Secret US arms shipment 'smuggled to terrorists'

by **Rigorous Intuition** » Wed May 10, 2006 9:00 am

Aerocom, the Moldovan company at the centre of it all, is one of Victor Bout's. 10 May 2006 HAVE 200,000 AK47S FALLEN INTO THE HANDS OF IRAQ TERRORISTS? FEARS OVER SECRET U.S. ARMS SHIPMENT SOME 200,000 guns the US sent to Iraqi security forces may have been smuggled to terrorists, it was feared yesterday. The 99-tonne cache of AK47s was to have been secretly flown out from a US base in Bosnia. But the four planeloads of arms have vanished. Orders for the deal to go ahead were given by the US Department of Defense. But the work was contracted out via a complex web of private arms traders. And the Moldovan airline used to transport the shipment was blasted by the UN in 2003 for smuggling arms to Liberia, human rights group Amnesty has discovered. It follows a separate probe claiming that thousands of guns meant for Iraq's police and army instead went to al-Qaeda. Amnesty chief spokesman Mike Blakemore said: "It's unbelievable that no one can account for 200,000 assault rifles. If these weapons have gone missing it's a terrifying prospect." American defence chiefs hired a US firm to take the guns, from the 90s Bosnian war, to Iraq. But air traffic controllers in Baghdad have no record of the flights, which supposedly took off between July 2004 and July 2005. A coalition forces spokesman confirmed they had not received "any weapons from Bosnia" and added they were "not aware of any purchases for Iraq from Bosnia". Nato and US officials have already voiced fears that Bosnian arms - sold by US, British and Swiss firms - are being passed to insurgents. A Nato spokesman said: "There's no tracking mechanism to ensure they don't fall into the wrong hands. There are concerns that some may have been siphoned off." This year a newspaper claimed two UK firms were involved in a deal in which thousands of guns for Iraqi forces were re-routed to al-Qaeda. <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/tm_objectid=17055497&method=full&siteid=94762&headline=have-200-000-missing-ak47s-fallen-into-the-hands-of-iraq-terrorists---name_page.html">www.mirror.co.uk</a> Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=rigorousintuition>Rigorous Intuition</A> at: 5/10/06 7:12 am

by **chiggerbit** » Wed May 10, 2006 10:19 am

Here we go, Iran/contra all over again. Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=chiggerbit@rigorousintuition>chiggerbit</A> at: 5/10/06 9:41 am

by **Gouda** » Wed May 10, 2006 10:40 am

This was also mentioned in the recent, wider-ranging Amnesty/TransArms report "Dead on Time – arms transportation, brokering and the threat to human rights" which havanagilla posted downboard.... <a href="http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGPOL300132006">news.amnesty.org/index/ENGPOL300132006</a> Full report: <a href="http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact300082006">web.amnesty.org/library/i...t300082006</a> Good information, but I find their "positions" and recommendations very weak at best, and counterproductive at worst as they skip past root causes and structures by calling for reliance on fully corrupt and infiltrated agencies, and for cosmetic reforms to a rotten system. Edited by: <A HREF=http://p216.ezboard.com/brigorousintuition.showUserPublicProfile?gid=gouda@rigorousintuition>Gouda</A> at: 5/10/06 8:53 am

