stefano » Tue May 20, 2014 7:33 pm wrote:Sure. Sorry I had a spasm of paranoia about posting proprietary stuff on the Internet in searchable form but don't suppose many of my clients will be hanging around RI. Here is the whole thing.
No offense, but I don’t understand. Your analysis doesn't contain anything that isn't all over American Dream’s cut and paste junk that he gets from disinfo faux-Left and other thinly-disguised US intelligence propaganda sites. Is that what your clients want? How useful has that sort of thing been in the past, in making accurate predictions? For example, on December 8, 2012, nearly seven months before he was formally deposed, I wrote in a pm to someone on this board:
Morsy and his gang of thugs are finished. Only he and his American and Israeli admirers refuse to face this reality
something that was obvious to most Egyptians, and yet for some reason beyond the grasp of “analysts” and “experts”, who wrote reams and reams of worthless blather that served to obfuscate and confuse rather than inform.
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SISI'S CAMPAIGN AND WHAT TO EXPECT NEXT
Campaigning ahead of Egypt’s presidential election on May 26 and 27 is in the final stretch. The election will be a one-round affair since there are only two candidates: Field Marshal Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi, the former defence minister and leader of the coup d’état against then-president Mohammed Moursi in July 2013, and Hamdeen Sabbahi, a Nasserite social democrat with long experience in politics. Mr Sisi’s popularity is enormous thanks to the coup and the subsequent efforts of the army under his command to pacify Egypt and bring to heel the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), but there is opposition to him from MB members and other Islamists who still consider Mr Moursi the legitimate president of Egypt, as well as from liberals who see the military man as a potential dictator in the mould of Hosni Mubarak, the former Air Force commander who ruled Egypt from 1981 to 2011.
First, be conscientious about terminology and stop parroting labels that are misleading and inaccurate. What happened on July 3, 2013 was not a coup d’état. A coup d’état is when a group of military officers (usually a small group from within the army, and not necessarily from among its top brass) depose the legitimate government and replace it. This group of officers become the country's new rulers; they almost invariably impose martial law and 'emergency measures' that supersede normal laws and state institutions.
This is exactly the OPPOSITE of what happened last summer. It was Morsi, backed by the militias of the Muslim Brotherhood, who instituted a coup in November 2012 by nullifying the constitution and declaring himself to be above the law, when he grabbed the legislative, executive and judiciary powers by issuing a "constitutional declaration" that rendered him and all his decisions, past or present or future, to be immune from legal accountability or prosecution. The moment he did so, violating his vow to respect the constitution and the laws of the land, he lost the legitimate claim to the presidency that had been conditional on this vow.
In response to this and many other outrages, there was a groundswell of opposition that ultimately led to the largest popular uprising in human history, much larger and more inclusive even than the January 25th revolution that the world recognized as a revolution, rather than a coup d’état, even though back in 2011, the army did take over as the new government, and General Tantawy became the head of state. In the winter of 2011, Mubarak and his regime were genuinely and widely hated, and their removal was seen by most Egyptians as nothing short of miraculous. But even during the brief honeymoon, in which Tantawy was hailed as a hero, there was never any serious public interest in having him run for president. By ascribing Sisi's "enormous popularity" to "the coup", you simply ignore the fact that General Tantawy never, at any point, enjoyed anything resembling Sisi's popularity. Indeed, the opposite was true.
In contrast to 2011, last summer El-Sisi's role was strictly limited: first, as Defense Minister, he deployed the army to support the police in order to prevent the Brotherhood's armed militias from carrying out their threat to massacre the Egyptian people and "set Egypt on fire"; second, he invited representatives of all the political movements and parties and civil institutions to join together to set a timetable for the transition to democracy. In compliance with the people's demand (as specified in the more than 22 million signatories to the Tamarod form), the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was appointed interim president until elections could be held. The political parties and representatives of civil society appointed a temporary civilian prime minister and cabinet to run the government.
There was no martial law; all the state institutions continued to function normally; there was no suspension of legal rights and liberties at all, other than a brief night-time curfew that was progressively reduced as the security situation improved, and lifted entirely in September. Just because the West is so disappointed that Morsi and the Brotherhood failed to destroy Egypt and emulate the US' "successes" in Iraq, Syria and Libya, does not give Westerners the right to define a popular revolution as a military coup.
