversight committees have kicked the tires on these programs very hard, with hearings and legislation and oversight, and the programs have overwhelming bipartisan support on these committees,” a Rockefeller spokeswoman said.

At this point in the story, I started wondering why the WaPo made no mention of this Guardian report, which documented what the House Intelligence Committee’s responsiveness was really like.

Rep. [Morgan] Griffith requested information about the NSA from the House Intelligence Committee six weeks ago, on June 25. He asked for “access to the classified FISA court order(s) referenced on Meet the Press this past weekend”: a reference to my raising with host David Gregory thestill-secret 2011 86-page ruling from the FISA court that found substantial parts of NSA domestic spying to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well as governing surveillance statutes.

In that same June 25 letter, Rep. Griffith also requested the semi-annual FISC “reviews and critiques” of the NSA. He stated the rationale for his request: “I took an oath to uphold the United States Constitution, and I intend to do so.”

Almost three weeks later, on July 12, Rep. Griffith requested additional information from the Intelligence Committee based on press accounts he had read about Yahoo’s unsuccessful efforts in court to resist joining the NSA’s PRISM program. He specifically wanted to review the arguments made by Yahoo and the DOJ, as well as the FISC’s ruling requiring Yahoo to participate in PRISM.

On July 22, he wrote another letter to the Committee seeking information. This time, it was prompted by press reports that that the FISA court had renewed its order compelling Verizon to turn over all phone records to the NSA. Rep. Griffith requested access to that court ruling.

The Congressman received no response to any of his requests.

The Guardian story also reveals how the House Intelligence Committee voted against giving Alan Grayson material, and quotes Justin Amash saying he had similar difficulties getting information.

But I also wondered, since this WaPo report was clearly written in part to assess claims in the White Paper that Congressional approval has been a key part of this program, why it didn’t quote these two passages:

In December 2009, DOJ worked with the Intelligence Community to provide a classified briefing paper to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees that could be made available to all Members of Congress regarding the telephony metadata collection program. A letter accompanying the briefing paper sent to the House Intelligence Committee specifically stated that “it is important that all Members of Congress have access to information about this program” and that “making this document available to all members of Congress is an effective way to inform the legislative debate about reauthorization of Section 215.” See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich to the Honorable Silvestre Reyes, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Dec. 14, 2009). Both Intelligence Committees made this document available to all Members of Congress prior to the February 2010 reauthorization of Section 215. See Letter from Sen. Diane Feinstein and Sen. Christopher S. Bond to Colleagues (Feb. 23, 2010); Letter from Rep. Silvestre Reyes to Colleagues (Feb. 24, 2010);

[snip]

An updated version of the briefing paper, also recently released in redacted form to the public, was provided to the Senate and House Intelligence Committees again in February 2011 in connection with the reauthorization that occurred later that year. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich to the Honorable Dianne Feinstein and the Honorable Saxby Chambliss, Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 2, 2011); Letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Weich to the Honorable Mike Rogers and the Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Feb. 2, 2011). The Senate Intelligence Committee made this updated paper available to all Senators later that month. See Letter from Sen. Diane Feinstein and Sen. Saxby Chambliss to Colleagues (Feb. 8, 2011).

They describe the two notices the Intelligence Community sent the Intelligence Committees during PATRIOT Act reauthorization describing the phone and Internet dragnets.

Ron Wyden has already shown that the notices made claims about the importance of the Internet dragnet that the IC has subsequently agreed were wrong. And I have shown that what the IC actually did is send a document after a long delay, after significant parts of the debate on the program had taken place, and at a point when the Administration was already screaming Terror! Terror! Reauthorize now!

The White Paper’s description of the 2009 distribution reveals that Dianne Feinstein and Silvestre Reyes actually sat on the documents for two months, from December until February (making the total delay from the start of the debate five months), before they invited their colleagues to come look at them, — I guess to get further into the Terror! Terror! Reauthorize now! stage?

But the White Paper also seems to suggest — with its mention of Dianne Feinstein’s letter inviting Senators to read the 2011 notice but silence about Mike Rogers’ letter — that Rogers didn’t even tell House members about it.