by **Gouda** » Wed May 10, 2006 12:13 pm

Good info on this transfer from the Amnesty Report: <blockquote>Quote:<hr>8. Brokering a covert arms supply operation(416) Large quantities of small arms and light weapons from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) war-time stockpiles and tens of millions of rounds of ammunition were exported and supposedly shipped to Iraq by a chain of private brokers and transport contractors under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) between July 31, 2004 and June 31, 2005, according to sources within the EU-led peace-keeping force (EUFOR) the Organisation for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR).(417) However, whether a series of shipments of AK47-type assault rifles documented as weighing 99,000 kg reached or remained in Iraq remains in doubt.(41<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> Despite the strong US law regulating the activities of arms brokers and freight-forwarders, the use of multiple private sub-contractors in this US-sponsored arms brokering and transportation process has included the involvement of foreign companies one of which was named by the United Nations for arms smuggling and another of which was unregulated by its own government. As the following case shows, US tax dollars from the Pentagon have been used to fund foreign arms shipments delivered by an east European air cargo company which in the previous months had been accused in a highly-publicised UN investigation report of violating the UN arms embargo on Liberia and which had no valid operating certificate. "The largest arms shipments from Bosnia since the second world war have occurred in the last year. There are Swiss, US and UK companies involved. The deal was organised through the embassies and the military attaché offices were involved. The idea was to get the weapons out of Bosnia where they pose a threat and to Iraq where they are needed. But NATO has no way of monitoring the shipments once they leave Bosnia, there is no tracking mechanism to ensure that they do not fall into the wrong hands. There are concerns that some of the weapons may have been siphoned off. A lot of the weapons left from Tuzla airforce base, others from the port at Ploèe [Croatia]," said one NATO official in June 2005.(419) *** "Peeling the skin of an onion"– establishing accountability The US-sponsored arms deal for Iraq was technically a state-to-state affair – the Bosnian state authorities officially gave permission for the sale following the presentation of end-user certificates from the US Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the interim Iraqi administration. However, the sale, purchase, transportation and storage of the weapons has been handled entirely by a complex network of private arms brokers, freight forwarders and air cargo companies operating at times illegally and subject to little or no governmental regulation. Governmental and inter-governmental oversight ended at the cargo aircraft point of departure from US "Eagle base" in Tuzla.(43<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> It appears that the BiH Directorate of Civil Aviation (BHDCA)(439) and Eurocontrol, the pan-European body responsible for the control of European airspace,(440) did not receive all the data on arms flights declared from BiH to Iraq. The blurring of roles between government agencies and private contractors is a key aspect of arms deliveries. In BiH, US DoD officials and US agencies staff have assisted the primary contractor in identifying weapons, facilitating their purchase and helping enable their movement across Bosnian territory.(441) A NATO intelligence officer said that the embassies of other major European states assisted companies originating from their own countries to export weapons whose ultimate destination was Iraq. In Iraq, US government agency procurement officers responsible for the arrival of the weapons in Baghdad from BiH were not Federal government employees but contractors working for CACI, a Virginia-based private security company that is better known for its role in interrogations at the Abu Ghraib prison complex in Iraq.(442) The CACI-contracted staff member named as responsible for authorising the shipments to Iraq and liaising with the freight-forwarders could not be contacted and his office telephone numbers no longer worked.(443) State and entity agencies in BiH have also been reluctant to provide information on either the transfer process or the network. The Bosnian Serb Ministry responsible for arms sales stated that clauses within the contracts signed with the private contractor network forbid any disclosure of information relating to the sale of arms.