Many of these liberals are backing Mr Sabbahi (others are boycotting or supporting Mr Sisi), but Islamists are either calling for a boycott or, in the case of the Salafi movements, supporting Mr Sisi. Together with the massive support Mr Sisi has among middle-class Egyptians who are grateful for the return to stability, among poorer Egyptians who have become safer and who have been energised by the post-coup surge in nationalist feeling, among Christians and women whom he has protected from the MB’s hostile and divisive Islamist project, and among civil servants and soldiers, the boycott seals the election. We do not expect Mr Sisi to get less than 70% of the vote and a score of over 75% is a possibility.
By looking at Sisi's popularity from an ideological perspective, or as discrete sectors putting their own particular interests ahead of the nation, you are completely missing the point: first, because Sisi has no specific ideology, and second, because his enormous popularity transcends ideological, class, gender and religious differences. You yourself mention the "massive support" he enjoys among: middle-class Egyptians, poor Egyptians, Christians, women, civil servants and soldiers. He also enjoys "massive support" among wealthy Egyptians, devout Muslims (as opposed to Islamists), peasants, workers, Nasserists and other Leftists, Liberals, and among the widely diverse Egyptians living abroad (as demonstrated by his landslide victory – 94.5% of the vote – in the first stage of the presidential elections among Egyptian expats around the world). For that matter, Sisi also enjoys tremendous support among ordinary non-Egyptian Arab citizens across the region. As for the Salafi movements, the Salafi Nour Party has declared its support for Sisi, but the facts on the ground indicate that the majority of Salafists do not, and do not consider the Nour Party as their representative. They have cast their lot in with their natural allies, the Muslim Brotherhood.
Sisi's phenomenal popularity has nothing to do with ideology and everything to do with his personal character, his long and impressive record of achievements on Egypt’s behalf, the principles he espouses, and even more importantly, his vision for Egypt's future (and that of the region), which has captured the public’s imagination and enthusiasm. This last is an amazing accomplishment in itself, given how jaded and suspicious and simply exhausted Egyptians had become, after the last three and a half years of chaos and shocks and disappointments.
Mr Sisi has run a low-key campaign, partly for reasons of safety: he is an obvious target for assassination at the hands of radicalised MB members or the more extremist jihadists to whom he is a mortal enemy. On May 17 a bomb went off at a Sisi campaign rally (the candidate was not present) and injured four people.
Instead of running a traditional presidential campaign, Mr Sisi has preferred to hold small meetings with regional figures of influence and gave a long, two-part interview on television in May in which he laid out his vision for Egypt under his presidency.
In a way, Sisi is not running a presidential campaign at all. He did not ask to run for president, and had no desire to do so, but only decided to declare his candidacy after months of sustained and almost desperate public pressure. He doesn't act like a candidate: he doesn't speak much about himself, or about his achievements, or his qualifications. He doesn't ask people to vote for him. He never, ever criticizes or says a negative word about his opponent. Instead of populist speeches, he explains how he sees things, he calmly describes Egypt's dire current situation and the economic problems we face, using facts and figures, and how he believes they can be overcome. For months now, he's been meeting with representatives of various communities including Nubians, Bedouin tribes, peasants, civil society, authors and scholars, and internationally renowned experts in various fields such as alternative energy, geologists, public transport, finance, etc., listening intently to all of them, and asking detailed questions. In fact, it's accurate to say that he's not running for president, he's working very hard to inform himself and preparing himself to shoulder the heavy burdens of the presidency.
There's a big difference.
As could be expected from a military man, his main emphasis is on security and on re-establishing the stability of the country.
Last week, a "peaceful" Brotherhood march provided cover for two masked gunmen in a car, who shot and killed three army conscripts who were guarding Azhar University and wounded nine other people, in the middle of a crowded Cairo suburb. Immediately after the shooting, gunmen and demonstrators disappeared without a trace, in what was clearly an organized retreat. This was only the latest in a long string of vicious attacks. The economy and Egypt's ability to progress on any front are being held hostage by a bunch of crazed, armed fanatics, and people are really suffering. Without security, there is nothing. But security is not the objective; it is the prerequisite for realizing the objectives that all Egyptians want: justice, a decent quality of life for all citizens, economic progress and freedom.