The Administration keeps pointing to these Congressional notices as proof that Congress was properly informed about the dragnet. But as each new detail about the notices comes out, it becomes increasingly clear those notices were about obfuscation, not information.

Update: Justin Amash just posted this:

Less than two weeks ago, the Obama administration released previously classified documents regarding ‪#‎NSA‬’s bulk collection programs and indicated that two of these documents had been made available to all Members of Congress prior to the vote on reauthorization of the Patriot Act. I can now confirm that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document available to Representatives in Congress, meaning that the large class of Representatives elected in 2010 did not receive either of the now declassified documents detailing these programs.

[seemslikeadream]

Intelligence committee withheld key file before critical NSA vote, Amash claims

Republican who led Congress revolt against surveillance insists members did not see document before 2011 Patriot Act vote

Spencer Ackerman in Washington
theguardian.com, Monday 12 August 2013 17.37 EDT
Jump to comments (23)

Justin Amash
Justin Amash said: 'It is not acceptable for the intelligence committee, or any other committee, to withhold critically important information.' Photo: J Scott Applewhite/AP

A leader of the US congressional insurrection against the National Security Agency's bulk surveillance programs has accused his colleagues of withholding a key document from the House of Representatives before a critical surveillance vote.

Justin Amash, the Michigan Republican whose effort to defund the NSA's mass phone-records collection exposed deep congressional discomfort with domestic spying, said the House intelligence committee never allowed legislators outside the panel to see a 2011 document that described the surveillance in vague terms.

The document, a classified summary of the bulk phone records collection effort justified under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, was declassified by the Obama administration in late July.

The Justice Department and intelligence agencies prepared it for Congress before a 2011 vote to reauthorize the Patriot Act, and left it for the intelligence committees in Congress to make the document available to their colleagues.

"It is not acceptable for the intelligence committee, or any other committee, to withhold critically important information pertaining to a program prior to the vote," Amash told the Guardian.

While the document does not go into great detail about the program, first revealed by the Guardian through documents provided by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, it does tell legislators that NSA is collecting phone records in "bulk" from Americans. The Obama administration and intelligence agencies have pointed to the availability of the document as an example of keeping Congress fully informed about controversial NSA surveillance.

"We believe that making this document available to all members of Congress, as we did with a similar document in December 2009, is an effective way to inform the legislative debate about the reauthorization of Section 215," assistant attorney general Ronald Weich wrote to the Republican and Democratic leaders of the House intelligence committee on February 2 2011. The hundreds of members of Congress who did not serve on the intelligence committee were to be told they could read the document in a secured facility.

But Amash claimed on his Facebook page that never happened.

"I can now confirm that the House permanent select committee on intelligence did not, in fact, make the 2011 document available to representatives in Congress," Amash wrote late Sunday, "meaning that the large class of representatives elected in 2010 did not receive either of the now declassified documents detailing these programs."

A spokeswoman for the House intelligence committee, Susan Phelan, did not return a message from the Guardian on Monday. The committee staff said only Phelan was authorized to address the press.

But one of Amash's Democratic colleagues, a former member of the House intelligence committee, backed Amash's claim.

"I was not aware of the document," Rush Holt, a New Jersey Democrat, told the Guardian.

"This is another example of the difficulty in Congress exerting any oversight of the intelligence community, because the information is frequently not made available to all members."

The intelligence committees in Congress receive access to classified information that non-members rarely receive. Legislators not on the secretive panels often look to their colleagues who serve on them as barometers of opinion about the appropriateness of intelligence activities.

Amash said that he had no reason to believe that a similar summary document about the bulk phone records collection, prepared for release in 2009, was similarly withheld.

That raised the specter of the intelligence committee, which is charged with overseeing the NSA, withholding information from members elected in the 2010 election, when many libertarian and Tea Party Republicans uncomfortable with government power – like Amash – won office.

"Nobody I've spoken to in my legislative class remembers seeing any such document," Amash told the Guardian. "We checked back with the committee, and it was not offered to members."

Amash speculated that congressional leaders and intelligence committee leaders were "concerned the Patriot Act would not pass" if the newer class of legislators knew about the NSA's bulk phone records collection. "In fact, the first time it was brought up, it was brought up under suspension, and it did not pass," Amash said.