(444) The BiH state-level Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MoFTER) have, in accordance with the new, internationally-sponsored arms transfer legislation provided the legal minimum of information required and admitted to being pressured by foreign diplomats into not discussing the identity of contractors named in arms documentation which was altered in order to prevent that disclosure.(445) In Iraq, the level of transparency appears even lower. Although the altered MoFTER documentation cites "Coalition forces in Iraq" as the official end-users in five shipments of arms to Iraq, the Multi-National Security Transition Command in Iraq, MNSTC-I, the coalition force responsible for training the new Iraqi security forces, and their commanding US General have claimed "not to have …received any weapons from Bosnia" and say they are "not aware of any [arms] purchases for Iraq from Bosnia".(446) MNSTC-1 claimed in September 2005 that "the Iraqi Security Forces received more than 172,000 AK-47 automatic rifles, 163,000 pistols, 8,000 heavy machine guns and 195,000sets of body armor."(447) The process of discovering which company made which delivery was defined by an executive of the primary arms dealing company as "peeling the skin of an onion" – with layer after layer of sub-contractor in both the brokerage and transportation networks.(44<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> <hr></blockquote> *** <blockquote>Quote:<hr>US sponsored arms brokering and freighting network The US-sponsored BiH-Iraq transfers provide insight into the structure and processes by which contemporary state-sanctioned arms brokering is conducted. The arms brokering and freight forwarding network can be viewed in this case as a pyramidal structure with an primary contractor sitting at the apex astride a collection of largely unregulated, secretive companies operating out of private apartment buildings and gun shops but involved in an arms deal worth tens of millions of dollars. The primary contractor in the BiH-Iraq transfers has been Taos Industries Inc. ("Total Acquisition One Source"<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/wink.gif ALT=";)"> based in Madison, Alabama. Taos claims to have 27 staff and describes itself as a "small business" which has "satellite" offices in Baghdad, Iraq; Kiev, Ukraine; Sofia, Bulgaria; and in Florida at Elgin Air Force Base, the headquarters of US forces Central Command responsible for the Middle East, south-west and central Asia.(449) Taos may consider itself a small company, but its website advertises "complete procurement services" and offers a wide range of military materiel including items spanning the entire ex-Soviet armed forces arsenal including advanced missile systems, main battle tanks, portable anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs) as well as more than a dozen rocket-propelled grenade launcher variants and AK47 derivatives.(450) Taos promotes its close connections to the U.S. Department of Defense and other DoD agencies including the Strategic Defense Command, the US Army and Aviation Command and DoD staff stationed in various US diplomatic missions in eastern Europe and the US Central Command orbit.(451) Taos has, in turn, subcontracted downwards to companies in Israel, Switzerland, Bulgaria and the UK who in turn sub-contracted to other firms, creating a network of business relationships involving a variety of companies. Other companies within the network, which have not been named in open-source materials relating to arms trafficking, operate from offices in BiH, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Serbia and the Ukraine, states in which government oversight is weak and there is little in the way of independent scrutiny. Despite owning arms brokering and transportation licences, the authorities in a number of these states profess to be unaware these companies’ involvement in the Iraq arms network.(452) The US DoD and its principal US contractor, Taos, appear to have no effective systems to ensure that their contractors and sub-contractors do not use firms that violate UN embargoes and also do not use air cargo firms for arms deliveries that have no valid air operating certificates, despite strong clauses regarding unlawful conduct by contractors and sub-contractors in DoD sponsored supply agreements for Iraq.(453) "I find that shocking that they [a Bulgarian brokering firm] used a company [an unlicensed Moldovan air cargo company, Aerocom, that had violated a UN arms embargo – see below] involved in smuggling," said a Taos executive on checking this in the Taos hard copy records.(454) The US Dept of Commerce appears to maintain no fewer than five lists of restricted parties, including parties that have been barred by the UN Security Council, but Aerocom does not seem to be on the lists examined by Amnesty International. Taos had personnel periodically present in Iraq from 2003 onwards but became directly involved in the Iraq arms transfer process when the company won a Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, contract worth over $20 million which was part of a wider $34,432,072 deal under DoD auspices on April 28, 2004 [US DoD Contract W914NS-04-D-0115].