While he said that “protesting and expressing one’s opinion […] cannot be rejected,” he sounded distinctly unenthusiastic about the “state of revolution” in which Egypt has been since Mr Mubarak was forced to resign in February 2011, and said that Egyptians need to “organise our whole lives, this includes our way of expressing our opinions.” This statement was made in defence of a controversial protest law which has been used to detain prominent young revolutionary leaders who played important roles in the 2011 uprising and even in the protests that preceded the end of Mr Moursi’s government.
It's important to note that Sisi had no part in issuing that law, which was passed by the interim government headed by Hazem Beblawy, co-founder of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, and approved by the president. To be sure, the law was passed in response to pressure from the public, who were sick and tired of having their lives disrupted by chaotic, unregulated and unpredictable demonstrations and marches. (Just as one example, I once spent 90 minutes stuck in my car only a 5-minute drive from my destination, because the Ultras were marching and blocking the roads of an entire neighborhood for God knows what reason). Nevertheless, Sisi defended the law, which ensures that the freedom of expression for some does not violate the human rights of others, for example by blocking major roads and highways, or intimidating worshipers or, as is currently happening, providing cover from anonymous "demonstrators" for criminal or terrorist attacks.
In any case, all laws issued by the interim government(s) will become null and void as soon as parliament is elected and convenes, unless they are ratified by the new parliament. Those who want to change this or any other law would do better to start working to ensure that the new parliament includes their views, instead of grandstanding for the news cameras and trying to incite more chaos and disrespect for the law.
The "prominent young revolutionary leaders" you mention, called a press conference to declare that they refuse to be bound by the law, and proceeded to violate it in front of news cameras. As a result, they were arrested. By their own actions and words, they have marginalized themselves and lost credibility with Egyptians, even if they continue to be treated as "prominent young revolutionary leaders" among their Western patrons and consumers of Western disinformation. To illustrate how little influence they now have: a few weeks ago, they announced that five of the "biggest" "revolutionary" organizations and movements were organizing a demonstration in front of the presidential palace; these included April 6, Aboul-Fotouh's Strong Egypt Party, the Revolutionary Socialists, the Alliance of Revolutionary Youth, and another one I can't recall right now. When the big day came, less than 150 people showed up, hung around for a while to be jeered and insulted by passers-by, and went home. It was pathetic to see how far they'd fallen from the days during and after the revolution, when all they had to do was announce a "millioneya" and hundreds of thousands of people would flock to join them, braving the police and Central Security forces! Their continuing glorification in Western media, and their glaring irrelevance to Egyptians, only serve to highlight whose interests they really serve.
He was impatient when the interviewer from Sky News Arabia asked a question about recent court judgements that open the door for mass death sentences, saying that the question “doubts the independence and fairness of our judiciary” and “we are not eligible to comment on its verdicts.” Egypt’s courts have consistently been hostile to the MB and this attitude will tend to make them co-operative with the executive after Mr Sisi is elected. His statements about the MB leave no doubt that the current measures against the movement will be kept in place or intensified after the election: he reiterated an earlier statement that “in case I win the elections the MB will no longer exist.”
First, it's silly to say that "Egypt’s courts have consistently been hostile to the MB," given the fact that the MB is a criminal, terrorist organization under Egyptian law, which, duh, makes it rather unlikely that Egypt's courts would be
friendly to the MB. Furthermore, Egyptian law forbids anyone from commenting on judicial verdicts, except through legal channels, such as appeals and lawsuits. Given that respect for the law is one of the core principles that Sisi not only espouses, but embodies personally, it's hardly surprising that he would refuse to violate the law in this, as in any other matter.