The accusation represents an escalation between Amash and the intelligence leadership, which fiercely fought his late-July effort to end the NSA's bulk collection of American phone records. The panel chairman, Amash's fellow Michigan Republican Mike Rogers, swiped at the younger congressman during a raucous July 24 floor debate: "Are we so small that we can only look at our Facebook "likes" today in this chamber?"

Rogers has pledged to introduce greater privacy protections over the bulk phone records program when his committee takes up the annual intelligence funding bill after the August congressional recess. Amash, meanwhile, has pledged to renew his efforts to vastly restrict the NSA's ability to collect phone data on Americans without individual suspicion of wrongdoing.

Asked if it would be possible to work with the Rogers and the House intelligence committee leadership after learning the committee withheld the document, Amash replied: "I don't know."

[seemslikeadream]

Ally and Target: US Intelligence Watches Germany Closely

By Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark
Photo Gallery: Targeting Germany Photos
DPA

German intelligence services cooperate closely with the NSA, but the country is also a target of US surveillance, as a document seen by SPIEGEL makes clear. The spy software XKeyscore is operated from a facility in Hesse, with some of the results landing on President Obama's desk.

The US military compound in Griesheim, near Frankfurt, is secured with a tall wire fence topped with barbed wire. The buildings are relatively modest and surrounded by large areas of green space, which has long led local residents to suspect that many of those working at the facility spend much of their time underground -- and that they are engaged in espionage.

ANZEIGE
The so-called "Dagger Complex" is one of the best protected sites in the German state of Hesse. Griesheim resident Daniel Bangert recently discovered what could happen to those who show a little too much interest in sites like Dagger. In early July, Bangert -- inspired by the leaks of whistleblower Edward Snowden -- used his Facebook account to post an invitation to a "stroll" to the Dagger Complex, for the purpose of "joint research into the threatened habitat of NSA spies." But before he could embark on his outing into the world of espionage, Bangert found himself dealing with the police.

Lawmakers in the German parliament, the Bundestag, have also expressed an interest in the group of buildings near Darmstadt, south of Frankfurt. The campus houses one of the most important European branches of the National Security Agency (NSA), the American intelligence agency that has come under fire worldwide as a result of leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

According to internal NSA information, which SPIEGEL has seen, the agency's European Cryptologic Center (ECC) is headquartered in Griesheim. A 2011 NSA report indicates that the ECC is responsible for the "largest analysis and productivity in Europe." According to the report, results from the secret installation find their way into the President's Daily Brief, the daily intelligence report given to US President Barack Obama, an average of twice a week.

Germany is a special place for the NSA, in many respects. Few other countries are the source of as much data for US intelligence agencies, much of which comes from the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany's foreign intelligence agency. At the same time Germany itself, despite all friendly assurances to the contrary, is also a target of the surveillance. According to a "secret" summary among the documents obtained by Snowden, which SPIEGEL was able to view, Germany is one of the targets of US espionage activity.

Of Interest

In the April 2013 summary, the NSA defines its "intelligence priorities" on a scale ranging from "1" (highest interest) to "5" (lowest interest). Not surprisingly, the top targets include China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Germany ranks somewhere in the middle on this priority list, together with France and Japan, but above Italy and Spain. Among the issues listed as being of interest are German foreign policy and questions of economic stability as well as threats to the financial system, both given a priority rating of "3." Other surveillance assignments include subjects like arms exports, new technologies, advanced conventional weapons and international trade, all with a priority of "4." The US spies apparently feel that counter-espionage and the risk of cyber attacks on US infrastructure coming from Germany are not particularly threatening (priority level "5"). The document lists a total of nine areas to be covered by surveillance in Germany.

According to the list of spying priorities, the European Union is also one of the targets of American surveillance, specifically in six individual areas. The areas assigned a priority level of "3" are EU foreign policy goals, "international trade" and "economic stability." Lower-priority areas are new technologies, energy security and food security issues.

Countries like Cambodia, Laos and Nepal are apparently more or less irrelevant from a US intelligence perspective, as are most European countries, like Finland, Denmark, Croatia and the Czech Republic.