(455) According to Taos’s press statement of July 12, 2004, Taos won an "indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity" contract worth $50 million over three years to provide "equipment for Afghanistan".(456) The company website also states that on February 21, 2005, Taos Industries together with four other businesses were awarded a two year $300 million indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract to "supply security equipment in support of US nation building in Iraq."(457) Moreover, Taos announced that on August 18, 2005, it won a further DoD contract worth $13.5 million to provide "110 armoured (sic) vehicles in support of US forces in Iraq".(45<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> EUFOR and Taos executives confirmed that the company is the apex contractor, closely linked with Pentagon officials working in the Balkans who helped facilitate the weapons transfer arrangements.(459)<hr></blockquote> Amnesty ought to wise up a little. (Why they don't is another discussion). They state that "The US DoD and its principal US contractor, Taos, appear to have no effective systems" to ensure legitimate, transparent shipments. What they do not say is that there are systems to ensure the opposite. and don't forget Scout of Croatia: <blockquote>Quote:<hr> Croatian, Swiss and UK brokers Scout d.o.o., of Croatia, was the interface arms brokering company which acted as a conduit between the Federal BiH Ministry of Defence, Taos and related sub-contractors.(462) According to a US State Department diplomat from the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Scout have "a long-standing relationship with the Pentagon" and "good connections with the [Bosnian] Federation Ministry of Defence."(463) According to EUFOR and OSCE sources, Scout played a key role in the early stages of the arms transfer process. Scout obtained the contract from the FBiH Ministry of Defence and then proceeded to sell tens of thousands of weapons to the Taos brokering network.(464) The relative power accorded to Scout was explained by a Taos executive: "We could not buy the weapons without going through Scout. Scout owned every one of those weapons in that warehouse…and SFOR…they allowed these guys [Scout] in and out…we had no choice…frankly it was a good deal for the US government rather than having them demilled…they could be used in Iraq where they were needed.. It [Scout] was the only party we could go to."(465) Scout’s business address in the arms transfer documentation is a fifth-floor flat in a shabby apartment building in an outlying suburb in Zagreb. The business address is the private residence of the two directors of the company listed in Croatia’s business directory.(466) Ivan Peranec together with his wife, Dragica Peranec run the company which lists its business activities as a travel agency, tour operator, a producer of electronic equipment, a representative of foreign companies among others. Last on the list is "arms and ammunition broker".(467)<hr></blockquote> Do you think Amnesty will ever get around to connecting all these embassy contacts, UN/NATO logistics-procurement officers, and shady 5th-floor flat cutouts to various intelligence agencies? Hmmm...wasn't Foggo kind of in charge of CIA admin, contracts etc., and thus necessarily tied in (or tied up) with various defense contractors? Anyway, more on Aerocom: <blockquote>Quote:<hr> Air carriers and the lack of delivery verification The first four flights carrying arms destined for Iraq were carried out by Aerocom, an air cargo company accused in an April 2003 UN report to the UN Security Council for smuggling weapons from Serbia to Liberia in 2002 in contravention of the UN arms embargo on Liberia.(473) Aerocom’s flights from the US-military controlled Eagle base at Tuzla in BiH were carried out on August 7, 8, 21, and 22, 2004.(474) Planned and actual take-off times were noted. According to BHDCA documentation and confirmed by Taos, the flights comprised of 99,000 kg of small arms and light weapons, almost entirely Kalashnikov AK47 assault rifle variants and derivatives. In addition to this, neither the BHDCA nor Eurocontrol were informed about the fourth flight on August 21, records of which were only kept at Tuzla airbase.(475) Apart from using a company named by the UN as engaged in weapons smuggling from Serbia in previous months, there were a number of other irregularities of concern. The plane, a Russian-made Ilyushin 76, registration number ER-IBV, using call signs MCC9071 and MCC9073 when departing Tuzla, was flying illegally because Aerocom had lost its Air Operating Certificate (AOC) on August 6, 2004 the day before it carried out the series of arms flights from Tuzla.