Another example is when his opponent, Sabbahy, began to appear in television interviews to campaign for president before the legal date for launching campaigns, Sisi remained silent and refused to appear on television, despite tremendous pressure to do so, in obedience to the law. He was bitterly criticized for waiting so long to announce his candidacy, long after Sabbahy had announced his, but he refused to do so until the date mandated by law. In his long career as a military officer, there has not been a whiff of scandal or abuse of power or position for personal gain, unlike so many others. In reference to the Brotherhood, and other Islamists, he has described their ideology as "not viable", because it is inflexible, backward and oppressive, and has pointed out that Egypt's constitution forbids political parties and political organizations based on religion.
On the economy, Mr Sisi has made few clear policy statements, instead seeing the same unity and co-operation that are required to re-establish security and stability as the solution to the country’s economic woes: “the unification of Egyptians to understand the problem, then the unification to overcome it.” He talked about reorganising subsidies (“rich people are the ones who benefit the most”), addressing the energy crisis, and paying off Egypt’s substantial external debt. If Egypt pulls together in the way it needs to, then, Mr Sisi said, “Egyptians and Sisi promise themselves that within two years their problems will come to an end.”
This paragraph contains many inaccuracies. First: he has made it clear that it is solely the police and the army's role to ensure Egypt's security internally and along its borders, and to brave the danger and sacrifice their lives in doing so; in contrast, every citizen is responsible for contributing to Egypt's economic recovery. Subsidies for the poor will not be reduced in any way, but will be managed much more intelligently. He has pointed out that under the current system the lion's share of public subsidies go to the richest. He provided the example of foreign embassies and multinational corporations, which use heavily-subsidized electricity and fuel, and noted that a person with one or more villas and heated swimming pools and central air-conditioning, can receive tens of thousands of dollars' worth (or more) of subsidized electricity and gasoline for his or her fleet of SUV's (and yacht!) per month, while a poor person living in a small apartment with a few lights, a fridge, a TV, and maybe a small fan receives only a few pennies' worth every month. This is not acceptable, and most Egyptians, rich and poor, heartily agree.
Furthermore, what he actually said is that if we each do our part, we should begin to see concrete results within two years. Your misquote,“Egyptians and Sisi promise themselves that within two years their problems will come to an end,” is not only ludicrous, but totally out of character. He never promises anything, other than that he will serve the Egyptian people and nation faithfully, and work tirelessly and sacrifice without limit on their behalf. Everything else is conditional and depends on the people's will.
Mr Sabbahi has been campaigning on one of the slogans of the revolution: ‘bread, freedom and social justice’. Since Mr Sisi, too, promises bread and social justice, and both candidates say that they intend to follow the vision of Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt’s near-mythical leader from 1956 to 1970), Mr Sabbahi’s electoral strategy has been mostly about freedom – more specifically about the freedoms that Egyptians fought for in the streets over the past three chaotic years. Mr Sabbahi says that, if elected, he will repeal the protest law and free ‘unjustly imprisoned’ youth revolutionaries, although like the front-runner he says that he will make sure the MB does not regain its former power. A number of members of the Tamarod campaign which preceded the 2013 coup are backing Mr Sabbahi for this reason, as are some smaller leftist parties. He will get support from some other middle-class liberals too, but MB sympathisers will not vote for him and the mass of Egypt’s population is firmly pro-Sisi.
Again, it is false that "both candidates say that they intend to follow the vision of Gamal Abdel Nasser.” While Sabbahy has based his entire career on identify himself as a "Nasserist", Sisi has never, ever come even close to doing so. When asked about his views of Nasser, he has replied in diplomatic terms, that there have been many great leaders in Egypt's past, but that history does not repeat itself and today's circumstances, obstacles and challenges are very different today than those faced by Nasser, Sadat or any other historical leaders.
In fact, it is the Egyptian people who have insisted on identifying Sisi with Nasser, a phenomenon which began on the streets, with people carrying the photos of both side-by-side. Nasser's own daughter, Hoda Abdel-Nasser, was the first to openly demand that Sisi run for president, long before it was considered a possibility. She cornered him in person when he visited Nasser’s grave last September, on the anniversary of Nasser’s death (a visit mandated by military protocol), and when he politely declined, she published an article reiterating her demand. It was gradually picked up until he couldn't appear anywhere without being pressured about it, and on the anniversary of the January 25th revolution, the streets were filled with people shouting, "Sisi is my president," in defiance of the Brotherhood's threats and attacks.