The report reflects the ambivalent relationship the United States has with many countries. On the one hand, intelligence agencies cooperate with one another and exchange information. On the other hand, Washington spies on many countries, at least to some extent. Only the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand -- referred to as the "five eyes," together with the United States -- are seen as true friends, largely off-limits in terms of espionage, and with which there is an open exchange of information.

The NSA classifies about 30 other countries as "3rd parties," with whom it cooperates, though with reservations. Germany is one of them. "We can, and often do, target the signals of most 3rd party foreign partners," the secret NSA document reads.

Still Waiting for Answers

The priorities list, in which Germany is shown as a target, is a setback for the Americans' efforts at controlling the damage caused by the leaking of information about various espionage programs and surveillance operations. Only last week, the BND insisted that it had "no indications" that the NSA "collects personal data on German citizens in Germany."

"The monitoring of friends -- this is unacceptable," Chancellor Angela Merkel's spokesman Steffen Seibert said after SPIEGEL published the story in July describing how the NSA infiltrates institutions of the European Union. "We're no longer in the Cold War."

More than six weeks after the scandal began, the German government is still waiting for answers on what exactly the NSA is doing in -- and against -- Germany. In particular, Berlin has yet to be fully informed about what kinds of data the NSA gathers, directly or indirectly, in addition to the millions of pieces of metadata the BND admits to collecting at its surveillance stations, such as the one in Bad Aibling near Munich, and forwarding to the Americans.

Various NSA documents from years past, which SPIEGEL was able to examine, reveal the intensity of the American surveillance of international data communications from their facilities in Germany. In addition to the station in Bad Aibling, the NSA installation in Griesheim plays an important role, as evidenced by the NSA personnel's description of it as a "success story" in the field of technical surveillance. According to the document, the number of surveillance operations with specific targets increased from 5 to 26 from 2007 to 2011 alone, with the 240 employees working at the ECC (total from 2011) focusing on various priorities, including Africa, Europe, the Middle East and counterterrorism operations.

The site in Hesse is also of interest for another reason: The controversial XKeyscore software appears to be in use there, as indicated by a 2012 internal NSA progress report. The report, with the odd title "Tales from the Land of Brothers Grimm" describes how successful the analysts have been in using the program. It is also enlightening because it shows that many NSA employees had a great deal of respect for XKeyscore. One analyst is quoted as saying that he always felt that he had one foot in prison when he was using the program, but that he began feeling more confident after going through training.

Toilet Seats and Seaweed

Prior to XKeyscore, the work of the NSA analysts was comparable with "Forrest Gump on his shrimping boat off the coast of Alabama," reads the report from Griesheim. From the ocean of data, the report reads, the analysts pulled in "a boot, a toilet seat, seaweed, and, there they are … three shrimp!" (ellipse in original) To get to these few shrimp, they were forced to use vast resources, including documents or metadata that expand knowledge about the targets. "We deal with tons of toilet seats, the spam and other junk," the report reads. But after the introduction of XKeyscore, the work, the report indicates, became much more efficient, because the tools made it possible to make precise casts, bringing in more shrimp and less by-catch.

With XKeyscore, his staff discovered "new traffic and documents," raves a unit manager in the Africa department. Among the catch, the unit manager notes according to the document, was material from the Tunisian Interior Ministry that no other surveillance system had managed to capture.

The documents make clear that the NSA wanted to distribute the new features offered by the system, which the BND had also been using on a small scale since 2007, as widely as possible using an internal modernization program. To do so, it used a training program, a sort of circuit training for various stations, conceived by the British intelligence agency GCHQ. When 68 people attended one of these programs in Griesheim in March 2012, the participants said that spending 20 minutes at each of the different stations was like "speed dating."

To create additional motivation, the NSA incorporated various features from computer games into the program. For instance, analysts who were especially good at using XKeyscore could acquire "skilz" points and "unlock achievements." The training units in Hesse were apparently successful. ECC analysts had achieved the "highest average of skilz points" compared with all other NSA departments participating in the training program.

The Americans are hardly likely to admit to the German government what exactly the group in Griesheim is doing and whether the Americans there also have targets in Germany under surveillance. Former NSA Director Michael Hayden told SPIEGEL that "the damage for the German-American relationship is huge." After September 11, he says, he focused on developing a strong working relationship with the BND. "I tried to avoid acting as an occupier. We extended our cooperation." This success, he adds, was now in jeopardy.