(476) The AOC is the single most important document required by airline companies in order to operate. The flights were actually scheduled for August 1, but were delayed for reasons unknown.(477) According to a flight operations specialist at the Moldovan Civil Aviation Authority, CAA(47<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> , Aerocom’s AOC was not renewed following concerns expressed by Germany and other EU member states regarding the company’s "safety and security record".(479) Even more importantly, it cannot be established with any certainty that the weapons carried by Aerocom were actually delivered to Baghdad. The coalition air traffic control authority, the Regional Air Movement Coordination Control Center (RAMCC),(480) has no records of any landing slot requests made by Aerocom under their registered call signs during the month of August. RAMCC Iraq chief Major Fred Boehm told in written correspondence that Aerocom had filed requests to land at Baghdad but that these flights originated from Kuwait and related to an Antonov 12 aircraft.(481) Requests for further information from the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) met with no response. According to civil aviation sources flying into Iraq, the Iraqi CAA has remained non-functional, and full authority in practice was vested in the RAMCC, something that the RAMCC documentation makes clear. In addition to this, it is alleged that the Iraqi CAA was not in a position to keep records of landing slot requests during the period in question – August 2004 – as they existed at best on paper. Subsequent appeals to the RAMCC to re-check records by Artic Group Ltd, a Ukrainian company which acted on behalf of Aerocom for the BiH-Baghdad flights [see further below], failed to elicit any response from the RAMCC.(482) Under military regulations, all planes landing at Baghdad airport have to file landing slot request forms with the RAMCC except in emergencies. It would be extremely dangerous for an unauthorised aircraft to attempt a landing at Baghdad airport as there are rigorous security protocols and defences in place, giving added weight to the RAMCC motto "Better not fly without us".(483) Speedex and Artic both state that they have documents to prove the delivery of the weapons to Baghdad but they have refused to make such documentation available, saying it would compromise client confidentiality.(484) This argument is slightly spurious given the fact that they themselves have identified the consigner – Taos Industries - and the consignee – the US Department of Army/Department of State, US Mission Iraq – and claim to have delivered the weapons.(485) Taos claims the weapons were delivered to Baghdad but say they do not possess documentation that would prove the planes actually landed at Baghdad and that the weapons were actually delivered. However, Taos do say they have documents to prove that they were paid for the weapons.(486) Taos claims that it would be difficult to obtain documentary evidence of landings and delivery because of the chaotic situation in Iraq combined with high staff turnover in Baghdad.(487) This may seem unconvincing given that the operation was a significant and sensitive US-sponsored arms deal and it is the US authorities that have most control over military affairs in Baghdad, yet an executive of Taos Industries described his experience: "Sometimes we’re not paid for as much as six months because they can’t find the material, they can’t [unclear] the documents….I mean we have guys…I have a guy over there about every two months to walk around with the officers and point out the boxes with our material, to point out our material… and to find our documents, things can easily get lost or get confused."(48<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> The US government department responsible for authorising the arms shipments to Iraq and liaising with the freight-forwarders, the Project Contracting Office, PCO, is not the agency responsible for receiving the weapons on arrival in Baghdad.(489) Weapons delivery is "probably" handled by the US "Defense Contract Management Activity."(490) This is part of the Office of Management and Budgets (OMB). Taos Industries claims that even if the person in Baghdad who signed for the receipt of the weapons delivered by Aerocom could be found, it may prove very difficult to identify the arms themselves since there was no tracking system once the weapons left the airport.