All the other members of Nasser's family are staunch supporters of Sisi as president, and so are most prominent Nasserists, including the widely respected journalist Abdel-Halim Qandil, and the popular film director Khaled Youssef, as well as other longstanding friends and allies of Sabbahy. On a personal note, I have long been a "Nasserist to the core", and like many others, I supported Sabbahy in the past. But when the real thing appears, the fake loses its luster. That is not to say that Sisi resembles Nasser in any obvious way; he does not. There are some very important differences.
At the risk of being long-winded, I’ll provide one example that illustrates those differences:
Over the years and decades, a number of "mafias" have formed in Egypt, which exert a monopoly on certain sectors and have led to escalating prices that aggravate the suffering of the poor. One of these is the "beef mafia". With corruption having allowed more and more agricultural land to be swallowed up by construction, Egypt's agricultural sectors have shrunk to the point where most of the country's food must be imported. A cartel of importers controls prices, so that beef, both domestic and imported, has become too expensive for Egypt's poor to afford. Nasser's characteristic solution would have been to arrest the members of the cartel and throw them in prison, and he would have regulated prices by force, and punished violators, until longer-term measures could be implemented to revive the local meat industry.
When asked what he would do to address this problem, Sisi's solution was very different. He began by explaining that imported beef costs the importer LE 30 per kg (around $4), and that it's resold to consumers for LE 70 and upwards, reaching LE 90 ($12) in some supermarkets. He said that a profit of LE 10 per kg would be very reasonable, but the current rate of profit was not. He proposed not to go near the current importers, nor to tell them what to do. Instead, the state itself would import beef for LE 30, add a profit of LE 10, and establish a network of well-run public sector supermarkets across the country which would sell this and other food products at a reasonable profit that would accrue to the state, and would provide diverse employment opportunities. He would use the current resources of the state, including the armed forces, to build the supermarkets at cost. In other words, his solution is for the state to compete with the cartel, forcing it to either reduce its prices or go out of business.
There has already been a similar system in place for decades, but on a much smaller scale than what he is proposing: a national network of bakeries, supermarkets and other facilities run by and for the armed forces personnel and their families. Their products are known to be of excellent quality, and are sold at reasonable prices. They make a profit. This model would simply be expanded so that similar opportunities could become available to non-military consumers, who would be free to choose whether to shop there, or at other retail shops.
This type of solution is very typical of Sisi's style, which is non-confrontational, practical and offers multiple benefits. When possible, he doesn't attack what's wrong, but instead produces something that's right. It also changes the rules of the game in a way that benefits ordinary Egyptians, while not depriving anyone of their rights or freedoms. I could name other examples of his approach, but that's enough for now.
While Mr Sisi has not made any clear statements on economic policy, what he has said so far, and the actions of the interim government in which he was defence minister are a fairly good guide to what we can expect from his presidency (Mr Sisi was certainly one of the most influential cabinet members in the interim government, if not the real decider in the place of the two prime ministers that government has had).
That is false. As Defense Minister, Sisi confined himself strictly to his role within the armed forces and had no influence at all outside that sphere, within the cabinet. The "real decider" was and is the president, Adly Mansour, followed by the prime minister, who is accountable to the president until the parliamentary elections, after which the president himself, the prime minister and cabinet will be answerable only to the parliament. Beblawy and most of the cabinet were selected by Mohamed El-Baradei, and the other representatives of civil society and the political parties, with Sisi having no say. This is why Beblawy and most of his cabinet were from so-called "liberal" parties, many of whom turned out to be neo-liberals.
The main focus will be on security and on rebuilding the operational capacity of the police to address crime and extremism. The president’s hostility to street protests will continue to extend to organised labour, and we expect strikes to be repressed fairly harshly. There have already been signs of this, with strikers being accused of playing the MB’s game or of lacking sufficient patriotism. Subsidies will be cut, and street actions in protest at these measures will be cracked down on, too. There will be more formal repression against media and civil society, in addition to the self-censorship that has been apparent in the media as journalists and television personalities make sure to be seen as pro-Sisi. Other austerity measures in government will follow, but defining and implementing those measures will be the task of the next prime minister, to be elected along with a Parliament at a date to be announced.