'We Steal Secrets'

However Hayden, a four-star general who is now retired, does not deny that the NSA is involved in espionage. "We steal secrets. We're number one in it," he says." But, he adds, this is not malicious or industrial espionage. "We steal stuff to make you safe, not to make you rich."

Sept. 11, 2001, says former NSA employee Thomas Drake, assumed a central role in America's relationship with Germany. Drake, who speaks German, flew reconnaissance aircraft over German territory for years, listening in on the Eastern bloc. He left the agency in 2008 and, like Snowden, became a whistleblower. "Sept. 11 was the trigger that Germany became a target of high priority." The Americans, he adds, were interested in finding out who in Germany sympathized with Islamists.

Drake's claim is supported by a presentation from the Griesheim NSA installation. It describes the framework for analysis for European targets, noting that "most" terrorists travel through Europe.

Another NSA document also provides information on which groups the Americans are interested in. According to the document, there are active groups associated with the Anonymous movement in Germany that are seen as legitimate targets for the NSA -- as long as they are not US citizens. In addition, the Americans mine data from Germany for information about possible weapons deals.

XKeyscore is an outstanding tool for this, because it allows for non-specific search procedures. With the help of the software, an analyst can be made aware of previously unknown Internet users, because they suddenly become interested in certain topics or exhibit a certain type of behavior.

It will be interesting to see whether the American government acts on the promise of transparency that Obama made on Friday in response to growing public pressure. "We can and must be more transparent," said the president, noting that he had instructed US intelligence agencies to release significantly more information about the surveillance programs under fire.

'Whatever We Like'

But whether that includes the NSA's work in Griesheim is just as unlikely as an explanation of the priority list for espionage targets. As is always true in these cases, the fine print is what matters. Some accusations, such as that EU embassies were bugged, could not be explained without a loss of face, especially since Obama, after his visit to Berlin, said that if he wanted to know what Merkel was thinking he would call her, and that he didn't need the NSA for that.

Chancellery chief Ronald Pofalla and Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich will probably have taken note, with some satisfaction, of one particular sentence uttered by the American president: That the United States does not spy on the people of other countries. The German government had urged Washington to make such a statement for weeks. Of course, its pleasure will no doubt be muted by the fact that Germany and the EU are listed among the targets of American surveillance.

German intelligence agencies hope to see the revelations come to an end soon. They want to return to everyday life, which provides for close cooperation with the Americans. This is a sentiment they share with most NSA employees, to whom Snowden is anathema, because they savor the power of tools like XKeyscore. After all, everyone likes "a new toy," an NSA employee raves in one of the reports. XKeyscore, the report continues, is perhaps "a seven-headed dragon. Big and scary? Sure. Strong and powerful? Oh yeah."

According to the report, it is up to NSA employees to tame it, and then "to do with whatever we like."

[seemslikeadream]

The NSA Is Commandeering the Internet
Technology companies have to fight for their users, or they'll eventually lose them.
Bruce Schneier Aug 12 2013, 10:05 AM ET

It turns out that the NSA's domestic and world-wide surveillance apparatus is even more extensive than we thought. Bluntly: The government has commandeered the Internet. Most of the largest Internet companies provide information to the NSA, betraying their users. Some, as we've learned, fight and lose. Others cooperate, either out of patriotism or because they believe it's easier that way.

I have one message to the executives of those companies: fight.

Do you remember those old spy movies, when the higher ups in government decide that the mission is more important than the spy's life? It's going to be the same way with you. You might think that your friendly relationship with the government means that they're going to protect you, but they won't. The NSA doesn't care about you or your customers, and will burn you the moment it's convenient to do so.

We're already starting to see that. Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and others are pleading with the government to allow them to explain details of what information they provided in response to National Security Letters and other government demands. They've lost the trust of their customers, and explaining what they do -- and don't do -- is how to get it back. The government has refused; they don't care.