(491) Taos supplies were intended for the police as well as army units in Iraq and claims that EUFOR in BiH should have received documents following the Aerocom shipments, specifically a US DoD form known as DD1907, a signature and tally record in which the consignee representative should sign for all items at point of delivery. A Taos executive stated that the DD 1907 form should have turned up in BiH "four weeks" after delivery of the shipment. EUFOR officials said that completed DD1907 forms were the only evidentiary documents for delivery verification of arms and such forms should be completed and sent to show that the weapons have been delivered - and that this had been the case with other shipments.(492) However, EUFOR refused to respond to written requests for confirmation that they are in receipt of the DD1907s for the Aerocom shipments.(493) One EUFOR official stated that "the DD1907 document is in practical terms meaningless since it deals with shipment weight, tonnage, rather than the number of weapons and systems delivered, we do not give the DD1907 any credibility, they could have delivered steel pipes and we in Sarajevo would be unaware if the shipment that arrived actually comprised of the material that left Tuzla."(494) According to Turkish air traffic control documentation, five Aerocom flights did exit and enter Turkish airspace on the dates in question, ostensibly bound for and returning from Baghdad international airport. However this by itself does not constitute evidence that the planes themselves actually landed at their stated destination or that the cargoes ended up with the authorised end-users.(495) While the coalition air traffic control stated that they have no record of the Aerocom shipments, even if the weapons were delivered to Iraq, there has been a significant risk of diversion of US-supplied weaponry inside Iraq to actors associated with grave violations of human rights. Firearms delivered to Iraq as part of a deal involving Taos Industries and two UK companies, Super Vision International and Helston Gunsmiths have allegedly ended up "in Al-Qaeda hands."(496) In another report, US officers training the new Iraqi Security Forces are quoted as describing the arms distribution process as becoming "very murky" with one official estimating that "unaccounted equipment [including weapons] could total $500 million in value". The article also quoted a lawyer representing an arms broker which had supplied the Iraqi ministry of defence as saying that out of a shipment of 1,500 AK-47s, "nearly all of the AK-47 rifles disappeared."(497) There were also other actors within the arms freighting and logistics network that have close, yet undefined, links to Aerocom, a now-defunct company. As already mentioned, the Aerocom flights involved Artic Group Ltd. In the BHDCA take-off slot request form, the telephone numbers provided by Aerocom do not contain the Moldova country code where Aerocom were officially based prior to AOC decertification. Instead, the contact numbers and staff names for Aerocom are identical to the numbers listed to Artic Group Ltd, a Kiev-based company.(49<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> The man named as "Aerocom operations manager" in the BHDCA documentation stated that he works for Artic and written correspondence with him originated from an Artic email address.(499) While Artic claims to have consulted with Aerocom staff in replying to written correspondence, they repeatedly failed to provide the requested contact names and numbers for Aerocom offices and staff and declined to respond to the allegation that Artic was in fact Aerocom operating under a different name.(500) The aircraft used by Aerocom/Artic for the weapons flights to Iraq, was registered as ER-IBV (an Ilyushin 76T), and was leased by Aerocom from Jet Line International, an air cargo firm named as a partner company in the Artic Group website. However, since August 6, 2004 Aerocom could not legally operate the Ilyushin ER-IBV because the company had lost its Air Operating Certificate (AOC). Aerocom’s international call designator, MCC, assigned from the International Civil Aviation Organisation, was withdrawn in the first 2005 listing.(501) This Ilyushin has since been operating under the AOC of Jet Line International. One Jet Line official, said that in fact "they [Artic] operate that aircraft under our AOC" and that "Artic owns ER-IBV".(502) Artic has been advertising the use of an Il-76 for charter flights from its website. A representative of Speedex, the freight-forwarding company responsible for contracting Aerocom, also said that Artic owns the ER-IBV plane.(503) Another Artic staff member appears to be the previous contact person for Jet Line International in Kiev.(504) Jet Line International and Aerocom are also linked through Asterias Commercial, SA, describing itself as a company registered in Greece but also based in Kiev, Ukraine, and listing Jet Line International as one of its "partners." Asterias is named as the holder of an insurance policy for another Aerocom plane, ER-IBE for the period 2004 – 2005.(505)<hr></blockquote>