Sorry, Stefano, but this is absolute nonsense. You are allowing your own prejudices to blind you. There will be no "crack-down", not only because that is the very opposite of Sisi's style. He does not "repress", harshly or otherwise. His record speaks for itself.
This is someone who became Minister of Defense at a time when the army was at its lowest point, in terms of morale, in decades. Discipline had become slack, and corruption had made significant inroads. There were rumors of cracks in the army's unity, and of possible infiltration by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Just as dangerously, the army's image among the general population, and the trust and respect that it had enjoyed, were badly damaged by the 18 months in which the SCAF ruled the country. Working quietly and tirelessly under the radar, he managed to transform all this in six months, and he did this without any crack-down, but using the same principles upon which he is basing his current political leadership. First, he provided a living example of the values that he wanted to promote among the rank and file. Second, he traveled constantly, personally overseeing (and participating in) the training exercises. Third, he spoke to the troops, explaining, discussing, answering questions thoughtfully and honestly, and listening to their concerns. And fourth, he strictly enforced a just and transparent system of distributing privileges and benefits.
Ironically, we were able to witness for ourselves his attitude in closed meetings with the army rank and file, because of Al-Jazeera, the media network that burns with a corrosive hatred for him personally and for the Egyptian armed forces. Several months ago, they broadcast “leaks” from some of these meetings, advertising them as “scandalous”. Far from “exposing” him, on the contrary his popularity and public's respect soared with each release of the supposedly scandalous videos and recordings, until Al-Jazeera stopped broadcasting them.
In any case, the new constitution radically reduces presidential powers and commensurately increases the authority and powers of the prime minister, who will be appointed by the president, but only conditionally, pending the parliament's approval. The president will not be able to hold the prime minister or indeed any cabinet minister accountable, let alone fire them. In contrast, the parliament has the authority to legally depose the president, and must ratify most of his decisions. The parliament will issue the laws that the police and that the independent judiciary are obliged to enforce, and the Ministry of Interior (which includes the police) is accountable to the parliament. But the parliament will be only accountable to the people. In other words, under the new constitution real power will be in the hands of the people, through the parliament. Sisi as president will not have the tools that previous presidents have had, to oppress or enforce his will against that of the people.
These are the new rules of the game, which for some reason you neglect to account for, in your analysis.
Unlike the system under Mubarak, in which the prime minister and all the cabinet (including the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense) were solely answerable to the president, under the new constitution the president has very little power to order anybody to do anything. This includes the army, from which Sisi has permanently retired. It's worth noting that Sisi himself, when he was the director of military intelligence, before the January 25th revolution broke out, asked the members of the then-Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to discuss and vote on the question: in any conflict between the president and the people, with whom would the armed forces side? The members voted to confirm that the armed forces exist to serve the Egyptian people, not any particular government or person. This is consistent with the longstanding creed of the Egyptian military, which is a general people's army of conscripts, led by graduates of Egypt's national military college, committed to the defense of Egypt's national security and integrity.
Bottom line: Sisi is gambling everything on the people’s free will. With their support, he will be able to lead Egypt to fulfill our shared vision of the future and be virtually unstoppable. Without it, he will be helpless. He understands this very well, and so do we. This is the new reality established by the constitution that he asked us to vote for, and which more than 98% of voters approved: a constitution that gives the next president no real power at all, unless the people are willing to back him up.
The next few years will certainly be difficult in Egypt. The austerity measures and efforts to reduce government debt of which Mr Sisi has spoken have been urgent for years, and unfortunately such measures can only be implemented by a government which is willing to back its arguments with State force. Mr Sisi’s government will be of that kind. While the medium-term impact on civil rights and organised labour will be negative, the long-term benefits will accrue to the population as a whole and will strengthen Egypt, on one condition: that the reforms take place in a fair and transparent way.