It will be the same with you. There are lots more high-tech companies who have cooperated with the government. Most of those company names are somewhere in the thousands of documents that Edward Snowden took with him, and sooner or later they'll be released to the public. The NSA probably told you that your cooperation would forever remain secret, but they're sloppy. They'll put your company name on presentations delivered to thousands of people: government employees, contractors, probably even foreign nationals. If Snowden doesn't have a copy, the next whistleblower will.

This is why you have to fight. When it becomes public that the NSA has been hoovering up all of your users' communications and personal files, what's going to save you in the eyes of those users is whether or not you fought. Fighting will cost you money in the short term, but capitulating will cost you more in the long term.

Already companies are taking their data and communications out of the US.

The extreme case of fighting is shutting down entirely. The secure e-mail service Lavabit did that last week, abruptly. Ladar Levison, that site's owner, wrote on his homepage: "I have been forced to make a difficult decision: to become complicit in crimes against the American people or walk away from nearly ten years of hard work by shutting down Lavabit. After significant soul searching, I have decided to suspend operations. I wish that I could legally share with you the events that led to my decision."

The same day, Silent Circle followed suit, shutting down their email service in advance of any government strong-arm tactics: "We see the writing the wall, and we have decided that it is best for us to shut down Silent Mail now. We have not received subpoenas, warrants, security letters, or anything else by any government, and this is why we are acting now." I realize that this is extreme. Both of those companies can do it because they're small. Google or Facebook couldn't possibly shut themselves off rather than cooperate with the government. They're too large; they're public. They have to do what's economically rational, not what's moral.

But they can fight. You, an executive in one of those companies, can fight. You'll probably lose, but you need to take the stand. And you might win. It's time we called the government's actions what it really is: commandeering. Commandeering is a practice we're used to in wartime, where commercial ships are taken for military use, or production lines are converted to military production. But now it's happening in peacetime. Vast swaths of the Internet are being commandeered to support this surveillance state.

If this is happening to your company, do what you can to isolate the actions. Do you have employees with security clearances who can't tell you what they're doing? Cut off all automatic lines of communication with them, and make sure that only specific, required, authorized acts are being taken on behalf of government. Only then can you look your customers and the public in the face and say that you don't know what is going on -- that your company has been commandeered.

Journalism professor Jeff Jarvis recently wrote in The Guardian: "Technology companies: now is the moment when you must answer for us, your users, whether you are collaborators in the US government's efforts to 'collect it all' -- our every move on the internet or whether you, too, are victims of its overreach."

So while I'm sure it's cool to have a secret White House meeting with President Obama -- I'm talking to you, Google, Apple, AT&T, and whoever else was in the room -- resist. Attend the meeting, but fight the secrecy. Whose side are you on?

The NSA isn't going to remain above the law forever. Already public opinion is changing, against the government and their corporate collaborators. If you want to keep your users' trust, demonstrate that you were on their side.

[seemslikeadream]

N.S.A Scandal and High-Tech Espionage on Brazil
Posted: 08/12/2013 2:09 pm


Is the U.S. ready to embrace the notion that Brazil has finally arrived on the world stage? Judging from the recent National Security Agency (N.S.A.) scandal, Washington is very skittish about the up and coming South American player. According to journalist Glen Greenwald, N.S.A. intercepts of Brazilian transmissions, including phone calls and internet communications, have been massive. Indeed, within the wider Americas region, N.S.A. snooping on the South American nation is second only to the U.S. in terms of overall scope. Writing in O Globo newspaper, Greenwald adds that the N.S.A. spied on the Brazilian Embassy in Washington and the South American nation's mission at the United Nations in New York.

Needless to say, some Brazilian politicians are hardly amused by the revelations. During a recent hearing called by the Brazilian Senate's Commission on Foreign Relations, officials peppered Greenwald, who resides in Brazil, about the N.S.A.'s capabilities. Specifically, politicians asked the journalist whether the spying agency was able to acquire Brazil's commercial secrets and to capture communications of the country's president and military. Confirming officials' worst fears, Greenwald declared that indeed, Washington's espionage was not solely aimed at preserving national security but also at collecting valuable commercial and industrial data from rivals.