by **Gouda** » Wed May 10, 2006 12:37 pm

More. Now we've also got Israelis (Talon, of all names for a company), Brits n' Kurds (Global Trading Group Ltd.) n' Slavs (Kosmas Air) oft via a newly liberated Serbia in support of newly liberated Iraq, oft via some darned Swiss channel... <blockquote>Quote:<hr>Israeli, Swiss and UK firms and exports from Serbia & Montenegro(506) The current moratorium on arms transfers originating from the BiH wartime stockpiles has helped focus attention on arms stockpiles and the arms industry in Serbia and Montenegro. International and local observers in Belgrade say that arms stockpiles of newly manufactured weapons and ammunition from Serbia and Montenegro are being transferred to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Taos executives mentioned the involvement of a previously unknown Israeli-registered company, "Talon," which they said was an arms-brokering company "based in Tel Aviv, Israel", playing a major role to facilitate the transfer of weapons from Serbia to the Middle East.(507) A Montenegrin arms company executive also stated that Talon acted as an "agent" on behalf of Taos in Serbia & Montenegro, but that a confidentiality clause in their contract forbade them for discussing the company’s identity. Moreover, the Serbia & Montenegro Ministry of International Economic Relations (MIER) stated that the company involved in procuring weapons for Iraq in Serbia & Montenegro is Talon Security Consulting and Trade Ltd, registered at an address in the "Diamond Tower" Twin Towers complex in Jabotinsky street, Ramat-Gan, Tel Aviv.(50<img src=http://www.ezboard.com/images/emoticons/glasses.gif ALT="8)"> Talon’s owner is Major Shmuel Avivi, according to the Federation of Israeli Chambers of commerce website. An Israeli source described Shmuel Avivi as "former Israeli military attaché in Switzerland." Mr. Avivi declined to say whether he was currently a serving member of the Israeli defence forces.(509) Mr. Avivi appears to have served as Israel’s military attaché in Denmark and Sweden. The Israeli source stated that "He [Mr. Avivi] operated out of Switzerland with a Swiss business partner whose first name is Henri." Henri goes by the name of Heinrich in Switzerland where he is known as Mr. Heinrich Thomet, associated with at least two companies involved in arms dealing, Brugger & Thomet AG and BT International Ltd. Mr Heinrich Thomet stated that he worked together with Mr. Shmuel Avivi "occasionally" and that his company "are supplying Taos Industries on the US SOCOM(510) business" but that his company was not "actually providing any services for Iraq or Afghanistan, we are mainly working on the US government contract which is a SOCOM transaction." Another company involved in arms transfers to Iraq is a UK-based company called Global Trading Group Ltd. Global have purchased large quantities of small arms and light weapons for Iraq, including an order for 1000 sniper rifles.(511) In documentation supplied to the Ministry of International Economic Relations, Global Trading Group Ltd give as their address premises currently used by a high street store selling hi-fi equipment. This is a different address from the one supplied in their official UK company registration papers. Global Trading Group Ltd is a new company, incorporated on April 5, 2005, the only publicly available document is the appointments report which describes the company as a "private limited company"; no information is supplied under section entitled "Nature of business" and no accounts have been filed to date. According to UK company house data, Global’s business address is a private one, which appears to be the home of one of the directors of the company. One of the directors of Global Trading Group Ltd is listed in the Company house documentation as "Fawzi Francis Toma", who is described as a British citizen born in 1958. Mr Fawzi Toma is known in Iraq as Mr. Fawzi Hariri, a one-time aide to Kurdish faction militia and political leader Massoud Barzani and now a senior figure within Barzani’s political party the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Mr. Hariri liaises with foreign governments on behalf of the KDP and currently serves as chief of staff of the Iraqi foreign ministry, currently headed by Mr. Hoshyar Zebar, also of the KDP.(512) According to Companies’ House documentation, Global Trading Group Ltd’s registered business address is at the home of another company director, Praidon Darmoo, who lobbied the UK government to support the war in Iraq in 2003. A Global Trading director stated that the weapons supplied by Global Trading Group Ltd were on behalf of another company in Jordan who held the contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Defence but that he had seen the end user certificate which he said was issued on behalf of the Iraqi ministry of defence and was sent to Belgrade.(513) Airline companies involved in Serbian arms exports According to aviation sources and Taos Industries, other companies involved in transporting weapons from BiH to Iraq include Kosmas Air based in Serbia, Atlant-Soyuz based in Russia, Reem Air based in Kyrgyzstan and Vega Airlines based in Bulgaria. Kosmas, Reem, and Vega were all named in official reports as flying from Tuzla airbase in December 2004 and in 2005.(514) Aviation sources and Taos Industries state that the majority of the flights from Tuzla to Baghdad were performed by Kosmas Air which has been operating cargo flights, including of weapons, in support of "US nation-building" for Taos from Serbia and Montenegro.(515) ...According to a civil aviation source, Kosmas Air have "mostly Russian technical crew with Yugoslav (sic) escort, most flights are transport of ammunitions (sic) locally made in Serbia into two countries west and east of Iran (obviously with US approval) .. and beyond. Pretty busy, office floors rented from Belgrade museum."(519) <hr></blockquote> Still no mention of any spook involvement or ties. That's odd.

by **greencrow0** » Wed May 10, 2006 2:13 pm

Thanks to RI and all for this. Very interesting read. GC

Secret US arms shipment 'smuggled to terrorists'

Secret US arms shipment 'smuggled to terrorists'

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