It's important to point out that any government headed by Sisi will be based on the rule of law, not because this is one of his own core principles, but because this is the system mandated by the country's new constitution. Of course, a lot depends on the quality of the upcoming parliament, which will bear the tremendous responsibility of translating the constitution into applicable laws, and which will also be the main body tasked with oversight of the executive branches.
Even more depends on the people's willingness to shoulder their own responsibilities for raising their nation up, whether as individuals or collectively. This is widely understood, not least because he has made no promises, but conditional “if-then” statements: “This is the problem. It can be solved, if we do this.” He has also made it clear that the greatest costs will be borne by those who can most afford them, but that the system will be transparent and fair. The past three and a half years have really served to inform and sober up Egyptians, and believe it or not, that’s exactly what they want to hear, especially from someone who has earned their trust and respect.
We have concerns about grand corruption in the coming government – Mr Sisi has been making the right noises about corruption but his backers include some of the most powerful business interests in Mr Mubarak’s government, and of course the army, which is a huge economic player in Egypt. If these interests manage to safeguard the privileges they acquired especially in the Mubarak years, if workers continue to work for low wages while their officer bosses asset-strip companies and pay themselves enormous salaries, and prices increase while connected businessmen snap up lucrative tenders, then political risk will trend negative. If, by contrast, Mr Sisi delivers what he is promising, and he really is the man Egyptians think they are voting for next week, then risk will trend slowly positive.
While it's true that some wealthy individuals have bought billboard space and banners promoting Sisi's candidacy, and organized campaign rallies, etc.(which he does not attend or even acknowledge), the fact is that they add nothing to Sisi's popularity, which is already sky-high and needs no publicity; on the contrary, it is they who are trying to associate themselves in the public's mind with Sisi, almost certainly in preparation for the upcoming parliamentary elections. As for Sisi himself, when asked about these supposed "backers", he smiles and says that "nobody will get anything from me," meaning that he has no strings to be pulled. As for the army being "a huge economic player in Egypt," a lot of crazy figures have been tossed around in the Western media, but the actual figure is that the army's business activities comprise less than 2% of the Egyptian economy (1.8% to be precise), a tiny fraction of the rate in the US, France or many other countries, including Israel and Iran. This is largely the legacy of Sadat and especially Mubarak, whose regimes not only gutted the public sector, but also the military industries.
Sisi makes no secret of the fact that he considers the armed forces to be the "tent-pole", or the "spinal column" that holds the entire nation together and keeps it standing. Its role is not only to defend the nation's borders and to fight armed terrorists, but also to provide a living model of sacrifice, national pride, personal competence, team-work and discipline. When he was Defense Minister, the army committed itself to a number of important infrastructure projects, which prompted accusations by some self-styled 'revolutionaries' that it was grabbing economic benefits for itself at the expense of the public purse. In fact, the army acts only as a contractor, enforcing specifications, budget and deadlines, and assigning interested and qualified private sector contractors to execute the actual work. The projects in question, which include a number of roads and bridges, were executed in record time, well within budget, and at a much higher quality than usual.
Sisi proposes, once again, to apply this model to all future government projects, and indeed to demand a similarly high standard of efficiency and achievement from each citizen and from the business community. If anyone can accomplish this, he can. Though as president he will have no coercive power, the moral authority he currently enjoys is tremendous, far more powerful than the legal or oppressive powers that either Mubarak or Morsi ever had.
That moral authority, and the people's genuine, freely-given trust and respect are the most important elements in the equation. Even today, when Sisi is a private citizen with no legal status and no actual powers, he is a formidable figure, by virtue of the people’s will. As president, it will be no different, except that the current situation will be legalized and formalized, especially in the international arena. This is the elephant in the room which so many Western observers seem unable or unwilling to see, which explains why they so often get it wrong. As one social scientist aptly put it, "Sisi has cracked the code of the Egyptian people," a code that remains indecipherable to many so called 'experts', which keeps them out of the loop and incapable of seeing, still less explaining, what is so evident to so many Egyptians, and even non-Egyptians.
"If you're not careful the newspapers will have you hating the oppressed and loving the people doing the oppressing." - Malcolm X
, Alice!