Just why would the N.S.A. conduct industrial espionage on Brazil, a U.S. diplomatic partner? Greenwald promises to publish more articles which will illuminate the specific contours of such spying, and at this point it's anyone's guess what the further revelations will contain. It's no secret, however, that behind all the bonhomie, Washington is wary of Brazil and particularly skittish about providing high-tech secrets to the South American juggernaut.

Tensions over Sensitive Technology

Though many will associate Brazil with agriculture and the export of such commodities as soymeal and coffee, the country has also taken off as a leader in the aerospace industry. In recent years, giants such as Embraer have become global players in their own right. The company, which exercises considerable political leverage, manufactures the Super Tucano fighter aircraft and has even managed to lure in a number of international partners such as an Italian helicopter firm and even an Israeli drone maker. Impressed business observers remark that today, Embraer represents nothing less than the cornerstone of the military industrial complex in Latin America.

According to secret State Department cables released by WikiLeaks, the U.S. is a little nervous about Brazil's recent political trajectory and the notion of collaborating with Embraer on sensitive technology. In 2005, when then President Lula gave Embraer the green light to sell 20 Super Tucanos to Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, the Bush administration protested vigorously. Since U.S. suppliers provided 50 percent of the components of the Super Tucano, Washington was able to eventually block the advance of the sale. According to cables, however, Lula was furious and claimed that the U.S. had unfairly sought to hinder the growth of Brazil's own domestic arms industry. What is more, chiefs of the Brazilian armed services also felt chastened by the incident, with officers griping that the State Department's policy of delaying export licenses was "aimed at restricting Brazil's access to military technology," and U.S. intransigence had created "problems at the political level."

From Aerospace to Satellite Technology

Fast forward some eight years, and it does not seem as if U.S. wariness toward Brazil has abated and, if anything, the N.S.A. scandal will probably irk the Brazilian armed forces yet further. What is more, in light of additional reporting dealing with sensitive satellite espionage, the top brass may have grown even more irritated with the Pentagon. According to Greenwald, the N.S.A. worked in tandem with the C.I.A. to set up a spying operation in Brasilia. The joint espionage program, code-named "F6" but more commonly known as the "Special Collection Service," sought to scoop up and obtain valuable satellite data.

Writing in O Globo newspaper, Greenwald claims the U.S. used Brazil as a "bridge" to collect data on more protected countries whose traffic nonetheless passed through the large South American nation. Whatever the case, news of the allegations must have surely put the top brass in Brasilia on edge. At present, Brazil has no satellites of its own though the country leases eight satellites operated by foreign companies. Nevertheless, Brazil has plans to become a satellite power in its own right in time, and industrial giant Embraer wants in on the action. By 2020, the company hopes to launch its own satellites, sensors and unmanned aircraft which will manage a vast border surveillance system.

The Coming Satellite Rivalry

Perhaps, the U.S. has second thoughts about Brazil becoming a high-tech power: not only has the N.S.A. collected satellite data in Brazil, but Washington has been quietly passing on sensitive technology to Argentina. To be sure, Buenos Aires is a Brazilian ally, though the two nations have also been historic rivals in the Southern Cone of South America.

According to U.S. State Department cables released by WikiLeaks, the U.S. ambassador to Argentina, accompanied by the defense attaché and U.S. air force officers met with CEO's of INVAP, a high technology company which builds nuclear reactors and satellites. The company served as the prime contractor for the Argentine National Commission for Space Activities and NASA to build a series of scientific satellites.

In 2006, the U.S. ambassador recommended that his superiors support a $50 million Inter-American Development Bank loan to Argentina for a remote sensing satellite. The project, the ambassador believed, fell within the "U.S. national interest" as the loan "would develop an industry where Argentina is globally competitive, and one in which the U.S. government and U.S. companies have extensive military, scientific and commercial interests."

All branches of the U.S. military were interested in the project, the ambassador added, and "two U.S. military entities are interested in INVAP satellite technology for Future Combat Systems (FCS). The Space and Missile Defense Command is interested in INVAP satellite buses and, potentially, in its L-Band radar technology." In addition, the U.S. Army International Technology Centre South America, based in Argentina, was interested in identifying local technology" that could be useful for U.S. defense applications."

It's anyone's guess what the Brazilian top brass makes of all this "under the radar" collaboration between Argentina and the Pentagon. Perhaps, however, the Rousseff government is finally sitting up and taking notice as the U.S.-Argentine technological partnership seems to have borne fruit. In the provincial town of Resistencia, located in the Chaco region, U.S. military satellite experts are "providing services" to the Argentines. The Chaco region is a strategically located northern Argentine province lying near to Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil.

Growing Defense Integration

In light of the N.S.A. and earlier "Cable Gate" scandals, the Brazilian government may believe the Pentagon sees the country as a menace or potential threat. If that is Washington's view, however, such a policy may become more problematic in future. Indeed, if anything the Brazilian and American defense establishments have recently become more and more intertwined in each other's affairs.

Take, for example, the case of Embraer: recently the aerospace giant concluded a technical agreement with U.S.-based Boeing. The two companies will cooperate on the KC-390 military transport plane, with Boeing heading up sales, marketing, training and sustainment of the project in selected markets. Currently, Embraer is developing the plane under contract for the Brazilian air force.

Meanwhile, both Boeing and Embraer have their sights turned on each other's respective countries and markets. For some time, the Brazilian air force has been looking to replace its aging fleet with new fighters, and Boeing's F-18 Super Hornet package is being considered for the bid. The high-stakes contract, which is worth more than $4 billion and involves 36 jets, is currently one of the most prized deals in the defense industry. Indeed, according to sensitive WikiLeaks cables, U.S. diplomats have been transformed into glorified sales reps in Brasilia as they seek to get government officials on board with the Boeing deal. There's so much riding on the sale that Vice President Joe Biden, no less, lobbied the Brazilian government on Boeing's behalf during a recent trip in June.

At the same time, Embraer is extending its own tentacles into the U.S. market. Recently, the Brazilian behemoth won a U.S. Air Force contract to provide 20 Super Tucano fighters to the Afghan military. Prior to the bid, Brazilian officials frankly told their U.S. counterparts that if Embraer was rebuffed this would bode ill for Boeing's Hornet bid in Brasilia. Reportedly, Boeing's star has soared as a result of the favorable Afghan deal.

The Growing Paradox of U.S.-Brazilian Relations

Despite such growing business deals, the U.S.-Brazilian partnership still remains somewhat politically fraught and this has complicated sensitive technology transfer. Just how will Brazil maintain Boeing's fleet of Super Hornets if the Rousseff government doesn't have access to the plane's technological specs? Like her predecessor Lula, who was irate about U.S. interference in the Super Tucano affair, Rousseff too has placed great emphasis on Brazilian technological advancement. Indeed, the Brazilian leader has said that such technology is more important than the Hornets themselves, as the deal must boost the country's growing defense industry.

In private conversations, Biden reportedly assured Rousseff that if the Boeing deal were to go through, Congress would respect the manufacturer's agreement to transfer Hornet technology to Brazil. Nevertheless, the N.S.A. spying scandal may complicate Biden's diplomatic efforts and make Brazil think twice about awarding its fighter aircraft contract to an American manufacturer. By now in damage control mode, Biden recently suggested the U.S. might brief Rousseff officials in Washington about the N.S.A. program.

Just how much sensitive information will the Obama administration actually provide to Brasilia? Perhaps, Washington figures it can mollify the Brazilians by sketching the broad outlines of N.S.A. spying without giving up key details about the program. To be sure, if the U.S. wants to continue its espionage there is little that Rousseff can do to stop such operations, as the Brazilian Defense Minister has frankly admitted that his country "is still in diapers" in terms of cyber-security. Nevertheless, such spying is becoming increasingly more paradoxical in light of growing defense integration between Brasilia and Washington. In the long-term, the U.S. may be forced to decide: Is Brazil friend or foe?

[slimmouse]

Oh I shouldn't worry yourself too much about all of this stuff.

See Obama just set up this panel of experts to reccomend changes to how we are surveilled.

Led, apparently by James Clapper.

Anyone interested in the source, heres the link,

http://www.techdirt.com/articles/201308 ... ance.shtml

What more really needs to be said, apart from perhaps that the world owes a debt of big gratitude to Edward Snowden.

He's finally proved to us how its truly gonna be if we dont get our act together anytime soon.